T.F. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 17, 2019
• Docket: 18A-JV-2562
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 17 2019, 8:54 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Troy D. Warner Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana South Bend, Indiana Henry A. Flores, Jr. Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

T.F., July 17, 2019 Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JV-2562 v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate Court State of Indiana, The Honorable James C. Stewart Appellee-Plaintiff. Brown, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 71J01-1806-JD-166

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2562| July 17, 2019 Page 1 of 9 Statement of the Case

[1] T.F. was adjudicated a delinquent child with a true finding for Class A

misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. 1 T.F. argues that there was

insufficient evidence to support his true finding and that the probate court

abused its discretion by committing him to the Department of Correction

(“DOC”). Concluding that there was sufficient evidence and the probate court

did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court.

[2] We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain T.F.’s true finding for dangerous possession of a firearm. 2. Whether the probate court abused its discretion by committing T.F. to the DOC. Facts

[3] On June 8, 2018, Officer Hunter Miller (“Officer Miller”) with the South Bend

Police Department initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle with a false license plate.

The vehicle had five occupants: the driver, a front-seat passenger, and three

individuals in the backseat. After the vehicle had stopped, two of the

individuals from the backseat exited the left rear passenger door and fled on

1 IND. CODE § 35-47-10-5.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2562| July 17, 2019 Page 2 of 9 foot. T.F. exited the vehicle from the right rear passenger door and was ordered

to stop by Officer Miller. Officer Miller had observed T.F. sitting in the

backseat behind the front passenger seat and did not observe any of the

occupants attempt to crawl over each other prior to exiting the vehicle.

[4] After all parties had been detained, Officer Miller approached the vehicle and

observed a rifle and a handgun in plain view in the backseat. The rifle was

leaning against the seat which T.F. had previously occupied and the handgun

was located on the seat. Ammunition for the rifle was also observed on the

floor where T.F. had been sitting.

[5] The State filed a petition alleging that T.F. was a delinquent child for

committing the crime of Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a

firearm. On August 24, 2018, the probate court held a fact-finding hearing on

the delinquency petition. Several officers from the South Bend Police

Department, including Officer Miller, testified to the facts above. In addition to

the testimony of the officers, the State also introduced into evidence

photographs depicting the location of the firearms in the backseat. After the

presentation of evidence, the probate court entered a true finding against T.F.

for dangerous possession of a firearm.

[6] On September 24, 2018, the court held a disposition hearing. The Probation

Department recommended the court commit T.F. to the DOC because

“probation, home detention, placement, [and] day reporting” had all failed “to

get [T.F.] to make the right choices.” (Tr. 62). The Probation Department

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2562| July 17, 2019 Page 3 of 9 further explained that T.F. had “been out [of residential placement] for two

months when he was involved in the new offense that is pending disposition

today.” (Tr. 62). The court found that “[i]t is in the best interests of the child to

be removed from the home environment and [that] remaining in the home

would be contrary to the health and welfare of the child because: [T.F.’s]

actions pose [a] danger to self and others[ ]” and awarded wardship of T.F. to

the DOC. (App. Vol. 2 at 16). T.F. now appeals.

Decision

[7] T.F. argues that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his true finding;

and (2) the probate court abused its discretion by committing him to the DOC.

We address each of his contentions in turn.

1. Sufficiency of Evidence

[8] T.F. first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his true finding.

A true finding “must be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” I.C. §

31-37-14-1. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence

supporting a true finding, “we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness

credibility.” B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018). Rather, “[w]e

consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable

inferences supporting it.” Id. We will affirm the judgment so long as there is

“substantial evidence of probative value . . . from which a reasonable fact finder

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt” that the juvenile engaged in the

unlawful conduct. A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ind. 2008). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2562| July 17, 2019 Page 4 of 9 [9] T.F. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of constructive possession.

INDIANA CODE § 35-47-10-5(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] child who

knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses a firearm . . . commits

dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor.” To satisfy these

elements, the State must prove the defendant had either actual or constructive

possession of the firearms. Negash v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1281, 1291 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2018). Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control

over an item, whereas constructive possession occurs when a person has the

intent and the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item. Id.

