1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JULIA TERYAEVA-REED, Case No. 24-cv-03910-JSW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL; DENYING 9 v. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 10 COLETTE S. PETERS, et al., (ECF No. 3) Defendants. 11
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, a federal prisoner in Miami, Florida proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights case 14 against officials of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). She is granted leave to proceed in 15 forma pauperis (“IFP”) in a separate order. For the reasons discussed below, the complaint is 16 dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 17 ANALYSIS 18 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 When a plaintiff is proceeding IFP, as in this case, "the court shall dismiss the case at any 20 time if the court determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal 21 (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 22 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 23 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 24 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; the 27 statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 1 which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 2 in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's 3 obligation to provide the 'grounds of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and 4 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 5 Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell 6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint 7 must proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. 8 B. LEGAL CLAIMS 9 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ transferring her from the Federal Correctional Institute 10 (“FCI”) in Dublin, California, to FCI Miami “without medical clearance and screening for 11 community placement” caused a number of adverse consequences, including the loss of her prison 12 job and property, delays in her pursuit of a sentence reduction and a motion for compassionate 13 release, “disrupted [her] established social ties,” and “adversely affected” her application for 14 placement in a halfway house. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) She also alleges FCI Miami is “comparable to 15 supermax” and has “no library, no rec, no religious services, no jobs and no meaningful 16 rehabil./programming for women.” (Id.) She seeks money damages and either release to a 17 halfway house or home confinement or transfer to FCI Tallahasee. (Id.) 18 The Supreme Court has held on three occasions that, even absent statutory authority, a 19 private right of action for damages may be implied from the Constitution itself for constitutional 20 violations by federal employees or their agents. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 21 Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392-97 (1971) (4th Amendment unreasonable search and seizure); Davis v. 22 Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979) (5th Amendment Due Process Clause gender 23 discrimination); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1980) (8th Amendment inadequate 24 medical treatment). 25 Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants caused her harm by transferring her to another 26 federal prison do not, even when liberally construed, amount to a violation of her constitutional 27 rights. Prisoners have no constitutional right to incarceration in a particular institution. See Olim 1 extinguished by his conviction that the state may generally confine or transfer him to any of its 2 institutions, to prisons in another state or to federal prisons, without offending the Constitution. 3 See id. (interstate prison transfer does not implicate Due Process Clause)), and Rizzo v. Dawson, 4 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (intrastate prison transfer does not implicate Due Process 5 Clause); see also Stewart v. McManus, 924 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1991) (no due process rights 6 implicated in transfer from state to federal prison). This is true even if, as alleged here, the 7 transfer is to a considerably less favorable institution. See Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 8 1221 (9th Cir. 1989) (transfer from work release center back to prison does not implicate due 9 process nor equal protection rights). Under this authority, Defendants’ transfer of Plaintiff from 10 FCI Dublin to FCI Miami, where the conditions are allegedly less favorable to Plaintiff, does not 11 implicate his constitutional rights. 12 Additionally, “Bivens, Davis, and Carlson – represent the only instances in which the 13 [Supreme] Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself.” 14 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017). The Court has made clear that “expanding the Bivens 15 remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity,” id. at 1857 (citation omitted), and will not be 16 available if there are “‘special factors’ counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action 17 by Congress,” id. at 1848 (citation omitted). The Court has emphasized that “for almost 40 years, 18 we have consistently rebuffed requests to add to the claims allowed under Bivens.” Hernandez v. 19 Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020); see also Chambers v. C. Herrera, 78 F.4th 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 20 2023) (“Under Egbert v. Boule, [596 U.S. 482, 501 (2022)], most claims seeking to expand Bivens 21 are ‘dead on arrival’”). “A plaintiff cannot justify a Bivens extension based on ‘parallel 22 circumstances’ with Bivens, Passman, or Carlson unless he also satisfies the analytic framework’ 23 prescribed by” Ziglar and Hernandez. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 501 (2022) (quoting Ziglar, 24 582 U.S. at 138). Plaintiff has cited no authority, nor is the Court aware of any, extending the 25 Bivens remedy to prison-transfer claims, or that such claims may satisfy the analytic framework 26 prescribed by Ziglar and Hernandez. 27 Plaintiff also claims that the Defendants’ order to close FCI Dublin and transfer its inmates 1 free speech and to access the courts.” (ECF No.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JULIA TERYAEVA-REED, Case No. 24-cv-03910-JSW
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL; DENYING 9 v. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 10 COLETTE S. PETERS, et al., (ECF No. 3) Defendants. 11
