1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TETRA TECH EC, INC., Case No. 24-cv-06367-WHO
8 Plaintiff, ORDER ON THE MOTIONS FOR 9 v. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION; 10 AIG SPECIALTY INSURANCE VACATING HEARING COMPANY, 11 Re: Dkt. Nos. 87, 94 Defendant.
12 Plaintiff Tetra Tech EC, Inc. (“Tetra Tech”) moves for entry of judgment pursuant to 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or, in the alternative, for a certification for interlocutory 14 appeal, on my Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment (“Prior Order”). Dkt. No. 86. Tetra 15 16 Tech has also filed an administrative motion to change the briefing and hearing schedule on 17 defendant AIG Specialty Insurance Company’s (“AIG”) recently filed Motion for Summary 18 Judgment seeking to resolve the remaining claims. Because neither judicial administrative 19 interests nor the equities favor a separate judgment on these claims, I DENY Tetra Tech’s motion 20 for an entry of judgment, and slightly adjust the briefing schedule for the pending motion for 21 summary judgment. 22 BACKGROUND1 23 24 In January 2025, I allowed the parties to present their dispositive motions in two parts. 25 Dkt. No. 42. I heard argument on the parties’ respective positions on AIG’s duty to defend on 26
27 1 I address only the procedural history necessary to contextualize this motion. I summarized the June 4, 2025. Dkt. No. 80. On August 25, 2025, I held that AIG had no duty to defend Tetra Tech 1 2 in the underlying cases and required the parties to meet and confer about next steps in this case. 3 See Prior Order [Dkt. No. 86]. 4 On September 12, 2025, Tetra Tech filed its Motion for Entry of Judgment. See Rule 5 54(b) Motion (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 87]. AIG opposed and Tetra Tech replied. See Opposition 6 (“Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 90]; Reply [Dkt. No. 92]. AIG filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the 7 remaining issues on October 17, 2025. See Dkt. No. 93. On October 22, 2025, Tetra Tech filed 8 its administrative motion seeking an extension on the briefing and hearing scheduled on AIG’s 9 10 motion until after I fully hear and resolve its Motion for Entry of Judgment. See Administrative 11 Motion (“Admin. Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 94]. AIG opposed Tetra Tech’s administrative motion. See 12 Opposition to the Administrative Motion (“Oppo. Admin. Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 95]. I find the Motion 13 for Entry of Judgment suitable for disposition without a hearing. The hearing currently scheduled 14 for November 5, 2025, is VACATED pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). 15 LEGAL STANDARD 16 Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that where an action involves 17 18 more than one claim for relief, a district court has discretion to “direct entry of a final judgment as 19 to one or more, but fewer than all, claims . . . only if the court expressly determines that there is no 20 just reason for delay.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2009). 21 Courts apply a “pragmatic approach focusing on severability and efficient judicial 22 administration.” Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1525 (9th 23 Cir. 1987). As “the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons 24 25 for delay,” the district court’s decision under Rule 54(b) receives substantial deference. Curtiss- 26 Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citation 27 omitted). DISCUSSION 1 2 I. RULE 54(b) 3 4 Tetra Tech asks that I “enter partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) so that [it] may 5 immediately appeal” the Prior Order. Mot. 1. As Tetra Tech recognizes, “[t]he critical question is 6 whether Rule 54(b) certification may serve to ‘streamline the ensuing litigation.’” Mot. 4 (quoting 7 Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1991)). Tetra Tech has presented no 8 compelling argument to suggest that entering a partial final judgment on the question of AIG’s 9 duty to defend so “streamline[s] the ensuing litigation.” Texaco, 939 F.2d at 798. 10 This motion requires me to consider, among other things, “whether the claims under 11 12 review [are] separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the 13 claims already determined [are] such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues 14 more than once even if there [are] subsequent appeals.” Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. 8. 15 “Similar legal facts or issues that may require the appellate court to review legal or factual issues 16 similar to those in the pending claims will ‘weigh heavily against entry of judgment’ under Rule 17 54(b). Henderson v. City and Cnty. San Francisco, No. 05-CV-0234-VRW, 2009 WL 2058369 at 18 *1 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2009) (quoting Morrison-Knudson Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th 19 20 Cir. 1981). The issues remaining for my consideration include Tetra Tech’s indemnification and 21 bad faith causes of action, along with AIG’s reimbursement claim. See Mot. 1, n.1; Dkt. No. 93 at 22 2. Each of these issues addresses similar legal and/or factual issues as those that I have already 23 addressed in the Prior Order. It makes little sense for me to allow Tetra Tech to appeal the duty to 24 defend issue on its own now as opposed to waiting for the case