An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA 25-280
Filed 15 October 2025
Johnston County, No. 18CVD001233-500
THE ARMSTRONG LAW FIRM, P.A., Plaintiff,
v.
RONNIE CHAPMAN, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from orders entered 18 February 2021 by Judge Addie
Rawls and 28 October 2024 by Judge Jason Coats in Johnston County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 2024.
The Armstrong Law Firm, PA, by L. Lamar Armstrong, III, for plaintiff- appellee.
Ronnie Chapman, pro se, for defendant-appellant.
ARROWOOD, Judge.
Ronnie Chapman (“defendant”) petitions this Court to issue writ of certiorari
to review the trial court’s denials of two sets of motions to recuse and to grant new
trials issued by Judge Addie Rawls on 18 February 2021 and Judge Jason Coats on
28 October 2024. For the following reasons, we deny his petition for writ, lack
jurisdiction to reach the merits of Judge Rawls’ order, and affirm Judge Coats’ orders. THE ARMSTRONG LAW FIRM, P.A. V. CHAPMAN
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
This case arises from a contract dispute between the Armstrong Law Firm,
P.A. (“plaintiff”) and defendant over unpaid legal fees. Following a bench trial in
March 2019 before the Honorable O. Henry Willis in which Chapman appeared pro
se, the district court entered judgments in favor of plaintiff and taxed a portion of
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees against defendant. Defendant did not appeal those
judgments, but on 6 May 2019, he filed a motion for a new trial and amendments to
judgment pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure 52, 59, and 60, followed by a motion
to recuse Judge Willis on 31 May 2019.
On 18 February 2021, the Honorable Addie Rawls entered an order denying
Defendant’s motion for a new trial, finding that he had failed to support his
contentions, while the Motion to Recuse was deemed abandoned. Again, defendant
did not file a notice of appeal from that order within thirty days. Instead, on
3 March 2021, Defendant filed a second set of post-trial motions raising arguments
substantially identical to those rejected by Judge Rawls, and also moved to recuse
Judge Rawls. On 22 March 2021, defendant filed a motion under Rule 62(a) to stay
execution of the judgments against him. However, defendant did not attempt to
schedule any of these motions.
The matter lay dormant until plaintiff revived collection efforts and defendant
received Notice of Right to Have Exemptions Designated on 14 May 2024. On
28 October 2024, the Honorable Jason Coats entered two orders denying defendant’s
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second post-trial motions and denying as moot defendant’s motion to recuse Judge
Rawls. Judge Coats found that defendant failed to timely appeal the judgments, that
the post-trial motions used the same arguments and evidence previously raised, that
Rawls’ order was the law of the case and the product of a sound exercise of discretion
containing final and binding rulings and sufficient findings of fact to support its legal
conclusions, and that defendant failed to meet his burden to show grounds for relief
under Rules 52, 59, or 60.
On 27 November 2024, defendant filed a notice of appeal as to Judge Rawls’
February 2021 Order and the “order or judgment entered by the District Court on
October 28, 2024, with Judge Jason Coats presiding.” Defendant also petitioned for
writ of certiorari seeking review of both Judge Rawls’ 2021 order and Judge Coats’
2024 orders, but the petition was not verified and did not attach the orders for which
review was sought. Plaintiff opposed this petition and moved for sanctions.
II. Discussion
Defendant seeks review of multiple trial court orders entered between 2021
and 2024. We first address defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari and consider the
timeliness of his notice of appeal as to Judge Rawls’ 18 February 2021 Order. We
then consider whether defendant properly invoked this Court’s jurisdiction to review
Judge Coats’ 28 October 2024 orders. Next, finding that this court has jurisdiction to
consider Judge Coats’ orders, we examine the merits. Last, we consider plaintiff’s
motion for sanctions.
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A. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Defendant petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of Judge
Rawls’ 18 February 2021 order and Judge Coats’ 28 October 2024 orders. “A party is
entitled to a writ of certiorari when–and only when–the failure to perfect the appeal
is due to some error or act of the court or its officers, and not to any fault or neglect
of the party or his agent.” In re Snelgrove, 208 N.C. 670 (1935). Certiorari is a
discretionary writ which may “be issued only for good or sufficient cause shown,” and
must “show merit or that [the petitioner] has reasonable grounds for asking that the
case be brought up and reviewed on appeal.” Id. (citation omitted). “[Extraordinary]
circumstances” must justify this writ, generally requiring a showing of “substantial
harm, considerable waste of judicial resources, or ‘wide-reaching issues of justice and
liberty at stake.’ ” Cryan v. Nat’l Council of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns of U.S.,
384 N.C. 569, 572–73 (2023) (citations omitted). Our decisions on these petitions are
“discretionary determinations to be made on a case-by-case basis.” State v. Ricks, 378
N.C. 737, 740 (2021) (cleaned up). “A writ of certiorari is not intended as a substitute
for a notice of appeal because such a practice would render meaningless the rules
governing the time and manner of noticing appeals.” Id. at 741 (cleaned up).
