Texas Standard Oil & Gas, L.P. v. Frankel Offshore Energy, Inc.

344 S.W.3d 628, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5112, 2011 WL 2646966

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 7, 2011
• Docket: 14-11-00125-CV
• Status: Published

Opinions

ORDER

SHARON McCALLY, Justice.

Appellants Texas Standard Oil & Gas, L.P., Grimes Energy Co., and Petroval, Inc. April 4, 2011, motion to lower bond is pending before the Court. By the motion, Appellants seek review of the trial court’s order signed March 80, 2011, determining the amount of security required for them to suspend enforcement of the court’s judgment pending appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 52.006(d) and Tex.R.App. P. 24.4. Appellants’ motion to lower bond is denied.

This is Appellants’ second motion to lower bond. Appellant’s first motion asked that this Court “reverse the Order setting bond, hold that Appellants are not required to post a supersedeas bond on amounts awarded for purpose of punishing Appellants, and set the proper amount of the bond based on costs and interest only.” (emphasis supplied) By March 3, 2011, order¹, this Court granted appellant’s first motion and reversed the trial court’s initial determination of security, as it was improperly calculated upon damages that are, by order of the trial court, punitive in nature. Specifically, the March 3, 2011, order granted all relief Appellants sought and remanded the issue to the trial court to determine security from interest for the duration of the appeal and costs. On remand, the trial court calculated security solely from interest for the duration of the appeal because zero costs were awarded.²

By Appellant’s second motion, they now ask that this Court reverse the new super-sedeas order of the trial court and hold that they are not required to post security at all. In light of the record as a whole, including Appellant’s initial request for relief, and this Court’s March 3, 2011, order, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating security precisely as directed by this Court in its order granting Appellant’s first motion.

Without the necessity of resort to a statutory construction of § 52.006, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the bond. We further conclude, again in light of the current appellate record as a whole, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in estimating an eighteen-month duration of the appeal. Therefore, appellants’ (second) motion to lower the supersedeas bond is denied. The stay of post-judgment proceedings ordered on May 10, 2011, is lifted as of the date of this order.

JAMISON, J., concurring; FROST, J., dissenting.

1 . This Court's original order fully sets forth the background and nature of the dispute; thus, it is omitted here.

2 . Specifically, the trial court determined that the supersedeas bond should be posted in the amount of $300,628.12. This amount represents 18 months' post-judgment interest on the court’s judgment.