Texas v. Donoghue

302 U.S. 284, 58 S. Ct. 192, 82 L. Ed. 264, 1937 U.S. LEXIS 1217
Supreme Court of the United States·Decided December 6, 1937·No. 28·Published·Cited by 27 cases

Opinions

Mr. Justice Butler

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This writ is limited to the questions raised on the application of Texas to the United States court for the northern district of that State in a proceeding under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act1 for permission to institute proceedings in a state court for the confiscation of oil held by the trustee but claimed by the State as “unlawful oil” because produced or transported in violation of state conservation measures.

Texas statutes2 and orders of its Railroad Commission purport to prorate production of crude oil, to prohibit purchase, transportation or handling of that produced in whole or in part in excess of the amount allowed,3 to impose fines and penalties for violations,4 and to make oil produced or transported in violation of statute or order subject to confiscation in an action brought by the State for that purpose.5 The statute declares that if at the [286]*286trial it shall be found that the oil is unlawful, the court shall render judgment forfeiting the same to the State and authorizing an order directed to sheriff or constable commanding him “to seize and sell” the condemned oil. Costs of suit and expenses of the sale are to be paid out of money received from the oil, and the balance becomes part of the general revenue fund of the State.

There is before us no question as to validity of the State’s measures to regulate production, or as to when, if ever, the oil in controversy became forfeit.6 The sole issue is whether the bankruptcy court should have permitted the State to bring suit in a state court to have the oil adjudged confiscate.

These are the facts.

Texas sued the Trinity Refining Company in the district court, 126th judicial district, Travis county, to recover fines and penalties for violation of the conservation [287]*287laws. The court appointed Clopton and Hyder receivers of defendant’s property pending the trial of the case. They took possession of property claimed by the defendant, including a large quantity of oil which the State insists had already become its property because unlawfully produced or transported. Later, the State sued the company in the district court, 98th judicial district of the same county, to recover delinquent taxes. That suit having been transferred to the district in which the first was pending, the court there appointed as receivers in the second case the same persons it had appointed in the first one.

Within four months after commencement of the first suit, the company filed its petition in the United States district court, submitting a plan of reorganization. The court found the petition to have been presented in good faith, approved it as properly filed, appointed Donoghue trustee of the debtor, directed him to take possession of its property, ordered that all persons having property of the debtor deliver it to him and issued in usual form a restraining order preventing interference with his possession or control. The trustee took from the receivers property claimed by the debtor including the oil in question, approximately 77,000 barrels. Texas applied to the bankruptcy court for permission to bring suit in a state court to obtain judgment of confiscation against that oil. The court withheld consent and directed the trustee to retain the oil. The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained that ruling, 88 F. (2d) 48, 51, and to review its judgment upon that issue, we brought the case here. 301 U. S. 674.7

[288]*288The State’s right to bring the suit in the state court is the same as if on its voluntary petition the company had been adjudged bankrupt on the day its petition for reorganization was approved. § 77B (o). Forfeiture of unlawful oil under Texas law is a penalty imposed to vindicate the State’s policy of conservation. Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 240-241. The bankruptcy court exercises jurisdiction under sovereignty that is independent of and foreign to that of Texas. Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U. S. 18, 23. It is without power to enforce penalties imposed by the State for violation of its laws. The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 289, et seq. Cf. § 57 (j), Bankruptcy Act;8 New York v. Jersawit, 263 U. S. 493, 496; United States v. Childs, 266 U. S. 304, 309-310. The State’s insistence is not that it is presently entitled to establish a right to forfeit the oil, but that the oil became its property when produced or transported contrary to law. It seeks not to forfeit but to enforce the forfeiture that resulted, as it maintains, immediately from unlawful production or transportation.

Possession or control of the oil by the state court is not essential to its jurisdiction to entertain the suit proposed to be brought.9 Texas does not claim to be entitled to possession of the oil until final adjudication in the state court. Retention by the trustee is not inconsistent with the maintenance of that suit. He is entitled there to be heard in support of his claim to the oil. If when the debtor’s petition was approved the oil did not belong to Texas, the State was not entitled to have it withheld from the trustee. But, if by reason of unlawful production or transportation, the oil had already by forfeiture become [289]*289the property of the State, the trustee was not entitled to take or retain it. If in a suit brought by Texas in a state court it should be determined that title to the oil had vested in the State before approval of the debtor’s petition, the bankruptcy court doubtlessly will recognize that title and direct the trustee to hand over the oil or account for it to the State. Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 268. Hudson v. Guestier, 4 Cranch 293, 297. See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., supra, 291.

The filing of the petition for reorganization in the bankruptcy court may not be held to deprive the State of opportunity in its own court to establish its claim that through forfeiture it had already become the owner of the oil for that would be to take the State’s property for the benefit of the offending company or its creditors. Nor may the receivers’ voluntary surrender of possession to the debtor’s trustee prevent adjudication of the State’s claim. The bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying the State’s application for permission to institute proceedings in the state court and, to the extent that the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained that ruling, its judgment must be

Reversed.

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Texas v. Donoghue, 302 U.S. 284, 58 S. Ct. 192, 82 L. Ed. 264, 1937 U.S. LEXIS 1217 (1937).

302 U.S. 284 (Texas v. Donoghue) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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