IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0904 Filed November 13, 2025
TERRY LYNN LADAWN REYNOLDS, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie Vaudt, Judge.
An applicant appeals the denial of postconviction relief following two
convictions for lascivious acts with a child. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
The State originally charged Terry Reynolds with two counts of sexual
abuse for conduct against eleven- and thirteen-year-old sisters in 2020. After
bargaining with the State, Reynolds entered Alford pleas1 to two counts of
lascivious acts with a child. A year later, Reynolds applied for postconviction relief
(PCR), which the district court denied. Reynolds appeals that denial, advancing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. Because
Reynolds did not preserve error on his ineffective-assistance claims and did not
meet the demanding standard to show he was actually innocent, we affirm the
district court.
I. Prior Proceedings
Reynolds signed a written guilty plea, admitting there was “strong evidence”
that he was guilty of two counts of lascivious acts with a child, class “C” felonies,
in violation of Iowa Code section 709.8(1)(a) (2020). The district court sentenced
him to indeterminate ten-year terms to run consecutively. Beyond prison, he
received a “special sentence” of lifetime supervision under Iowa Code
section 903B.1. The court also advised him that his convictions qualified as
“sexually predatory offenses” under Iowa Code section 901A.1. Reynolds did not
challenge his convictions or sentence on direct appeal.
But in 2022, Reynolds—representing himself—applied for PCR, alleging
three grounds for relief. First, he asserted his plea attorney failed to “properly
represent” him or “investigate the case.” Second, he claimed actual innocence.
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“[A]n express admission of
guilt . . . is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of [a] criminal penalty.”). 3
Third, he contested the consecutive nature of his sentencing. Reynolds also asked
to proceed as a pro se litigant, which the court allowed.
In moving for summary judgment, Reynolds fleshed out his claim of
ineffective assistance, alleging that “counsel provided no investigation or
preparation for trial and forced [Reynolds] to take a plea agreement.” And he also
alleged that the State “had no evidence other than hearsay statements that were
absurd to charge [him] of the underlying crimes in this case.” The State also moved
for summary dismissal. After a hearing in October 2022, the district court
dismissed Reynolds’s claims concerning the sufficiency of the State’s proof and
the consecutive sentences. The court also granted Reynolds’s motion for counsel.
Represented by counsel, in March 2024, Reynolds appeared for a hearing
on the merits of his ineffective assistance and actual innocence claims. He was
the only live witness. The State presented a transcript of trial counsel’s testimony
from the summary-judgment hearing. After the hearing, both sides filed proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its order, the district court rejected
Reynolds’s request for relief. On the ineffective-assistance claim, the court found
no breach of duty or prejudice because counsel presented the State’s offer to
Reynolds and he decided to accept that proposed plea deal. The court did not
address Reynolds’s argument that counsel failed to investigate the case. As for
his actual-innocence claim, the district court found that Reynolds presented no
newly discovered evidence. And, regardless, there was not clear and convincing
evidence in the record that no reasonable factfinder could convict Reynolds of the
offenses.
Reynolds now challenges the denial of PCR. 4
II. Analysis
That challenge is two-fold. First, Reynolds argues he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed “to conduct any
investigation” and failed to “adequately explain the special sentence.” Reynolds
insists these errors, individually and cumulatively, were prejudicial. Second,
Reynolds contends the district court erred in rejecting his claim of actual
innocence. We will address these claims in turn.2
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Reynolds airs two grievances about counsel’s performance. But as the
State argues, he preserved neither claim for our review. True, Reynolds alleged
that his trial counsel failed to investigate the case in his PCR application and in his
motion for summary judgment. But the district court did not decide that ground or
even reference that argument in its PCR ruling. If “a court fails to rule on a matter,
a party must request a ruling” to preserve error. State v. Krogmann, 804
N.W.2d 518, 524 (Iowa 2011). Relying on Lamasters v. State, Reynolds argues
the district court “necessarily ruled” on this issue in finding that the guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary. 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012). We disagree. Unlike
Lamasters, in this case the court failed to mention the disputed issue. Thus, error
was not preserved.
