Terry L Hargis, Jr. v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 22, 2026
• Docket: 25A-CR-01194
• Status: Published
• Author: Judge Vaidik

Opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Terry L. Hargis, Jr., Apr 22 2026, 8:43 am

Appellant-Defendant CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v.

State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

April 22, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1194 Appeal from the Allen Superior Court The Honorable David M. Zent, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 02D06-2205-F3-43

Opinion by Judge Vaidik Judges Mathias and Pyle concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 1 of 13 Vaidik, Judge.

Case Summary [1] Terry L. Hargis, Jr., was convicted of two counts of Level 3 felony neglect of a

dependent resulting in serious bodily injury, found to be a habitual offender,

and sentenced to 52 years in the Department of Correction. He now appeals,

arguing: (1) the trial court erred by trying him in absentia; (2) his two neglect

convictions constitute double jeopardy; and (3) his sentence is inappropriate.

We hold that Hargis was properly tried in absentia and that he waived his

inappropriate-sentence claim by failing to develop a cogent argument.

However, we conclude that the two neglect convictions constitute double

jeopardy, so we reverse the second conviction and sentence and remand to the

trial court with instructions to amend the sentencing documents accordingly.

We also direct the trial court to attach the habitual-offender enhancement to the

sentence for the remaining neglect conviction.

Facts and Procedural History [2] In 2021, Hargis was in a relationship with Amy Savino. They lived together

with their son, J.H., who was born in January 2021, and several children from

prior relationships. Savino worked as a mail carrier for the post office while

Hargis stayed home with the children.

[3] When Savino returned home from work on the evening of June 2, 2021, Hargis

was not in a good mood, and they had an argument. Hargis said he was

“having a really hard time with life in general at the moment and like handling Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 2 of 13 his anger.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 244. Later that night, Savino woke up and fed J.H.,

who was still less than five months old. Hargis then took J.H. so Savino could

go back to sleep.

[4] In the morning—June 3—Hargis told Savino that “something happened” with

J.H. overnight, but he was “very vague about it.” Id. at 246. Savino had to go to

work, so she told Hargis to keep an eye on J.H. When Savino returned that

night, she held J.H. and felt a “click” in his leg. Id. She “didn’t think anything

of it at the time,” but when she changed J.H.’s diaper later that night, his leg

“sort of fell to the side.” Id. at 246, 247. He cried and seemed to be in pain.

Savino saw that J.H. had a bruise on one of his legs and “was starting to look a

little swollen.” Id. at 247.

[5] The next morning—June 4—Hargis and Savino discussed J.H.’s condition, and

Hargis said he would take J.H. to a doctor that day. But Hargis didn’t take J.H.

to a doctor, so when Savino returned from work, she took J.H. to his

pediatrician’s office. Imaging revealed that J.H.’s right femur, tibia, and fibula

were broken and that he had broken ribs. The leg fractures hadn’t begun

healing, meaning they were “less than five to seven days old.” Tr. Vol. 3 pp.

168, 171. The rib fractures were healing and were likely several weeks old.

[6] Hargis provided several explanations for how J.H. was injured. He told Savino

that he grabbed J.H. by the leg to prevent him from falling, that he may have sat

on J.H. on a couch, and that he repeatedly fell onto a couch while holding J.H.

to make J.H. laugh. Hargis told the Department of Child Services that J.H. had

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 3 of 13 fallen out of bed and also that the other children had thrown J.H. onto a couch.

A month after J.H.’s injuries were discovered, Hargis sent Savino the following

text message:

You know what I remember everything when it happened and yeah I did get so mad at [J.H.] for crying and I hit him so hard in his leg that it must of broken [sic]. I think I have very bad anger issues and something needs to happen.

Ex. Vol. 1 p. 123.

