1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 IRVIN TELLEZ, 7 Case No. 23-cv-00170 EJD (PR) Plaintiff, 8 ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND v. 9
10 WARDEN, et al., 11 Defendants.
12 13
14 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 15 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officers at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). Dkt. No. 16 1. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis which will be addressed 17 in a separate order. 18
19 DISCUSSION 20 A. Standard of Review 21 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 22 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 23 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 24 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 25 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 26 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally 27 construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 1 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 2 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 3 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 4 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 5 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 6 Plaintiff names the following as Defendants: (1) John Doe #1, Director of Adult 7 Institutions of CDCR; (2) SVSP’s Warden; (3) John Doe #2, Chief of Plant Operations at 8 SVSP; and (4) Sandoval, plumber at SVSP. Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6. Plaintiff claims that he 9 suffered inhumane conditions for over 57 days due to plumbing and lack of power and 10 lighting in his cell from March 17, 2022 to May 13, 2022. Id. at 6-10. The specific 11 allegations are set forth as follows. 12 When Plaintiff first complained about leaks in his cell on March 17, 2022, the floor 13 officer submitted a work order. Id. at 6. On March 19, 2022, Defendant Sandoval came in 14 response to the work order but was unable to fix the problem; he stated that he would come 15 back with a required part the next day but did not return. Id. at 7. Plaintiff requested 16 another work order on March 27, 2022, when the problem remained unfixed. Id. On April 17 4, 2022, Defendant Sandoval returned but was again unable to fix the problem because of 18 the missing part; he stated that he would order it. Id. Then on April 6, 2022, the power in 19 Plaintiff’s cell went out due to the leaks. Id. Another work order was submitted at his 20 request. Id. On April 27, 2022, the toilet stopped working. Id. at 7-8. The next day, April 21 28, 2022, the “Plumber”1 came and fixed the toilet which again broke the next day; 22 however, the loss of power and the leaks were not fixed. Id. at 8. Another attempt to fix 23 the toilet was made the following day, April 29, 2022, but without success; the toilet 24 remained broken until May 5, 2022. Id. On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff was moved to the 25 neighboring cell, which had the same exact problems, i.e., leak, broken toilet, and power 26 outage. Id. Another work order was placed on May 7, 2022. Id. On May 12, 2022, the 27 1 “Plumber”2 came and fixed the toilet and leak, but Plaintiff still had no power or lights. Id. 2 The light was fixed the next day, but not the lack of power. Id. at 9. Plaintiff claims the 3 lack of power meant he could not cook water in the hot pot to make food, nor use his 4 television or radio. Id. He also claims that the lack of light meant all he could do was lie 5 down in the dark after sunset. Id. Plaintiff seeks damages. Id. at 10. 6 The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 7 inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a 8 prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to 9 scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). 10 The Eighth Amendment imposes duties on these officials, who must provide all prisoners 11 with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care 12 and personal safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't 13 of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). A prison official violates the Eighth 14 Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, 15 objectively, sufficiently serious, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 16 294, 298 (1991)), and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, 17 id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 18 Plumbing which deprives inmates of basic hygiene and seriously threatens inmates’ 19 physical and mental well-being amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. See Hoptowit 20 v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 21 1388, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 22 A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a 23 substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps 24 to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The prison official must not only “be aware of facts 25 from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but 26 “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, 27 1 but did not actually know, the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter 2 how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). 3 Plaintiff appears to be attempting to state an Eighth Amendment claim for the 4 inhumane conditions he experienced for approximately two months. However, nowhere in 5 the complaint does Plaintiff describe how the conditions seriously threatened his physical 6 and mental well-being to amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 7 Amendment. See Hoptowit, 753 F.2d at 783. Even assuming that the conditions were 8 objectively, sufficiently serious to satisfy the first element, the allegations do not to satisfy 9 the second element for an Eighth Amendment claim. Specifically, Plaintiff must allege 10 that each named Defendant personally knew that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of 11 serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. 12 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. However, the only Defendant who is specifically named and 13 whose actions are described in Plaintiff’s statements of facts is Defendant Sandoval, the 14 plumber. Dkt. No. 1 at 6-10. Furthermore, there are no facts indicating that Defendant 15 Sandoval was not only “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 16 substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that he drew that inference. Id.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 IRVIN TELLEZ, 7 Case No. 23-cv-00170 EJD (PR) Plaintiff, 8 ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND v. 9
