The Armstrong Law Firm, P.A. v. Chapman

Opinions

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA 25-280

Filed 15 October 2025

Johnston County, No. 18CVD001233-500

THE ARMSTRONG LAW FIRM, P.A., Plaintiff,

v.

RONNIE CHAPMAN, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from orders entered 18 February 2021 by Judge Addie

Rawls and 28 October 2024 by Judge Jason Coats in Johnston County District Court.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 2024.

The Armstrong Law Firm, PA, by L. Lamar Armstrong, III, for plaintiffappellee .

Ronnie Chapman, pro se, for defendant-appellant.

ARROWOOD, Judge.

Ronnie Chapman (“defendant”) petitions this Court to issue writ of certiorari

to review the trial court’s denials of two sets of motions to recuse and to grant new

trials issued by Judge Addie Rawls on 18 February 2021 and Judge Jason Coats on

28 October 2024. For the following reasons, we deny his petition for writ, lack

jurisdiction to reach the merits of Judge Rawls’ order, and affirm Judge Coats’ orders.

Opinion of the Court

I. Background

This case arises from a contract dispute between the Armstrong Law Firm,

P.A. (“plaintiff”) and defendant over unpaid legal fees. Following a bench trial in

March 2019 before the Honorable O. Henry Willis in which Chapman appeared pro

se, the district court entered judgments in favor of plaintiff and taxed a portion of

plaintiff’s attorney’s fees against defendant. Defendant did not appeal those

judgments, but on 6 May 2019, he filed a motion for a new trial and amendments to

judgment pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure 52, 59, and 60, followed by a motion

to recuse Judge Willis on 31 May 2019.

On 18 February 2021, the Honorable Addie Rawls entered an order denying

Defendant’s motion for a new trial, finding that he had failed to support his

contentions, while the Motion to Recuse was deemed abandoned. Again, defendant

did not file a notice of appeal from that order within thirty days. Instead, on

3 March 2021, Defendant filed a second set of post-trial motions raising arguments

substantially identical to those rejected by Judge Rawls, and also moved to recuse

Judge Rawls. On 22 March 2021, defendant filed a motion under Rule 62(a) to stay

execution of the judgments against him. However, defendant did not attempt to

schedule any of these motions.

The matter lay dormant until plaintiff revived collection efforts and defendant

received Notice of Right to Have Exemptions Designated on 14 May 2024. On

28 October 2024, the Honorable Jason Coats entered two orders denying defendant’s

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second post-trial motions and denying as moot defendant’s motion to recuse Judge

Rawls. Judge Coats found that defendant failed to timely appeal the judgments, that

the post-trial motions used the same arguments and evidence previously raised, that

Rawls’ order was the law of the case and the product of a sound exercise of discretion

containing final and binding rulings and sufficient findings of fact to support its legal

conclusions, and that defendant failed to meet his burden to show grounds for relief

under Rules 52, 59, or 60.

On 27 November 2024, defendant filed a notice of appeal as to Judge Rawls’

February 2021 Order and the “order or judgment entered by the District Court on

October 28, 2024, with Judge Jason Coats presiding.” Defendant also petitioned for

writ of certiorari seeking review of both Judge Rawls’ 2021 order and Judge Coats’

2024 orders, but the petition was not verified and did not attach the orders for which

review was sought. Plaintiff opposed this petition and moved for sanctions.

II. Discussion

Defendant seeks review of multiple trial court orders entered between 2021

and 2024. We first address defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari and consider the

timeliness of his notice of appeal as to Judge Rawls’ 18 February 2021 Order. We

then consider whether defendant properly invoked this Court’s jurisdiction to review

Judge Coats’ 28 October 2024 orders. Next, finding that this court has jurisdiction to

consider Judge Coats’ orders, we examine the merits. Last, we consider plaintiff’s

motion for sanctions.

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A. Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Defendant petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari seeking review of Judge

Rawls’ 18 February 2021 order and Judge Coats’ 28 October 2024 orders. “A party is

entitled to a writ of certiorari when–and only when–the failure to perfect the appeal

is due to some error or act of the court or its officers, and not to any fault or neglect

of the party or his agent.” In re Snelgrove, 208 N.C. 670 (1935). Certiorari is a

discretionary writ which may “be issued only for good or sufficient cause shown,” and

must “show merit or that [the petitioner] has reasonable grounds for asking that the

case be brought up and reviewed on appeal.” Id. (citation omitted). “[Extraordinary]

circumstances” must justify this writ, generally requiring a showing of “substantial

harm, considerable waste of judicial resources, or ‘wide-reaching issues of justice and

liberty at stake.’ ” Cryan v. Nat’l Council of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns of U.S.,

384 N.C. 569, 572–73 (2023) (citations omitted). Our decisions on these petitions are

“discretionary determinations to be made on a case-by-case basis.” State v. Ricks, 378

N.C. 737, 740 (2021) (cleaned up). “A writ of certiorari is not intended as a substitute

for a notice of appeal because such a practice would render meaningless the rules

governing the time and manner of noticing appeals.” Id. at 741 (cleaned up).

