Tenerife Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. WM Capital Management, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: June 10, 2024
• Docket: 21-1806
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 20-2089

FRANCISCO ALMEIDA-LEÓN, WANDA CRUZ-QUILES, JUAN ALMEIDA-LEÓN, TENERIFE REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

WM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.

No. 21-1806

TENERIFE REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

No. 21-1807

FRANCISCO ALMEIDA-LEÓN, WANDA CRUZ-QUILES, JUAN ALMEIDA-LEÓN,

Defendant, Appellee. APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lipez, Howard, and Thompson, Circuit Judges.

Edilberto Berríos Pérez, with whom REC Law Services, PSC was on brief, for Francisco Almeida-León, Wanda Cruz-Quiles, Juan Almeida-León, appellants. Roberto E. Berríos-Falcón, with whom Berríos Falcón, LLC was on brief, for Tenerife Real Estate Holdings, LLC, appellant. Jairo Mellado-Villarreal, with whom Tessie Leal-Garabis and Mellado & Mellado-Villarreal was on brief, for WM Capital Management, Inc., appellee.

June 10, 2024

 Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation.

- 2 - HOWARD, Circuit Judge. United States Courts of Appeals

are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that authority

conferred by Constitution and statute. When parties bring appeals

that exceed our statutory grant of jurisdiction, we must dismiss

them. This case presents two such appeals. We lack jurisdiction

over 20-2089 -- appealing the district court's order appointing a

third party to enforce the court's final judgment -- because

appellants did not demonstrate that the order was final,

injunctive, important, or unreviewable. We lack jurisdiction over

21-1806 and 21-1807 -- appealing the district court's temporary

restraining order ("TRO") -- because appellants did not

demonstrate that the order was final, conclusive, injunctive,

related to a receiver, or otherwise subject to our jurisdiction.1

We dismiss.

I.

We have previously summarized the facts and procedural

history of this case. See Almeida-León v. WM Cap. Mgmt., Inc.,

993 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir. 2021). We pick up this yet tortured

narrative where we last left off.

1 Appellants failed to helpfully brief the appellate- jurisdiction issue, despite having that issue flagged by appellees. For example, appellants' consolidated reply brief contains a single-sentence defense of appellate jurisdiction that cites some statutes and a legal doctrine but that provides neither caselaw nor reasoned analysis on this complex question.

- 3 - The district court entered final judgment in favor of WM

Capital and against Francisco Almeida-León, Wanda Cruz-Quiles,

Juan Almeida-León, and Tenerife Real Estate Holdings, LLC

(collectively, "the Almeidas") in 2019, and the Almeidas appealed

to this court. While the appeal was pending, the Almeidas -- who

did not move to stay the judgment pending appeal -- refused to

comply with the final judgment. As a result, the district court

in August 2020 granted in part WM Capital's motion under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 70(a) to appoint a third party to execute

the final judgment.2 The court instructed WM Capital to present a

third party or obtain the U.S. Marshal's consent for appointment.

WM Capital proposed attorney Dora Monserrate as the third-party

appointee. The district court approved Monserrate's appointment

in an October 2020 order, and the Almeidas appealed. Notably, the

Almeidas appealed the district court's October order appointing

Monserrate -- not the court's August order granting WM Capital's

motion to appoint a third party. This appeal, 20-2089, is the

first under our consideration.

Rule 70(a) provides, "If a judgment requires a party to 2

convey land, to deliver a deed or other document, or to perform any other specific act and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may order the act to be done -- at the disobedient party's expense -- by another person appointed by the court. When done, the act has the same effect as if done by the party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 70(a).

- 4 - The Almeidas' obstinance continued, even after we

affirmed the district court's final judgment. See Almeida-León,

993 F.3d at 15. The district court held the Almeidas and their

attorneys in contempt in August 2021, allowing them two weeks to

comply with the final judgment before sanctions would begin. But

four days later, a Commonwealth of Puerto Rico court issued a

ruling in favor of the Almeidas, concluding that the federal court

lacked jurisdiction and ordering various sanctions and remedies in

favor of the Almeidas and against WM Capital.

WM Capital promptly moved for a TRO and permanent

injunction in federal district court, seeking to enjoin the state

court from contravening, and the Almeidas from collaterally

attacking, the federal judgment. The district court granted the

TRO and published an order explaining its reasoning. The TRO's

fourteen-day term would conclude September 29, 2021.

With the TRO operational but set to expire, the court

gave the Almeidas a week to oppose WM Capital's motion for a

permanent injunction. The Almeidas filed a motion opposing both

the TRO and the permanent injunction on September 22. The next

day, the district court issued a status order requesting that WM

Capital file a reply to the Almeidas' opposition and instructing

both parties to inform the court by October 1 if they wanted an

evidentiary hearing on the permanent-injunction motion. The

status order indicated that the court would decide the permanent-

- 5 - injunction motion when WM Capital filed its reply and extended the

TRO "from September 29, 2021 until further order of the Court,"

impliedly the forthcoming permanent-injunction ruling. The

Almeidas requested "an evidentiary hearing on all issues of fact

and related legal points" the following day, September 24, 2021.