10 WARDEN, et al., 11 Defendants.
12 13
14 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 15 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officers at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). Dkt. No. 16 1. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis which will be addressed 17 in a separate order. 18
19 DISCUSSION 20 A. Standard of Review 21 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 22 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 23 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 24 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 25 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 26 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally 27 construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 1 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 2 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 3 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 4 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 5 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 6 Plaintiff names the following as Defendants: (1) John Doe #1, Director of Adult 7 Institutions of CDCR; (2) SVSP’s Warden; (3) John Doe #2, Chief of Plant Operations at 8 SVSP; and (4) Sandoval, plumber at SVSP. Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6. Plaintiff claims that he 9 suffered inhumane conditions for over 57 days due to plumbing and lack of power and 10 lighting in his cell from March 17, 2022 to May 13, 2022. Id. at 6-10. The specific 11 allegations are set forth as follows. 12 When Plaintiff first complained about leaks in his cell on March 17, 2022, the floor 13 officer submitted a work order. Id. at 6. On March 19, 2022, Defendant Sandoval came in 14 response to the work order but was unable to fix the problem; he stated that he would come 15 back with a required part the next day but did not return. Id. at 7. Plaintiff requested 16 another work order on March 27, 2022, when the problem remained unfixed. Id. On April 17 4, 2022, Defendant Sandoval returned but was again unable to fix the problem because of 18 the missing part; he stated that he would order it. Id. Then on April 6, 2022, the power in 19 Plaintiff’s cell went out due to the leaks. Id. Another work order was submitted at his 20 request. Id. On April 27, 2022, the toilet stopped working. Id. at 7-8. The next day, April 21 28, 2022, the “Plumber”1 came and fixed the toilet which again broke the next day; 22 however, the loss of power and the leaks were not fixed. Id. at 8. Another attempt to fix 23 the toilet was made the following day, April 29, 2022, but without success; the toilet 24 remained broken until May 5, 2022. Id. On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff was moved to the 25 neighboring cell, which had the same exact problems, i.e., leak, broken toilet, and power 26 outage. Id. Another work order was placed on May 7, 2022. Id. On May 12, 2022, the 27 1 “Plumber”2 came and fixed the toilet and leak, but Plaintiff still had no power or lights. Id. 2 The light was fixed the next day, but not the lack of power. Id. at 9. Plaintiff claims the 3 lack of power meant he could not cook water in the hot pot to make food, nor use his 4 television or radio. Id. He also claims that the lack of light meant all he could do was lie 5 down in the dark after sunset. Id. Plaintiff seeks damages. Id. at 10. 6 The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 7 inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a 8 prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to 9 scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). 10 The Eighth Amendment imposes duties on these officials, who must provide all prisoners 11 with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care 12 and personal safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't 13 of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). A prison official violates the Eighth 14 Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, 15 objectively, sufficiently serious, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 16 294, 298 (1991)), and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, 17 id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 18 Plumbing which deprives inmates of basic hygiene and seriously threatens inmates’ 19 physical and mental well-being amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. See Hoptowit 20 v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 21 1388, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 22 A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a 23 substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps 24 to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The prison official must not only “be aware of facts 25 from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but 26 “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, 27 1 but did not actually know, the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter 2 how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). 3 Plaintiff appears to be attempting to state an Eighth Amendment claim for the 4 inhumane conditions he experienced for approximately two months. However, nowhere in 5 the complaint does Plaintiff describe how the conditions seriously threatened his physical 6 and mental well-being to amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 7 Amendment. See Hoptowit, 753 F.2d at 783. Even assuming that the conditions were 8 objectively, sufficiently serious to satisfy the first element, the allegations do not to satisfy 9 the second element for an Eighth Amendment claim. Specifically, Plaintiff must allege 10 that each named Defendant personally knew that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of 11 serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. 12 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. However, the only Defendant who is specifically named and 13 whose actions are described in Plaintiff’s statements of facts is Defendant Sandoval, the 14 plumber. Dkt. No. 1 at 6-10. Furthermore, there are no facts indicating that Defendant 15 Sandoval was not only “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 16 substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that he drew that inference. Id. With respect 17 to the other Defendants, nowhere in his statement of facts does Plaintiff mention the 18 Warden or the Chief of Plant Operations, or much less describe their knowledge or 19 actions/inactions regarding Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement. Moreover, it is doubtful 20 that the CDCR’s Director of Adult Institutions was personally aware of Plaintiff and his 21 specific circumstances to be liable. Nevertheless, Plaintiff shall be granted leave to file an 22 amended complaint to allege specific facts with respect to each named Defendant to 23 support an Eighth Amendment claim. 24 Regarding “John Doe” Defendants, the use of “John Doe” to identify a defendant is 25 generally not favored in the Ninth Circuit, see Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th 26 Cir. 1980); Wiltsie v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1968). 27 However, situations may arise where the identity of alleged defendants cannot be known 1 opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that 2 discovery would not uncover their identities or that the complaint should be dismissed on 3 other grounds. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642; Velasquez v. Senko, 643 F. Supp. 1172, 4 1180 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Here, Plaintiff identifies John Doe Defendants by their title or 5 position, i.e., “Director” and “Chief of Operations,” such that, if such positions exist, their 6 names should be readily identifiable with some minor research. Furthermore, Plaintiff 7 must make sufficient allegations against these “John Doe” Defendants in the amended 8 complaint that are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim against them. 9 In preparing an amended complaint, Plaintiff should keep the following principles 10 in mind. Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under § 1983 only if 11 Plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the deprivation of a federally 12 protected right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of 13 Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives another of a 14 constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, 15 participates in another’s affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally 16 required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. See Leer, 844 17 F.2d at 633. 18 19 CONCLUSION 20 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 21 1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within twenty-eight 22 (28) days of the date this order is filed, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint to attempt 23 to correct the deficiencies discussed above. The amended complaint must include the 24 caption and civil case number used in this order, Case No. 23-cv-000170 EJD (PR), and 25 the words “AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. If using the court form 26 complaint, Plaintiff must answer all the questions on the form in order for the action to 27 proceed. 1 The amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as 2 || non-existent. Ramirez v. Cty. Of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). 3 || Consequently, claims not included in an amended complaint are no longer claims and 4 || defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. See Ferdik v. 5 || Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.1992). 6 2. Failure to respond in accordance with this order in the time provided 7 || will result in dismissal with prejudice of this action for failure to state a claim, 8 || without further notice to Plaintiff. 9 The Clerk shall include two copies of the court’s complaint with a copy of this 10 || order to Plaintiff. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 || Dated: May 17, 2023 3 EDWARD J. DAVILA United States District Judge 14
15 16
Oo Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28