In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00199-CV
TERRI BLEVINS, APPELLANT
V.
BEVERLY BROWN, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 112601-1-CV, Honorable Walton Weaver, Presiding
March 19, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Appearing pro se, appellant Terri Blevins appeals the trial court’s order dismissing
his suit against Beverly Brown, appellee. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Both Blevins and Brown were employed as customer service agents by Southwest
Airlines. On December 20, 2024, Blevins filed a lawsuit setting forth two causes of action,
slander and tortious interference with employment, against Brown. In his petition, Blevins asserted that he was questioned by his employer about three alleged conversations,
including one “regarding a photograph of Miley Cyrus shown to a coworker, Defendant
Beverly Brown, where [Blevins] expressed personal opinions about Cyrus’s public
behavior.” 1 Blevins alleged that after being questioned, he was placed on administrative
leave pending an investigation. One week later, he was terminated.
Blevins claimed that Brown “maliciously made false and defamatory statements
about [Blevins] with the intent to get [Blevins] terminated from employment. [Brown’s]
sexual harassment allegations were published to others . . . .” Blevins did not identify the
alleged defamatory statements that Brown made.
Brown timely filed an answer and general denial. On February 24, 2025, she filed
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, asserting that
Blevins’s claims had no basis in law or in fact. Blevins filed a response and objection to
the motion, attaching evidence, on March 3. Brown’s motion was set for hearing on March
27, 2025. That same day, Blevins filed an amended petition claiming defamation per se
and setting forth additional details in the factual background. At the hearing, the trial court
considered only the original petition when evaluating the merits of Brown’s motion. The
trial court entered an order granting Brown’s motion to dismiss.
Blevins filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. This appeal followed.
1 In his descriptions of the other two conversations, Blevins did not allege any involvement by
Brown.
2 ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Failure to Consider Amended Pleading
In his first issue, Blevins asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to consider
his first amended petition when ruling on Brown’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss. Blevins
notes that the amended pleading was on file before the hearing and included clarifying
facts and exhibits. Blevins relies on the general rule that an amended pleading
supersedes earlier pleadings under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 65. However, Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 91a.5 specifically governs the timing of an amended pleading in
response to a Rule 91a motion to dismiss and therefore controls over Rule 65. The
principles of statutory construction apply to the rules of civil procedure, and it is a well-
settled principle of statutory construction that a specific statute controls over a general
statute. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.026.
Rule 91a.5 prohibits a trial court from considering an amendment not filed as
required by the Rule:
(b) If the respondent amends the challenged cause of action at least 3 days before the date of the hearing, the movant may, before the date of the hearing, file a withdrawal of the motion or an amended motion directed to the amended cause of action.
(c) Except by agreement of the parties, the court must rule on a motion unless it has been withdrawn or the cause of action has been nonsuited in accordance with (a) or (b). In ruling on the motion, the court must not consider a nonsuit or amendment not filed as permitted by paragraphs (a) or (b).
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5.
3 Brown filed her Rule 91a motion to dismiss on February 24, 2025. It was set for
hearing on March 27. Blevins, the respondent, filed his first amended original petition on
March 27, the same day the Rule 91a motion was set for hearing. Because Blevins did
not amend his petition three days prior to the date of the hearing, the trial court was
obligated to rule on the Rule 91a motion without considering the amended pleading.
Thus, the trial court did not err by refusing to consider Blevins’s first amended original
petition. See City of Houston v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 712 S.W.3d 707, 717 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (where nonmovant amended petition two days
before submission, trial court required to rule on Rule 91a motion without considering
untimely amendment); Wells v. Sumruld, No. 11-23-00281-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS
1503, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 6, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court must
rule on 91a motion to dismiss if nonmovant does not nonsuit or amend challenged causes
of action at least three days before hearing); Odam v. Texans Credit Union, No. 05-16-
00077-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 8189, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 24, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (no error when trial court did not consider untimely filed amended pleading).
We overrule Blevins’s first issue.
Issue 2: Dismissal under Rule 91a
Next, Blevins argues that the trial court misapplied Rule 91a because his
allegations, taken as true, stated viable claims for defamation and tortious interference.
Rule 91a provides a procedure for dismissal of a case that has no basis in law or no basis
in fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. “A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations,
taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the
4 claimant to the relief sought.” Id. “A cause of action has no basis in fact if no reasonable
person could believe the facts pleaded.” Id. We review de novo whether a cause of
action has any basis in law or fact. City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex.
2016) (per curiam).
Blevins sued Brown for slander and tortious interference with employment. He
was required to plead facts that, along with reasonable inferences, could support all of
the elements of both causes of action. Id.
To state a claim for slander, Blevins was required to show (1) a defamatory
statement, (2) communicated or published to a third person, (3) without legal excuse.
Campbell v. Salazar, 960 S.W.2d 719, 725–26 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, pet. denied).
A defamatory statement is one that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating with him.
Innovative Block of S. Tex., Ltd. v. Valley Builders Supply, Inc., 603 S.W.3d 409, 417
(Tex. 2020); see also Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. 2013) (defining
defamation “as the invasion of a person’s interest in her reputation and good name”).