A notice to appeal an order must be filed within thirty days unless otherwise
tolled by a proper post-trial motion. N.C. R. App. P. 3 (c) (1). Failure to give timely
notice of appeal is jurisdictional and an untimely attempt to appeal must be
dismissed. Booth v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 308 N.C. 187, 189 (1983). Defendant did not
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appeal within thirty days of Judge Rawls’ order. Instead, on 3 March 2021, he filed
a second round of motions “as allowed under Rule 52, Rule 59 and Rule 60.”
A proper and timely Rule 52(b) or Rule 59 motion can stop the appeal clock
until the trial court resolves the motion. N.C. R. App. P. 3 (c) (3). However, an
improper Rule 52(b) or Rule 59 motion does not toll the deadline. Reints v. WB
Towing Inc. 289 N.C. App. 653, 657 (2023); see also Davis v. Rizzo, 261 N.C. App. 9,
15 (2018). Rule 52(b) and Rule 59 motions are timely if filed within 10 days of the
entry of judgment. N.C. R. Civ. P. 52 (b); N.C. R. Civ. P. 59 (c). Therefore, if defendant
sought to file a motion under Rule 52 and 59 after Judge Rawls’ order, his deadline
was 1 March 2021. N.C. R. Civ. P. 6(a). Accordingly, the round of motions filed
3 March 2021 was untimely and did not toll the appeal deadline.
Moreover, a Rule 52(b) motion is intended to request amended or additional
findings to a judgment issued following a bench trial to ensure that an appellate court
has a “correct understanding of the factual issues determined by the trial court.”
Parrish v. Cole, 38 N.C. App. 691, 694 (1978). Its purpose does not encompass re-
litigating old matters or presenting arguments and evidence that were or could have
been raised earlier. See generally 19 N.C. Index 4th Judgments § 53 (2025)
(discussing the misuse of rules permitting a court to alter or amend a judgment).
Likewise, this Court has long held that Rule 59 also cannot be used as a means to
rehash matters already argued. Smith v. Johnson, 125 N.C. App. 603, 606 (1997).
Judge Willis issued judgments in April 2019 and defendant did not appeal.
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Judge Rawls’ order contained the final and binding rulings on defendant’s motions
for relief under Rules 52 and 59. Defendant admits that the March 2021 motions
raised the same arguments, based upon the same evidence, previously raised both at
trial and supporting the motions Judge Rawls considered, “to have them reviewed by
an unbiased trier of fact.” Neither Rule 52(b) nor Rule 59 contemplates this purpose;
indeed, a motion for a new trial is no substitute for appeal. Musick v. Musick, 203
N.C. App. 368, 371 (2010). Furthermore, neither Rule provides for motions seeking
relief from orders; they provide an avenue for relief only from judgments. N.C. R. Civ.
P. 52; N.C. R. Civ. P. 59.
Accordingly, the motions were untimely, improper, and ineffective to toll the
deadline to appeal Judge Rawls’ order. The notice of appeal filed 27 November 2024,
is over three years late as to that order, and the delay is attributable solely to
defendant’s failure to comply with the “time and manner” of our procedural rules.
Ricks, 378 N.C. at 741. He identifies no external circumstance, mistake of the trial
court, or other factors outside his control preventing him from properly preserving
appellate review. Thus, no extraordinary circumstances merit certiorari review of
the order, and we deny the petition.
B. Appeal from Judge Coats’ 28 October 2024 Orders
Defendant timely seeks review of “the order or judgment entered by the
District Court on October 28, 2024, with Judge Jason Coats presiding.” On that date,
Judge Coats entered two separate orders: the denial of defendant’s second motion for
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a new trial and the denial of defendant’s motion to recuse Judge Rawls.
As a general rule, this Court may exercise jurisdiction only over the rulings
specifically designated in the notice of appeal as the ones the appellant appeals.
Ochsner v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 268 N.C. App. 391, 399 (2019). Ambiguity or failure
to specify the order deprives this Court of jurisdiction. Fairfield Harbour Prop.
