STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A23-1879
Court of Appeals McKeig, J. Took no part, Hennesy, J. Thaleaha McBee,
Appellant,
vs. Filed: October 29, 2025 Office of Appellate Courts Team Industries, Inc.,
Respondent.
________________________
Daniel G. Leland, Ryan T. Conners, Leland Conners, PLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.
John A. Kvinge, Daniel J. Ballintine, Paige K. Clark, Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
Stephen M. Premo, Premo Frank, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
Christopher J. Moreland, MSB Employment Justice LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae the Minnesota Chapter of the National Employment Lawyers Association.
Leslie L. Lienemann, Celeste E. Culberth, Culberth & Lienemann, LLP, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Employee Lawyers Association of the Upper Midwest. ________________________
SYLLABUS
As used in Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), the phrase
“absolutely privileged” provides immunity from liability in civil actions for which
information submitted to the Department of Employment and Economic Development, in order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to unemployment benefits, forms the subject
matter or basis of the claim.
Affirmed.
OPINION
MCKEIG, Justice.
Appellant Thaleaha McBee was terminated from employment at Team Industries,
Inc. (Team) after she reported to Team staff that she was experiencing back problems.
McBee sued Team under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), alleging failure to
provide reasonable accommodations and disability discrimination. Minn. Stat.
§§ 363A.01–.50. Before trial, Team moved to exclude from evidence a questionnaire that
it had completed and submitted to the Department of Employment and Economic
Development (DEED) so that DEED could determine McBee’s entitlement to
unemployment benefits. 1 The district court excluded the questionnaire (DEED
Questionnaire), relying on Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), which
provides: “Information obtained under the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law, in
order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to unemployment benefits, are absolutely
privileged and may not be made the subject matter or the basis for any civil proceeding,
administrative, or judicial.” The district court reasoned that the DEED Questionnaire
1 The Department of Employment and Economic Development is the agency that oversees and administers the Unemployment Insurance program in Minnesota. Cf. Minn. Stat. § 268.035, subd. 8a (defining Commissioner in the context of the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance statutes as “the commissioner of employment and economic development”).
2 should be excluded because it was “information created or generated solely” for purposes
of an application for unemployment insurance benefits. The court of appeals affirmed,
holding that “information submitted to DEED for processing an unemployment-benefits
claim is absolutely privileged and thus inadmissible in another civil, administrative, or
judicial proceeding.” McBee v. Team Indus., Inc., 9 N.W.3d 592, 599 (Minn. App. 2024).
We disagree with the court of appeals’ interpretation. We conclude that the phrase
“absolutely privileged,” as used by the Legislature in section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), is
an immunity from liability, which in the context of the statute, shields an employer from
liability for information it has communicated to DEED when that information is obtained
by DEED “in order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to unemployment benefits” and
later “made the subject matter or the basis for” a civil proceeding. Section 268.19,
subdivision 2(c), does not state an evidentiary rule of general inadmissibility. Because the
DEED Questionnaire is not the subject matter or basis of McBee’s employment
discrimination claim, the district court erred by excluding the document from evidence at
trial. Even so, McBee is not entitled to a new trial because the exclusion did not constitute
prejudicial error. We therefore affirm the court of appeals, though on different grounds.
FACTS
Appellant McBee began working at a foundry operated by respondent Team
Industries, Inc. in Detroit Lakes in September 2014. 2 In early 2015, McBee began
2 For a more complete recitation of the background facts of this case, see our opinion in McBee’s first appeal before us. See McBee v. Team Indus., Inc., 925 N.W.2d 222, 224– 27 (Minn. 2019).
3 experiencing back problems with nerve-related symptoms, including numbness and limited
mobility in her hands. Based on these symptoms, a doctor placed McBee on a 10-pound
lifting restriction to avoid additional injuries. Shortly after McBee notified Team of this
lifting restriction, Team terminated McBee’s employment without attempting to provide
her with accommodations.
After her termination, McBee filed a claim for unemployment benefits with DEED.
