Texas City Independent School District v. Jorstad

752 F. Supp. 231, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16454, 1990 WL 192934
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedDecember 4, 1990
DocketCiv. A. G-90-350
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 752 F. Supp. 231 (Texas City Independent School District v. Jorstad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Texas City Independent School District v. Jorstad, 752 F. Supp. 231, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16454, 1990 WL 192934 (S.D. Tex. 1990).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

KENT, District Judge.

On November 21, 1990, came on to be heard Plaintiff Texas City Independent School District’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin John Jorstad, a student at the Blocker Middle School, in the Texas City Independent School District, from attending regular classes, as presently provided in an Individual Education Program previously adopted by and between the School District and Mr. and Mrs. Jor-stad, John’s parents, and instead limiting John’s educational participation in such School District to its Behavioral Management Class, at the Blocker Middle School, or home care, at the election of his parents, pending completion of administrative review of John’s educational status, under applicable provisions of law, and the Court being of the opinion for the reasons herein-below discussed in detail, that the Motion is in order, and should be granted, the Court herewith makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and so enjoins Candace Jorstad and Leon Jorstad, individually and as guardians and next friends of John Jorstad, and John Jorstad, individually-

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE INSTANT ACTION

On November 4, 1990, Plaintiff, Texas City Independent School District, (hereinafter referred to as “School District”), filed Plaintiff’s Original Complaint for Injunc-tive Relief, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, together with substantial affidavits and attachments. Also filed, was a Memorandum of Authorities in support of Plaintiff’s Request for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. A Temporary Restraint hearing was held before the Honorable Lynn Hughes, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, on November 14, 1990, and that Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order, further ordering the parties to appear before the Honorable Samuel B. Kent, in the Galveston Division, where this matter remains pending, for a hearing on the Preliminary Injunction, on November 21, 1990. On that date, timely responsive pleadings were filed by Defendants Candace Jorstad and Leon Jorstad, individually and as guardians and next friends of John Jorstad, (hereinafter referred to as “Parents”), and John Jorstad individually, (hereinafter referred to as “John”). Following a day long hearing, also on such date, involving the- testimony of seven witnesses, this Decision and Order follows.

APPLICABLE LAW

This Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), and F.R.C.P. Rule 65(a).

The Education of Handicapped Act, (hereinafter referred to as “E.H.A.”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., provides in significant detail for the education of handicapped individuals. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 provides, also in detail, for the administrative rights of affected persons, and educational institutions, in administering the Act. Specifically, this section establishes specific administrative review obligations, which must be exhausted before either party is entitled to seek relief from a Federal District *233 Court, as regards the educational needs of any individual. Concurrently, and notwithstanding the provisions of such section, allegedly aggrieved school districts may seek injunctive relief from Federal District Courts, during the pendency of the resolution of administrative review of educational plans, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 65(a), in very limited circumstances. The Supreme Court has. held, in Honig vs. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328, 108 S.Ct. 592, 607, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988), that while 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) “effectively creates a presumption in favor of the child’s current educational placement”, school officials can seek injunctive relief, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), where the school district can successfully overcome such presümption by showing that “maintaining the child in his or her current placement is substantial likely to result in injury to either himself or herself, or to others.” In considering such relief, the District Court is obligated to balance the affected child’s “interest in receiving a free appropriate public education in accordance with the procedures and requirements of the E.H.A. against the interest of the State and local school officials in maintaining a safe learning environment for all of their students.” Honig vs. Doe, supra, at 328, 108 S.Ct. at 607. It is expressly noted that injunctive relief, pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 65(a), is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy,” and that relief of this nature is the exception rather than the rule. U.S. vs. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536 (11th Cir.1983). A party seeking injunctive relief must carry the burden of persuasion on each of four distinct elements: .

(1) A substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits;
(2) The threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threat of harm to defendant;
(3) A preliminary injunction will not disservice the public interest; and,
(4) A substantial threat that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.

Treasure Salvors vs. Unidentified Wreck, Etc., 640 F.2d 560, 568 (5th Cir.1981), Texas vs. Seatrain Int’l. S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.1975).

FINDINGS OF FACT

(1) Under the provisions of the E.H.A., each handicapped student must have an individualized educational program developed by qualified school officials and the children’s parents. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19). In Texas, the individualized educational program for each handicapped child is prepared by an “admission, review and dismissal” (ARD) Committee, comprised of a representative from the school district administration, a representative from the school district instructional program, and the student’s parents. 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.221.

(2) Mr. Richard Carter is the Building Principal at Blocker Middle School, T.C.I. S.D. John Jorstad is a student at such school. Mr. Carter knew John would be enrolled, for the 1990-91 school year, as John had completed, during the spring of 1990, the curriculum at Levi Fry Elementary School, in T.C.I.S.D.

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Bluebook (online)
752 F. Supp. 231, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16454, 1990 WL 192934, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/texas-city-independent-school-district-v-jorstad-txsd-1990.