Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Linda Puglisi

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided August 14, 2015·No. 03-15-00226-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 03-15-00226-CV 6505541 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 8/14/2015 2:26:54 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK CASE NO. 03-15-00226-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS AT AUSTIN, TEXAS 8/14/2015 2:26:54 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Texas Health & Human Services Commission, Clerk Appellant, v. Linda Puglisi, Appellee.

On Appeal from Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000381 53rd Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas Honorable Judge Gisela D. Triana Presiding.

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

KEN PAXTON EUGENE A. CLAYBORN Attorney General of Texas State Bar No.: 00785767 Assistant Attorney General CHARLES E. ROY Deputy Chief, Administrative Law Division First Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station JAMES E. DAVIS Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Deputy Attorney General for Telephone: (512) 475-3204 Civil Litigation Facsimile: (512) 320-0167 eugene.clayborn@texasattorneygeneral.gov DAV ID A. TALBOT, JR. Chief, Administrative Law Attorneys for Texas Health and Division Human Services Commission

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED August 14, 2015 Table of Contents

Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... ii

Table of Authorities ................................................................................................. iii

I. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................1 A. Puglisi’s definition for covered DME is misleading. .............................1 B. Puglisi requires maximum assistance from her caregivers for all activities of daily living. .........................................................................3 C. Compliance with Tex. Hum. Res. Code §§ 32.04242, 32.050(b) ...........4 D. Puglisi subverts the substantial evidence review standard. ....................6 E. Detgen is controlling authority regarding HHSC’s categorical exclusion of mobile standers based on the availability of a cost- effective alternative. ...............................................................................7 F. Puglisi received adequate due process. ................................................11

II. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................11

PRAYER ..................................................................................................................12

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..........................................................................14

APPENDICES .........................................................................................................15

ii Table of Authorities Cases

City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 883 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1994) ..................................................................................6

DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80 (2nd Cir. 1998) ...............................................................................3, 5

Detgen ex. rel. Detgen v. Janek, 752 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 2014) ....................................................................... 8, 9, 10

Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. (1976) ......................................................................................................6

Slekis v. Thomas, 525 U.S. 1098 S.Ct. 864 L.Ed.2d 767 (1998) ........................................................6

Tex. Health Facilities Comm’n v. Charter Med.-Dall., 665 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1984) ..................................................................................6

Tex. Rivers Prot. Ass’n v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n, 910 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied) ......................................6

Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1995) ................................................................................11

Statutes Texas Government Code § 2001.175 ............................................................................................................12

Rules

1 Tex. Admin. Code § 354.1039(a)(4)(D) ...............................................................................................8 § 354.1041 ..................................................................................................... 4, 5, 6

iii Tex. Hum. Res. Code §§ 32.04242, .050(b) ..................................................................................... 4, 5, 6

Other Authorities Part 431 Subpart E ..................................................................................................9

TMPPM § 2.2.14.22 ..............................................................................................................8 § 2.2.14.26 ..........................................................................................................8, 9 § 2.3.1.2 ..................................................................................................................5 § 2.3.1.3 ..................................................................................................................5

Fed. Reg. Vol. 76, No. 133, Tuesday, July 12, 2011, Page 41032 .........................................3

iv CASE NO. 03-15-00226-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

Texas Health & Human Services Commission, Appellant, v. Linda Puglisi, Appellee.

On Appeal from Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000381 53rd Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas, Honorable Judge Gisela D. Triana Presiding.

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT:

COMES NOW the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC)

and submits Appellant’s Reply Brief.

I. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. Puglisi’s definition for covered DME is misleading.

Puglisi erroneously alleges that “[a]n item of medical equipment is covered if

it meet HHSC’s definition of DME.” Br. of Appellee, p. 3. Puglisi’s definition of

covered DME, however, is derived from her fundamental misreading of the May 21,

2013 CMS letter. Br. of Appellee; App. 1. The May 21, 2013 CMS letter states

that “[a]s such, items of DME meeting the state’s definition of such coverage is to

1 be provided to individuals (of any age) meeting the State’s medical necessity

criteria.” (emphasis added). Br. of Appellee; App. p. 1. This statement shows that

an item defined as DME may or may not meet the State’s definition of covered DME.

In fact, there is no dispute about whether any of Puglisi’s requested items are

defined as DME. The facts are that the power wheel chair, the integrated standing

feature, and the power seat system are all defined as DME. Similarly, there is no

dispute about which of Puglisi’ requested items are covered. The facts are that the

power wheelchair and the power seat system are covered DME. However, the

integrated standing feature is not covered.

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