Blevins did not specify in his petition what defamatory statement was the basis of his
claim for slander. Instead, he simply recited that Brown “made false, defamatory, and
misleading statements, alleging misconduct” by Blevins.
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00199-CV
TERRI BLEVINS, APPELLANT
V.
BEVERLY BROWN, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 112601-1-CV, Honorable Walton Weaver, Presiding
March 19, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Appearing pro se, appellant Terri Blevins appeals the trial court’s order dismissing
his suit against Beverly Brown, appellee. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Both Blevins and Brown were employed as customer service agents by Southwest
Airlines. On December 20, 2024, Blevins filed a lawsuit setting forth two causes of action,
slander and tortious interference with employment, against Brown. In his petition, Blevins asserted that he was questioned by his employer about three alleged conversations,
including one “regarding a photograph of Miley Cyrus shown to a coworker, Defendant
Beverly Brown, where [Blevins] expressed personal opinions about Cyrus’s public
behavior.” 1 Blevins alleged that after being questioned, he was placed on administrative
leave pending an investigation. One week later, he was terminated.
Blevins claimed that Brown “maliciously made false and defamatory statements
about [Blevins] with the intent to get [Blevins] terminated from employment. [Brown’s]
sexual harassment allegations were published to others . . . .” Blevins did not identify the
alleged defamatory statements that Brown made.
Brown timely filed an answer and general denial. On February 24, 2025, she filed
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, asserting that
Blevins’s claims had no basis in law or in fact. Blevins filed a response and objection to
the motion, attaching evidence, on March 3. Brown’s motion was set for hearing on March
27, 2025. That same day, Blevins filed an amended petition claiming defamation per se
and setting forth additional details in the factual background. At the hearing, the trial court
considered only the original petition when evaluating the merits of Brown’s motion. The
trial court entered an order granting Brown’s motion to dismiss.
Blevins filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. This appeal followed.
1 In his descriptions of the other two conversations, Blevins did not allege any involvement by
Brown.
2 ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Failure to Consider Amended Pleading
In his first issue, Blevins asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to consider
his first amended petition when ruling on Brown’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss. Blevins
notes that the amended pleading was on file before the hearing and included clarifying
facts and exhibits. Blevins relies on the general rule that an amended pleading
supersedes earlier pleadings under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 65. However, Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 91a.5 specifically governs the timing of an amended pleading in
response to a Rule 91a motion to dismiss and therefore controls over Rule 65. The
principles of statutory construction apply to the rules of civil procedure, and it is a well-
settled principle of statutory construction that a specific statute controls over a general
statute. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.026.
Rule 91a.5 prohibits a trial court from considering an amendment not filed as
required by the Rule:
(b) If the respondent amends the challenged cause of action at least 3 days before the date of the hearing, the movant may, before the date of the hearing, file a withdrawal of the motion or an amended motion directed to the amended cause of action.
(c) Except by agreement of the parties, the court must rule on a motion unless it has been withdrawn or the cause of action has been nonsuited in accordance with (a) or (b). In ruling on the motion, the court must not consider a nonsuit or amendment not filed as permitted by paragraphs (a) or (b).
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5.
3 Brown filed her Rule 91a motion to dismiss on February 24, 2025. It was set for
hearing on March 27. Blevins, the respondent, filed his first amended original petition on
March 27, the same day the Rule 91a motion was set for hearing. Because Blevins did
not amend his petition three days prior to the date of the hearing, the trial court was
obligated to rule on the Rule 91a motion without considering the amended pleading.
Thus, the trial court did not err by refusing to consider Blevins’s first amended original
petition. See City of Houston v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 712 S.W.3d 707, 717 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (where nonmovant amended petition two days
before submission, trial court required to rule on Rule 91a motion without considering
untimely amendment); Wells v. Sumruld, No. 11-23-00281-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS
1503, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 6, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court must
rule on 91a motion to dismiss if nonmovant does not nonsuit or amend challenged causes
of action at least three days before hearing); Odam v. Texans Credit Union, No. 05-16-
00077-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 8189, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 24, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (no error when trial court did not consider untimely filed amended pleading).
We overrule Blevins’s first issue.
Issue 2: Dismissal under Rule 91a
Next, Blevins argues that the trial court misapplied Rule 91a because his
allegations, taken as true, stated viable claims for defamation and tortious interference.
Rule 91a provides a procedure for dismissal of a case that has no basis in law or no basis
in fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. “A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations,
taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the
4 claimant to the relief sought.” Id. “A cause of action has no basis in fact if no reasonable
person could believe the facts pleaded.” Id. We review de novo whether a cause of
action has any basis in law or fact. City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex.
2016) (per curiam).
Blevins sued Brown for slander and tortious interference with employment. He
was required to plead facts that, along with reasonable inferences, could support all of
the elements of both causes of action. Id.
To state a claim for slander, Blevins was required to show (1) a defamatory
statement, (2) communicated or published to a third person, (3) without legal excuse.