Owners Ass’n v. Midsouth Golf, LLC, 215 N.C. App. 66, 70 (2011). However, our
Courts construe Rule 3 liberally to excuse defects in a notice of appeal where the
“intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be fairly inferred . . . and the appellee
is not misled.” Smith v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 269, 274 (1979). The
“fairly inferred” doctrine ensures that Rule 3(d) violations result in dismissal only
where the appellee is prejudiced by the appellant’s mistake. Phelps Staffing, LLC v.
S.C. Phelps, Inc., 217 N.C. App. 403, 410 (2011).
Here, although the notice of appeal did not expressly distinguish between the
orders, one can easily and fairly infer the scope of defendant’s appeal from the record.
The order denying defendant’s motion to recuse as moot was conclusory and collateral
to the motion for a new trial and issued simultaneously after a hearing on both
motions. Defendant’s brief argues at length as to both orders, and plaintiff’s brief
considers both orders on their merits. Furthermore, plaintiff makes no claim that it
was prejudiced or misled by any ambiguity as to the scope of this dispute. Because
both plaintiff and this Court fairly infer that this appeal encompasses both orders,
we have jurisdiction to consider them on the merits.
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C. Denial of Defendant’s Post-Trial Motions
Defendant appeals from Judge Coats’ order denying his 3 March 2021 Motion
for New Trial and Amendment of Judgments. We review a trial court’s ruling on a
motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard and reverse only upon a
showing that its actions were “manifestly unsupported by reason.” Davis v. Davis
360 N.C. 518, 523 (2006). Accordingly, appellate courts will afford due deference and
reluctance to disturb these rulings unless the record clearly demonstrates a “manifest
abuse of discretion.” Worthington v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 482 (1982).
Judge Coats found that Judge Rawls’ order contained the “final, binding
rulings” on his requests pursuant to Rules 52, 59, and 60, and constituted the “final,
binding law” of the case. Defendant did not timely appeal Judge Rawls’ order, and
an un-appealed order becomes “the law of the case, and other district judges [are]
without authority to enter orders to the contrary.” Johnson v. Johnson, 7 N.C. App.
310, 313 (1970). The trial court may disturb the prior order of another trial court
judge only where the original order was interlocutory, discretionary, and where there
has been a substantial change in circumstances in the interim. First Fin. Ins. Co. v.
Commercial Coverage, 154 N.C. App. 504, 507 (2002). Also, the party seeking
modification must show that intervening new facts have “changed the legal
foundation for the prior order.” Dublin v. UCR, Inc., 115 N.C. App. 209, 220 (1994).
Because the post-trial motions requested the same relief, upon the same grounds and
evidence, as defendant requested in his prior motions, Judge Coats determined they
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were an “impermissible collateral attack” on Judge Rawls’ final order. This finding
was legally sound, supported by the record, and sufficient to deny the motions.
Judge Coats went further, however, concluding that even if relief were
available in this case, defendant failed to demonstrate any grounds under Rules 52,
59, or 60. Defendant would have been required to demonstrate either: (1) that the
judgments set forth insufficient findings of fact to support their legal conclusions,
pursuant to rule 52; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgments’
findings, pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7); (3) that there were errors of law at trial or in the
judgments, pursuant to Rule 50(a)(8); or (4) that newly discovered evidence exists
that could not have been discovered by due diligence in time to move for a new trial,
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2).
First, Judge Coats reasonably approved Judge Rawls’ determination that the
judgments’ factual findings sufficiently supported their legal conclusion that
defendant breached the contract and owes the outstanding amount, plus interest and
attorney’s fees. Judge Coats listed the evidence from the record supporting Judge
Rawls’ conclusion, including the signed agreement and emails showing services
rendered, itemized invoices, and defendant’s refusal to pay and repeated failure to
provide any legally recognized justification. Defendant offered no argument
permitting him to disturb that conclusion. Thus, Judge Coats did not abuse his
discretion by determining that Judge Rawls saw sufficient evidence to support both
the judgments’ findings and legal conclusions.
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Second, Judge Coats found no error of law at trial or in the judgments.
Defendant’s arguments on this issue arise from the initial signed and fully integrated
contract. The trial court determined that the contract term “from time to time” was
ambiguous. However, it resolved the ambiguity in favor of plaintiff, because
defendant’s interpretation—that plaintiff was required to invoice him more
frequently and therefore excused him of his payment obligations—was not
reasonable. Judge Willis found “that the failure to invoice more often does not mean
the services are not appropriate or that Chapman is excused from paying for them.”