Curiously, that same day, the Almeidas filed a notice of

appeal from the TRO and the status order extending it. The

Almeidas amended that notice of appeal, and Tenerife filed its own

notice of appeal, on September 29, 2021. These appeals, 21-1806

and 21-1807, challenge the TRO, the district court's explanation

for the TRO, and the status order extending the TRO. Consolidated,

they form the second appeal under our consideration. Because,

however, we lack appellate jurisdiction to hear any of the appeals

before us, we must dismiss.

II.

As grounds for appellate jurisdiction over their appeal

from the order appointing Monserrate,3 the Almeidas invoke 28

3 Our jurisdictional inquiry is limited to the order that the Almeidas cite in their notice of appeal: the district court's October order appointing Monserrate. We decline to extend our jurisdiction to review the district court's August order granting WM Capital's motion to appoint a third party. Even if we were to disregard the norm that our "jurisdiction extends only to review of the orders and judgments specifically enumerated in the notice of appeal," Caribbean Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Erikon LLC, 966 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 2020), the Almeidas' arguments are best construed as scattered attacks on the final judgment. Resultingly, "the context of the record as a whole" gives us no reason to conclude that the Almeidas meant to appeal the August order, rather than the October

- 6 - U.S.C. § 1291, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and the collateral-order

doctrine. Because none of these grounds provides appellate

jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appointment-order appeal.

Section 1291 grants us jurisdiction over "appeals from

all final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A

post-judgment order "is final if it leaves the district court with

no further work to resolve the post-judgment dispute and, thus,

ends the post-judgment proceeding." Caribbean Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v.

Erikon LLC, 966 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2020); see Whitfield v.

Municipality of Fajardo, 564 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2009). The

order appointing Monserrate contemplated that the district court

would adjudicate any disputes regarding Monserrate's compensation

and terminate her appointment when the Almeidas fulfilled their

final-judgment obligations. The order, in short, left the district

court more work to do and thus lacked finality.

Section 1292(a)(1) grants us jurisdiction over appeals

from interlocutory orders regarding injunctions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1). An injunction directs or forbids a party to act, is

enforceable by contempt, and provides some relief requested by the

favored party. See W Holding Co. v. AIG Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 377,

383 (1st Cir. 2014); Fryzel v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,

Inc., 719 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2013). The Almeidas make no effort

one. Id. (quoting Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2002)).

- 7 - to explain how the appointment order can be understood to fulfill

these injunctive characteristics.4 They thus waive any argument

that we have appellate jurisdiction under section 1292(a)(1). See

United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

The collateral-order doctrine allows us to "entertain an

appeal from non-final decisions when the order (1) conclusively

determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue

completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is

effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."5 United

States v. Pedró-Vidal, 991 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021) (internal

quotations omitted) (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166,

176 (2003)); Doe v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 46 F.4th 61, 65 (1st

Cir. 2022). The appointment order conclusively determines that

Monserrate is an appropriate third party to execute the judgment,

but it does not satisfy the remaining two elements. An issue is

4 The appointment order is, in any case, not an injunction. Orders directing payment of money cannot ordinarily be appealed as injunctive. See 16 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3922 (3d ed. 2023); see also Whitfield, 564 F.3d at 45. Except for setting Monserrate's salary, the district court's order does not even direct payment. It merely appoints a third party to enforce a judgment. 5 Some of our cases break these three factors into four. See, e.g., Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 35 F.4th 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2022), rev'd on other grounds, 598 U.S. 339 (2023). "[B]ut the substance is the same: a definitive decision, distinct from the merits, on an important issue, which would effectively be unreviewable at the end of the case." Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 585 F.3d 479, 480 n.1 (1st Cir. 2009).

- 8 - important if it is "weightier than the societal interests advanced

by the ordinary operation of final judgment principles." Mass.

Inst. of Tech., 46 F.4th at 65 (quoting Gill v. Gulfstream Park

Racing Ass'n, Inc., 399 F.3d 391, 399 (1st Cir. 2005)). This is

unlikely to be true where, as here, the issue presented "is highly

unlikely to affect, or even be consequential to, anyone aside from

the parties." Lee-Barnes v. Puerto Ven Quarry Corp., 513 F.3d 20,

26 (1st Cir. 2008). An order is effectively unreviewable if

denying its review would irreparably harm the appealing party.

Id. It is doubtful the Almeidas could show that an appointment

order enforcing a valid final judgment does them irreparable harm,

and -- in any case -- they have made no effort to do so. Like

sections 1291 and 1292(a)(1), the collateral-order doctrine does

not provide us appellate jurisdiction.

III.

from the TRO, the Almeidas invoke 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a)(1),

1292(a)(2), and 2283; the collateral-order doctrine; and Bivens v.

Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403

U.S. 388 (1971). As above, none of these grounds provides

appellate jurisdiction, and we must dismiss the Almeidas' appeal

from the TRO.