12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, a federal prisoner in Miami, Florida proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights case 14 against officials of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). She is granted leave to proceed in 15 forma pauperis (“IFP”) in a separate order. For the reasons discussed below, the complaint is 16 dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 17 ANALYSIS 18 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 When a plaintiff is proceeding IFP, as in this case, "the court shall dismiss the case at any 20 time if the court determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal 21 (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 22 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 23 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 24 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; the 27 statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 1 which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 2 in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's 3 obligation to provide the 'grounds of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and 4 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 5 Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell 6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint 7 must proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. 8 B. LEGAL CLAIMS 9 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ transferring her from the Federal Correctional Institute 10 (“FCI”) in Dublin, California, to FCI Miami “without medical clearance and screening for 11 community placement” caused a number of adverse consequences, including the loss of her prison 12 job and property, delays in her pursuit of a sentence reduction and a motion for compassionate 13 release, “disrupted [her] established social ties,” and “adversely affected” her application for 14 placement in a halfway house. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) She also alleges FCI Miami is “comparable to 15 supermax” and has “no library, no rec, no religious services, no jobs and no meaningful 16 rehabil./programming for women.” (Id.) She seeks money damages and either release to a 17 halfway house or home confinement or transfer to FCI Tallahasee. (Id.) 18 The Supreme Court has held on three occasions that, even absent statutory authority, a 19 private right of action for damages may be implied from the Constitution itself for constitutional 20 violations by federal employees or their agents. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 21 Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392-97 (1971) (4th Amendment unreasonable search and seizure); Davis v. 22 Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979) (5th Amendment Due Process Clause gender 23 discrimination); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1980) (8th Amendment inadequate 24 medical treatment). 25 Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants caused her harm by transferring her to another 26 federal prison do not, even when liberally construed, amount to a violation of her constitutional 27 rights. Prisoners have no constitutional right to incarceration in a particular institution. See Olim 1 extinguished by his conviction that the state may generally confine or transfer him to any of its 2 institutions, to prisons in another state or to federal prisons, without offending the Constitution. 3 See id. (interstate prison transfer does not implicate Due Process Clause)), and Rizzo v. Dawson, 4 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (intrastate prison transfer does not implicate Due Process 5 Clause); see also Stewart v. McManus, 924 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1991) (no due process rights 6 implicated in transfer from state to federal prison). This is true even if, as alleged here, the 7 transfer is to a considerably less favorable institution. See Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 8 1221 (9th Cir. 1989) (transfer from work release center back to prison does not implicate due 9 process nor equal protection rights). Under this authority, Defendants’ transfer of Plaintiff from 10 FCI Dublin to FCI Miami, where the conditions are allegedly less favorable to Plaintiff, does not 11 implicate his constitutional rights. 12 Additionally, “Bivens, Davis, and Carlson – represent the only instances in which the 13 [Supreme] Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself.” 14 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017). The Court has made clear that “expanding the Bivens 15 remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity,” id. at 1857 (citation omitted), and will not be 16 available if there are “‘special factors’ counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action 17 by Congress,” id. at 1848 (citation omitted). The Court has emphasized that “for almost 40 years, 18 we have consistently rebuffed requests to add to the claims allowed under Bivens.” Hernandez v. 19 Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020); see also Chambers v. C. Herrera, 78 F.4th 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 20 2023) (“Under Egbert v. Boule, [596 U.S. 482, 501 (2022)], most claims seeking to expand Bivens 21 are ‘dead on arrival’”). “A plaintiff cannot justify a Bivens extension based on ‘parallel 22 circumstances’ with Bivens, Passman, or Carlson unless he also satisfies the analytic framework’ 23 prescribed by” Ziglar and Hernandez. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 501 (2022) (quoting Ziglar, 24 582 U.S. at 138). Plaintiff has cited no authority, nor is the Court aware of any, extending the 25 Bivens remedy to prison-transfer claims, or that such claims may satisfy the analytic framework 26 prescribed by Ziglar and Hernandez. 27 Plaintiff also claims that the Defendants’ order to close FCI Dublin and transfer its inmates 1 free speech and to access the courts.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) “Within the prison context, a viable claim 2 of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took 3 some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and 4 that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action 5 did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 6 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). There is no allegation as to the protected First 7 Amendment speech or other conduct Plaintiff engaged in that led to the decision to close FCI 8 Dublin. She does not allege she filed or was a party in lawsuits that led to the closure, or that the 9 || closure was taken in response to her speech or the filing of those lawsuits as opposed to rulings 10 || made by the court in those lawsuits. As a result, she has not alleged the elements of a cognizable 11 retaliation claim. Furthermore, even if she could make such allegations, there is no authority of 12 || which the Court is aware that the Bivens remedy may be extended to such a retaliation claim. 5 13 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable claim for relief based upon 14 || her transfer to another prison. No amendment will be allowed because her allegations make clear 3 15 that she cannot state a cognizable Bivens claim for such a transfer or for retaliation. 16 CONCLUSION 3 17 For the reasons set out above, Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED without leave to amend. 18 || In light of this ruling, and because the interests of justice do not require otherwise, the motion for 19 appointment of counsel is DENIED. 20 The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 || Dated: July 24, 2024 23 SO } y 24 Vi YA, □ AWhie 25 Jeb REY 5. WHITE Untited/States strict Judge 26 ‘
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