Specifically, T.F. contends that there was “insufficient [evidence] to prove

dominion and control sufficient for [a] dangerous possession of a firearm” true

finding. (T.F.’s Br. 8).

[10] To fulfill the intent element of constructive possession, the State must

demonstrate the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the contraband.

Griffin v. State, 945 N.E.2d 781, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In cases where the

accused has exclusive possession of the premises in which the contraband is

found, an inference is permitted that he knew of the presence of the contraband

and was capable of controlling it. Id. Where the control is non-exclusive, as

was the case here, knowledge may be inferred from evidence of additional

circumstances indicating the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the

firearm. Causey v. State, 808 N.E.2d 139, 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). These

additional circumstances may include: (1) incriminating statements made by

the defendant; (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures; (3) proximity of the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2562| July 17, 2019 Page 5 of 9 firearm to the defendant; (4) location of the firearm within the defendant’s plain

view; and (5) the mingling of a firearm with other items owned by the

defendant. Deshazier v. State, 877 N.E.2d 200, 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.

denied. To fulfill the capability requirement of constructive possession, the State

must demonstrate that the defendant had the ability to reduce the firearm to his

personal possession. K.F. v. State, 961 N.E.2d 501, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012),

trans. denied.

[11] Our review of the record reveals that there were a total of five individuals in the

vehicle: the driver, front passenger, and three in the backseat. Two of the

backseat occupants fled out of the left rear passenger door, and T.F. exited the

right rear passenger door when he was ordered to stop by Officer Miller. After

all parties had been detained, Officer Miller observed, in plain view, two

firearms in the seat that was previously occupied by T.F. A rifle was leaning

against T.F.’s seat and a handgun was on top of his seat. Additionally,

ammunition was on the floor. This evidence sufficiently supports the probate

court’s finding that T.F. had constructive possession of the firearms because he

had the intent and capability to exercise dominion and control over both

firearms. The State presented sufficient evidence to support T.F.’s true finding

beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. DOC Commitment

[12] T.F. asserts that the probate court abused its discretion by committing him to

the DOC. He argues that his commitment “was a punitive decision based upon

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2562| July 17, 2019 Page 6 of 9 T.F.’s presence in the [vehicle] that day and the size of the rifle found by police

in the back seat.” (T.F.’s Br. 10). We note that “the purpose of the juvenile

process is vastly different from the criminal justice system.” R.H. v. State, 937

N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Specifically, the goal of juvenile

proceedings is “rehabilitation so that the youth will not become a criminal as an

adult.” Id. (emphasis in original). To facilitate this goal, courts have a number

of options available for juvenile placement: “from a private home in the

community, a licensed foster home, a local juvenile detention center, to State

institutions[.]” Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987), reh’g denied.

[13] To assist juvenile courts in selecting amongst available placement alternatives,

the Indiana Legislature has provided guidance regarding the option selected for

any particular child:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2562| July 17, 2019 Page 7 of 9 IND. CODE § 31-37-18-6. Within those parameters, a juvenile court has

discretion in choosing the disposition appropriate for each juvenile delinquent.

D.E. v. State, 962 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We review a court’s

disposition for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 97. An abuse of discretion occurs

if the court’s decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and

circumstances before it, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be

drawn therefrom.” Id.

[14] Here, a representative from the Probation Department testified at the

disposition hearing that “probation, home detention, placement, [and] day

reporting” had all failed “to get [T.F.] to make the right choices.” (Tr. 62).

Further, the representative testified that within two months of release from a

residential placement facility, T.F. had been charged with the present offense.

It is clear from the disposition hearing transcript that the probate court, after

reviewing the ineffectiveness of numerous less-restrictive alternatives afforded

to T.F., determined that making T.F. a ward of the DOC would be in his best

interest. In light of T.F.’s failure to modify his behavior in response to prior

services and placements, the probate court did not abuse its discretion by

committing him to the DOC. See, e.g., D.E., 962 N.E.2d at 97 (concluding that

there was no abuse of discretion in placement of juvenile at DOC where less-

restrictive dispositions had been unsuccessful). Accordingly, we affirm the

court’s commitment of T.F. to the DOC.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2562| July 17, 2019 Page 8 of 9 [15] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2562| July 17, 2019 Page 9 of 9