Moving to the second grievance, Reynolds did not assert that his counsel
was ineffective for failing to advise him of the consequences of the guilty plea until
he submitted his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. At the summary
2 We review both claims de novo. Dewberry v. State, 941 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2019). 5
judgment hearing, Reynolds asserted that he was “ambushed” by the plea deal
and forced to accept it. He did not argue that counsel failed to explain the special
sentence of lifetime supervision. At the PCR hearing on the merits, Reynolds did
testify that when he signed the plea, trial counsel did not explain the special
sentence. But that testimony was not connected to a legal argument until
Reynolds’s proposed findings of fact and legal conclusions. See Est. of Grossman
v. McCreary, 373 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Iowa 1985) (proposed findings submitted to
the court did not obviate the post-trial requirement to file a motion to reconsider,
enlarge or amend to preserve error). Even if the testimony and proposed findings
sufficiently raised the issue, the district court did not rule on that ground. See
Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d at 524. We find Reynolds failed to preserve this issue for
our review.
B. Actual Innocence
Reynolds next argues that the district court erred in rejecting his actual-
innocence claim. The State again contests error preservation, maintaining that
Reynolds abandoned this argument in his proposed findings of fact and
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-0904 Filed November 13, 2025
TERRY LYNN LADAWN REYNOLDS, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie Vaudt, Judge.
An applicant appeals the denial of postconviction relief following two
convictions for lascivious acts with a child. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
The State originally charged Terry Reynolds with two counts of sexual
abuse for conduct against eleven- and thirteen-year-old sisters in 2020. After
bargaining with the State, Reynolds entered Alford pleas1 to two counts of
lascivious acts with a child. A year later, Reynolds applied for postconviction relief
(PCR), which the district court denied. Reynolds appeals that denial, advancing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. Because
Reynolds did not preserve error on his ineffective-assistance claims and did not
meet the demanding standard to show he was actually innocent, we affirm the
district court.
I. Prior Proceedings
Reynolds signed a written guilty plea, admitting there was “strong evidence”
that he was guilty of two counts of lascivious acts with a child, class “C” felonies,
in violation of Iowa Code section 709.8(1)(a) (2020). The district court sentenced
him to indeterminate ten-year terms to run consecutively. Beyond prison, he
received a “special sentence” of lifetime supervision under Iowa Code
section 903B.1. The court also advised him that his convictions qualified as
“sexually predatory offenses” under Iowa Code section 901A.1. Reynolds did not
challenge his convictions or sentence on direct appeal.
But in 2022, Reynolds—representing himself—applied for PCR, alleging
three grounds for relief. First, he asserted his plea attorney failed to “properly
represent” him or “investigate the case.” Second, he claimed actual innocence.
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“[A]n express admission of
guilt . . . is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of [a] criminal penalty.”). 3
Third, he contested the consecutive nature of his sentencing. Reynolds also asked
to proceed as a pro se litigant, which the court allowed.
In moving for summary judgment, Reynolds fleshed out his claim of
ineffective assistance, alleging that “counsel provided no investigation or
preparation for trial and forced [Reynolds] to take a plea agreement.” And he also
alleged that the State “had no evidence other than hearsay statements that were
absurd to charge [him] of the underlying crimes in this case.” The State also moved
for summary dismissal. After a hearing in October 2022, the district court
dismissed Reynolds’s claims concerning the sufficiency of the State’s proof and
the consecutive sentences. The court also granted Reynolds’s motion for counsel.
Represented by counsel, in March 2024, Reynolds appeared for a hearing
on the merits of his ineffective assistance and actual innocence claims. He was
the only live witness. The State presented a transcript of trial counsel’s testimony
from the summary-judgment hearing. After the hearing, both sides filed proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its order, the district court rejected
Reynolds’s request for relief. On the ineffective-assistance claim, the court found
no breach of duty or prejudice because counsel presented the State’s offer to
Reynolds and he decided to accept that proposed plea deal. The court did not
address Reynolds’s argument that counsel failed to investigate the case. As for
his actual-innocence claim, the district court found that Reynolds presented no
newly discovered evidence. And, regardless, there was not clear and convincing
evidence in the record that no reasonable factfinder could convict Reynolds of the
offenses.
Reynolds now challenges the denial of PCR. 4
II. Analysis
That challenge is two-fold. First, Reynolds argues he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed “to conduct any
investigation” and failed to “adequately explain the special sentence.” Reynolds
insists these errors, individually and cumulatively, were prejudicial. Second,
Reynolds contends the district court erred in rejecting his claim of actual
innocence. We will address these claims in turn.2
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Reynolds airs two grievances about counsel’s performance. But as the
State argues, he preserved neither claim for our review. True, Reynolds alleged
that his trial counsel failed to investigate the case in his PCR application and in his
motion for summary judgment. But the district court did not decide that ground or
even reference that argument in its PCR ruling. If “a court fails to rule on a matter,
a party must request a ruling” to preserve error. State v. Krogmann, 804
N.W.2d 518, 524 (Iowa 2011). Relying on Lamasters v. State, Reynolds argues
the district court “necessarily ruled” on this issue in finding that the guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary. 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012). We disagree. Unlike
Lamasters, in this case the court failed to mention the disputed issue. Thus, error
was not preserved.
