Opinion issued November 13, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00891-CV ——————————— TERRI ANN TODD, Appellant V. SARAH MICHELLE GARZA AKA SARAH MICHELLE GALLEGOS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 280th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2023-52304
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Terri Ann Todd appeals a three-year protective order issued against her for
the protection of her daughter, Sarah Michelle Garza aka Sarah Michelle Gallegos,
and two grandchildren. In two issues, Todd contends the trial court failed to make
required findings and the evidence is insufficient to support the order. We affirm. Background
In August 2023, Garza applied on behalf of herself and her two children—an
eleven-year-old boy and a ten-year-old girl—for a protective order against her
mother Todd under Chapter 7B, Subchapter A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Garza alleged that Todd had engaged in conduct that constituted stalking and
harassment and was intended to “threaten, harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or
embarrass” her and her children. She further alleged that Todd’s conduct constituted
family violence.
At the hearing on her application, Garza testified that her relationship with
Todd was irreparably damaged by an incident that took place in January 2021.
Garza’s maternal uncle—Todd’s brother—owned a car repair shop, where Garza
and her sister worked. According to Garza, Todd came to the shop uninvited in
January 2021 to accuse Garza’s uncle of sexually assaulting her when she was a
child:
[Todd] shows up out of nowhere screaming, yelling, yelling accusations towards my uncle, my boss. She tries to access — I was in an upstairs office, she tries to access that office. She has a large wrench in her hand and she is yelling and screaming, “Where is Michelle?” Garza explained that, at the time, she was in an office on the shop’s second floor but
she could see and hear what was happening in the shop below through a live camera
2 feed.1 When she screamed, “Where’s Michelle,” Todd was calling Garza by her
middle name and trying to go up the stairs to where Garza was hiding.
Silent video footage from the shop’s surveillance system shows Todd enter
the reception area, have a verbal altercation with Garza’s sister, and then walk into
the garage. In the garage, Garza’s sister blocks Todd from accessing the stairs, Todd
pushes against Garza’s sister, and, visibly frustrated, begins damaging property in
the garage and reception area. Among other acts, Todd can be seen grabbing an
impact tool from a utility cart and another tool from out of the frame in the garage,
overturning the utility cart, pushing over a water cooler, using the impact tool and
other objects to damage multiple computer monitors and a computer tower inside of
the reception area, throwing furniture, pulling an alarm pad and other equipment
from the walls, and smashing a decorative object. Another video shows Todd taking
a fire extinguisher from the shop, carrying it across the street to where Garza had
parked her car, and striking Garza’s car with the fire extinguisher. After the incident,
Garza found the fire extinguisher inside of her car, with the rear window smashed.
1 While Garza testified that she could see and hear what was happening in the shop through the live camera feed, the video exhibits admitted into the evidence do not include audio.
3 The cost to repair Garza’s car was $5,000; the cost to repair the other damage caused
by Todd was higher.2
After the January 2021 incident, Garza went “no contact” with Todd. Garza
explained that even though Todd’s behavior was not typical of Todd and Todd had
not physically attacked her, Todd’s “rage” during the incident “terrified” her. Garza
believed Todd was angry with her for maintaining a relationship with her uncle
despite Todd’s sexual-assault allegation against him.
Garza did not press charges against Todd, but Todd was still charged with
criminal mischief in connection with the January 2021 incident.3 The conditions of
Todd’s pretrial bond prohibited Todd from contacting Garza, Garza’s husband, and
Garza’s uncle. Todd ultimately received deferred adjudication community
supervision on the charge, successfully completed the community supervision, and
paid restitution.
Garza testified that when Todd’s community supervision ended in April 2022,
Todd began trying to contact her.
