Tempelman v. USA
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Tempelman v. USA, (1st Cir. 1993).
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
June 3, 1993
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 92-2280
ANDREW TEMPELMAN AND PRISCILLA TEMPELMAN,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
______________
____________________
Andrew Tempelman and Priscilla Tempelman on brief pro se.
________________ ___________________
Peter E. Papps, United States Attorney, James A. Bruton, Acting
______________ ________________
Assistant Attorney General, Gary R. Allen, William S. Estabrook, and
_____________ _____________________
Doris D. Coles, Attorneys, Tax Division, Department of Justice, on
_______________
brief for appellees.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Andrew and Priscilla Tempelman (the
___________
taxpayers) filed a pro se action in federal district court
seeking to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from
collecting back taxes. The lower court denied relief,
concluding that the suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction
Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a). We agree with this determination
and therefore affirm.
I.
The taxpayers own and operate a small inn and restaurant
in Milford, New Hampshire. In 1990, the IRS served them with
notices of deficiency pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6212 claiming
that approximately $130,000 in taxes, interest and penalties
were owed for the years 1984 and 1985.1 The taxpayers
thereafter filed a timely petition under 26 U.S.C. 6213 for
redetermination in tax court. On October 4, 1991, the
taxpayers and the IRS presented the court with a stipulated
agreement calculating a total liability for those years of
approximately $35,000 plus interest. The tax court judge
adopted this agreement in a decision dated November 27, 1991.
The taxpayers filed an appeal from this decision on May 20,
1992, claiming inter alia that they had been coerced by the
__________
IRS and the tax court into signing the stipulation. Because
their notice of appeal was filed well past the 90-day period
prescribed by Fed. R. App. P. 13(a), we dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction on September 1, 1992. We thereafter
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1. While the IRS also alleged deficiencies for the years
1983 and 1986-88, the instant case pertains only to the years
1984-85.
denied their motion for reconsideration and for permission to
file late.
Under 26 U.S.C. 6213(a), the IRS is prohibited from
making any assessment or levy or otherwise initiating
collection efforts until the decision of the tax court "has
become final"--which in this case occurred on February 25,
1992. See 26 U.S.C. 7481(a). In the stipulated decision
___
adopted by the tax court, however, the taxpayers expressly
agreed to waive this restriction. Accordingly, in December
1991, the IRS made assessments for the years 1984-85 in
accordance with that decision. Upon taxpayers' failure to
pay, the IRS in August 1992 levied upon their New Hampshire
bank account and filed a notice of tax lien against their
property. Taxpayers responded by filing their complaint for
injunctive relief.
II.
The Anti-Injunction Act provides, with certain
enumerated exceptions, that "no suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person ...." 26 U.S.C.
7421(a). In Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U.S. 1
______ ______________________
(1962), the Court fashioned an additional exception to this
provision, holding that a suit for injunctive relief may lie
where (1) the taxpayer will suffer irreparable harm absent an
injunction, and (2) it is clear that "under no circumstances
-3-
could the Government ultimately prevail" on the underlying
dispute. Id. at 7; accord, e.g., South Carolina v. Regan,
___ ______ ____ _______________ _____
465 U.S. 367, 374 (1984); Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S.
____________ _______
614, 627 (1976); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737
_______________ _____
(1974); Lane v. United States, 727 F.2d 18, 20 (1st Cir.),
____ _____________
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984). The taxpayers here seek
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to invoke this exception, arguing that they satisfy both of
the Enochs criteria. The district court (adopting the
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