DEED sent Team an Unemployment Insurance Request for Information form (the DEED
Questionnaire) to determine whether McBee qualified for unemployment benefits. The
DEED Questionnaire included questions about McBee’s employment, disability, and
termination. One of these questions asked: “If you (the employer) were aware of the
illness, injury, or medical condition, did you try to make accommodations for the
applicant’s situation?” Team checked a “No” box in response. Team further explained:
Due to potential for paralysis (stated by [Employee] to supervisor, HR and several co-workers) and the unwillingness of her doctors to take her out of work, she claimed she could be paralyzed simply by looking up. We did not want to be liable for aggravating her injury and being subject to a work comp claim.
Team responded to several other questions on the form. Team then returned the DEED
Questionnaire to DEED for its assessment of McBee’s claim.
In June 2015, McBee filed a complaint against Team alleging, among other things,
that Team violated the MHRA when it failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.
During discovery, Team moved for a protective order to exclude the DEED Questionnaire
from both discovery and admission at trial. The district court ruled that the DEED
Questionnaire was discoverable but reserved its decision as to admissibility, expressly
4 stating: “Admissibility of these records at trial is NOT determined herein” and that
admissibility was “an unresolved issue.”
In July 2016, Team moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
Team’s motion, and the court of appeals affirmed that dismissal. We granted review,
identified two genuine issues of material fact, and reversed and remanded for trial. McBee
v. Team Indus., Inc., 925 N.W.2d 222, 233 (Minn. 2019). Those issues of material fact
were (1) whether McBee could perform the “essential functions” of her job with reasonable
accommodation, see Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 6; and (2) whether her continued
employment posed a serious threat to her health or safety (a defense to a claim of disability
discrimination by an employer under Minn. Stat. § 363A.25). McBee, 925 N.W.2d at 230–
33.
On remand, Team filed a motion in limine to exclude the DEED Questionnaire from
evidence at trial. McBee filed an affirmative motion to admit it. Following a hearing, the
district court granted Team’s motion and excluded the DEED Questionnaire. In relevant
part, it concluded that Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), renders
“information created or generated solely” for the purpose of assessing an application for
unemployment insurance benefits inadmissible for any purpose in any civil proceeding
held outside of that administrative case. 3 After a bench trial, the district court entered an
3 In addition, the district court concluded that the DEED Questionnaire is inadmissible pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 268.105, subdivision 5(b), which governs the use of hearing testimony obtained upon referral for a direct hearing or during an appeal from the commissioner’s determination of eligibility or ineligibility for unemployment benefits. In reaching its decision, the district court characterized the DEED Questionnaire as “testimonial in nature.”
5 order resolving all disputed issues in Team’s favor, ordered judgment for Team, and
dismissed McBee’s claim. McBee appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. McBee, 9 N.W.3d at 603.
It reasoned that the DEED Questionnaire is inadmissible in McBee’s employment
discrimination suit because the document is “absolutely privileged” under section 268.19,
subdivision 2(c). 4 McBee, 9 N.W.3d at 599. We granted review on the issue of whether
Minnesota Statutes section 268.19 prohibits the admission of documents like the DEED
Questionnaire in a disability discrimination case filed under the employment provisions of
the MHRA.
ANALYSIS
Minnesota Statutes chapter 268 establishes Minnesota’s unemployment insurance
program, which is intended to promote the public good “by providing workers who are
unemployed through no fault of their own a temporary partial wage replacement to assist
the unemployed worker to become reemployed.” Minn. Stat. § 268.03. Section 268.19
governs how information gathered under the administration of the Minnesota
Unemployment Insurance Law may be disclosed or used. Concerning information
submitted to DEED by employers, section 268.19, subdivision 2, states in part:
4 Because the court of appeals read the district court order as relying on section 268.19 and because it concluded that statute is dispositive, the court of appeals did not address McBee’s argument that the district court erred by concluding that the DEED Questionnaire is also inadmissible under Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 5(b). McBee, 9 N.W.3d at 597–98 n.4.
6 (a) Regardless of any provision of law to the contrary, an employer may provide the commissioner with information on an applicant so that the commissioner can determine an applicant’s entitlement to unemployment benefits under the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law. .... (c) Information obtained under the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law, in order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to unemployment benefits, are absolutely privileged and may not be made the subject matter or the basis for any civil proceeding, administrative, or judicial.
