Ten Bridges LLC v. Midas Mulligan LLC

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE

9 10 TEN BRIDGES, LLC, CASE NO. C19-1237JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12 ON WCPA COUNTERCLAIM MIDAS MULLIGAN, LLC, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

16 Before the court is Defendant Madrona Lisa, LLC’s (“Madrona”) motion for 17 summary judgment on its counterclaim for violation of the Washington Consumer 18 Protection Act (“WCPA”), ch. 19.86 RCW. (Mot. (Dkt. # 75); see also Reply (Dkt. 19 # 86).) Plaintiff Ten Bridges, LLC (“Ten Bridges”) opposes the motion and filed a 20 surreply. (Resp. (Dkt. # 84); Surreply (Dkt. # 93).) The court has considered the 21 motions, all submissions filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the relevant 22 1 portions of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised,1 the court GRANTS 2 Madrona’s motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim.

4 The court discussed the factual background of this case in detail in its September 5 23, 2021 order granting Defendants Madrona, Midas Mulligan, LLC (“Midas”), Danielle 6 Gore, and M. Alex Toth’s2 (collectively, “Defendants”) motion for summary judgment 7 on Ten Bridges’s second amended complaint. (See 9/23/21 Order (Dkt. # 93) at 2-9.) 8 Accordingly, the court focuses here on the factual background relevant to Madrona’s

9 counterclaim. 10 Madrona’s counterclaim arises from a real estate transaction involving non-party 11 Yukiko Asano. (See generally SAC Ans. (Dkt. # 50).) After Ms. Asano’s condominium 12 owners association foreclosed on her condominium unit, Madrona purchased the 13 condominium at a sheriff’s sale. (See 8/19/21 Beckett Decl. (Dkt. # 74) ¶ 20.) The sale

14 resulted in surplus proceeds of $346,892.95, which were deposited in the King County 15 Superior Court registry. (See id.) As the mortgage debtor, Ms. Asano was entitled to 16 receive the surplus proceeds. See RCW 61.12.150 (surplus proceeds from judicial 17 foreclosure sales “shall be paid to the mortgage debtor, his or her heirs and assigns”). On 18 May 15, 2019, however, Ms. Asano assigned her rights to redeem the property and

19 20 1 Neither party requests oral argument (see Mot. at 1; Resp. at 1), and the court finds oral argument unnecessary to its disposition of the motion, see Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4). 21

2 Ms. Gore and Mr. Toth are the sole managers and members of Midas and Madrona. 22 (See 8/19/21 Toth Decl. (Dkt. # 72) ¶ 2.) 1 receive the surplus proceeds to Ten Bridges in exchange for its promise to pay her the 2 first $172,000 it received of any surplus proceeds. (See 8/19/21 Beckett Decl. ¶ 46, Ex.

3 41 (“Asano Quitclaim Deed”).) If Ten Bridges had been permitted to obtain Ms. Asano’s 4 surplus proceeds pursuant to that agreement, it would have received a net of over 50% of 5 the surplus proceeds. 6 Ten Bridges notified the King County Sheriff that it intended to redeem Ms. 7 Asano’s condo; it disputed, however, the redemption price set by Madrona. (See id. ¶ 21, 8 Ex. 17 (Ten Bridges’s Verified Motion for Determination of Redemption Price, Carlyle

9 Condo. Owners Assoc. v. Asano (“Asano”), No. 18-2-03471-0 SEA (King Cnty. Super. 10 July 10, 2019)).3) Ten Bridges then moved the superior court to determine the correct 11 redemption amount. (See id.) Madrona opposed the motion, arguing that Ten Bridges 12 had no right to redeem because the agreement between Ten Bridges and Ms. Asano was 13 void under RCW 63.29.350(1), which places a five-percent cap on fees that a fund-finder

14 can claim as compensation for locating surplus proceeds. (See id. ¶ 22, Ex. 18.) On 15 August 8, 2019, the superior court ruled in favor of Madrona, holding that the quitclaim 16 deed between Ms. Asano and Ten Bridges was void and unenforceable because it 17 violated RCW 63.29.350(1). (See id. ¶ 24, Ex. 20 (Order, Asano (King Cnty. Super. Aug. 18 8, 2019).)

