Texas Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Lawhon

251 S.W.2d 477, 220 Ark. 932
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedOctober 13, 1952
Docket4-9835
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 251 S.W.2d 477 (Texas Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Lawhon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Texas Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Lawhon, 251 S.W.2d 477, 220 Ark. 932 (Ark. 1952).

Opinions

Holt, J.

Appellees owned 150-acre farm in Randolph County, consisting of four contiguous 40-acre tracts, lying north and south. A 10-acre plot in the northeast corner of one of the tracts had been sold to the United States for radio purposes. Appellant sought to condemn a right of way across this property in which to lay a pipe line. The parties were unable to agree upon the amount of damages to be paid, and on order of the court deposited $2,950 in the registry of the court before entering upon the property. This right of way was 75 ft. wide, 2178 ft. long, and ran diagonally across one 40 and the corners of two others, as well as the G-overnment property, and amounted to 3.75 acres of appellees’ property actually taken.

There was a verdict and judgment for $4,500 for appellees and this appeal followed.

For reversal, appellant alleged: (1) that the court erred in its instructions on the measure of damages; (2) that the verdict is excessive, and (3) that there was error in the court’s refusal to give its requested instructions 2 and 4.

-(!)-

The court, at appellant’s request, gave the following instruction on the measure of damages: ‘ ‘ The petitioner, pursuant to authority conferred on it by proper governmental authority has constructed a pipe line across certain lands belonging to respondents. This action has been instituted to determine the amount of damage sustained by the respondents by virtue of the taking of their lands by petitioner and the construction thereon of its pipe line facility. This is the sole question you are to determine. There are three elements of damage you are to consider, as follows:

‘ ‘ 1. The value of the strip of land, hereinafter called ‘right of way,’ actually taken by petitioner.
“2. The damage, if any, resulting to respondents by virtue of having their remaining lands separated by petitioner’s right of way.
“3. The damage, if any, caused by the petitioner in the construction of its pipe line to lands or crops of respondents lying off the right of way.”

Immediately following this instruction, the court orally instructed the jury: ‘ ‘ The court might also caution you about what we sometimes speak of as severance damage. With regard to severance damage, no instruction has been given by the court, intended to cover what we called severance damage. The last instruction, just read to you, covers the damages. If there had been something built across the land that prevented ingress and egress, so that respondents could not get across the right of way from one part of their land to the other, there would be severance damage. You will not consider any damage to respondents ’ other lands by reason of being separated by this right of way. ’ ’

Appellant says: “The court has, in effect, first told the jury to determine the severance damages and then has told the jury that there can be no severance damage. The two parts of the instruction are directly conflicting and left the jury with no real basis upon which to determine damages.”

The answer to this contention is that any conflict in the two instructions was invited and occasioned by appellant and it can not now, after having offered an instruction in which its liability for severance was admitted, complain that the trial court sought to remove this element of damages in appellant’s favor.

- (2) -

Appellant’s contention that the verdict is excessive, we think, must be sustained. Primarily, appellant argues that the court erred in permitting witnesses to express opinions as to what the damages relating to the decreased value of appellees’ farm were, without giving any fair or reasonable basis on which such opinions were based.

3.75 acres were taken for the right of way. Appellees’ own value of this land was $275 per acre, or a total of $1,031.25, which appears to be the highest value placed upon it. Under the law of this State, the owner of land is entitled to be paid the full value of the land embraced within the right of way easement, as if the fee had been taken even though the landowner, after the pipe line .was constructed, had the right to continue using the surface of the right of way for farming or other purposes not inconsistent with the use of the easement. Appellant acquired by the condemnation proceedings the power to make such use of the right of way as its future needs required for the purpose for which the right of way was condemned. Baucum v. Arkansas Power & Light Company, 179 Ark. 154, 15 S. W. 2d 399.

Appellees were entitled to recover, in addition to the value of the land actually taken, for any loss of crops, both on the right of way and off, caused by appellant, and for any damages to appellees’ other land, and decreased market value that they might be able to show by competent proof.

After the pipe line had been constructed at a minimum depth of 3% ft., the land was smoothed over and leveled off. Appellees can cross over at will. There were no fences, poles or obstructions and appellees are now cultivating most of the right of way. There are a few spots where quicksand'came up along the pipe line which are still soft. Some of this sand was left scattered along and outside of the right of way.

Appellee, L. J. Lawhon, testified that his total crop damage amounted to $1,764.20, which when added to the value of 3.75 acres for the right of way, would total $2,795.45. Appellee also testified that his entire farm (150 acres) had depreciated in value from $50 to $75 per acre, and further: “Q. But you do say that putting a pipe line across your farm affects the value of it? A. Yes, sir. Q. Will it do that as long as the pipe line is there? A. Yes, sir. Q. And, just as soon as it is put in, the land value is.affected? A. Yes, sir, the putting it in is what affects the value. Q. If a pipe line could be put down, without disturbing the soil, would the simple fact that a pipe line is laid under the soil affect the value ? A. I would say, if you did not disturb the soil, it would not affect it — it would not hurt it. How do you figure it that your land has been affected and how do you calculate it has been damaged from $50 to $75 per acre, the whole farm? A. The inconveniences — probably ten years from now. You cannot get across the pipe line ditch, and it will take that long to get the hardpan packed, and the soil built up, so that it will produce. Q. They are buying that 75-foot strip of land? A. No, sir, they are taking it. Q. They are paying for that — how does that damage the rest of your farm?- A. The inconvenience in trying to cultivate the rest of it. Where the line crosses, diagonally, across the corner, when you get in that corner, with machinery, you cannot turn. Q. Why not drive right on across the right of way? There is not any fence along there? A. Yes, sir there is a fence there. Q. That is your fence? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you wanted it built where it is? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is that fence what makes it inconvenient to cultivate? A. No, if you attempt to cultivate across this ditch, and drop in, you would have to go get your neighbors to get you out. Q. Do you contemplate that that would occur, in fixing your damages? A. Yes, by the experience I have had with pipe lines. The Mississippi pipe line went through my land, in 1929, and brought up quicksand, and you still mire down along that ditch.

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Texas Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Lawhon
251 S.W.2d 477 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1952)

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Bluebook (online)
251 S.W.2d 477, 220 Ark. 932, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/texas-illinois-natural-gas-pipeline-co-v-lawhon-ark-1952.