2 Additional testimony suggested that Todd also damaged property in a house in connection with the January 2021 incident. Garza testified that between the shop and the house, Todd caused about $30,000 in damages. 3 The indictment named Todd’s brother—not Garza—as the complainant for the criminal mischief charge. The indictment alleged Todd damaged property including four windows, a door, two weed eaters, a table, a plant pot, three window screens, three computers, a jumper box, an alarm pad, and two impact tools. 4 By July 2022, Garza had switched jobs and was teaching at the private school
her children attended on a church campus. The school principal testified that Todd
called him with concerns about the school. She demanded to know why school
administrators had not returned her call about “the complaint that she was having
towards the church, getting abused, having sex offenders, or whatever the cause may
be, on site.” Unsatisfied with the principal’s response, Todd pledged to bring
protestors to the school and “make it as loud as possible so it’s a disruption and it’s
going to be all over the news and this and that.” The principal notified the school’s
administrative team and facility managers of Todd’s statement, but nothing came of
her pledge. To the principal’s knowledge, Todd had not visited the school or
threatened Garza’s children, though she had visited the affiliated church.
A few months later, on November 15, Todd went uninvited to Garza’s home.
Garza was home with the children celebrating her son’s birthday when Todd
“showed up knocking on the door, banging on the door, and asking to be let in.” In
her declaration admitted into evidence at the hearing, Garza described Todd as
looking “angry and irritated” as she knocked on the door. Garza hid in a closet with
the children and called 911, claiming she was “afraid for [her] safety and [her] kids’
safety” based on the January 2021 incident.
Garza testified that Todd knocked on the door for about ten minutes before
leaving. When she left, Todd placed a birthday card from Todd’s husband to Garza’s
5 son and a letter from Todd to each of Garza’s children on the front doormat. In the
letters, Todd wrote that she loved the children, missed them, and hoped to be a part
of their lives. Garza testified that even though the letters did not contain any threats,
she was still frightened by them and Todd’s uninvited visit to her home considering
the events of January 2021.
The next day, Todd attended service at the church affiliated with the school,
which Garza and her children were also attending, even though Todd did not usually
attend service there and belonged to a different church. Garza testified that Todd’s
uninvited presence at the church caused Garza’s children to cry and feel afraid.4 She
added in her declaration that she left the church with the children, took them to her
classroom, and told her school supervisors about the “situation with [Todd].” Todd
attended other services at the church as well, including a few weeks later when Garza
again removed the children to her classroom to avoid Todd, locked the door, and
stayed in the classroom until the service ended. During one of these church visits,
Todd approached Garza’s son and touched his cheek without permission.5
4 On cross-examination, Garza was asked why her children would fear Todd. She testified that she told her son “a very filtered, as age appropriate as it could be, version” of the January 2021 incident “to keep him safe.” She had also discussed the incident with her daughter. 5 From the hearing testimony, it is not clear when the cheek touching occurred. But Garza’s declaration states the touching happened in May 2023, that it caused her son to feel “upset, frazzled, [and] in shock” and to cry, and that they left the church immediately.
6 Then, toward the end of February 2023, Todd entered Garza’s home while
Garza was at work. Garza returned home to find a letter from Todd inside the house.
Garza had not invited Todd to the home.6 But when she reviewed footage from her
security camera, Garza discovered that the woman who cleans her house had let
Todd in. The letter Todd left inside was a written apology, which Garza tore up
because she was “terrified” for herself and her children. Asked on
cross-examination why it was so bad that Todd wanted to apologize, Garza
responded, “[B]ecause it was inside my home.” Garza confirmed that she felt
“stalked” and “harassed” by Todd’s conduct, again pointing to the January 2021
incident as the origin of her concerns. Garza was asked whether an “outside person
looking in” might say Todd “is just trying to have a relationship with you.” She
answered:
A. I’m terrified.
Q. Why?
A. Because of [the January 2021 incident]. What I lived through that day. I’m terrified for my kids.
A. Because I’ve seen her [Todd’s] violence and rage. Q. Okay. And do you believe that that violence and rage was towards you?
