[449]*449MEMORANDUM
Stengel, District Judge
This case is part of a Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) involving claims of liver damage from the use of Tylenol at or just above the recommended dosage.1 The first “bellwether” case is scheduled for trial.2 [450]*450The plaintiff plans to offer Dr. Timothy Davern, M.D. as a general and specific causation expert. Dr. Davern contends that recommended doses of acetaminophen, the main ingredient in Tylenol, can cause acute liver failure (ALF). He is of the opinion that the decedent, Denice Hayes, died of acetaminophen-induced ALF after taking recommended doses. The defendants move to exclude his testimony under Daubert. For the reasons stated below, I will deny their motion.3
I. LEGAL STANDARD
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 as well as by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and its progeny.4 See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 735 (3d Cir.1994). “Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a trial judge acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ to ensure that ‘any and all expert testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but also reliable.’ ” Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir.2008)(quoting Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir.1997)). The Third Circuit recognizes a “liberal policy of admissibility” regarding Rule 702. Pineda, 520 F.3d at 243 (quoting Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 806); United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 173 (3d Cir.2010).5
“[Bjecause expert evidence is often more misleading than other evidence, Rule 403 gives a judge more power over experts than over lay witnesses.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 747 (3d Cir.1994). However, “in order for a district court to exclude scientific evidence, there must be something particularly confusing about the scientific evidence at issue—something other than the general complexity of scientific evidence.” Id.
a. Rule 702
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has three major requirements: 1) the expert must be qualified; 2) the expert must testify about matters requiring scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge; and 3) the testimony must assist the trier of fact.6 Pineda, 520 F.3d at 243 (citing Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 806). 702’s inquiry should be a “flexible one.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow [451]*451Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
i. Expert Must Be Qualified
An expert’s qualifications may include education, provided it is in a field related to the one in which the expert intends to testify. Fedor v. Freightliner, Inc., 193 F.Supp.2d 820, 827 (E.D.Pa.2002). Overall, the court will consider both academic training and practical experience to determine if the expert has “more knowledge than the average lay person” on the subject. Id at 827-28 (citing Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 627 (3d Cir.1996)). “An expert may be generally qualified but may lack qualifications to testify outside his area of expertise.” Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 322 (3d Cir.2003).
However, this does not mean that the “best qualified” expert must testify. “[W]itnesses may be competent to testify as experts even though they may not, in the court’s eyes, be the ‘best’ qualified.” Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir.1996).7 “Rule 702 and Daubert put their faith in an adversary system designed to expose flawed expertise.” U.S. v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 244-45 (3d Cir.2004)(citations omitted). “As long as an expert’s scientific testimony rests upon ‘good grounds, based on what is known,’ it should be tested by the adversary process—competing expert testimony and active cross-examination—rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.” Id at 244 (citations omitted).
ii. Expert’s Methods Must be Reliable
This Circuit interprets the second factor as one of “reliability,” i.e., the testimony is admissible so long as the process or technique the expert used in formulating the opinion is reliable. Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244. An expert’s opinion need not be correct, only reliable. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir.1994)(“This does not mean that plaintiffs have to prove then-case twice—they do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions are reliable.” (emphasis in original)). “[A]n expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. “[I]t is the burden of the party offering the expert scientific testimony to demonstrate reliability by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 705 (3d Cir.1999)(citing Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 744).8
“Rule 702 grants the district judge the discretionary authority, reviewable for its abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Judges considering this factor should look to whether a theory, technique, or opinion can be tested or has been subject to peer review or publication. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786. “The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer [452]
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[449]*449MEMORANDUM
Stengel, District Judge
This case is part of a Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) involving claims of liver damage from the use of Tylenol at or just above the recommended dosage.1 The first “bellwether” case is scheduled for trial.2 [450]*450The plaintiff plans to offer Dr. Timothy Davern, M.D. as a general and specific causation expert. Dr. Davern contends that recommended doses of acetaminophen, the main ingredient in Tylenol, can cause acute liver failure (ALF). He is of the opinion that the decedent, Denice Hayes, died of acetaminophen-induced ALF after taking recommended doses. The defendants move to exclude his testimony under Daubert. For the reasons stated below, I will deny their motion.3
I. LEGAL STANDARD
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 as well as by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and its progeny.4 See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 735 (3d Cir.1994). “Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a trial judge acts as a ‘gatekeeper’ to ensure that ‘any and all expert testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but also reliable.’ ” Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir.2008)(quoting Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir.1997)). The Third Circuit recognizes a “liberal policy of admissibility” regarding Rule 702. Pineda, 520 F.3d at 243 (quoting Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 806); United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 173 (3d Cir.2010).5
“[Bjecause expert evidence is often more misleading than other evidence, Rule 403 gives a judge more power over experts than over lay witnesses.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 747 (3d Cir.1994). However, “in order for a district court to exclude scientific evidence, there must be something particularly confusing about the scientific evidence at issue—something other than the general complexity of scientific evidence.” Id.