Campbell v. Salazar, 960 S.W.2d 719, 725–26 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, pet. denied).
A defamatory statement is one that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating with him.
Innovative Block of S. Tex., Ltd. v. Valley Builders Supply, Inc., 603 S.W.3d 409, 417
(Tex. 2020); see also Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. 2013) (defining
defamation “as the invasion of a person’s interest in her reputation and good name”).
Blevins did not specify in his petition what defamatory statement was the basis of his
claim for slander. Instead, he simply recited that Brown “made false, defamatory, and
misleading statements, alleging misconduct” by Blevins. This is a conclusory statement
unsupported by factual allegations. As other courts have explained, “threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2014, pet. denied) (cleaned up, quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)); see also Kinder Morgan SACROC, LP v. Scurry Cnty., 5 622 S.W.3d 835, 850 (Tex. 2021) (“The pleading of a legal theory, without more, does not
provide notice of the facts that could be pleaded to support that theory.”).
“Our notice-pleading rules require pleadings to not only give notice of the claim
and the relief sought but also of the essential factual allegations.” Kinder Morgan, 622
S.W.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks omitted). “As we have explained many times, a
‘cause of action’ means the ‘fact or facts entitling one to institute and maintain an action,
which must be alleged and proved in order to obtain relief.” In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P.,
671 S.W.3d 653, 662 (Tex. 2023) (citation omitted). Therefore, to survive a Rule 91a
motion, a plaintiff’s pleadings must include the “essential factual allegations supporting
[the] claims,” and those allegations “must be sufficient to support a judgment if ultimately
proven.” Id.
By stating that Brown defamed him, Blevins has made a legal accusation but not
a factual allegation. “The pleading of a legal theory, without more, does not provide notice
of the facts that could be pleaded to support that theory.” Kinder Morgan, 622 S.W.3d at
850. Therefore, we conclude that Blevins’s petition did not provide enough factual
allegations to support his cause of action for slander. The trial court did not err in
dismissing this claim pursuant to Rule 91a.
As for his second cause of action, tortious interference with an employment
relationship, Blevins had to show (1) an employment contract or other relationship, (2) a
willful and intentional act of interference resulting in damages, and (3) actual damages or
loss. See ACS Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997). Blevins
asserted that Brown “instigat[ed] an investigation and termination based on false or
6 misleading allegations.” Again, however, he does not provide factual support for any
“false or misleading allegation” made by Brown. Blevins’s petition fails to include facts
that show he has a viable, legally cognizable right to relief, such as what Brown said, and
when, where, and to whom she said it. Blevins has alleged no specific facts showing
what action Brown took and how that action led to his injury. “Unadorned recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, fail to
sufficiently allege a cause of action under the fair-notice and Rule 91a standards.” Statler
v. Challis, No. 02-18-00374-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 8519, at *32 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Oct. 29, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
We conclude that Blevins’s claim that Brown tortiously interfered with his
employment has no basis in fact as pleaded. Thus, the trial court did not err by dismissing
this claim.
Issues 3–5: Appearance of Partiality, Cumulative Effect of Actions, and Violation of Due Process By his third issue, Blevins claims that the trial court’s conduct created an
appearance of partiality, violating his right to a fair hearing. In his fourth, Blevins maintains
that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s procedural restrictions and disparaging
treatment denied him due process. Lastly, Blevins asserts that the trial court’s express
bias toward him as a pro se litigant violated due process and undermined the
constitutional guarantee of judicial impartiality. These issues are based on the trial court’s
admonition to refrain from interrupting the court or be held in contempt, its statement that
Blevins did not know what he was doing, its failure to consider Blevins’s amended petition,
7 and its “disparate treatment between the represented party and the unrepresented one.”
We consider these three interrelated issues together.
Blevins does not direct us to, nor has our own review uncovered, any instance of
Blevins making an objection to the trial court’s statements on any basis. The record
includes no motion seeking the trial judge’s recusal or removal. An objection is generally
required to preserve complaints about judicial misconduct, such as bias. In re M.J.M.,
406 S.W.3d 292, 299–300 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.); see also Jonson v.
Duong, 642 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (litigant claiming judge
is biased or prejudiced must timely move to recuse judge in trial court in accordance with
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a; otherwise issue is waived on appeal); Kinney v.
Batten, No. 01-11-00393-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 5778, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] July 19, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding party waived complaints
regarding judicial bias by failing to timely file motion to recuse judge in trial court). Thus,
Blevins failed to preserve his complaints for our review.
Even if the complaints had been preserved, the conduct complained of by Blevins
does not rise to the level of showing incurable judicial bias or a due process violation.
The record reflects the trial judge’s concern with Blevins’s pro se status and lack of
understanding of procedural standards. Nothing, however, indicates that Blevins was
deprived of an impartial factfinder that resulted in an improper judgment.
Consequently, we overrule issues three, four, and five.
8 CONCLUSION
We overrule each issue presented by Blevins on appeal. The judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Judy C. Parker Chief Justice
Doss, J., dissenting.