Defendant has since argued in repeated motions, and again on appeal, that
resolution of a contract ambiguity poses a question of law and, in reliance upon
Electrical South, Inc. v. Lewis, that the trial court was required to construe the
ambiguous term against its draftsman. See Electrical South, Inc. v. Lewis, 96 N.C.
App. 160, 167 (1989). Not so. It is a question of fact. Crider v. Jones Island Club,
Inc., 147 N.C. App. 262, 266–67 (2001). Furthermore, defendant’s reading of
Electrical South is contrary to our case law; in fact, the court would have erred had
it adopted defendant’s construction, because it would have imposed upon plaintiff
liability not bargained for and not found in the terms of the contract. DeRossett v.
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 206 N.C. App. 647, 653 (2010). Electrical South does
not oblige the court to ignore the only reasonable interpretation before it and instead
enforce defendant’s unreasonable and unlawful construction. Accordingly, Judge
Rawls found no merit in defendant’s argument that the trial court’s conclusions were
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unsupported by law. Judge Coats reasonably agreed that the issue was properly
resolved and correctly observed that defendant had waived any affirmative defense
“that Plaintiff materially breached the Parties’ agreement.” Furthermore, defendant
obtained no transcript to show he objected to legal error at trial, as Rule 59(a)(8)
requires. N.C. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(8). For the above reasons, Judge Coats exercised sound
discretion supported by reason on this question.
Lastly, in the 21 October 2024 hearing, defendant claimed he had “new
evidence” proving that plaintiff violated the North Carolina Rules of Professional
Conduct requiring attorneys to conduct monthly and quarterly reconciliations. Judge
Coats found that the proposed evidence had been admitted in the original trial, failed
to prove the allegation, and was “another impermissible attempt to make the same
arguments, based upon the same evidence.” Judge Coats reasonably determined that
defendant had not carried his burden to show changed circumstances due to new
evidence, and he committed no manifest error.
In sum, Judge Coats concluded that “Judge Rawls’ Order is in all respects
proper and the product of a sound exercise of [her] discretion” and that Defendant
“failed to meet his burden to show grounds for relief” under Rules 52, 59, or 60. Our
review of the record confirms that Judge Coats came to the correct and properly
reasoned conclusion. Defendant merely recycled litigated issues, offered “new”
evidence already admitted at trial, and failed to identify any legal error or evidentiary
insufficiency. We find no manifest abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of the post-
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trial motions. Accordingly, we affirm Judge Coats’ order.
D. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Recuse
Defendant also appeals from Judge Coats’ order denying his 3 March 2021
motion to recuse Judge Rawls. The denial of a motion for recusal is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Roper v. Thomas, 60 N.C. App. 64, 76 (1982). “A recusal motion
is a pretrial motion. It does not go to the merits of the pleadings.” Lowder v. All Star
Mills, Inc., 60 N.C. App. 699, 704 (1983). Parties must move to recuse at the earliest
moment after acquiring knowledge of facts necessitating recusal. State v. Pakulski,
106 N.C. App. 444, 450 (1992). A party cannot “choose to wait and seek a trial judge’s
recusal until after the trial judge rules unfavorably.” Id. A question is moot where
its resolution would have no practical effect on the present controversy. Emerson v.
Cape Fear Country Club, Inc., 259 N.C. App. 755, 764 (2018).
Here, defendant sought to disqualify Judge Rawls from a final and binding
order. Defendant was obligated to do so before her role in the controversy came to its
conclusion. Otherwise, the Court is merely determining “abstract propositions of
law.” In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147 (1978). Furthermore, Judge Coats judicially
noticed Judge Rawls’ retirement from the bench. Considering the tardiness of
defendant’s motion, Judge Coats properly determined that the question was moot and
denied the motion. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.
E. Motion for Sanctions
Plaintiff moved for sanctions, arguing that defendant’s appeal was frivolous.
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Sanctions may be warranted if an appeal is not well grounded in fact, not warranted
by existing law, taken for an improper purpose, or filed in violation of appellate rules.
N.C. R. App. P. 34(a). We recognize that defendant’s notice of appeal was sufficient
to invoke our jurisdiction of Judge Coats’ orders, and that defendant is a pro se
litigant, which may explain his pursuit of issues already foreclosed. Given the pro se
nature of plaintiff’s appeal, in our discretion we deny the motion for sanctions.
Nevertheless, we strongly advise defendant to respect the final, settled, and binding
nature of the lower court’s judgments and orders and to comply with the lawfully
entered judgment as further dilatory tactics will clearly be sanctionable.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders.
AFFIRMED.
Judges STROUD and STADING concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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