(Emphasis added.).
The issue presented in this case is one of statutory interpretation. The parties
advance different interpretations of the words “absolutely privileged” as used in Minnesota
Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c). McBee argues “absolutely privileged” is a legal
term that means an actor has “complete immunity against defamation claims.” McBee
interprets subdivision 2(c) as codifying a commonly recognized rule of immunity by
prohibiting employees from filing defamation claims against employers based upon the
information they submit to DEED in connection with unemployment benefit applications.
According to McBee, the district court erred by excluding the DEED Questionnaire
because her lawsuit does not include defamation claims.
Team disagrees. It identifies “privileged” as an adjective that is independently
modified by the adverb “absolute.” It argues the word “privileged” is a legal term that
means “inadmissible” and that “absolutely privileged” information is always inadmissible.
Team interprets subdivision 2(c), as stating an evidentiary rule of inadmissibility that
precludes employees from offering into evidence any information that employers submit
to DEED in connection with unemployment benefits applications, regardless of the type of
7 claim an employee brings. According to Team, the district court correctly excluded the
DEED Questionnaire.
The court of appeals agreed with Team’s broad interpretation. It held: “[U]nder
section 268.19, subdivision 2 information submitted to DEED for processing an
unemployment-benefits claim is absolutely privileged and thus inadmissible in another
civil, administrative, or judicial proceeding.” McBee, 9 N.W.3d at 599. Below, we first
interpret the meaning of “absolutely privileged” as it is used in the statute, considering
whether it is a reference to immunity from liability or inadmissibility, as well as if it is
limited to the defamation context, as McBee argues. Next, we apply that interpretation to
the facts presented in this case, determining whether the DEED Questionnaire was
appropriately excluded under section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), and if not, whether the
exclusion of that evidence prejudiced McBee.
A.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Poehler
v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 899 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. 2017). When interpreting a statute,
our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent. Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Comm’r
of Revenue, 931 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. 2019). The first step is to determine whether the
challenged statutory language is unambiguous, that is, whether there is only one reasonable
way to read the text. In re Est. of Ecklund, 20 N.W.3d 351, 355 (Minn. 2025). If there is
only one reasonable way to read the statutory text, its meaning is plain. Walsh v. State,
975 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Minn. 2022). We give effect to the plain meaning because we
presume plain and unambiguous statutory language expresses the Legislature’s intent.
8 Shire v. Rosemount, Inc., 875 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn. 2016). “If, however, there is more
than one reasonable interpretation, then the statute is considered ambiguous” and further
analysis is required. Ecklund, 20 N.W.3d at 355. In this case, we must assess the
reasonableness of each party’s interpretation of the meaning of “absolutely privileged” as
that phrase is used in section 268.19, subdivision 2(c).
When assessing the reasonableness of a statutory interpretation, “we analyze ‘the
statute’s text, structure, and punctuation’ and use the canons of interpretation.” Hagen v.
Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 170 (Minn. 2021) (quoting State v. Pakhnyuk,
926 N.W.2d 914, 921 (Minn. 2019)); see also State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682–83
(Minn. 2015) (discussing pre-ambiguity “canons of interpretation” and post-ambiguity
“canons of construction”). We read “words and phrases . . . according to rules of grammar
and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1). Phrases
that have “acquired a special meaning . . . are construed according to such special meaning
or their definition.” Id.; see also State v. Cannady, 727 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Minn. 2007)
(“ ‘When terms of art or peculiar phrases are used, it must be supposed they are used in the
sense as understood by persons familiar and acquainted with such terms.’ ” (quoting
Minnesota & P.R. Co. v. Sibley, 2 Minn. 13, 19 (1858))). When the Legislature has not
defined a statutory term, we may consider dictionary definitions to determine the term’s
common usage, and when legal terms are referenced in statutes we often look to legal
dictionaries. See Getz v. Peace, 934 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Minn. 2019) (“Because the phrase
‘pursuant to’ frequently appears as a legal phrase in statutory references, we may look to
legal dictionaries to define it.”); Billigmeier v. Hennepin County, 428 N.W.2d 79, 82
9 (Minn. 1988) (defining “collection” in the tax law context by reference to Ballentine’s Law
Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary). Here, the Legislature has not defined “absolutely
privileged” in section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), and we look to legal dictionaries for
evidence of the legal term’s meaning.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “absolute privilege” as “[a] privilege that
immunizes an actor from suit, no matter how wrongful the action might be, and even though
it is done with an improper motive. Cf. qualified privilege.” Absolute Privilege, Black’s
Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (first emphasis added). 5 Ballentine’s Law Dictionary
similarly defines “absolute privilege” as conferring protection from liability, but
specifically addresses this in the defamation context. Absolute Privilege, Ballentine’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2010) (“The privilege which exists in the law of defamation when by
reason of the occasion on which a defamatory communication is made or the matter in
reference to which the communication is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action.”