6 Todd admitted in her testimony that she “purposely” went to Garza’s home when she knew Garza would not be there because she did not want to upset Garza and she did not trust the postal service to deliver the apology letter. 7 A. Yes.
Garza wrote to Todd a few months later, in May 2023, asking Todd to leave
her alone and stop harassing her. According to Garza’s declaration, the letter read:
“Leave us alone! You are harassing and further traumatizing my kids and I. Leave
us alone!”
Todd called the school once or twice after receiving Garza’s letter. Todd
again claimed that she contacted the school out of concern for her grandchildren and
others who attended the school because she believed the school was “allowing sexual
predators in.” On cross-examination, she acknowledged telling one of the school
administrators that Garza was treating her “as the devil incarnate,” that Garza was a
bad person, and that Garza should not have been hired as a “religious teacher.”
Garza testified that, even though Todd had never physically harmed her, she
felt threatened or harassed by Todd more than once, she believed Todd’s behavior
would continue to be alarming, and she worried Todd’s conduct would humiliate her
children, cause her to lose her job, or lead to more property damage. She also
claimed to have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) after
the January 2021 incident.
For her part, Todd denied that she was stalking or harassing Garza. She
explained that she went to the car repair shop in January 2021 to confront her brother
about the sexual assault, not Garza. She emphasized that she had taken responsibility
8 for the January 2021 incident, which she described as just “one episode” that she
agreed was wrong, completed her community supervision early, paid restitution, and
not had any similar incidents since. She previously was close with Garza and
Garza’s children and wanted to mend the relationship. She claimed that her
interactions after the January 2021 incident were motivated by missing her
grandchildren, whom she had not seen for more than three years.
Todd also presented testimony from her husband and a different brother.
Todd’s husband testified that Todd was not a threat to anyone. In his opinion,
Garza’s concerns were “truly unfounded” and stemmed from jealousy related to the
adoption of another grandchild—Garza’s niece—into Todd’s home. Todd’s brother
testified that he also noticed jealousy from Garza after the adoption. He described
Todd’s behavior in the January 2021 incident as out of character, and noted he had
not seen Todd behave that way before or after the incident.
At the end of the hearing, the trial court orally granted Garza’s application for
a protective order based on stalking and harassment. In ruling, the trial court
commented on boundaries, remarking that once a child reaches adulthood, “there
have to be boundaries . . . in order to keep everything on an even keel” and that Todd
had violated those boundaries. The trial court told Todd, “[Y]ou can’t go into
people’s homes, even if the housekeeper lets you in,” “you also can’t call her job
and degrade her,” and “you cannot approach a person, even if it’s a child, and touch
9 them without their consent.” The trial court continued, “When you went into that
home, you crossed boundaries. When you called her job, you crossed boundaries.
And when you touched that child, you crossed boundaries.”
The trial court’s written order made the protective order effective for three
years. As grounds, the protective order recited the trial court’s findings that “there
are reasonable grounds to believe [Garza] is a victim of STALKING by [Todd]” and
that the protective order is necessary for Garza’s safety and to prevent family
violence.7 After requesting and obtaining findings of fact and conclusions of law,
Todd appealed.
Required Proof and Findings
We understand Todd as arguing that the protective order must be set aside
because Garza did not prove, and the trial court did not find, that Todd committed
7 We note that in its oral rendition at the end of the hearing, the trial court remarked that “probable cause” exists to believe that stalking and harassment had occurred, rather than “reasonable grounds.” “Probable cause” is the standard for a protective order under Chapter 7B, Subchapter B. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 7B.052. Subchapter B applies for protective orders when a defendant is appearing at a proceeding relating to a stalking offense. See Bevers v. Mabry, No. 05-22-00713-CV, 2024 WL 469550, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 7, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting that Subchapter B did not apply because, at the time the application was filed, there was no proceeding relating to a stalking offense in which a “defendant” was appearing, citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 7B.051(a)). Both the protective order itself and the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law correctly reference the Subchapter A standard for the protective order issued here, which requires a finding of “reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is the victim” of certain offenses, including stalking. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 7B.001(a), .003(a).