a. Rule 702
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has three major requirements: 1) the expert must be qualified; 2) the expert must testify about matters requiring scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge; and 3) the testimony must assist the trier of fact.6 Pineda, 520 F.3d at 243 (citing Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 806). 702’s inquiry should be a “flexible one.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow [451]*451Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
i. Expert Must Be Qualified
An expert’s qualifications may include education, provided it is in a field related to the one in which the expert intends to testify. Fedor v. Freightliner, Inc., 193 F.Supp.2d 820, 827 (E.D.Pa.2002). Overall, the court will consider both academic training and practical experience to determine if the expert has “more knowledge than the average lay person” on the subject. Id at 827-28 (citing Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 627 (3d Cir.1996)). “An expert may be generally qualified but may lack qualifications to testify outside his area of expertise.” Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 322 (3d Cir.2003).
However, this does not mean that the “best qualified” expert must testify. “[W]itnesses may be competent to testify as experts even though they may not, in the court’s eyes, be the ‘best’ qualified.” Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir.1996).7 “Rule 702 and Daubert put their faith in an adversary system designed to expose flawed expertise.” U.S. v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 244-45 (3d Cir.2004)(citations omitted). “As long as an expert’s scientific testimony rests upon ‘good grounds, based on what is known,’ it should be tested by the adversary process—competing expert testimony and active cross-examination—rather than excluded from jurors’ scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.” Id at 244 (citations omitted).
ii. Expert’s Methods Must be Reliable
This Circuit interprets the second factor as one of “reliability,” i.e., the testimony is admissible so long as the process or technique the expert used in formulating the opinion is reliable. Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244. An expert’s opinion need not be correct, only reliable. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir.1994)(“This does not mean that plaintiffs have to prove then-case twice—they do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions are reliable.” (emphasis in original)). “[A]n expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. “[I]t is the burden of the party offering the expert scientific testimony to demonstrate reliability by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 705 (3d Cir.1999)(citing Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 744).8
“Rule 702 grants the district judge the discretionary authority, reviewable for its abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Judges considering this factor should look to whether a theory, technique, or opinion can be tested or has been subject to peer review or publication. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786. “The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer [452]*452reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.” Id. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786. A court should also consider the known or potential rate of error involved in a scientific method. Id. “Reliability” does not require that a technique or methodology be generally accepted by a scientific community. Id. See also id. at 597-98, 113 S.Ct. 2786. However, “[widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible” while a minimally supported technique “may properly be viewed with skepticism.” Id.
iii. Expert Must be Helpful
The third factor “is typically understood in terms of whether there is a sufficient ‘fit’ between the expert’s testimony and the facts that the jury is being asked to consider.” United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 172-73 (3d Cir.2010)(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786). See also In re: TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 670 (3d Cir.1999). This factor is about relevance. “Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (quoting 3 Weinstein & Berger ¶ 702[02], p. 702-18). “Rule 702’s ‘helpfulness’ standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.” Id. at 591-92,113 S.Ct. 2786.
b. Rule 703
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703, the data underlying the expert’s opinion is the central focus. Rule 703 states:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Fed. R. Evid. 703. The trial court must evaluate whether the data used by an expert is reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 747-49 (3d Cir.1994).