A notice to appeal an order must be filed within thirty days unless otherwise

tolled by a proper post-trial motion. N.C. R. App. P. 3 (c) (1). Failure to give timely

notice of appeal is jurisdictional and an untimely attempt to appeal must be

dismissed. Booth v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 308 N.C. 187, 189 (1983). Defendant did not

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appeal within thirty days of Judge Rawls’ order. Instead, on 3 March 2021, he filed

a second round of motions “as allowed under Rule 52, Rule 59 and Rule 60.”

A proper and timely Rule 52(b) or Rule 59 motion can stop the appeal clock

until the trial court resolves the motion. N.C. R. App. P. 3 (c) (3). However, an

improper Rule 52(b) or Rule 59 motion does not toll the deadline. Reints v. WB

Towing Inc. 289 N.C. App. 653, 657 (2023); see also Davis v. Rizzo, 261 N.C. App. 9,

15 (2018). Rule 52(b) and Rule 59 motions are timely if filed within 10 days of the

entry of judgment. N.C. R. Civ. P. 52 (b); N.C. R. Civ. P. 59 (c). Therefore, if defendant

sought to file a motion under Rule 52 and 59 after Judge Rawls’ order, his deadline

was 1 March 2021. N.C. R. Civ. P. 6(a). Accordingly, the round of motions filed

3 March 2021 was untimely and did not toll the appeal deadline.

Moreover, a Rule 52(b) motion is intended to request amended or additional

findings to a judgment issued following a bench trial to ensure that an appellate court

has a “correct understanding of the factual issues determined by the trial court.”

Parrish v. Cole, 38 N.C. App. 691, 694 (1978). Its purpose does not encompass re-

litigating old matters or presenting arguments and evidence that were or could have

been raised earlier. See generally 19 N.C. Index 4th Judgments § 53 (2025)

(discussing the misuse of rules permitting a court to alter or amend a judgment).

Likewise, this Court has long held that Rule 59 also cannot be used as a means to

rehash matters already argued. Smith v. Johnson, 125 N.C. App. 603, 606 (1997).

Judge Willis issued judgments in April 2019 and defendant did not appeal.

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Judge Rawls’ order contained the final and binding rulings on defendant’s motions

for relief under Rules 52 and 59. Defendant admits that the March 2021 motions

raised the same arguments, based upon the same evidence, previously raised both at

trial and supporting the motions Judge Rawls considered, “to have them reviewed by

an unbiased trier of fact.” Neither Rule 52(b) nor Rule 59 contemplates this purpose;

indeed, a motion for a new trial is no substitute for appeal. Musick v. Musick, 203

N.C. App. 368, 371 (2010). Furthermore, neither Rule provides for motions seeking

relief from orders; they provide an avenue for relief only from judgments. N.C. R. Civ.

P. 52; N.C. R. Civ. P. 59.

Accordingly, the motions were untimely, improper, and ineffective to toll the

deadline to appeal Judge Rawls’ order. The notice of appeal filed 27 November 2024,

is over three years late as to that order, and the delay is attributable solely to

defendant’s failure to comply with the “time and manner” of our procedural rules.

Ricks, 378 N.C. at 741. He identifies no external circumstance, mistake of the trial

court, or other factors outside his control preventing him from properly preserving

appellate review. Thus, no extraordinary circumstances merit certiorari review of

the order, and we deny the petition.

B. Appeal from Judge Coats’ 28 October 2024 Orders

Defendant timely seeks review of “the order or judgment entered by the

District Court on October 28, 2024, with Judge Jason Coats presiding.” On that date,

Judge Coats entered two separate orders: the denial of defendant’s second motion for

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a new trial and the denial of defendant’s motion to recuse Judge Rawls.

As a general rule, this Court may exercise jurisdiction only over the rulings

specifically designated in the notice of appeal as the ones the appellant appeals.

Ochsner v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 268 N.C. App. 391, 399 (2019). Ambiguity or failure

to specify the order deprives this Court of jurisdiction. Fairfield Harbour Prop.