10 family violence. This argument conflates the requirements of a protective order
under the Family Code with the requirements of a protective order under the Code
of Criminal Procedure.
A person can request a protective order under either statute. See Shoemaker
v. State for Protection of C.L., 493 S.W.3d 710, 715 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, no pet.) (observing that both the Family Code and the Code of Criminal
Procedure authorize protective orders). Under the Family Code as it existed when
this case was filed, a trial court may issue a protective order if it finds “that family
violence has occurred and is likely to occur in the future.”8 TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 81.001. Relevant here, Chapter 7B, Subchapter A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure authorizes a protective order on the trial court’s finding that “there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is a victim of [stalking].” TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 7B.003(a) (authorizing protective orders for victims of certain
crimes, including stalking). No other fact findings are required under Chapter 7B,
8 Several of the statutes governing protective orders were amended effective September 1, 2023, or later. See Act of Jun. 18, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 947, § 2 (S.B. 1717) (amending certain provisions of Title 4 of the Family Code and Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as Sections 42.07 and 42.072 of the Penal Code); see also, e.g., 89th Leg., ch. 251 (H.B. 2596). Because Garza filed her protective-order application in August 2023, before the amendments were effective, we apply the prior versions of these statutes. See Segundo Navarro Drilling, Ltd. v. San Roman Ranch Min. Partners, 612 S.W.3d 489, 496 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (“[W]e must apply the statute as it existed at the time the lawsuit was filed[.]”).
11 Subchapter A.9 See id.; see also Netaji v. Roberts, No. 03-19-00840-CV, 2021 WL
5312489, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The trial
court’s protective order here includes its finding that ‘[r]easonable grounds exist to
believe that Applicant has been the victim of stalking.’ This fact finding is the only
necessary under [Chapter 7B, Subchapter A] for issuance of the order.”); R.M. v.
Swearingen, 510 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.) (“No
additional showings beyond status as a crime victim are required to obtain the order
[under Subchapter A].”).
Here, Garza alleged in her application that Todd engaged in conduct that
constituted stalking, which was intended to “harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment,
9 Todd also complains that the trial court did not explain how the evidence satisfies the elements of stalking in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, citing Dessens v. Argeroplos, 658 S.W.3d 438, 444 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). In Dessens, the appellant complained that the trial court’s findings could not be extended to support the protective order because they described only a single instance of threatening conduct—a single obscene email—and thus did not establish the “course of conduct” required by the stalking statue. Id. at 444. However, the court expressly refused in the opinion to hold that a trial court is required to make a finding on every subpart of the statue violated. Id. at 447. Here, the fact findings do not contain a detailed discussion of evidence, but in the legal conclusions the trial court made the only finding required for the protective order when it found reasonable grounds to believe Garza was the victim of stalking by Todd. See Ray v. Farmers’ State Bank of Hart, 576 S.W.2d 607, 608 n.1 (Tex. 1979) (where a finding of fact is contained in a conclusion of law, the trial court’s designation is not controlling on appeal); Garza v. Renteria, No. 14-24-00079-CV, 2025 WL 2413260, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 21, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (affirming protective order when trial court’s oral rendition of judgment included finding of “reasonable grounds to believe” applicant was victim of stalking or harassment even though protective order did not). Moreover, the trial court explained its reasoning when it orally rendered judgment. 12 or embarrass” her. Although she also alleged that Todd’s conduct constituted family
violence, she expressly requested relief under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Likewise, the trial court granted the protective order under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, expressly finding reasonable grounds to believe Garza was a victim of
stalking by Todd. This was the only required finding; neither proof nor a finding of
family violence was needed. See Netaji, 2021 WL 5312489, at *10; R.M., 510
S.W.3d at 633; see also R.S. v. D.R.T., No. 01-22-00701-CV, 2023 WL 8938409, at
*7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting
argument that protective order must be set aside because there was no proof of family
violence where trial court’s Chapter 7B findings provided separate, independent
basis for order); Straughan v. Girsch, No. 14-20-00763-CV, 2022 WL 2977049, at
*4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Todd contends the trial court erred in granting the protective order because its
fact findings are not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence and its legal
conclusions cannot withstand de novo review.