[7] The State charged Hargis with three counts of Level 3 felony neglect of a

dependent resulting in serious bodily injury—Count 1 for the broken femur,

Count 2 for the broken ribs, and Count 3 for the broken tibia and fibula. All

three counts alleged a date range of May 20, 2021, through June 5, 2021. The

State also alleged that Hargis is a habitual offender based on prior felony

convictions.

[8] A three-day jury trial was held in March 2025. On the first morning, Hargis was

pulled over for speeding on his way to court. Hargis told the officer he was

speeding because he was late for trial. Although Hargis’s SUV wasn’t properly

registered, the officer told Hargis he would not tow the vehicle so that Hargis

could make it to court. After being released, however, Hargis didn’t go to court,

nor did he contact his attorney or the court. The judge and the attorneys,

clueless as to Hargis’s whereabouts, had to decide how to proceed. Hargis’s

attorney told the court that she thought he would be there and moved for a

continuance because the plan was for him to testify. The court denied the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 4 of 13 motion, finding that Hargis had waived his right to be present. The court issued

an arrest warrant and proceeded with trial. Hargis remained absent throughout.

[9] Dr. Shannon Thompson, a child-abuse pediatrician who examined J.H.,

testified at length about his injuries. Regarding the leg fractures, Dr. Thompson

testified that the femur fracture was likely caused by a different force than the

tibia and fibula fractures. Specifically, the femur fracture “requires a bending

force or a direct impact to that leg,” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 178, while the tibia and fibula

fractures were likely caused by a “pretty significant yank or pull,” id. at 171.

However, Dr. Thompson could not say whether the fractures happened “at the

same time or different times[.]” Id.

[10] The jury found Hargis not guilty on Count 2 (broken ribs) but guilty on Count 1

(broken femur) and Count 3 (broken tibia and fibula). It also found him to be a

habitual offender. Hargis was arrested a few days later, and the court scheduled

a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Hargis offered the following explanation

for his absence from trial:

I did not intend to miss trial. I did get pulled over the morning of. I was wearing steel toes. I didn’t know I wasn’t allowed to wear steel toes in the Courthouse so I was going to get my shoes. I was doing seventy on a forty-five just so I didn’t be late but obviously I was late. After I was released from custody of the police, it was 9:06 a.m. I was told a Warrant would already have been issued and my Court date would have been continued and when I called the jail they said there wasn’t no Warrant and I couldn’t turn myself in until a Warrant was issued so I was waiting on that.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 5 of 13 Tr. Vol. 4 p. 9. Hargis didn’t say who told him “a Warrant would already have

been issued and [his] Court date would have been continued[.]”

[11] In sentencing Hargis, the trial court found seven aggravating circumstances: (1)

Hargis’s criminal and juvenile history (five felony convictions, six misdemeanor

convictions, and ten juvenile adjudications); (2) prior attempts at rehabilitation

have failed; (3) the nature and circumstances of the offenses; (4) Hargis violated

a position of trust or care; (5) the impact on the victim; (6) the young age of the

victim; and (7) Hargis’s IRAS score indicates a high risk of reoffending. Finding

no mitigating circumstances, the court imposed the maximum sentence of 16

years on each of the two neglect convictions and the maximum habitual-

offender enhancement of 20 years, all consecutive, for a total of 52 years in the

Department of Correction.

[12] Hargis now appeals.

Discussion and Decision I. The trial court didn’t abuse its discretion by finding that Hargis knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial [13] Hargis first contends that the trial court erred by finding that he knowingly and

voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial. We review such a finding for

an abuse of discretion. Calvert v. State, 14 N.E.3d 818, 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

In explaining his absence from trial, Hargis didn’t claim that he was unaware of

the trial date or that he was unable to attend. Rather, he said some unidentified

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 6 of 13 person told him that, because he was late for court, an arrest warrant “would

already have been issued” and trial “would have been continued.” The trial

court either (1) didn’t believe this vague, self-serving claim or (2) concluded

that, even if someone told Hargis there would be a continuance, Hargis acted

unreasonably by not contacting his attorney or court staff to confirm that

information. Either way, the court didn’t abuse its discretion.

