Texas Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Lawhon

251 S.W.2d 477, 220 Ark. 932
Supreme Court of Arkansas·Decided October 13, 1952·No. 4-9835·Published·Cited by 15 cases

Opinions

Holt, J.

Appellees owned 150-acre farm in Randolph County, consisting of four contiguous 40-acre tracts, lying north and south. A 10-acre plot in the northeast corner of one of the tracts had been sold to the United States for radio purposes. Appellant sought to condemn a right of way across this property in which to lay a pipe line. The parties were unable to agree upon the amount of damages to be paid, and on order of the court deposited $2,950 in the registry of the court before entering upon the property. This right of way was 75 ft. wide, 2178 ft. long, and ran diagonally across one 40 and the corners of two others, as well as the G-overnment property, and amounted to 3.75 acres of appellees’ property actually taken.

There was a verdict and judgment for $4,500 for appellees and this appeal followed.

For reversal, appellant alleged: (1) that the court erred in its instructions on the measure of damages; (2) that the verdict is excessive, and (3) that there was error in the court’s refusal to give its requested instructions 2 and 4.

-(!)-

The court, at appellant’s request, gave the following instruction on the measure of damages: ‘ ‘ The petitioner, pursuant to authority conferred on it by proper governmental authority has constructed a pipe line across certain lands belonging to respondents. This action has been instituted to determine the amount of damage sustained by the respondents by virtue of the taking of their lands by petitioner and the construction thereon of its pipe line facility. This is the sole question you are to determine. There are three elements of damage you are to consider, as follows:

‘ ‘ 1. The value of the strip of land, hereinafter called ‘right of way,’ actually taken by petitioner.
“2. The damage, if any, resulting to respondents by virtue of having their remaining lands separated by petitioner’s right of way.
“3. The damage, if any, caused by the petitioner in the construction of its pipe line to lands or crops of respondents lying off the right of way.”

Immediately following this instruction, the court orally instructed the jury: ‘ ‘ The court might also caution you about what we sometimes speak of as severance damage. With regard to severance damage, no instruction has been given by the court, intended to cover what we called severance damage. The last instruction, just read to you, covers the damages. If there had been something built across the land that prevented ingress and egress, so that respondents could not get across the right of way from one part of their land to the other, there would be severance damage. You will not consider any damage to respondents ’ other lands by reason of being separated by this right of way. ’ ’

Appellant says: “The court has, in effect, first told the jury to determine the severance damages and then has told the jury that there can be no severance damage. The two parts of the instruction are directly conflicting and left the jury with no real basis upon which to determine damages.”

The answer to this contention is that any conflict in the two instructions was invited and occasioned by appellant and it can not now, after having offered an instruction in which its liability for severance was admitted, complain that the trial court sought to remove this element of damages in appellant’s favor.

- (2) -

Appellant’s contention that the verdict is excessive, we think, must be sustained. Primarily, appellant argues that the court erred in permitting witnesses to express opinions as to what the damages relating to the decreased value of appellees’ farm were, without giving any fair or reasonable basis on which such opinions were based.

3.75 acres were taken for the right of way. Appellees’ own value of this land was $275 per acre, or a total of $1,031.25, which appears to be the highest value placed upon it. Under the law of this State, the owner of land is entitled to be paid the full value of the land embraced within the right of way easement, as if the fee had been taken even though the landowner, after the pipe line .was constructed, had the right to continue using the surface of the right of way for farming or other purposes not inconsistent with the use of the easement. Appellant acquired by the condemnation proceedings the power to make such use of the right of way as its future needs required for the purpose for which the right of way was condemned. Baucum v. Arkansas Power & Light Company, 179 Ark. 154, 15 S. W. 2d 399.

Appellees were entitled to recover, in addition to the value of the land actually taken, for any loss of crops, both on the right of way and off, caused by appellant, and for any damages to appellees’ other land, and decreased market value that they might be able to show by competent proof.

After the pipe line had been constructed at a minimum depth of 3% ft., the land was smoothed over and leveled off. Appellees can cross over at will. There were no fences, poles or obstructions and appellees are now cultivating most of the right of way. There are a few spots where quicksand'came up along the pipe line which are still soft. Some of this sand was left scattered along and outside of the right of way.

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Texas Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Lawhon, 251 S.W.2d 477, 220 Ark. 932 (Ark. 1952).

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Texas Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Lawhon
251 S.W.2d 477 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1952)