A. The standard of review
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a protective order under
Chapter 7B, Subchapter A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence. Shoemaker, 493 S.W.3d at 714–15 (considering
13 predecessor statute that was recodified as Chapter 7B, Subchapter A without
substantive changes).
When conducting a legal-sufficiency review, we consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every reasonable
inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822, 827
(Tex. 2005). To prevail, an appellant must show that no more than a scintilla of
evidence supports a finding on which the opponent had the burden of proof. See
Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Texas Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142,
156–57 (Tex. 2014); City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 826. More than a scintilla of
evidence exists to support a finding when the evidence enables reasonable and
fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Sols.,
Inc., 464 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. 2015).
When conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence
and set aside the trial court’s order only if the evidence is so weak as to make the
order clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176
(Tex. 1986). Under both standards, the factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, and we defer to the factfinder’s
implicit credibility and weight determinations. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at
816–17, 819–20, 822; Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761
(Tex. 2003).
14 B. The stalking statue
A trial court must grant a protective order under Chapter 7B, Subchapter A of
the Code of Criminal Procedure if it finds there are reasonable grounds to believe
the applicant is a victim of certain crimes, including stalking. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 7B.003(a)–(b); Bevers v. Mabry, No. 05-22-00713-CV, 2024 WL 469550,
at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 7, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Protective orders
issued under the Code of Criminal Procedure may be effective for the duration of
the lives of the offender and the victim or for any shorter period stated in the order.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 7B.003(b), 7B.007(a); Beach v. Beach, No.
01-19-00123-CV, 2020 WL 1879553, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr.
16, 2020, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.).
Relevant here, the stalking statute incorporates an intent element, a subjective
harm element, and an objective harm element. See Bevers, 2024 WL 469550, at *8.
A person commits the offense of stalking if, on more than one occasion and pursuant
to the same scheme or course of conduct that is directed specifically at another
person, she knowingly engages in conduct that:
(1) . . . [she] knows or reasonably should know the other person will regard as threatening:
(A) bodily injury or death for the other person; (B) bodily injury or death for a member of the other person’s family or household . . . ; or
15 (C) that an offense will be committed against the other person’s property; (2) causes the other person [or] a member of the other person’s family . . . to be placed in fear of bodily injury or death or in fear that an offense will be committed against the other person’s property, or to feel harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended; and
(3) would cause a reasonable person to:
(A) fear bodily injury or death for himself or herself;
(B) fear bodily injury or death for a member of the person’s family or household . . . ; (C) fear that an offense will be committed against the person’s property; or
(D) feel harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended. TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.072(a);10 Garza v. Renteria, No. 14-24-00079-CV, 2025 WL
2413260, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 21, 2025, no pet. h.). A
scheme or course of conduct can include different types of conduct described by the
stalking statute, if done on more than one occasion. Id. at § 42.072(c).
C. The evidence is sufficient
Todd contends that the evidence is not legally or factually sufficient to support
the trial court’s finding of reasonable grounds to believe that Garza was a victim of
stalking by Todd. She argues that the trial court could not reasonably find a
10 The pre-2023 amendment version of Section 42.072 applies here. See Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., ch. 1278 (H.B. 1606), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2013.