I. Dr. Davern is a Leading Expert in DILI9
Timothy Davern, M.D. is a board-certified gastroenterologist and hepatologist, specializing in liver transplants. He is the Director of the Acute Liver Failure Program at California Pacific Medical Center (CPMC) in San Francisco, California. Prior to joining CPMC, he held several academic positions at University of California, San Francisco (UCSF), including Associate Professor of Medicine.
Dr. Davern is an active investigator for the Acute Liver Failure Study Group (ALFSG). He has been involved with the ALFSG for almost 15 years. He has personally enrolled nearly 300 ALFSG cases, most of which were due to acetaminophen toxicity. He represented ¿he American Association for the Study of Liver Disease (AASLD) at the joint meeting of three [453]*453Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Advisory Committees, held in June 2009. He presented data from the ALFSG on unintentional acetaminophen poisoning at that joint meeting. He was also the principal investigator for the National Institutes o£ Health (NIH)-funded Drug-Induced Liver Injury Network (DILIN) Study from its inception in 2004 until 2014.
Dr. Davern is a national-recognized expert in drug-induced liver injury (DILI).10 He has published close to 100 articles, including peer-reviewed research, book chapters and abstracts—almost all of which have to do with acute liver failure (ALF), drug-induced liver disease, and acetaminophen-induced ALF.11 He has conducted research related to acetaminophen-induced liver injury. In addition, he has written about the DILI “causation assessment methodology” he uses in this case. He wrote a book chapter called “Drug-Induced Liver Disease” at the re[454]*454quest of McNeil’s expert, Steven Flamm, M.D.12
II. Dr. Davern’s General Causation Methodology is Reliable13
Dr. Davem opines that acetaminophen-induced livery injury can occur at or near 4 grams—the daily recommended dose of acetaminophen at the time of the decedent’s death.14 Dr. Davern was of this opinion prior to this litigation; he has routinely limited his patients to only 2 grams of acetaminophen a day.15 He explained that certain factors enhance susceptibility to acetaminophen poisoning: chronic alcohol use, female gender, chronic ingestion of certain drugs, fasting/malnutrition, and/or gastric bypass surgery.16 He also noted that not all the risk factors which could cause acetaminophen-induced liver injury are known, making a “wide margin of safety” (i.e., the difference between a safe dose and a toxic dose) important for everyone.17 In making his determination, he relied on the available information on this subject area—case series, case reports, clinical trials, FDA documents, animal studies—and his own clinical experience.18
a. Lack of Epidemiological and Case-controlled Studies Does Not Render Opinion Unreliable19
The defendants argue that Dr. Davern’s general causation opinion about [455]*455the risk of acetaminophen-induced ALF at recommended doses is flawed because it is not supported by statistically-significant data.20
The Fourth Circuit addressed this exact same argument by the defendants in a [456]*456similar case decided over twenty years ago. In Benedi v. McNeil, a jury found that the defendants failed to warn consumers about the risk of liver damage when acetaminophen was taken with alcohol. Benedi v, McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1381 (4th Cir.1995).21 On appeal, McNeil argued that Benedi’s experts should have been excluded because they “did not rely upon epidemiological data in formulating their opinions.” Id. at 1384. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument:
[W]e do not read Daubert as restricting expert testimony to opinions that are based solely upon epidemiological data. Daubert merely requires that the expert testimony be both relevant and reliable; and Daubert clearly vests the district courts with discretion to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. Under the Daubert standard, epidemiological studies are not necessarily required to prove causation, as long as the methodology employed by the expert in reaching his or her conclusion is sound.