19 // 20 //

21 3 The court granted the parties’ unopposed requests to take judicial notice of filings and orders in the underlying actions in King County and the Washington Court of Appeals. (See 22 9/23/21 Order at 3 n.3.) 1 Ten Bridges requested and received a different form of quitclaim deed from Ms. 2 Asano and moved again in the superior court to set the amount required to redeem the

3 property from Madrona. (See id. ¶ 25, Ex. 21.) It contended that because the new 4 quitclaim deed did not contain the terms that the court had previously found unlawful, it 5 was severable from the original contract and enforceable. (See generally id.) Madrona 6 again opposed Ten Bridges’s motion. (See id. ¶ 26, Ex. 22.) On October 30, 2019, the 7 superior court again ruled in Madrona’s favor on the ground that the agreement between 8 Ten Bridges and Ms. Asano was unlawful under RCW 63.29.350(1). (See id. ¶ 28, Ex.

9 24.) 10 Ten Bridges appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the superior 11 court’s orders invalidating Ten Bridges’s agreements with Ms. Asano. Ten Bridges, LLC 12 v. Guandai, 474 P.3d 1060, 1063-64 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020), review denied, 487 P.3d 515 13 (Table) (Wash. 2021). Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the Asano Quitclaim

14 Deed was void because: 15 In substance, Ten Bridges relied upon having located the surplus funds for a fee of almost 50 percent of the funds as compensation for obtaining the other 16 50 percent for [Ms.] Asano . . . . Because Ten Bridges combined the services of locating surplus funds held by King County and of connecting [Ms.] 17 Asano with her surplus funds, both in exchange for more than five percent of the returned funds’ value, the [Asano Quitclaim Deed] violated RCW 18 63.29.350 and was void.

19 Id. at 1069. Ten Bridges subsequently moved for reconsideration and petitioned the 20 Washington Supreme Court for review; its motion and petition were both denied. (See 21 8/19/21 Beckett Decl. ¶ 29, Ex. 25; id. ¶ 32, Ex. 28; id. ¶ 24, Ex. 30); see also Ten 22 Bridges v. Asano, 487 P.3d 517, 517 (Table) (Wash. 2021). 1 While its appeal of the orders invalidating the agreements was pending, Ten 2 Bridges moved in the trial court for an order extending the deadline to redeem Ms.

3 Asano’s condominium. (8/20/21 Beckett Decl. (Dkt. # 77) ¶ 2.) The superior court 4 denied the motion and Ten Bridges again appealed. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) After the Court of 5 Appeals affirmed that the agreements between Ten Bridges and Ms. Asano were void, 6 Madrona asked Ten Bridges to withdraw its appeal of the order denying its motion to 7 extend. (Id. ¶ 4.) Ten Bridges has not done so, and litigation of that appeal continues. 8 (Id.)

9 Madrona asserts that it has incurred a total $38,829.01 in attorney’s fees and 10 expenses opposing Ten Bridges’s motions to redeem and responding to Ten Bridges’s 11 appeals. (8/20/21 Toth Decl. (Dkt. # 76) ¶ 2, Exs. 1 & 2; 9/17/21 Beckett Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) 12 It anticipates that it will incur additional fees and expenses if Ten Bridges continues to 13 pursue its appeal of the trial court’s order denying an extension of the redemption period.

14 (8/20/21 Toth Decl. ¶ 3.) 16 Madrona now moves for summary judgment on its WCPA counterclaim and an 17 award of damages and attorney’s fees. The court begins by setting forth the standard of 18 review before turning to its analysis of Madrona’s motion.

19 A. Summary Judgment Standard 20 Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence viewed in the light most 21 favorable to the non-moving party shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any 22 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 2 816 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome

3 of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute 4 is “‘genuine’ only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the 5 non-moving party.” Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2001) 6 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49). 7 The moving party bears the initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute 8 of material fact and that it is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

9 323. If the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it can 10 show the absence of such a dispute in two ways: (1) by producing evidence negating an 11 essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or (2) by showing that the nonmoving 12 party lacks evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense. Nissan Fire & 13 Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party

14 meets its burden of production, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to identify 15 specific facts from which a factfinder could reasonably find in the nonmoving party’s 16 favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 17 B. WPCA Counterclaim 18 Madrona asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its WCPA

19 counterclaim. Under the WCPA, a private plaintiff must prove: (1) an unfair or 20 deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) that impacts the public 21 interest; (4) causes injury to the plaintiff’s business or property; and (5) that injury is 22 causally linked to the unfair or deceptive act. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. 1 Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1986). Because Madrona’s WCPA 2 counterclaim is based on Ten Bridges’s established violation of RCW 63.29.350(1), the

3 first three elements of the claim have been met as a matter of law. See id. at 535 (“[A] 4 per se unfair trade practice exists when a statute which has been declared by the 5 Legislature to constitute an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce has been 6 violated.”); RCW 63.29.350(2) (stating that practices covered by RCW 63.29.350(1) 7 “vitally affect[] the public interest” and any violation “is an unfair or deceptive act or 8 practice in trade or commerce and an unfair method of competition for the purpose of

