Thanh Dat Le v. Christopher J. Larose, Warden of the Otay Mesa ICE Detention Center; Gregory J. Archabeault, Director of the San Diego Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in their official capacities

S.D. California

Thanh Dat Le v. Christopher J. Larose, Warden of the Otay Mesa ICE Detention Center; Gregory J. Archabeault, Director of the San Diego Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in their official capacities

DecidedMarch 30, 2026

Docket3:26-cv-01798

StatusUnknown

This text of Thanh Dat Le v. Christopher J. Larose, Warden of the Otay Mesa ICE Detention Center; Gregory J. Archabeault, Director of the San Diego Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in their official capacities (Thanh Dat Le v. Christopher J. Larose, Warden of the Otay Mesa ICE Detention Center; Gregory J. Archabeault, Director of the San Diego Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in their official capacities) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Thanh Dat Le v. Christopher J. Larose, Warden of the Otay Mesa ICE Detention Center; Gregory J. Archabeault, Director of the San Diego Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in their official capacities, (S.D. Cal. 2026).

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THANH DAT LE, Case No.: 3:26-cv-1798-JES-VET

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden of

the Otay Mesa ICE Detention Center; 15 GREGORY J. ARCHABEAULT, Director [ECF No. 1] 16 of the San Diego Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 17 and U.S. Department of Homeland 18 Security, in their official capacities, 19 Respondents. 20 21 Before the Court is Petitioner Thanh Dat Le’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of 22 Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). ECF No. 1, (“Pet.”). Pursuant 23 to the Court’s Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 3.), Respondents (the “Government”) filed 24 the Response. ECF No. 4, (“Res.”). Upon the Government’s filing of the Response, the 25 Court considered the matter fully briefed and took it under submission. For the reasons set 26 forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 27 // 28 // 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Vietnam, fled persecution after experiencing 3 torture and abuse at the hands of the Vietnamese government for participating in a protest. 4 Pet. at 4. On October 14, 2024, Petitioner entered the United States through the U.S.- 5 Mexico border to seek asylum. Id. At some point thereafter, Petitioner turned himself into 6 Respondents, who initiated removal proceedings against him. Pet. ¶ 3. Then on January 31, 7 2025, Petitioner applied for asylum, for which the proceedings are still ongoing. Id. 8 After surrendering to Respondents, Petitioner and his wife were released and given 9 a Notice to Appear. Id. ¶ 4. On August 6, 2025, Petitioner and his wife appeared at the 10 Master Calendar Hearing, where they were re-detained by Immigration and Customs 11 Enforcement officers, as they left the courtroom. Petitioner was then mandatorily detained 12 and placed in the Otay Mesa detention center, where he has remained since. Id. at 4, ¶ 13. 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 15 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 16 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 17 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 18 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 19 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 20 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 21 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 22 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 23 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 24 of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 25 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Petitioner argues that his continued detention violates his due process rights and 3 requests that the Court order his immediate release. Pet. at 10. In its Response, the 4 Government asserts that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 5 § 1225(b)(2) but acknowledges that Courts in this district have consistently reached the 6 opposite conclusion. Res. at 1. 7 The Court disagrees with the Government’s assessment that Petitioner is subject to 8 mandatory detention. Petitioner unambiguously alleges that, prior to being re-detained on 9 August 6, 2025, he was released from immigration custody. Pet. ¶ 4. Generally, 10 Respondents may release a noncitizen from custody, for the pendency of their removal 11 proceedings, by granting them parole, bond, or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5); 12 Id. §§ 1226(a)(2)(A)-(B). When Respondents undertake such action, they cannot revoke a 13 noncitizen’s granted status without adhering to the procedural safeguards imposed by the 14 Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (proscribing the revocation of parole 15 unless a government official gives notice and makes certain findings); 8 C.F.R. § 16 212.5(e)(2)(i) (proscribing same); Panosyan v. Mayorkas, 854 F. App'x 787, 788 (9th Cir. 17 2021) (finding that a showing of change circumstance is needed to re-arrest noncitizen 18 ordered released by an immigration judge (“IJ”) on bond); Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 19 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (finding 20 that Government's practice is to require a showing of changed circumstances prior to re- 21 arrest of noncitizen that was ordered released by a DHS officer); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. 22 Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal 2025) (finding that conditional parole may only be revoked 23 after first providing noncitizen with notice and an opportunity to be heard). 24 The Court finds that this issue has been addressed by the undersigned in a recent 25 decision, Gergawi v. Larose. No. 3:25-CV-3352-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 3719321, at *2-4 26 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025). Therefore, the Court elects to follow the reasoning stated in 27 Gergawi and incorporates it by reference. Id. 28 // 1 As a threshold matter, the Court thinks it unlikely that Petitioner was granted bond 2 when he was released by Respondents. This is because, according to his own allegations, 3 he entered the United States unlawfully and soon after, surrendered to Respondents. Pet. ¶ 4 3. It is reasonable to assume that he would turn himself in where Respondents’ agents are 5 located, on or near the border. The Court, therefore, finds that Petitioner’s initial detention 6 was governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which bars the possibility of bond for a noncitizen, 7 especially at the outset of their detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Thus, the Court finds 8 that Petitioner was likely granted either parole or conditional parole prior to being re- 9 detained on August 6, 2025. 10 The Court finds that the Government’s conduct—here, granting Petitioner parole— 11 resulted in Petitioner’s acquisition of a liberty interest in remaining out of immigration 12 custody. See Gergawi, 2025 WL 3719321, at *3-4; see also Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 13 3d at 1032. 14 Petitioner claims that he has been detained since August 6, 2025, and has yet to 15 receive notice of the basis for which his parole was revoked or an opportunity to be heard 16 before an IJ. Pet. ¶¶ 23, 24, 27. The Government’s Response does not contest these 17 assertions.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THANH DAT LE, Case No.: 3:26-cv-1798-JES-VET