(emphasis added)). Likewise, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law also expressly
associates “absolute privilege” with immunity and notes that it frequently arises with
respect to defamation, but does not limit the term exclusively to the defamation context.
Absolute Privilege, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law (2016) (“a privilege that
5 Black’s directs the reader to compare “absolute privilege” with “qualified privilege,” which it defines as “[a] privilege that immunizes an actor from suit only when the privilege is properly exercised in the performance of a legal or moral duty. . . . Cf. absolute privilege.” Qualified Privilege, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). This comparison highlights a common quality shared by the doctrines of “absolute privilege” and “qualified privilege,” which is that they both confer immunity from liability in certain circumstances.
10 exempts a person from liability esp. for defamation regardless of intent or motive” and
“specif. : a privilege that exempts high public officials (as legislators) from liability for
statements made while acting in their official capacity without regard to intent or malice”
(emphasis added)). All of these definitions describe “absolute privilege” as conferring
protection from liability, and, in this sense, they strongly support McBee’s argument that
subdivision 2(c) states a rule of immunity, not a rule of inadmissibility.
Moreover, both the Legislature and this court consistently employ the phrase
“absolute privilege” to express a rule of immunity. In particular, the Legislature has
established “absolute privilege” as a defense to the offense of criminal defamation. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.765, subd. 3(1) (false and defamatory communication is justified if
“absolutely privileged”). And for well over 100 years, we have articulated a definition for
“absolute privilege” that is in accordance with those stated in the dictionaries above. See,
e.g., Sherwood v. Powell, 63 N.W. 1103, 1103 (Minn. 1895) (considering whether
statements published in a court pleading are “absolutely privileged” and may not “be made
the basis of an action for libel or slander”); Matthis v. Kennedy, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn.
1954) (statements made by participants in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged
and “will not support a civil action for defamation”); Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d
215, 223 (Minn. 1982) (high-level agency official “has an absolute privilege, in the
performance of . . . official duties, to communicate defamatory material”); Carradine v.
State, 511 N.W.2d 733, 736–37 (Minn. 1994) (state trooper had “absolute immunity from
a civil suit in defamation for the statements made in the written police report”); Zutz v.
Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. 2010) (“Two categories of privilege exist as defenses
11 against defamation claims—absolute privilege and conditional or ‘qualified’ privilege.
Both types of privilege are broadly recognized across the United States, and generally
‘result[] from the court’s determination that statements made in particular contexts or on
certain occasions should be encouraged despite the risk that the statements might be
defamatory.’ ” (quoting Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 889
(Minn. 1986)); Harlow v. State Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 569–70 (Minn.
2016) (same). Based on the “common and approved usage” of the legal term “absolute
privilege,” we conclude that McBee’s interpretation of in section 268.19, subdivision 2(c)
as a rule of immunity is consistent with the plain language of the statute and thus
reasonable.
On the other hand, Team’s assertion that “absolute privilege” under subdivision 2(c)
precludes employees from offering into evidence any information that an employer submits
to DEED in connection with unemployment benefits applications in any future claim,
regardless of type, is unreasonable for several reasons. Team has not cited, and we are
unaware of, any Minnesota statute or case in which the phrase “absolute privilege” is
ascribed a meaning other than the “acquired special meaning” discussed above as an
immunity from liability. Although Team argues that the Legislature often uses the word
“privileged” to mean “inadmissible,” none of the statutes Team points to in support of its
argument employ the phrase “absolutely privileged.” Compare Minn. Stat. § 268.19, subd.