9 applying” the WCPA). 10 Madrona contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no 11 genuine issue of material fact regarding the remaining two elements. (Mot. at 9-13.) It 12 asserts that suffered injury by incurring attorney’s fees and costs litigating the validity of 13 the Asano Quitclaim Deed in the Asano action; and that the injury was proximately

14 caused by Ten Bridges’s violation of RCW 63.29.350(1). (Id.) It asks the court to enter 15 judgment in its favor for $38,829.01 in attorney’s fees and expenses it incurred in 16 litigating Ten Bridges’s violation of RCW 63.29.350(1), plus $25,000 in statutory treble 17 damages under the WCPA. (Id. at 16.) It additionally asks the court to award it the 18 attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this action. (Id. (citing RCW 19.86.090 (authorizing

19 an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of suit)).) 20 Ten Bridges does not dispute Madrona’s proof of any of the five elements of its 21 WCPA claim. Instead, it asserts that summary judgment should be denied because (1) 22 Madrona’s counterclaim is barred by res judicata (Resp. at 21-22) and (2) its violation of 1 RCW 63.29.350(1) was done in good faith under an arguable interpretation of the law (id. 2 at 6-21). It also opposes an award of treble damages (id. at 22) and disputes a portion of

3 the attorney’s fees sought by Madrona as damages (Surreply at 1-2).4 4 1. Res Judicata 5 Ten Bridges asserts that res judicata bars Madrona’s counterclaim in this action 6 because Madrona was required to assert the counterclaim in the underlying Asano action. 7 (See Resp. at 21-22.) The court disagrees. 8 As an initial matter, Madrona contends that Ten Bridges cannot assert the

9 affirmative defense of res judicata because it did not plead the defense in its answer to 10 the counterclaim. (Reply at 8; see also Ans. to Counterclaim (Dkt. # 64) at 4.) A 11 defendant, however, may raise an affirmative defense for the first time at summary 12 judgment if the delay does not prejudice the plaintiff. Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health 13 Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001); see also McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 247

14 F. App’x 72, 75 (9th Cir. 2007). Assuming, without deciding, that Madrona was not 15 prejudiced by Ten Bridges’s failure to plead the affirmative defense, the court finds that 16 res judicata does not bar Madrona’s counterclaim. 17 The res judicata effect of a state court judgment is governed by the laws of the 18 state in which the court is located. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Manufactured Home Communities

20 4 Ten Bridges also devotes a substantial portion of its briefing to arguing that the Washington Court of Appeals wrongly decided Guandai and that Madrona and Midas violated RCW 63.29.350(1) in past transactions. (See, e.g., Resp. at 1 (referring to Guandai as “poorly 21 reasoned and results-oriented”), 4-5 (discussing past transactions by Madrona and Midas).) Because the court finds that neither argument is relevant to the instant motion, the court does not 22 address them further. 1 Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005). Under Washington law, 2 “[r]es judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents the same parties from relitigating a claim

3 that was raised or could have been raised in an earlier action.” Stevens Cnty. v. 4 Futurewise, 192 P.3d 1, 6 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Roberson v. Perez, 123 P.3d 5 844, 848 n.7 (Wash. 2005)) (emphasis added). Here, neither Madrona nor Ten Bridges 6 was a party to the Asano judicial foreclosure action; instead, that action was between Ms. 7 Asano and her condominium association. (See, e.g., 8/19/21 Beckett Decl. ¶ 21, Ex. 17.) 8 Madrona and Ten Bridges’s involvement in the matter began only after Ms. Asano’s

9 condominium was sold at public auction following entry of judgment on the judicial 10 foreclosure. (See, e.g., id.); see also Guandai, 474 P.3d at 1064. Thus, Madrona had no 11 right or opportunity to assert affirmative claims against Ten Bridges in the Asano action. 12 Because Madrona could not have raised its WPCA claim against Ten Bridges in the 13 Asano action, the court concludes that res judicata does not bar its assertion of the

14 counterclaim in this action. 15 2. “Good Faith” Defense 16 Ten Bridges contends that summary judgment on Madrona’s counterclaim is 17 unwarranted because its violations of RCW 63.29.350(1) were done in good faith under 18 an arguable interpretation of existing law. (Resp. at 12 (citing Perry v. Island Sav. &

19 Loan Ass’n, 684 P.2d 1281, 1289 (Wash. 1984), and Leingang v. Pierce Cnty. Med. 20 Bureau, Inc., 930 P.2d 288, 299 (Wash. 1997)).) Madrona counters that “good faith” is 21 not a defense where a party’s violation is a per se unfair or deceptive practice under the 22 WCPA. (Mot. at 13-16; Reply at 2-3.) The court agrees with Madrona. 1 When applying Washington law in a diversity case, the court must apply the law 2 as it believes the Supreme Court of Washington would apply it. Gravquick A/S v.