16 qualifying scheme or course of conduct directed at Garza because Garza’s case
rested exclusively on the January 2021 incident, which happened more than two and
half years before Garza applied for the protective order and was a one-off incident
that was directed at Todd’s brother, not Garza. Todd characterizes her other
conduct—leaving cards on Garza’s doormat, entering Garza’s home to deliver an
apology letter, attending service at Garza’s church, and touching her grandson’s
cheek—as “neutral” or “innocent” efforts to reconcile with her family or attend
public worship. She disagrees this conduct could be viewed as threatening bodily
injury or property damage because there is no evidence she physically attacked
Garza or Garza’s children, and she had not caused any property damage in the years
after the January 2021 incident. She asserts the trial court’s opinion that she “crossed
boundaries” is not enough to support a protective order under the stalking statute.
We conclude the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient.
The record contains ample evidence of a course of conduct directed at Garza
that Todd knew or reasonably should have known Garza would find threatening
bodily injury to her or that an offense would be committed against Garza’s property.
Garza testified that she began to fear for her own safety and the safety of her children
and property after the January 2021 incident. Todd asserts that the January 2021
incident was too widely separated in time and directed only at Garza’s uncle to be
considered part of a scheme or course of conduct directed at Garza. But “[S]ection
17 42.072 does not specify a time period in which the scheme or course of conduct must
occur; rather, it merely requires that the [actor’s] conduct must occur ‘on more than
one occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct.’” Pomier v.
State, 326 S.W.3d 373, 379–80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)
(quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.072(a)). Thus, by definition, the offense of stalking
“contemplates the presentation of evidence that covers the entire course of a
defendant’s alleged unlawful conduct” directed specifically toward another person.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
In its role as factfinder, the trial court was free to disbelieve Todd’s testimony
that the January 2021 incident was directed only at Garza’s uncle and instead believe
Garza’s testimony that she too was a target. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 816–
17, 819–20, 822; Golden Eagle Archery, 116 S.W.3d at 761. Garza testified that
Todd was angry with her for not rejecting her uncle, called out for her during the
incident, and tried to gain access to the office where she was hiding. Garza’s
testimony that she was a target of the January 2021 incident is corroborated by the
undisputed evidence that Todd used a fire extinguisher to strike Garza’s car after not
gaining access to Garza at the shop. Additionally, the trial court presiding in the
criminal case against Todd listed Garza as a person whom Todd could not contact
after the incident.
18 Contrary to Todd’s assertion, the January 2021 incident is not the only
conduct at issue. Instead, the protective order rests on conduct spanning two and a
half years. Around April 2022, after she completed community supervision for the
criminal mischief charge that resulted from the January 2021 incident and was no
longer bound by the order prohibiting contact with Garza, Todd began trying to
contact Garza despite Garza’s wish not to have a relationship. Todd called and
threatened to disrupt the school Garza worked at and the children attended a few
months later. In November 2022, Todd visited Garza’s home to see Garza’s
children, even though she had not been invited. Todd knocked for about ten minutes,
and Garza never answered the door, instead hiding in a closet with her children and
calling 911 because she was afraid for their safety.
Continuing her effort to see Garza’s children, Todd attended service at
Garza’s church the next day, even though she was not a member of the church and
did not usually worship there. Despite her presence at the church being distressing
for Garza and Garza’s children to the point that they left the church and hid in
Garza’s classroom, Todd attended service again a few weeks later. Then, in
February 2022, Todd visited and entered Garza’s home when she knew Garza would
not be there. And finally, in July 2023, Todd again contacted Garza’s place of
employment—the school—and degraded Garza, telling Garza’s coworkers that
19 Garza treated Todd as “the devil incarnate,” was a “bad person,” and “shouldn’t have
been hired” to teach at a religiously affiliated school.