II. Hargis’s two neglect convictions constitute double jeopardy [14] Hargis argues that his two neglect convictions constitute double jeopardy under

the continuous-crime doctrine. See, e.g., Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216 (Ind.

2015). But as the State notes, this doctrine and all other common-law double-

jeopardy rules were subsumed by the new tests announced by our Supreme

Court in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020), and Powell v. State, 151

N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020). See Jones v. State, 159 N.E.3d 55, 61-62 (Ind. Ct. App.

2020). The Wadle test applies when a defendant is convicted of different

statutory offenses with common elements, and the Powell test applies when, as

here, a defendant is convicted of a single statutory offense multiple times.

Moyers v. State, No. 26S-CR-86, 2026 WL 786823 *1 (Ind. Mar. 20, 2026).

Hargis doesn’t make an argument under Powell. The State contends that he

therefore waived any such argument and that, in any event, there is no double

jeopardy under Powell. Because the State has briefed the substance of Powell,

and because we could have raised the issue sua sponte, see Banks v. State, 231

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 7 of 13 N.E.3d 853, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied, we will analyze Hargis’s

convictions under Powell.

[15] The Powell test potentially includes two steps. Under the first step, we determine

whether the statute at issue clearly indicates a “unit of prosecution.” Powell, 151

N.E.2d at 264. “[A] unit of prosecution is ‘the minimum amount of activity a

defendant must undertake, what he must do, to commit each new and

independent violation of a criminal statute[.]’” Barrozo v. State, 156 N.E.3d 718,

725 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105, 1109

(10th Cir. 2015) (en banc)). If the statute clearly indicates a unit of

prosecution—that is, if the statute clearly allows multiple convictions for a

single criminal act or transaction, or if it clearly allows only one conviction for a

single criminal act or transaction—the court follows the legislature’s guidance

and the analysis is complete. Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 264. But if the statute is

ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution, the court proceeds to the second step.

Id. “Under this second step, a court must determine whether the facts—as

presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial—indicate a single

offense or whether they indicate distinguishable offenses.” Id.

To answer this question, we ask whether the defendant’s actions are so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. If the defendant’s criminal acts are sufficiently distinct, then multiple convictions may stand; but if those acts are continuous and indistinguishable, a court may impose only a single conviction. Any doubt counsels against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 8 of 13 Id. at 264-65 (quotation altered).

[16] Our Supreme Court’s recent application of the Powell test in Moyers is helpful.

Moyers was convicted of two counts of criminal confinement. That offense is

generally a Level 6 felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a), but one of the counts

against Moyers was elevated to a Level 3 felony because he was armed with a

deadly weapon, see id. at (b)(3), and the other count was elevated to a Level 4

felony because the confinement resulted in moderate bodily injury, see id. at

(b)(2). In determining the unit of prosecution under that statute, the Court

ignored the enhancing circumstances and focused on the base offense: “A

person who knowingly or intentionally confines another person without the

other person’s consent commits criminal confinement.” Moyers, 2026 WL

786823 at *7. The Court held that the unit of prosecution is “confining another

person without their consent.” Id. The Court noted that “a ‘confinement ends

when the victim both feels free and is, in fact, free from detention, and a

separate confinement begins if and when detention of the victim is re-

established.’” Id. (quoting Penrod v. State, 810 N.E.2d 345, 346 (Ind. 2004)). The

question, then, was whether the evidence showed that the defendant committed

“one or two discrete acts of criminal confinement.” Id. The evidence showed

that while the victim attempted to escape his confinement at one point, he was

unsuccessful, so he “was never actually free and certainly never felt free[.]” Id.

at *8. Therefore, a single continuous act of confinement occurred, and there

could be only one confinement conviction. Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 9 of 13 [17] We reach a similar conclusion here. The State charged Hargis with multiple

counts of neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury under Indiana