3 Trimble Navigation Intern. Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2003). In the absence of a 4 controlling Washington Supreme Court decision, the court must predict how that court 5 would decide the issue, using intermediate appellate court decisions, statutes, and 6 decisions from other jurisdictions as interpretive aids. Id.; see also Soltani v. W. & S. Life 7 Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2001). 8 No Washington Supreme Court or Court of Appeals decision has applied the

9 “good faith” defense to a per se violation of the WCPA. Indeed, the parties have 10 identified only two decisions, both from the United States District Court for the Eastern 11 District of Washington, that apply the “good faith” defense to a per se violation. 12 Watkins v. Peterson Enterprises, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1111 (E.D. Wash. 13 1999), involved a per se violation of RCW 19.16.440, which states that acts prohibited by

14 the Washington Collection Agency Act (“WCAA”), RCW 19.16.250, are “unfair acts or 15 practices or unfair methods of competition” for purposes of applying the WPCA. Noting 16 that RCW 19.16.440 made no mention of deceptive acts or practices, the court observed, 17 relying on Leingang and Perry, that “while [defendant’s] good faith may not be a defense 18 to a claim that it engaged in deceptive practices, [its] good faith is a defense to a claim

19 that its practices were per se unfair.” Id. (citing Leingang, 930 P.2d at 299, and Perry, 20 684 P.2d at 1289). The court held that the defendant could not be held liable under the 21 WCPA because its interpretation of the law was “arguable even if incorrect.” Id. In 22 determining that the “good faith” defense was available for per se violations of the 1 WCPA, the court did not set forth its analysis, instead relying solely on its citations to 2 Leingang and Perry—even though neither case involved a per se violation of the WCPA.

3 Id.; see Leingang, 930 P.2d at 297 (finding no per se violation because regulations at 4 issue did not apply to defendant health care service contractor); Perry, 684 P.2d at 1290 5 n.9 (holding “any claim of a per se violation is unfounded” because the legislature had 6 not enacted a statute restricting the conduct at issue). 7 Gray v. Suttell & Associates, No. 2:09-cv-00251-SAB, 2019 WL 96225 (E.D. 8 Wash. Jan. 3, 2019), also involved a per se violation of the WCAA. That court relied on

9 Perry, Leingang, and Watkins for the proposition that the “good faith” defense is 10 available for per se violations of the WCPA. Id. at *4 (citing Perry, 684 P.2d at 1289, 11 Leingang, 930 P.2d at 299, and Watkins, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1111). The Gray court 12 departed from an earlier ruling in the same case that the “good faith” defense is not 13 available for per se violations of the WCPA. Id. In that earlier order, a different judge

14 had held that because the Washington legislature had, “by statutory enactment, deemed 15 the operation of a ‘collection agency’ without a license to be a per se unfair act,” the 16 defendants’ violation of the WCAA was an unfair act for purposes of the WCPA, even if 17 the defendant collection agency acted in good faith. Gray v. Suttell & Assocs. P.S., No. 18 2:09-CV-251-RMP, 2016 WL 409706, at *8 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2016).

19 The court is not bound by decisions from its sister district courts, and respectfully 20 disagrees with Watkins and the 2019 Gray decision. Rather, the court agrees with the 21 first judge in Gray, and concludes that the Washington Supreme Court would likely hold 22 that “good faith” is not a defense where the legislature has expressly stated that a 1 violation of a statute constitutes a per se unfair or deceptive act or practice for purposes 2 of applying the WCPA. See Gray, 2016 WL 409706, at *8. Here, the legislature has

3 decreed that a violation of RCW 63.29.350(1) constitutes a per se unfair or deceptive act 4 or practice, see RCW 63.29.350(2), and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed that 5 Ten Bridges violated that statute, see Guandai, 474 P.3d at 1069. As a result, the court 6 concludes that even if Ten Bridges acted under an arguable interpretation of existing law, 7 it cannot rely on the “good faith” exception to escape liability. Accordingly, the court 8 GRANTS Madrona’s motion for summary judgment on its WCPA counterclaim.