Id. See also id, at 1384-85. While epidemiological studies can be valuable evidence of causation, they are not a pre-requisite for products liability causation expert testimony in this Circuit.22 The defense experts admit that having case-controlled epidemiological data is not a requirement in finding causation for drug-induced liver injuries.23
[457]*457In this case especially, epidemiological studies and/or statistically-significant clinical evidence would be difficult to obtain. Drug-induced ALF and severe liver injury are rare.24 Case-controlled epidemiologic studies of rare diseases, such as ALF, with control groups are difficult to perform. Drug-induced ALF is unlikely to ever be seen in a human prospective placebo-controlled clinical trial, which studies a small number of patients.25 Because of the rarity of drug-induced ALF, randomized placebo-controlled clinical trials would not necessarily establish a connection between acetaminophen and ALF.26
The experts in this case recognize that the types of studies the defendants claim are needed to make an opinion reliable— human prospective placebo-controlled clinical trials—are not feasible or ethical.27 During his deposition, Dr. Anthony Temple, former Vice President of Medical Affairs at McNeil, admitted that McNeil consulted with epidemiologists to design a statistically-significant controlled study which would prove or disprove acetaminophen-induced ALF; they found such a study was not feasible and/or was too expensive to conduct.28
[458]*458Like the Fourth Circuit, I find the defendants’ argument unpersuasive.29 Dr. Davern has extensive clinical experience treating patients with acetaminophen-induced liver injury. He has enrolled 300 patients in ALFSG studies. Most of them suffered from acetaminophen poisoning.30 He has presented to the FDA Advisory Committees about unintentional acetaminophen-induced liver injury. As a leading expert in acetaminophen-induced liver injury, he relies on his own clinical experience and available research in rendering his opinions.31 He weighs the “totality of the evidence”—acetaminophen clinical trials, animal studies, numerous case reports and case series, and his own clinical experience—in rendering his opinion.32 I see nothing wrong with his general causation methodology.33
[459]*459b. Reliance on the Watkins study is Appropriate
The defendants argue the Dr. Davern’s reliance on a study from 2006 authored by Dr. Paul Watkins is not appropriate because the article discusses elevated aminotransferase levels, not ALF.34 See Watkins, P., et al., “Amino-transferase Elevations in Healthy Adults Receiving 4 grams of Acetaminophen Daily: A Randomized Controlled Trial,” JAMA, 296:87-93, 2006 (Doc. No. 155, Ex. 14).
The Watkins article found that some adults had developed abnormalities in liver enzymes (e.g., aminotransferases or ALTs) after taking recommended doses of acetaminophen.35 ALF occurs when the liver [460]*460is severely damaged. Elevated ALTs are markers of liver damage (i.e., liver cell death).36 Increased ALTs do not necessarily lead to ALF.37 However, elevated ALTs are one early indicator that ALF might occur.38 The defendants fail to acknowledge the fact that the Watkins study was stopped early because the authors were concerned about the harm being caused to study participants.39 It would not have found ALF because inducing ALF—a life threatening condition—would have been unethical. I see no problem with Dr. Da-vern’s use of the Watkins data to support his opinions, along with the many other sources he cites.40
[461]*461c. Dr. Davern’s Use of Case Reports is Appropriate in this Case
The defendants argue that Dr. Davern cannot use case reports to establish causation.41 It is true that case reports and anecdotal evidence alone may not be sufficient support for a causation opinion. See, e.g., Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F.Supp. 1441, 1488 (D.V.I.1994)(“... anecdotal human data, whether from published case reports, DERs or other litigation, have inherent biases that make them unreliable.”). However, case reports considered in conjunction with other.evidence may be an appropriate basis for an expert’s causation opinion.42 Dr. Davern does not rely solely on case reports in rendering his opinion. The case reports and case series he does cite also include controls on the information analyzed, which enhance their reliability.43
[462]*462In addition, case reports and case series are the types of information on which DILI experts rely. See Fed. R. Evid. 703; Wolfe v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., No. 07-348, 2012 WL 38694, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 9, 2012); FDA Working Group Report (2008) at p. 11, n. 41 (Doc. No. 154, Ex. 30)(ex-plaining how members of the working group looked at two different databases of case reports/adverse event reports (AERs) in finding that there is a risk of liver injury for some people at 4 grams).44 As explained above, epidemiological or case-controlled studies for acetaminophen-induced liver injuries are not available. In the absence of epidemiological data, case reports and case series may be valuable sources of information for DILI experts, doctors, and scientists in determining causation.45 III. Dr, Davern’s Specific Causation Opinion is Reliable46
After reviewing Ms. Hayes’ medical records, Dr. Davern opined that Ms. Hayes died of acetaminophen-induced ALF after taking recommended doses of Tylenol. He ruled out alternative causes and noted that Ms. Hayes’ biochemical patterns were consistent with acetaminophen-induced ALF.47 He noted that her prior gastric bypass surgery was a risk factor.