2(c) (“absolutely privileged” information “may not be made the subject matter or the basis
for any civil proceeding, administrative, or judicial”), with Minn. Stat. § 169.09, subd.
13(b) (stating reports made to the commissioner of public safety concerning certain motor
12 vehicle accidents are “not discoverable” and “must not be used as evidence in any trial”),
and Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (describing certain information as “privileged” and identifying
individuals who may enforce a “privilege”). Nor has Team cited to any dictionary
describing “absolute privilege” in reference to “admissibility” rather than “immunity.”
Team instead encourages this court to interpret section 268.19, subd. 2(c), in accordance
with the Black’s Law Dictionary entry for the word “privilege,” standing alone. Because
Team’s interpretations do not fully reflect the language used by the Legislature in
section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), we find them to be unpersuasive.
That “absolute immunity” under section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), refers to
immunity from liability rather than inadmissibility is further confirmed when the language
of the subdivision is considered as a whole. “Because the meaning of a phrase often
depends on how it is being used in the context of the statute, we examine words and phrases
in context.” State v. Townsend, 941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 2020); see also Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1994) (“The sense
of a word depends on how it is being used; only if more than one meaning applies within
that context does ambiguity arise.”). Team’s broad interpretation is inconsistent with the
text of section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), as a whole, which expressly imposes a more
limited restriction on use of the information. Specifically, subdivision 2(c) states that the
“absolutely privileged” information “may not be made the subject matter or the basis for
any civil proceeding, administrative, or judicial.” Minn. Stat. § 268.19, subd. 2(c)
(emphasis added). Team’s interpretation is inconsistent with this text because information
submitted to DEED may be relevant to a civil claim without being “the subject matter or
13 the basis for” that claim. Reading the phrase “absolutely privileged” to mean the
information is inadmissible in a later civil proceeding for any purpose whatsoever nullifies
this limiting language and violates the canon against surplusage, as well as the whole-
statute canon of interpretation. See In re Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711, 716
(Minn. 2024) (stating the canon against surplusage “directs us to avoid interpretations that
would render a word or phrase superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 683 (stating the whole-statute
canon directs the court to “construe a statute as a whole and interpret its language to give
effect to all of its provisions.”).
Considering the full language and context of section 268.19, subdivision 2(c),
however, also compels the conclusion that, contrary to McBee’s argument, immunity from
liability under this subdivision is not exclusively limited to defamation claims. Again,
section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), states: “Information obtained under the Minnesota
Unemployment Insurance Law, in order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to
unemployment benefits, are absolutely privileged and may not be made the subject matter
or the basis for any civil proceeding, administrative, or judicial.” Grammatically, the
phrase “absolutely privileged” describes the legal status of “information” that an employer
submits to DEED so that DEED may “determine an applicant’s entitlement to
unemployment benefits.” The phrase “may not be made” places a restriction on the way
“information” having that status may be used—it “may not be made the subject matter or
the basis for any civil proceeding, administrative, or judicial.” Id. (emphasis added). Read
together, the two phrases operate to shield employers from civil liability for information
14 provided to DEED in order to determine an applicant’s eligibility for unemployment
insurance benefits. There is nothing in this statutory language specifically limiting
subdivision 2(c) to defamation claims. Rather, such an interpretation would effectively
ignore the second phrase, which broadly applies to “any civil proceeding,” not only claims
of defamation.
Applying the plain meaning of the legal term “absolute privilege” consistently with
its “acquired special meaning,” and within the context of section 268.19, subdivision 2(c),
as a whole, we conclude that the Legislature intended the phrase “absolutely privileged” to
state a rule of immunity rather than admissibility, and not one narrowly limited only to
defamation claims. As used in Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), the
phrase “absolutely privileged” shields employers from civil liability in proceedings for
which information submitted to DEED, in order to determine an applicant’s entitlement to
unemployment benefits, forms the subject matter or basis of the claim.
B.