Owners Ass’n v. Midsouth Golf, LLC, 215 N.C. App. 66, 70 (2011). However, our

Courts construe Rule 3 liberally to excuse defects in a notice of appeal where the

“intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be fairly inferred . . . and the appellee

is not misled.” Smith v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 269, 274 (1979). The

“fairly inferred” doctrine ensures that Rule 3(d) violations result in dismissal only

where the appellee is prejudiced by the appellant’s mistake. Phelps Staffing, LLC v.

S.C. Phelps, Inc., 217 N.C. App. 403, 410 (2011).

Here, although the notice of appeal did not expressly distinguish between the

orders, one can easily and fairly infer the scope of defendant’s appeal from the record.

The order denying defendant’s motion to recuse as moot was conclusory and collateral

to the motion for a new trial and issued simultaneously after a hearing on both

motions. Defendant’s brief argues at length as to both orders, and plaintiff’s brief

considers both orders on their merits. Furthermore, plaintiff makes no claim that it

was prejudiced or misled by any ambiguity as to the scope of this dispute. Because

both plaintiff and this Court fairly infer that this appeal encompasses both orders,

we have jurisdiction to consider them on the merits.

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C. Denial of Defendant’s Post-Trial Motions

Defendant appeals from Judge Coats’ order denying his 3 March 2021 Motion

for New Trial and Amendment of Judgments. We review a trial court’s ruling on a

motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard and reverse only upon a

showing that its actions were “manifestly unsupported by reason.” Davis v. Davis

360 N.C. 518, 523 (2006). Accordingly, appellate courts will afford due deference and

reluctance to disturb these rulings unless the record clearly demonstrates a “manifest

abuse of discretion.” Worthington v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 482 (1982).

Judge Coats found that Judge Rawls’ order contained the “final, binding

rulings” on his requests pursuant to Rules 52, 59, and 60, and constituted the “final,

binding law” of the case. Defendant did not timely appeal Judge Rawls’ order, and

an un-appealed order becomes “the law of the case, and other district judges [are]

without authority to enter orders to the contrary.” Johnson v. Johnson, 7 N.C. App.

310, 313 (1970). The trial court may disturb the prior order of another trial court

judge only where the original order was interlocutory, discretionary, and where there

has been a substantial change in circumstances in the interim. First Fin. Ins. Co. v.

Commercial Coverage, 154 N.C. App. 504, 507 (2002). Also, the party seeking

modification must show that intervening new facts have “changed the legal

foundation for the prior order.” Dublin v. UCR, Inc., 115 N.C. App. 209, 220 (1994).

Because the post-trial motions requested the same relief, upon the same grounds and

evidence, as defendant requested in his prior motions, Judge Coats determined they

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were an “impermissible collateral attack” on Judge Rawls’ final order. This finding

was legally sound, supported by the record, and sufficient to deny the motions.

Judge Coats went further, however, concluding that even if relief were

available in this case, defendant failed to demonstrate any grounds under Rules 52,

59, or 60. Defendant would have been required to demonstrate either: (1) that the

judgments set forth insufficient findings of fact to support their legal conclusions,

pursuant to rule 52; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgments’

findings, pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7); (3) that there were errors of law at trial or in the

judgments, pursuant to Rule 50(a)(8); or (4) that newly discovered evidence exists

that could not have been discovered by due diligence in time to move for a new trial,

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2).

First, Judge Coats reasonably approved Judge Rawls’ determination that the

judgments’ factual findings sufficiently supported their legal conclusion that

defendant breached the contract and owes the outstanding amount, plus interest and

attorney’s fees. Judge Coats listed the evidence from the record supporting Judge

Rawls’ conclusion, including the signed agreement and emails showing services

rendered, itemized invoices, and defendant’s refusal to pay and repeated failure to

provide any legally recognized justification. Defendant offered no argument

permitting him to disturb that conclusion. Thus, Judge Coats did not abuse his

discretion by determining that Judge Rawls saw sufficient evidence to support both

the judgments’ findings and legal conclusions.

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Second, Judge Coats found no error of law at trial or in the judgments.

Defendant’s arguments on this issue arise from the initial signed and fully integrated

contract. The trial court determined that the contract term “from time to time” was

ambiguous. However, it resolved the ambiguity in favor of plaintiff, because

defendant’s interpretation—that plaintiff was required to invoice him more

frequently and therefore excused him of his payment obligations—was not

reasonable. Judge Willis found “that the failure to invoice more often does not mean

the services are not appropriate or that Chapman is excused from paying for them.”