We disagree the record establishes that this conduct was “innocent” or
“neutral.” Even if, as Todd suggests, she engaged in this conduct in an effort to keep
school children safe from sexual predators when she called the school principal or
to mend damaged family relationships through her other actions, there is evidence
she reasonably should have known that Garza found her efforts threatening. See
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b) (stating that “person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge,” with respect to nature of conduct or to circumstances surrounding
conduct when she is aware of nature of conduct or that circumstances exist). Todd
acknowledged the January 2021 incident, which undisputedly involved damage to
Garza’s property and had frightened Garza, and a court ordered her not to contact
Garza after the incident. Garza never spoke with Todd after the January 2021
incident, did not solicit any relationship with Todd, and did not reciprocate Todd’s
efforts at reconciliation. When Todd created an occasion to be in the presence of
Garza and Garza’s children by attending their church, Garza manifested her fear of
Todd by leaving the church with her children. See Ploeger v. State, 189 S.W.3d 799,
809 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (considering stalking
complainant’s manifestation of fear as evidence that defendant knew or reasonably
should have believed victim would regard actions as threatening bodily injury or
20 death). When Todd delivered her apology letter to Garza’s home, she did so when
Garza was not there because she knew it might upset Garza. Additionally, Garza
wrote to Todd in May 2023 and asked Todd to leave her alone and stop harassing
her; yet in July 2023, Todd contacted Garza’s employer to speak poorly of Garza.
See, e.g., Bevers, 2024 WL 469550, at *9 (“A person’s decision to ignore the
requests of another person . . . to stop the conduct can reveal his knowledge about
his conduct.”); Hoover v. Guillory, No. 03-21-00421-CV, 2022 WL 3903124, at *4
(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 31, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering applicant’s
testimony that she told person against whom protective order was granted not to
contact her, but he continued to do so for more than a year).
There is also ample evidence in the record that Todd’s conduct caused Garza
to worry that Todd might harm her, her children, or her property and to feel harassed,
annoyed, alarmed, tormented, embarrassed, or offended. Garza testified that she was
diagnosed with PTSD because of the January 2021 incident. And she testified
repeatedly that even though Todd had not physically harmed her in the January 2021
incident, she worried Todd might do so in the future or damage her property, that
she felt harassed by Todd’s intrusions around her home, church, and workplace, and
that Todd’s communications with the school embarrassed her. See Ploeger, 189
S.W.3d at 810 (stating stalking complainant’s testimony that she feared appellant
would harm her supported jury’s findings). From the evidence that Todd intruded
21 at Garza’s old job, yelled for Garza, and damaged Garza’s car when she did not find
Garza; repeatedly ignored Garza’s efforts to avoid or cease contact; touched Garza’s
son without consent; entered Garza’s home without Garza’s permission; and
interfered with Garza’s workplace and reputation at the school, the trial court could
find that a reasonable person would share Garza’s feelings about Todd’s conduct.
Viewing the evidence under the applicable standards of review, we conclude
the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe that Todd, on more than one
occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct that was directed
specifically at Garza, knowingly engaged in conduct that caused Garza to fear bodily
injury or that an offense would be committed against her property, or to feel
harassed, annoyed, alarmed, tormented, embarrassed, or offended. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 7B.003; TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.072; see also Dessens v.
Argeroplos, 658 S.W.3d 438, 446–47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no
pet.); Shoemaker, 493 S.W.3d at 718–19. Accordingly, the evidence was legally and
factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Garza was a victim of
stalking so as to authorize the granting of a protective order against Todd under
Chapter 7B, Subchapter A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. arts. 7B.003(b), 7B.007(a); TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.072.
22 We overrule Todd’s issues.11
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s protective order.
Andrew Johnson Justice
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Guiney, and Johnson.
11 To the extent Todd complains that the duration of the protective order was too long, we also disagree. Protective orders issued under the Code of Criminal Procedure “may be effective for the duration of the lives of the offender and victim or for any shorter period stated in the order.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 7B.007(a). The trial court thus had statutory authority to make the protective order effective for three years, and the same evidence set out above supports the trial court’s exercise of that authority. 23