Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad v. Becker

45 N.E. 96, 146 Ind. 202, 1896 Ind. LEXIS 268
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 10, 1896
DocketNo. 17,090
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 45 N.E. 96 (Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad v. Becker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad v. Becker, 45 N.E. 96, 146 Ind. 202, 1896 Ind. LEXIS 268 (Ind. 1896).

Opinion

Jordan, J.

Mary A. Becker, as the administratrix of her deceased husband, Martin Becker, sued appellant to recover damages on account of its alleged wrongful act, which resulted in the death of the decedent while in the service of appellant, serving as a fireman upon one of its freight trains.

There was a special verdict returned by the jury, and upon it the court rendered judgment in favor of [203]*203appellant upon the second paragraph of the complaint, and in favor of appellee upon the third paragraph for f6,000.00, the snm awarded by the jury.

This latter paragraph, after setting out the character and surroundings of appellant’s railroad, especially that part of it lying between Crawfordsville Junction and Eoekville, and after further averring that its road Avas “a single track railroad,” and operated by “telegraph orders” from the company’s main office at the city of Terre Haute, and that the death of Martin Becker was occasioned by the train upon which he was firing, colliding with a certain train which, on the day of the fatal accident, had been, by appellant’s train dispatcher, ordered to “work wild,” etc., then apparently proceeds upon the theory that .said accident was due to the neglect of the appellant to notify decedent and those in charge of the train upon which he was at the time at work, of the “whereabouts” of the train which had been ordered to “work wild.”

The sufficiency of the paragraph upon which the special verdict is founded is assailed, but as the questions involved are better presented, under the special verdict, we may address our consideration to it, without directly passing upon the sufficiency of the paragraph in controversy. Omitting the facts found by the jury, which are not essential to the determination of the principal legal propositions at issue in this appeal, we may properly set out the remainder of the special verdict, which is as follows:

“2. That said railroad between said cities of Terre Haute and Logansport on and before said date consisted of but one main track, with switches and side tracks at intervening stations, and was a single-track railroad, having a line of telegraph along said main track from said city of Terre Haute to said city of Lo[204]*204gansport, and had telegraph offices at all the principal stations on said railroad, including the stations of Judson and Waveland, but had none at Dooleys, with the principal telegraph office in the city of Terre Haute, at which point the chief train dispatcher for said defendant had his headquarters and offices, and from which point said defendant controlled the movements of its trains on said railroad by orders through the use of its said lines of telegraph.

“3. That on and before said 10th day of December, 1889, the defendant was operating and funning four regular trains, two of which were passenger and two were freight, daily, southbound; and four regular trains, two of which were passenger and two were freight, daily, northbound over said railroad between the said cities of Terre Haute and Logansport; the time of the departure and arrival of said trains at the different stations on said railroad were fixed by said defendant, and printed in printed time tables, and issued to all its servants engaged then and there in operating and running said trains.

“That on the backs of said time tables were printed rules', made by said defendant for the direction and government of all its servants engaged in running and operating said trains, all of which rules were in force on and before said 10th day of December, 1889.

“That by said rules of the defendant it was the duty of conductors and enginemen of all work and wild trains to keep their trains out of the way and off the time of all regular passenger and freight trains of the defendant, and in no case to occupy the main track within ten minutes of the time of any regular train.

“That said rule 61 on said time table was as follows, to-wit:

“ ‘All work and wild trains will keep out of the way and off the time of all regular passenger and freight [205]*205trains, and in no case occupy the main track within ten minutes of the time of any regular train.’

“That by the said rules of the defendant it was the duty of conductors of all wood and work trains of defendant at the close of each day to report to the dispatching office of said defendant by telegraph the limits of the main track they intend to occupy the following day with their trains, and to never exceed the limits specified, without special telegraph or written authority. That rule 82 on said time table was as follows, to-wit: ‘Conductors of all wood and work trains must, at the close of each day, report to the dispatching office by telegraph the limits of the main track they intend to occupy the following day, and must never exceed the limits specified, without special telegraph or written authority.’

“That by the said rules of the defendant, enginemen were held accountable for the speed of their trains and the due observance of signals ahead, and were equally' responsible with the conductors of their trains for keeping off the time of other trains. That rule 101 on said time table was as follows, to-wit: . ‘The engine-men will be held accountable for the speed of the train and due observance of signals ahead, and will be equally responsible with the conductor for keeping off the time of other trains.’

“That by the rules of the defendant, telegraph orders from the dispatching office of the defendant to its conductors and enginemen were to be sent by defendant’s train dispatchers personally, and said train dispatch ers in giving and sending such orders in the line of duty represented the superintendent of the’ defendant and had authority to act and direct the conductors and enginemen of the defendant in respect to the movements of trains under their care and control. That rule 118 on said time tables was as follows, to-[206]*206wit: ‘Train dispatchers shall, themselves, send all messages involving the movements of the trains, and must not permit another person to do it for them.:

“That rule No. 119 on said time table was as follows, to-wit: ‘All special orders by telegraph for the movements of trains will be numbered consecutively, commencing with No. 1 on the first day of each month, and must be sent to all trains named in the order, at the same time addressed to the conductors of the trains for which they are intended, and signed by the train dispatchers, who, in the line of their duty, represent the superintendent.’ That by the said rules of the defendant all trains were to be run under the direction of the conductors, except when their directions conflicted with the defendant’s rules, or involved risk or hazard, in which case the enginemen were declared to be equally responsible with the conductors.

“That rule 80 on said time table was as follows, to-wit: ‘All trains must run under the direction of the conductor, except when his directions conflict with these rules, or involve risk or hazard, in which case the enginemen will be held equally responsible with the conductor. Conductors will be held responsible for the safe management of their trains, and for the proper behavior and performance of duty by their trainmen. They must not allow any person to ride in the baggage, mail or express cars, whether connected with the road or not, except those whose duties require them to be there.’

“á.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Fouts v. Largent
94 N.E.2d 448 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1950)
St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad v. Fithian
155 S.W. 88 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1913)
Chicago & Erie Railroad v. Hamerick
96 N.E. 649 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1911)
Stone v. Union Pacific Railroad
100 P. 362 (Utah Supreme Court, 1909)
Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad v. Roberts
67 N.E. 530 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1903)
Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Swearingen
122 F. 193 (Fifth Circuit, 1903)
Town of Boswell v. Wakley
48 N.E. 637 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1897)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
45 N.E. 96, 146 Ind. 202, 1896 Ind. LEXIS 268, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/terre-haute-indianapolis-railroad-v-becker-ind-1896.