Moving to the second grievance, Reynolds did not assert that his counsel
was ineffective for failing to advise him of the consequences of the guilty plea until
he submitted his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. At the summary
2 We review both claims de novo. Dewberry v. State, 941 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2019). 5
judgment hearing, Reynolds asserted that he was “ambushed” by the plea deal
and forced to accept it. He did not argue that counsel failed to explain the special
sentence of lifetime supervision. At the PCR hearing on the merits, Reynolds did
testify that when he signed the plea, trial counsel did not explain the special
sentence. But that testimony was not connected to a legal argument until
Reynolds’s proposed findings of fact and legal conclusions. See Est. of Grossman
v. McCreary, 373 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Iowa 1985) (proposed findings submitted to
the court did not obviate the post-trial requirement to file a motion to reconsider,
enlarge or amend to preserve error). Even if the testimony and proposed findings
sufficiently raised the issue, the district court did not rule on that ground. See
Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d at 524. We find Reynolds failed to preserve this issue for
our review.
B. Actual Innocence
Reynolds next argues that the district court erred in rejecting his actual-
innocence claim. The State again contests error preservation, maintaining that
Reynolds abandoned this argument in his proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. In that filing by his PCR counsel, Reynolds proposed this legal
conclusion:
The Court finds that while the Applicant has provided evidence of his innocence in the form of his testimony and the affidavits of two witnesses, the evidence presented in the record is not of a clear and convincing nature as required to prevail on a claim of actual innocence. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 797 (Iowa 2018).
Yet on appeal, Reynolds resurrects his claim of actual innocence. He
contends that the proposed order—“functionally a closing argument”—does not
bind him because the district court “considered the matter and issued a ruling on 6
the merits. We assume without deciding that Reynolds preserved error and
proceed to the merits.
On the merits, Reynolds must show by clear and convincing evidence that,
despite proof supporting his convictions, no reasonable fact finder could convict
him considering all the evidence. See Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 797. Under this
“demanding standard,” Reynolds must show that he is “factually and actually
innocent.” See Dewberry, 941 N.W.2d at 5 (emphasis omitted).
In the PCR proceedings, Reynolds presented affidavits from his wife and
his brother to support his claim that it was impossible for him to have sexually
abused the victims, S.W. and M.W., at the time and place they alleged. 3 Minutes
of testimony show S.W. and M.W. planned to testify that Reynolds sexually
assaulted them “around the time of a barbecue at [Reynolds]’s house.” S.W.
detailed that Reynolds came into the bathroom, took her to the garage, and “was
sticking his penis in her private part.” M.W. planned to testify that Reynolds
whispered things into her ear, followed her into a bedroom when she tried to get
away, “put his private part in her private part,” and “stopped when his wife started
calling his name.”
Reynolds contends that his own account, as well as the two affidavits,
amount to clear and convincing evidence of his innocence. Key to his contention
is that S.W. recalled the acts occurred in the garage during a family barbecue. But,
according to Reynolds, the garage door was open and barbecue guests were just
outside, so he could not have committed the crime without anyone seeing or
3 S.W. and M.W. refer to Reynolds and his wife as their grandparents or godparents. 7
hearing. Also, his wife claims S.W. and M.W. had behavioral issues and that
Reynolds was never alone with them during the barbeque.
In our de novo review, we find Reynolds fails to meet the “demanding”
standard to prove actual innocence. See Dewberry, 941 N.W.2d at 5. He does
not present clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder could
convict him of lascivious acts. The affidavits from his wife and brother are
conclusory and focus on the barbecue event. But, according to the minutes, M.W.
and S.W. allege the acts occurred “around the time of a barbecue,” not necessarily
during the barbecue. Reynolds also disparages the girls’ proposed testimony as
“confusing” and uncorroborated. But inconsistencies in the testimony of children
subjected to sexual conduct are common and would not “compel a jury to conclude
that the victim is not credible or that there is insufficient evidence to support a guilty
verdict.” State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Iowa 2021). As Reynolds admitted
in his Alford plea, a factfinder could have made an independent determination that
there was “strong evidence of [his] actual guilt.”
III. Conclusion
Because Reynolds failed to preserve error on his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims and failed to prove actual innocence, we affirm the district court’s
denial of relief.
AFFIRMED.