Defendant has since argued in repeated motions, and again on appeal, that

resolution of a contract ambiguity poses a question of law and, in reliance upon

Electrical South, Inc. v. Lewis, that the trial court was required to construe the

ambiguous term against its draftsman. See Electrical South, Inc. v. Lewis, 96 N.C.

App. 160, 167 (1989). Not so. It is a question of fact. Crider v. Jones Island Club,

Inc., 147 N.C. App. 262, 266–67 (2001). Furthermore, defendant’s reading of

Electrical South is contrary to our case law; in fact, the court would have erred had

it adopted defendant’s construction, because it would have imposed upon plaintiff

liability not bargained for and not found in the terms of the contract. DeRossett v.

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 206 N.C. App. 647, 653 (2010). Electrical South does

not oblige the court to ignore the only reasonable interpretation before it and instead

enforce defendant’s unreasonable and unlawful construction. Accordingly, Judge

Rawls found no merit in defendant’s argument that the trial court’s conclusions were

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unsupported by law. Judge Coats reasonably agreed that the issue was properly

resolved and correctly observed that defendant had waived any affirmative defense

“that Plaintiff materially breached the Parties’ agreement.” Furthermore, defendant

obtained no transcript to show he objected to legal error at trial, as Rule 59(a)(8)

requires. N.C. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(8). For the above reasons, Judge Coats exercised sound

discretion supported by reason on this question.

Lastly, in the 21 October 2024 hearing, defendant claimed he had “new

evidence” proving that plaintiff violated the North Carolina Rules of Professional

Conduct requiring attorneys to conduct monthly and quarterly reconciliations. Judge

Coats found that the proposed evidence had been admitted in the original trial, failed

to prove the allegation, and was “another impermissible attempt to make the same

arguments, based upon the same evidence.” Judge Coats reasonably determined that

defendant had not carried his burden to show changed circumstances due to new

evidence, and he committed no manifest error.

In sum, Judge Coats concluded that “Judge Rawls’ Order is in all respects

proper and the product of a sound exercise of [her] discretion” and that Defendant

“failed to meet his burden to show grounds for relief” under Rules 52, 59, or 60. Our

review of the record confirms that Judge Coats came to the correct and properly

reasoned conclusion. Defendant merely recycled litigated issues, offered “new”

evidence already admitted at trial, and failed to identify any legal error or evidentiary

insufficiency. We find no manifest abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of the post-

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trial motions. Accordingly, we affirm Judge Coats’ order.

D. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Recuse

Defendant also appeals from Judge Coats’ order denying his 3 March 2021

motion to recuse Judge Rawls. The denial of a motion for recusal is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. Roper v. Thomas, 60 N.C. App. 64, 76 (1982). “A recusal motion

is a pretrial motion. It does not go to the merits of the pleadings.” Lowder v. All Star

Mills, Inc., 60 N.C. App. 699, 704 (1983). Parties must move to recuse at the earliest

moment after acquiring knowledge of facts necessitating recusal. State v. Pakulski,

106 N.C. App. 444, 450 (1992). A party cannot “choose to wait and seek a trial judge’s

recusal until after the trial judge rules unfavorably.” Id. A question is moot where

its resolution would have no practical effect on the present controversy. Emerson v.

Cape Fear Country Club, Inc., 259 N.C. App. 755, 764 (2018).

Here, defendant sought to disqualify Judge Rawls from a final and binding

order. Defendant was obligated to do so before her role in the controversy came to its

conclusion. Otherwise, the Court is merely determining “abstract propositions of

law.” In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147 (1978). Furthermore, Judge Coats judicially

noticed Judge Rawls’ retirement from the bench. Considering the tardiness of

defendant’s motion, Judge Coats properly determined that the question was moot and

denied the motion. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.

E. Motion for Sanctions

Plaintiff moved for sanctions, arguing that defendant’s appeal was frivolous.

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Sanctions may be warranted if an appeal is not well grounded in fact, not warranted

by existing law, taken for an improper purpose, or filed in violation of appellate rules.

N.C. R. App. P. 34(a). We recognize that defendant’s notice of appeal was sufficient

to invoke our jurisdiction of Judge Coats’ orders, and that defendant is a pro se

litigant, which may explain his pursuit of issues already foreclosed. Given the pro se

nature of plaintiff’s appeal, in our discretion we deny the motion for sanctions.

Nevertheless, we strongly advise defendant to respect the final, settled, and binding

nature of the lower court’s judgments and orders and to comply with the lawfully

entered judgment as further dilatory tactics will clearly be sanctionable.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders.

AFFIRMED.

Judges STROUD and STADING concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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