Code section 35-46-1-4(a)(1) and (b)(2). Subsection (a)(1) defines the base

offense: “A person having the care of a dependent, whether assumed

voluntarily or because of a legal obligation, who knowingly or intentionally . . .

places the dependent in a situation that endangers the dependent’s life or health

. . . commits neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony.” Subsection (b)(2) makes

the offense a Level 3 felony if it results in serious bodily injury. As Moyers

instructs, in determining the unit of prosecution, we ignore the enhancing

circumstance and focus on the base offense. The unit of prosecution under

Section 35-46-1-4(a)(1) is placing a dependent in a situation that endangers the

dependent’s life or health. There is strong evidence that Hargis did so on the

night of June 2, 2021, because the next day, Hargis told Savino that “something

happened” with J.H. overnight, and Savino felt a click in J.H.’s leg, thought he

was in pain, and noticed swelling. The question is whether there is evidence

that Hargis placed J.H. in a dangerous situation on another occasion,

establishing a second unit of prosecution. There is not.

[18] To be sure, the evidence shows that J.H. suffered two different leg injuries that

required two different types of force. Specifically, Dr. Thompson testified that

the femur fracture required “a bending force or a direct impact to that leg”

while the tibia and fibula fractures were likely caused by a “pretty significant

yank or pull.” However, when asked whether the fractures happened “at the

same time or different times,” Dr. Thompson couldn’t say. She could say only

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 10 of 13 that both injuries were “less than five to seven days old.” Because the evidence

doesn’t clearly establish that there was a second incident or episode of neglect

in addition to what happened on the night of June 2, there cannot be a second

neglect conviction. We therefore reverse the conviction and 16-year sentence on

Count 3 and remand to the trial court with instructions to amend the Judgment

of Conviction and Abstract of Judgment accordingly. 1

III. Hargis waived his argument that his sentence is inappropriate [19] Hargis asks us to reduce his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which

provides that an appellate court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if,

after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the court finds that the

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character

of the offender.” Because we reverse the conviction and 16-year sentence on

Count 3, Hargis’s sentence will already decrease from 52 years to 36 years. To

the extent he believes that even 36 years is inappropriate, he hasn’t developed a

meaningful argument. He asserts:

The evidence presented during trial and at sentencing both show that Hargis is certainly not the worst of the worst offenders; nor can it be said the facts and circumstances of this case are the worst of the worst. Thus, the trial court had to find that Hargis and his acts are the worst of the worst. We do not believe this is

1 Because we reverse one conviction and sentence on double-jeopardy grounds, we need not address Hargis’s alternative argument that the trial court erred by imposing fully consecutive sentences on the two neglect convictions.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 11 of 13 to be possible. Such a sentence is not appropriate in light of the foregoing. Thus, this Court should exercise its constitutional authority and revise Hargis’s sentence.

Appellant’s Br. p. 20. By failing to make a cogent argument supported by

citations to the record and/or legal authority, Hargis waived his claim for 7(B)

relief. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); Gentry v. State, 835 N.E.2d 569, 577

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that appellant waived 7(B) claim by failing to

make a cogent argument).

IV. The habitual-offender enhancement must be attached to the sentence for Count 1 [20] Though neither party raised this issue, we note that the trial court imposed the

habitual-offender enhancement as a separate, consecutive sentence. That is

contrary to the habitual-offender statute, which provides, in part:

Habitual offender is a status that results in an enhanced sentence. It is not a separate crime and does not result in a consecutive sentence. The court shall attach the habitual offender enhancement to the felony conviction with the highest sentence imposed and specify which felony count is being enhanced.

I.C. § 35-50-2-8(j). Therefore, on remand, the trial court must attach the

habitual-offender enhancement to the sentence for Count 1.

[21] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 12 of 13 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Ryan M. Gardner Deputy Public Defender Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1194 | April 22, 2026 Page 13 of 13