9 3. Damages 10 Madrona seeks a judgment that it is entitled to an award of damages in the amount 11 of the fees and costs it has incurred in litigating the Asano action, plus treble damages. 12 (Mot. at 16.) Ten Bridges contends that Madrona is not entitled to treble damages (Resp. 13 at 22) and disputes a portion of Madrona’s claimed damages (Surreply at 1-2). Madrona

14 did not address Ten Bridges’s objection to an award of treble damages in its reply. (See 15 generally Madrona Reply.) 16 A party injured by a CPA violation may recover his or her actual damages, 17 together with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. RCW 18 19.86.090. In addition, the court may, in its discretion, award treble damages of three

19 times the amount of the actual damages sustained, up to a statutory maximum of 20 $25,000. Id. 21 In its motion, Madrona asserted that it was entitled to an award of $35,149.01 for 22 attorney’s fees and expenses it incurred in litigating the validity of the Asano Quitclaim 1 Deed under RCW 63.29.350(1) in King County Superior Court and the Washington 2 Court of Appeals. (Mot. at 16; see also 8/20/21 Toth Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1.) Ten Bridges did

3 not dispute this amount. (See generally Resp.) With its reply, Madrona asserted an 4 additional $3,680.00 in attorney’s fees incurred since the August 20, 2021 filing of the 5 instant motion for summary judgment. (See 9/17/21 Beckett Decl. ¶ 6.) Ten Bridges 6 argues that these additional fees should be excluded from any award of damages because 7 they do not relate to the litigation of the validity of the Asano Quitclaim Deed but rather 8 to collection activity. (Surreply at 2.) Having reviewed the time entries provided with

9 Madrona’s reply, the court agrees with Ten Bridges that there is a genuine issue of 10 material fact regarding whether the additional fees relate to the litigation of the validity of 11 the validity of the Asano Quitclaim Deed. Accordingly, the court DENIES Madrona’s 12 request for entry of judgment of the total amount of $38,829.01. The court ORDERS the 13 parties to submit a joint status report regarding their proposal for resolving their dispute

14 regarding the $3,680.00 in additional fees that Madrona sought with its reply.5 15 The parties also dispute whether Madrona is entitled to treble damages up to the 16 statutory maximum of $25,000. The purposes of the treble damages provision are: “(1) 17 financial rehabilitation of the injured consumer, (2) encouraging private citizens to bring 18 actions benefiting the public, (3) deterrence, and (4) punishment.” Sing v. John L. Scott,

19 Inc., 920 P.2d 589, 598 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 948 P.2d 816 20

5 In its surreply, Ten Bridges also moves to strike the declaration of Yukiko Asano 21 attached to the September 17, 2021 Beckett Declaration. (Id.; see also 9/17/21 Beckett Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 3.) Because the court did not consider Ms. Asano’s declaration in deciding the instant 22 motion, the court DENIES the motion to strike as moot. 1 (Wash. 1997). The court finds that these purposes would not be furthered by an award of 2 treble damages. First, an award of attorney’s fees and costs will provide full financial

3 rehabilitation to Madrona absent trebling of those damages. Second, it seems unlikely 4 that an award of treble damages in this case would encourage private citizens to bring 5 other WCPA actions. Finally, because Ten Bridges has stopped petitioning courts for 6 surplus funds (see 9/13/21 Heald Decl. (Dkt. # 85) ¶ 20), the court concludes that an 7 award of treble damages would not advance the goals of deterrence and punishment. The 8 court exercises its discretion under RCW 19.86.090 and DENIES Madrona’s request for

9 treble damages. 10 4. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 11 Madrona seeks a determination that it is entitled to an award of the attorney’s fees 12 and costs it incurred in this action pursuant to RCW 19.86.090. (Mot. at 16.) Ten 13 Bridges does not oppose this request. (See generally Resp.) The court GRANTS

14 Madrona’s request for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for its successful 15 prosecution of its WCPA counterclaim. The court reminds Madrona that it must 16 segregate the fees and costs incurred in its prosecution of its WCPA counterclaim from 17 fees and costs incurred in defending against Ten Bridges’s claims. See, e.g., Hume v. Am. 18 Disposal Co., 880 P.2d 988, 997 (Wash. 1994) (“If, as in this case, an attorney fees

19 recovery is authorized for only some of the claims, the attorney fees award must properly 20 reflect a segregation of the time spent on issues for which attorney’s fees are authorized 21 from time spent on other issues.”). 22 // 2 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Madrona’s motion for summary

3 judgment on its WCPA counterclaim (Dkt. # 75). The court, however, DENIES 4 Madrona’s request for treble damages and for entry of judgment in the total amount of 5 $38,829.01 in fees and costs. The court ORDERS the parties to submit a joint status 6 report by no later than October 14, 2021, regarding their proposal for resolving their 7 dispute regarding the $3,680.00 in additional fees that Madrona sought with its reply. 8 Dated this 6th day of October, 2021.

9 A 10 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22