to be fully ripe for review. This is 25 particularly true since AIG has filed a motion for summary judgment that I will hear soon that may 26 27 well dispose of the remaining issues. I am quite sure the Ninth Circuit would not be interested in The equities also disfavor an entry of judgment. Tetra Tech argues that it would be 1 2 prejudiced “if it is forced to continue to defend itself in the Bayview action until the matter is 3 finally resolved . . . [and] further be prejudiced by entry of a judgment against Tetra Tech for 4 millions of dollars on AIG’s reimbursement claim in Jahr.” Mot. 12. That would be true if the 5 Prior Order is incorrect, but ignores the prejudice to AIG in waiting for the Ninth Circuit’s 6 decision on the duty to defend and, if the Prior Order is affirmed, then having to return to this 7 court to litigate the remaining reimbursement claim, and then facing a potential second appeal 8 from Tetra Tech. Oppo. 7. 9 10 Tetra Tech’s motion in the alternative, for an interlocutory appeal, also fails. Pursuant to 11 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) an Order qualifies for interlocutory appeal when the order “[1] involves a 12 controlling question of law as to which [2] there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion 13 and that [3] an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination 14 of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). As AIG argues, “[t]hat settled law might be applied 15 differently does not establish a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” Couch v. Telescope 16 Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010). Tetra Tech’s “strong disagreement with the Court’s ruling 17 18 is not sufficient for there to be a ‘substantial ground for difference.’” Id. 19 I understand that Tetra Tech disagrees with my conclusions in the Prior Order.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TETRA TECH EC, INC., Case No. 24-cv-06367-WHO
8 Plaintiff, ORDER ON THE MOTIONS FOR 9 v. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION; 10 AIG SPECIALTY INSURANCE VACATING HEARING COMPANY, 11 Re: Dkt. Nos. 87, 94 Defendant.
12 Plaintiff Tetra Tech EC, Inc. (“Tetra Tech”) moves for entry of judgment pursuant to 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or, in the alternative, for a certification for interlocutory 14 appeal, on my Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment (“Prior Order”). Dkt. No. 86. Tetra 15 16 Tech has also filed an administrative motion to change the briefing and hearing schedule on 17 defendant AIG Specialty Insurance Company’s (“AIG”) recently filed Motion for Summary 18 Judgment seeking to resolve the remaining claims. Because neither judicial administrative 19 interests nor the equities favor a separate judgment on these claims, I DENY Tetra Tech’s motion 20 for an entry of judgment, and slightly adjust the briefing schedule for the pending motion for 21 summary judgment. 22 BACKGROUND1 23 24 In January 2025, I allowed the parties to present their dispositive motions in two parts. 25 Dkt. No. 42. I heard argument on the parties’ respective positions on AIG’s duty to defend on 26
27 1 I address only the procedural history necessary to contextualize this motion. I summarized the June 4, 2025. Dkt. No. 80. On August 25, 2025, I held that AIG had no duty to defend Tetra Tech 1 2 in the underlying cases and required the parties to meet and confer about next steps in this case. 3 See Prior Order [Dkt. No. 86]. 4 On September 12, 2025, Tetra Tech filed its Motion for Entry of Judgment. See Rule 5 54(b) Motion (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 87]. AIG opposed and Tetra Tech replied. See Opposition 6 (“Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 90]; Reply [Dkt. No. 92]. AIG filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the 7 remaining issues on October 17, 2025. See Dkt. No. 93. On October 22, 2025, Tetra Tech filed 8 its administrative motion seeking an extension on the briefing and hearing scheduled on AIG’s 9 10 motion until after I fully hear and resolve its Motion for Entry of Judgment. See Administrative 11 Motion (“Admin. Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 94]. AIG opposed Tetra Tech’s administrative motion. See 12 Opposition to the Administrative Motion (“Oppo. Admin. Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 95]. I find the Motion 13 for Entry of Judgment suitable for disposition without a hearing. The hearing currently scheduled 14 for November 5, 2025, is VACATED pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). 15 LEGAL STANDARD 16 Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that where an action involves 17 18 more than one claim for relief, a district court has discretion to “direct entry of a final judgment as 19 to one or more, but fewer than all, claims . . . only if the court expressly determines that there is no 20 just reason for delay.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2009). 21 Courts apply a “pragmatic approach focusing on severability and efficient judicial 22 administration.” Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1525 (9th 23 Cir. 1987). As “the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons 24 25 for delay,” the district court’s decision under Rule 54(b) receives substantial deference. Curtiss- 26 Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citation 27 omitted). DISCUSSION 1 2 I. RULE 54(b) 3 4 Tetra Tech asks that I “enter partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) so that [it] may 5 immediately appeal” the Prior Order. Mot. 1. As Tetra Tech recognizes, “[t]he critical question is 6 whether Rule 54(b) certification may serve to ‘streamline the ensuing litigation.’” Mot. 4 (quoting 7 Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1991)). Tetra Tech has presented no 8 compelling argument to suggest that entering a partial final judgment on the question of AIG’s 9 duty to defend so “streamline[s] the ensuing litigation.” Texaco, 939 F.2d at 798. 10 This motion requires me to consider, among other things, “whether the claims under 11 12 review [are] separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the 13 claims already determined [are] such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues 14 more than once even if there [are] subsequent appeals.” Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. 8. 15 “Similar legal facts or issues that may require the appellate court to review legal or factual issues 16 similar to those in the pending claims will ‘weigh heavily against entry of judgment’ under Rule 17 54(b). Henderson v. City and Cnty. San Francisco, No. 05-CV-0234-VRW, 2009 WL 2058369 at 18 *1 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2009) (quoting Morrison-Knudson Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th 19 20 Cir. 1981). The issues remaining for my consideration include Tetra Tech’s indemnification and 21 bad faith causes of action, along with AIG’s reimbursement claim. See Mot. 1, n.1; Dkt. No. 93 at 22 2. Each of these issues addresses similar legal and/or factual issues as those that I have already 23 addressed in the Prior Order. It makes little sense for me to allow Tetra Tech to appeal the duty to 24 defend issue on its own now as opposed to waiting for the case to be fully ripe for review. This is 25 particularly true since AIG has filed a motion for summary judgment that I will hear soon that may 26 27 well dispose of the remaining issues. I am quite sure the Ninth Circuit would not be interested in The equities also disfavor an entry of judgment. Tetra Tech argues that it would be 1 2 prejudiced “if it is forced to continue to defend itself in the Bayview action until the matter is 3 finally resolved . . . [and] further be prejudiced by entry of a judgment against Tetra Tech for 4 millions of dollars on AIG’s reimbursement claim in Jahr.” Mot. 12. That would be true if the 5 Prior Order is incorrect, but ignores the prejudice to AIG in waiting for the Ninth Circuit’s 6 decision on the duty to defend and, if the Prior Order is affirmed, then having to return to this 7 court to litigate the remaining reimbursement claim, and then facing a potential second appeal 8 from Tetra Tech. Oppo. 7. 9 10 Tetra Tech’s motion in the alternative, for an interlocutory appeal, also fails. Pursuant to 11 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) an Order qualifies for interlocutory appeal when the order “[1] involves a 12 controlling question of law as to which [2] there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion 13 and that [3] an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination 14 of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). As AIG argues, “[t]hat settled law might be applied 15 differently does not establish a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” Couch v. Telescope 16 Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010). Tetra Tech’s “strong disagreement with the Court’s ruling 17 18 is not sufficient for there to be a ‘substantial ground for difference.’” Id. 19 I understand that Tetra Tech disagrees with my conclusions in the Prior Order. In its 20 motion, Tetra Tech re-raises arguments to assert its view that I did not “correctly appl[y] 21 California law.” Mot. 13, 13–18. I thoroughly considered Tetra Tech’s position in the Prior Order 22 and I decline to reconsider it now. And for the reasons explained above, I do not conclude that 23 “an immediate appeal from the order” would “materially advance the ultimate termination of the 24 25 litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). To the contrary, it would significantly delay them. The hearing 26 on AIG’s motion on the outstanding issues is scheduled for December 10, 2025—less than fifty 27 days from now. And if Tetra Tech defeats summary judgment, I can set a trial well before a 1 motion is DENIED. 2 II. ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION 3 Tetra Tech timely filed an administrative motion following AIG’s filing of its Motion for 4 Summary Judgment to delay briefing until I rule on its motion for entry of judgment. I have now ruled. I partially grant Tetra Tech’s administrative motion and extend the outstanding briefing 6 somewhat. Tetra Tech’s Opposition is now due November 12, 2025, two weeks from today. 7 AIG’s Reply is extended until November 19, 2025. The hearing on the motion remains set on 8 December 10, 2025, at 2:00 p.m. 9 CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, Tetra Tech’s motion for entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) is DENIED. The November 5, 2025, hearing on the motion is VACATED. Tetra Tech’s 12 administrative motion is GRANTED IN PART as stated above. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED.
|| Dated: October 29, 2025 Q 16
= 17 8 iam H. Orrick United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28