Case: 16-12872 Date Filed: 08/22/2017 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 16-12872 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cv-00106-LGW-RSB
TERRY N. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MELISA COMBS FORSYTH, Prison Psychologist, Jesup FCI, P. G. RIENHARD, Judge, RICHARD A. POSNER, Judge, FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Judge, ROSEMARY COLLINS, Judge, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ________________________
(August 22, 2017) Case: 16-12872 Date Filed: 08/22/2017 Page: 2 of 6
Before HULL, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Terry Taylor, proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte dismissal of his
complaint. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Mr. Taylor, a then-federal prisoner, filed a complaint in the Southern District
of Georgia against several federal and state judges in Illinois, the Clerk of the
Court for the Seventh Circuit, Gino J. Agnello, and two psychologists, Melisa
Forsyth and Terrance Lichtenward, claiming that they violated his constitutional
rights and certain federal statutes. Although difficult to decipher, it appears that
Mr. Taylor alleges that Ms. Forsyth, who was a psychologist at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Jesup, Georgia, committed “identity theft” and “fraud”
by assuming someone else’s identity and convincing him to marry her in Illinois.
D.E. 1 at 5. He alleges that certain of the defendants conspired to put him in an
Illinois mental institution as retaliation for attempting to bring Ms. Forsyth’s
actions to light. He also claims that his constitutional rights were violated through
actions related to his court proceedings in Illinois state court, the Northern District
of Illinois, and the Seventh Circuit.
Upon conducting a frivolity review, a magistrate judge recommended that
the complaint be dismissed as to all of the defendants because the Southern District
of Georgia was not the proper venue for Mr. Taylor’s lawsuit, among other
2 Case: 16-12872 Date Filed: 08/22/2017 Page: 3 of 6
rationales. After reviewing Mr. Taylor’s objections to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge in
part and concluded that venue was improper as to all of the defendants except
Ms. Forsyth because it assumed as true Mr. Taylor’s assertion that Ms. Forsyth
lived in the Southern District of Georgia. Notwithstanding this assumption, the
district court dismissed Mr. Taylor’s claims against Ms. Forsyth because he failed
to state a claim against her. The district court also denied Mr. Taylor in forma
pauperis status on appeal.
Mr. Taylor then filed several motions for reconsideration related to the
district court’s dismissal of his complaint, denial of in forma pauperis status, and
prior ruling on his request for the appointment of counsel. The district court
denied Mr. Taylor’s motions.1
I
We review the district court’s dismissal of a lawsuit for improper venue for
an abuse of discretion, see Algodonera De La Cabezas, S.A. v. Am. Suisse Capital,
Inc., 432 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005), and a district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of a prisoner’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim de novo. See Boxer X v.
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). We construe Mr. Taylor’s filings
1 Mr. Taylor argues on appeal that he should have counsel appointed on his behalf. We have already reviewed and denied his motion for appointment of counsel and corresponding motion for reconsideration. See App. D.E. 11, 14. We deny his current request as well. 3 Case: 16-12872 Date Filed: 08/22/2017 Page: 4 of 6
liberally because he is proceeding pro se, but keep in mind that we cannot act as de
facto counsel for Mr. Taylor either. See Campbell v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 760 F.3d
1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).
II
On appeal, Mr. Taylor argues that the district court improperly dismissed his
complaint. Although he reiterates certain of his allegations against some
defendants, he fails to address the district court’s bases for dismissing his
complaint and explain why the district court erred.
As to Ms. Forsyth, Mr. Taylor reiterates that she resides in the Southern
District of Georgia and argues that a Georgia state court would not be the
appropriate venue to bring his claims against her. Although unclear, it appears that
Mr. Taylor argues that Ms. Forsyth’s actions violated his Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and that he has a claim under the
“Mental Cruelty Act.” He also asserts that her actions caused him to lose his First
Amendment right to seek redress from the courts.
We, however, agree with the district court that Mr. Taylor has failed to state
a claim against Ms. Forsyth. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Mr. Taylor’s complaint
is devoid of any allegation connecting Ms. Forsyth’s alleged acts and a
corresponding constitutional violation, notwithstanding Mr. Taylor’s efforts to
explain his claims now.