Dr. Davern uses a “causality assessment methodology” (CAM) in rendering his specific causation opinion.48 This is the same methodology Dr. Davern uses when treating patients. While there are variations among CAM tools, at the core of this methodology is a “differential assessment.” DILI causality assessments consider a combination of factors, including: temporal associations, the rate of improvement after [463]*463cessation of the drug, the definitive exclusion of alternative causes, and the “signature” of the drug as revealed in clinical trials and experience.49 This “science of [DILI] causality assessment” has been published by DILI experts in various forms since the 1980s.50
a. Use of the Holt Study in Rendering his Specific Causation Opinion
The defendants argue that Dr. Davern’s general causation opinion that gastric bypass surgery may be a risk factor for acetaminophen-induced acute liver failure (ALF) is not reliable because Dr. Davern only cites one study he published in 2014. See E. Holt, et al., “Acute Liver Failure Due to Acetaminophen Poisoning in Patients With Prior Weight Loss Surgery: A Case Series,” J. Clin. Gastroenterol., Yol. 00, No. 00, 1-4 (2014)(Doc. No. 154, Ex. 29). This study was published several years after the decedent’s death. Dr. Da-vern’s deposition testimony, however, makes clear that his opinion about gastric bypass surgery ties into his opinions about fasting and malnutrition.51 He bases his opinions not simply on the findings in the Holt study, but also his understanding of how fasting and malnutrition—and, in turn, gastric bypass surgery—can affect glutathione levels.52 Glutathione is neces[464]*464sary to neutralize toxins caused by acetaminophen.
The defendants also claim the Holt study cannot be relied on because it does not report dosing. Dr. Davern offers other evidence to support his opinion that acetaminophen-induced ALF can occur at recommended doses.53 That evidence is enough to support that part of his opinion.
b. Dr. Davern’s Discussion of Sepsis was Appropriate
The defendants argue that Dr. Davern’s specific causation opinion is flawed because he didn’t specifically note that he ruled out sepsis as an alternative cause. Only after he was served the defendants’ expert reports did he address sepsis. Dr. Davern explained during his deposition why he did not even consider sepsis as an alternative cause before reading the defendants’ expert reports—because it was “a far reach.”54 Dr. Davern has had considerable experience with sepsis, treating many patients with it during his career.55 He explained in his response to defendants’ expert reports that he “did not include sepsis in [his] initial report because there was no evidence [Ms. Hayes] had any type of significant infection at presentation, much less an infectious process that progressed or developed into sepsis.”56 He explained how her blood cultures and urine tests were negative, none of her treating physicians considered sepsis as a cause of death, that she did not present with an infection when she was in the hospital the week before her death, and that she did not show other signs of sepsis (i.e., deeply jaundiced skin, elevated ammonia, etc.).57 The defendants’ argument is unpersuasive.
c. Use of McNeil’s CAM Instrument
Lastly, the defendants argue that Dr. Davern’s causality assessment of Ms. Hayes’ case is flawed because he “relies upon a causality assessment form that is not generally accepted in the scientific community.” In fact, the form Dr. Davern uses is the one McNeil uses in determining causality, as confirmed by Dr. Anthony Temple (former Vice President of Medical Affairs at McNeil) during his deposition.58 This form was created with the assistance of Dr. Neil Kaplowitz, a leading DILI expert.59 This argument borders on ridicu[465]*465lous. McNeil criticizes Dr. Davern for using a form McNeil has approved. McNeil’s CAM assessment instrument—developed by a leading DILI expert for a leading producer of acetaminophen—shows all signs of being a reliable methodological tool for determining causation in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, I find that Dr. Davem’s opinions are reliable and appropriate under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence. I will DENY the defendants’ motion.
An appropriate Order follows.