Having interpreted Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), we now
apply it to the facts of this case. Here, McBee filed an employment discrimination suit
under the MHRA in which she alleged that Team failed to reasonably accommodate her
disability. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.08 (describing unfair discriminatory practices relating
to employment). The dispositive issues before the district court at trial were (1) whether
McBee was a “qualified disabled person” for purposes of the MHRA; (2) if so, whether
Team could demonstrate that providing accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on its business; and (3) alternatively, whether McBee’s continued employment posed a
15 serious threat to her own health or safety. See McBee, 9 N.W.3d at 597. McBee sought to
admit the DEED Questionnaire as evidence that Team did not attempt to accommodate her
disability before discharging her from employment. McBee’s claim stems from Team’s
alleged conduct in the workplace—failing to reasonably accommodate her disability and
terminating her employment. The DEED Questionnaire is arguably relevant to McBee’s
employment discrimination claim and may support that claim, but the employment
discrimination claim does not arise out of Team’s completion and submission of the DEED
Questionnaire, and it exists independent of that communication. 6 For this reason, the
DEED Questionnaire is not the “subject matter or the basis for” McBee’s civil suit and its
admission is not barred by section 268.19, subdivision 2(c). We therefore conclude that
the district court erred by excluding the DEED Questionnaire under Minnesota Statutes
section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), at trial.
6 In contrast, although our holding here is not limited to defamation claims, defamation is an example of a claim in which communicated information forms the subject matter or basis of the suit. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Powell, 63 N.W. 1103, 1103 (Minn. 1895) (considering whether statements published in a court pleading are “absolutely privileged” and may not “be made the basis of an action for libel or slander”); Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 130–31 (Minn. 2020) (defining the elements of a defamation action); see also Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 310 (Minn. 2007) (extending absolute privilege to claims “frame[d]” as breach of confidences, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy because the factual allegations supporting those claims “sound[ed] in defamation,” stating “[r]egardless of the label, appellant’s claims are in essence defamation claims; they are claims that arise as a consequence of Newgard’s purported defamatory statements”).
16 C.
Having determined that the district court erred by excluding the DEED
Questionnaire under Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), we must next
determine whether the exclusion of that evidence prejudiced McBee. See Minn. R. Civ. P.
61 (requiring courts to disregard harmless error). When an error exists at trial, it is not
grounds for reversal unless the error is prejudicial. Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d
92, 98 (Minn. 1987). “An error in the exclusion of evidence is grounds for a new trial if it
appears that the evidence ‘might reasonably have changed the result of the trial if it had
been admitted.’ ” Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 214 (Minn. 2007) (quoting
Poppenhagen v. Sornsin Constr. Co., 220 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1974)). “Where
excluded evidence is merely corroborative of other evidence admitted in the case,
prejudicial error does not result.” Hornof v. Klee, 106 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Minn. 1960); see
also Poppenhagen, 220 N.W.2d at 285. We do not assume error, and “the burden of
showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr.,
Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, McBee sought to introduce the DEED Questionnaire to show that Team did
not attempt to reasonably accommodate her disability before terminating her employment.
After reviewing the evidence presented in the case, we conclude that the DEED
Questionnaire is cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial. During trial, witness
testimony established that Team management was concerned about aggravating McBee’s
injury and the potential for a workers’ compensation claim if she were injured.
Additionally, witness testimony from a Team manager established that Team did not try to
17 implement any accommodations after learning of McBee’s 10-pound lifting restriction. 7
Thus, Team’s failure to accommodate McBee prior to her termination was amply called to
the attention of the factfinder through witness testimony such that the DEED Questionnaire
could not reasonably have changed the result of the trial had it been admitted. Accordingly,
we conclude that the error committed by the district court in excluding the DEED
Questionnaire under Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), was not
prejudicial. 8
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, though
on other grounds.
HENNESY, J. took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
7 At trial, Mark Kiser, a Team plant manager, testified as follows:
Q: Did you try to implement any accommodations of Miss McBee after you learned of these restrictions and the paralysis risk? A: If I understand the word implement by actually asking her to attempt to perform it physically, no. Q: Why not? A: We couldn’t come up with a scenario that would fit the ten pound [lifting restriction]. 8 Team also argued for the exclusion of the DEED Questionnaire under Minn. R. Evid. 403. Because we conclude that exclusion of the DEED Questionnaire was a harmless error, we need not reach this argument.