4 Case: 16-12872 Date Filed: 08/22/2017 Page: 5 of 6
Even if Mr. Taylor had properly alleged the claims against Ms. Forsyth and
they were viable under the law, Ms. Forsyth’s alleged wrongs purportedly took
place in 1994—years after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations to
bring a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed’l Bureau of Narcotics,
402 U.S. 399 (1971) action. See Crowe v. Donald, 528 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir.
2008) (explaining that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claim in Georgia is two
years); Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that the same
statute of limitations period governing § 1983 actions apply to Bivens actions and
that courts “generally apply § 1983 law to Bivens cases”). See also Chappell v.
Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the statute of
limitations for § 1983 action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have
known that they suffered the injury and who inflicted the injury). So, in any event,
Mr. Taylor’s claims against Ms. Forsyth are time-barred. 2
2 Mr. Taylor suggested in his objections to the magistrate’s report and recommendation that his claims against Ms. Forsyth could not be time-barred because he did not know of her identity until 2014. This is contradicted by the statement in his complaint that he brought a claim alleging fraud against her in 1996. Even using a date in 1996 as the time of accrual, Mr. Taylor’s claim is time-barred.
Mr. Taylor also claimed in his objections to the magistrate’s report and recommendation that he filed a complaint against Ms. Forsyth in the Northern District of Oklahoma and it was the dismissal of that case that prompted him to file suit in the Southern District of Georgia.
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Case: 16-12872 Date Filed: 08/22/2017 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 16-12872 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cv-00106-LGW-RSB
TERRY N. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MELISA COMBS FORSYTH, Prison Psychologist, Jesup FCI, P. G. RIENHARD, Judge, RICHARD A. POSNER, Judge, FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Judge, ROSEMARY COLLINS, Judge, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ________________________
(August 22, 2017) Case: 16-12872 Date Filed: 08/22/2017 Page: 2 of 6
Before HULL, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Terry Taylor, proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte dismissal of his
complaint. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Mr. Taylor, a then-federal prisoner, filed a complaint in the Southern District
of Georgia against several federal and state judges in Illinois, the Clerk of the
Court for the Seventh Circuit, Gino J. Agnello, and two psychologists, Melisa
Forsyth and Terrance Lichtenward, claiming that they violated his constitutional
rights and certain federal statutes. Although difficult to decipher, it appears that
Mr. Taylor alleges that Ms. Forsyth, who was a psychologist at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Jesup, Georgia, committed “identity theft” and “fraud”
by assuming someone else’s identity and convincing him to marry her in Illinois.
D.E. 1 at 5. He alleges that certain of the defendants conspired to put him in an
Illinois mental institution as retaliation for attempting to bring Ms. Forsyth’s
actions to light. He also claims that his constitutional rights were violated through
actions related to his court proceedings in Illinois state court, the Northern District
of Illinois, and the Seventh Circuit.
Upon conducting a frivolity review, a magistrate judge recommended that
the complaint be dismissed as to all of the defendants because the Southern District
of Georgia was not the proper venue for Mr. Taylor’s lawsuit, among other
2 Case: 16-12872 Date Filed: 08/22/2017 Page: 3 of 6
rationales. After reviewing Mr. Taylor’s objections to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge in
part and concluded that venue was improper as to all of the defendants except
Ms. Forsyth because it assumed as true Mr. Taylor’s assertion that Ms. Forsyth
lived in the Southern District of Georgia. Notwithstanding this assumption, the
district court dismissed Mr. Taylor’s claims against Ms. Forsyth because he failed
to state a claim against her. The district court also denied Mr. Taylor in forma
pauperis status on appeal.
Mr. Taylor then filed several motions for reconsideration related to the
district court’s dismissal of his complaint, denial of in forma pauperis status, and
prior ruling on his request for the appointment of counsel. The district court
denied Mr. Taylor’s motions.1
I
We review the district court’s dismissal of a lawsuit for improper venue for
an abuse of discretion, see Algodonera De La Cabezas, S.A. v. Am. Suisse Capital,
Inc., 432 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005), and a district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of a prisoner’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim de novo. See Boxer X v.
Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). We construe Mr. Taylor’s filings
1 Mr. Taylor argues on appeal that he should have counsel appointed on his behalf. We have already reviewed and denied his motion for appointment of counsel and corresponding motion for reconsideration. See App. D.E. 11, 14. We deny his current request as well. 3 Case: 16-12872 Date Filed: 08/22/2017 Page: 4 of 6
liberally because he is proceeding pro se, but keep in mind that we cannot act as de
facto counsel for Mr. Taylor either. See Campbell v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 760 F.3d
1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).
II
On appeal, Mr. Taylor argues that the district court improperly dismissed his
complaint. Although he reiterates certain of his allegations against some
defendants, he fails to address the district court’s bases for dismissing his
complaint and explain why the district court erred.
As to Ms. Forsyth, Mr. Taylor reiterates that she resides in the Southern
District of Georgia and argues that a Georgia state court would not be the
appropriate venue to bring his claims against her. Although unclear, it appears that
Mr. Taylor argues that Ms. Forsyth’s actions violated his Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and that he has a claim under the
“Mental Cruelty Act.” He also asserts that her actions caused him to lose his First
Amendment right to seek redress from the courts.
We, however, agree with the district court that Mr. Taylor has failed to state
a claim against Ms. Forsyth. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Mr. Taylor’s complaint
is devoid of any allegation connecting Ms. Forsyth’s alleged acts and a
corresponding constitutional violation, notwithstanding Mr. Taylor’s efforts to
explain his claims now.
4 Case: 16-12872 Date Filed: 08/22/2017 Page: 5 of 6
Even if Mr. Taylor had properly alleged the claims against Ms. Forsyth and
they were viable under the law, Ms. Forsyth’s alleged wrongs purportedly took
place in 1994—years after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations to
bring a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed’l Bureau of Narcotics,
402 U.S. 399 (1971) action. See Crowe v. Donald, 528 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir.
2008) (explaining that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claim in Georgia is two
years); Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that the same
statute of limitations period governing § 1983 actions apply to Bivens actions and
that courts “generally apply § 1983 law to Bivens cases”). See also Chappell v.
Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the statute of
limitations for § 1983 action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have
known that they suffered the injury and who inflicted the injury). So, in any event,
Mr. Taylor’s claims against Ms. Forsyth are time-barred. 2
2 Mr. Taylor suggested in his objections to the magistrate’s report and recommendation that his claims against Ms. Forsyth could not be time-barred because he did not know of her identity until 2014. This is contradicted by the statement in his complaint that he brought a claim alleging fraud against her in 1996. Even using a date in 1996 as the time of accrual, Mr. Taylor’s claim is time-barred.
Mr. Taylor also claimed in his objections to the magistrate’s report and recommendation that he filed a complaint against Ms. Forsyth in the Northern District of Oklahoma and it was the dismissal of that case that prompted him to file suit in the Southern District of Georgia. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on improper venue grounds but also suggested that Mr. Taylor’s claims were time-barred. See Taylor v. Tulsa Welding School, 604 F. App’x 673, 677 & n.8 (10th Cir. 2015). So, even if we ignore Mr. Taylor’s own statements in his complaint, we know that he knew about Ms. Forsyth’s identity in June of 2014 and therefore, his filing in July of 2016 still falls outside the two-year statute of limitations period. 5 Case: 16-12872 Date Filed: 08/22/2017 Page: 6 of 6
As to the other defendants, Mr. Taylor does not address why his claims
against them should be adjudicated in the Southern District of Georgia. He merely
reiterates his allegations against some of the defendants and presents broad
statements about venue being proper. Mr. Taylor does not attempt to explain how
any of the bases for proper venue apply, and with the limited information at our
disposal, we cannot determine how any basis applies either.
Therefore, we similarly affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims
against the other defendants. See Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278
(11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n appellant’s simply stating that an issue exists, without
further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue and
precludes our considering the issue on appeal.”). 3
III
The district court properly dismissed Mr. Taylor’s claims and Mr. Taylor has
failed to provide a basis for us to conclude otherwise. As a result, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
3 A district court may dismiss a suit sua sponte for lack of venue if it gave the parties an opportunity to present their views on the issue. See Algodonera De Las Cabezas, S.A., 432 F.3d at 1345. Mr. Taylor had the opportunity to object to the magistrate’s report and recommendation before the district court entered its final order and the district court reviewed the report de novo, so there is no due process concern here. See Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001). 6