Five of the jurisdictional grounds on which the Almeidas

rely are easy to dispose of. The TRO was neither final under

- 9 - section 1291 nor conclusive under the collateral-order doctrine,

as the impending permanent-injunction ruling gave the district

court more work to do to in determining TRO-related issues. See

Erikon, 966 F.3d at 40; Petralia v. AT&T Glob. Info. Sols. Co.,

114 F.3d 352, 354 (1st Cir. 1997) (defining "conclusively

determine" as "definitively resolve" (quoting Doughty v.

Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 6 F.3d 856, 863 (1st Cir. 1993))).

The TRO did not involve a receiver under section 1292(a)(2) or an

agent of the United States, as required in a Bivens action, see

Quinones-Pimentel v. Cannon, 85 F.4th 63, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2023).

Section 2283, the Anti-Injunction Act, does not provide

jurisdiction at all: "it merely deprives the federal courts of the

power to grant a particular form of equitable relief." Gloucester

Marine Rys. Corp. v. Charles Parisi, Inc., 848 F.2d 12, 15 (1st

Cir. 1988); see 17 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Vikram

David Amar, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4222 (3d ed. 2023).

The Almeidas' final shot at appellate jurisdiction,

section 1292(a)(1), also misses the mark. As described above,

section 1292(a)(1) grants us jurisdiction over appeals from

"[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting,

continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or

refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions." 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1). Because "the term 'injunction' is understood not to

encompass [TROs]," S.F. Real Estate Invs. v. Real Estate Inv. Tr.

- 10 - of Am., 692 F.2d 814, 816 (1st Cir. 1982), the grant of a TRO

generally is not appealable, In re Lieb, 915 F.2d 180, 183 (5th

Cir. 1990) (collecting cases); see 16 Wright, Miller & Cooper,

supra § 3922.1; cf. Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, 984 F.3d

21, 27 (1st Cir. 2020) ("[T]he denial of a [TRO] does not normally

fall within the compass of section 1292(a)(1)."). "However, the

use of the 'temporary restraining order' label by a district court

does not defeat appealability if the order is in substance

a[n] . . . injunction." S.F. Real Estate, 692 F.2d at 816;

Melanson v. John J. Duane Co., 605 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1979)

("[An order] has to be treated for what it is, a preliminary

injunction, not what it was labelled."). To ensure an order is

not an injunction masquerading as a TRO, we look primarily to the

order's duration. TROs are temporary and short; injunctions need

not be. Melanson, 605 F.2d at 33 (concluding order could not be

TRO because "[i]ts duration and effect were more than temporary");

Societe Generale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon Eur. Mgmt. &

Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863, 865 n.2 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding order

styled as TRO to be injunction when it operated "for more than a

year").

Here, the district court framed the duration of the TRO

in indefinite language, but context makes apparent that the TRO

was intended to be temporary. The district court originally

granted the TRO on September 15, 2021, for fourteen days. Cf.

- 11 - Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2) (limiting TRO initial term to fourteen

days). The court subsequently extended the TRO "until further

order of the Court." But, in doing so, the district court made

clear that it was extending the TRO to allow for briefing on the

pending permanent-injunction motion -- set to conclude on October

1, 2023 -- after which it indicated that the permanent-injunction

motion would be ripe for a decision.6

Context has informed our appellate-jurisdiction analysis

in similar circumstances. In State of Maine v. Fri, we found that

we had no jurisdiction to review a TRO that lacked an explicit

expiration date because the TRO time limit in the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, which had not yet expired, implicitly constrained

the duration of the order. See 483 F.2d 439, 442 (1st Cir. 1973)

(per curiam); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). Today, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2) limits an initial TRO term to

fourteen days and an extension to another fourteen days, for a

total of twenty-eight days. Like the appellants in Fri, the

6 The district court subsequently explained that it extended the TRO because its permanent injunction ruling was "imminent." In the same order, the district court intimated that it viewed its TRO "as more preliminary injunction than TRO." We are not bound by this observation and "must make our own analysis and characterization." Coal. for Basic Hum. Needs v. King, 654 F.2d 838, 839 n.1 (1st Cir. 1981). We also note that "our settled practice when confronted with borderline cases is to 'resolve[] against immediate appealability.'" Calvary Chapel, 984 F.3d at 27 (alteration in original) (quoting Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 303 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002)).

- 12 - Almeidas appealed the TRO before the time limit contemplated by

Rule 65(b)(2) had elapsed. Combined with the context explicitly

supplied by the district court, the context implicitly provided by

Rule 65(b)(2) strongly indicates that -- notwithstanding its

indefinite language -- the TRO was intended to be temporary and

short. Section 1292(a)(1) resultingly provides no appellate

jurisdiction to review the Almeidas' appeal of the TRO. We must

dismiss it.

***

For all these reasons, we DISMISS the Almeidas' appeals.

The district court can and should resume enforcing its valid final

judgment.

We deny WM Capital's sanctions motion. Each party shall

bear their own costs.

- 13 -