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden of

the Otay Mesa ICE Detention Center; 15 GREGORY J. ARCHABEAULT, Director [ECF No. 1] 16 of the San Diego Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 17 and U.S. Department of Homeland 18 Security, in their official capacities, 19 Respondents. 20 21 Before the Court is Petitioner Thanh Dat Le’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of 22 Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). ECF No. 1, (“Pet.”). Pursuant 23 to the Court’s Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 3.), Respondents (the “Government”) filed 24 the Response. ECF No. 4, (“Res.”). Upon the Government’s filing of the Response, the 25 Court considered the matter fully briefed and took it under submission. For the reasons set 26 forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 27 // 28 // 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Vietnam, fled persecution after experiencing 3 torture and abuse at the hands of the Vietnamese government for participating in a protest. 4 Pet. at 4. On October 14, 2024, Petitioner entered the United States through the U.S.- 5 Mexico border to seek asylum. Id. At some point thereafter, Petitioner turned himself into 6 Respondents, who initiated removal proceedings against him. Pet. ¶ 3. Then on January 31, 7 2025, Petitioner applied for asylum, for which the proceedings are still ongoing. Id. 8 After surrendering to Respondents, Petitioner and his wife were released and given 9 a Notice to Appear. Id. ¶ 4. On August 6, 2025, Petitioner and his wife appeared at the 10 Master Calendar Hearing, where they were re-detained by Immigration and Customs 11 Enforcement officers, as they left the courtroom. Petitioner was then mandatorily detained 12 and placed in the Otay Mesa detention center, where he has remained since. Id. at 4, ¶ 13. 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 15 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 16 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 17 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 18 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 19 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 20 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 21 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 22 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 23 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 24 of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 25 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Petitioner argues that his continued detention violates his due process rights and 3 requests that the Court order his immediate release. Pet. at 10. In its Response, the 4 Government asserts that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 5 § 1225(b)(2) but acknowledges that Courts in this district have consistently reached the 6 opposite conclusion. Res. at 1. 7 The Court disagrees with the Government’s assessment that Petitioner is subject to 8 mandatory detention. Petitioner unambiguously alleges that, prior to being re-detained on 9 August 6, 2025, he was released from immigration custody. Pet. ¶ 4. Generally, 10 Respondents may release a noncitizen from custody, for the pendency of their removal 11 proceedings, by granting them parole, bond, or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5); 12 Id. §§ 1226(a)(2)(A)-(B). When Respondents undertake such action, they cannot revoke a 13 noncitizen’s granted status without adhering to the procedural safeguards imposed by the 14 Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (proscribing the revocation of parole 15 unless a government official gives notice and makes certain findings); 8 C.F.R. § 16 212.5(e)(2)(i) (proscribing same); Panosyan v. Mayorkas, 854 F. App'x 787, 788 (9th Cir. 17 2021) (finding that a showing of change circumstance is needed to re-arrest noncitizen 18 ordered released by an immigration judge (“IJ”) on bond); Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 19 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (finding 20 that Government's practice is to require a showing of changed circumstances prior to re- 21 arrest of noncitizen that was ordered released by a DHS officer); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. 22 Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal 2025) (finding that conditional parole may only be revoked 23 after first providing noncitizen with notice and an opportunity to be heard). 24 The Court finds that this issue has been addressed by the undersigned in a recent 25 decision, Gergawi v. Larose. No. 3:25-CV-3352-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 3719321, at *2-4 26 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025). Therefore, the Court elects to follow the reasoning stated in 27 Gergawi and incorporates it by reference. Id. 28 // 1 As a threshold matter, the Court thinks it unlikely that Petitioner was granted bond 2 when he was released by Respondents. This is because, according to his own allegations, 3 he entered the United States unlawfully and soon after, surrendered to Respondents. Pet. ¶ 4 3. It is reasonable to assume that he would turn himself in where Respondents’ agents are 5 located, on or near the border. The Court, therefore, finds that Petitioner’s initial detention 6 was governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which bars the possibility of bond for a noncitizen, 7 especially at the outset of their detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Thus, the Court finds 8 that Petitioner was likely granted either parole or conditional parole prior to being re- 9 detained on August 6, 2025. 10 The Court finds that the Government’s conduct—here, granting Petitioner parole— 11 resulted in Petitioner’s acquisition of a liberty interest in remaining out of immigration 12 custody. See Gergawi, 2025 WL 3719321, at *3-4; see also Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 13 3d at 1032. 14 Petitioner claims that he has been detained since August 6, 2025, and has yet to 15 receive notice of the basis for which his parole was revoked or an opportunity to be heard 16 before an IJ. Pet. ¶¶ 23, 24, 27. The Government’s Response does not contest these 17 assertions. See generally Res. The Court, therefore, finds that the Government failed to 18 provide Petitioner with any notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to revoking his 19 parole—as required by the Fifth Amendment—when it re-detained him in January 2026. 20 See Gergawi, 2025 WL 3719321, at *3-4; see also Pinchi, 792 F. Supp.3d at 1032. 21 In doing so, Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights. C.A.R.V. v. 22 Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025); 23 Leiva Flores v. Albarran, No. 25-cv-09302-AMO, 2025 WL 3228306, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 24 Nov. 19, 2025); Faizyan v. Casey, No.: 3:25-cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at 25 *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025). Accordingly, the Court will order Petitioner’s immediate 26 release. 27 // 28 // I IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above: 3 (1) The Court GRANTS Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 4 U.S.C, § 2241; 5 (2) Because the Court GRANTS the Petition and concludes that 6 Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner's parole violates procedural due 7 process, Respondents are ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY release 8 Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions of his preexisting 9 parole; 10 (3) Respondents are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report on or before 11 April 3, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released; and 12 (4) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || Dated: March 30, 2026

16 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 7 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Thanh Dat Le v. Christopher J. Larose, Warden of the Otay Mesa ICE Detention Center; Gregory J. Archabeault, Director of the San Diego Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in their official capacities, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thanh-dat-le-v-christopher-j-larose-warden-of-the-otay-mesa-ice-casd-2026.

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