Tejeda v 57th & 6th Ground LLC 2024 NY Slip Op 33160(U) September 10, 2024 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 157783/2018 Judge: Paul A. Goetz Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 09/10/2024 03:46 PM INDEX NO. 157783/2018 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 196 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/10/2024
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. PAUL A. GOETZ PART 47 Justice ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 157783/2018 JUAN MIGUEL PRESINAL TEJEDA, 09/30/2022, Plaintiff, MOTION DATE 12/08/2022
-v- MOTION SEQ. NO. 003 004
57TH & 6TH GROUND LLC., CARNAGIE HOUSE TENNANTS CORPORATION, CA 114 PRINCE LLC F/K/A CARNEGIE RETAIL LLC, GEORGETOWN 57, LLC, ASK DECISION + ORDER ON STANDARD TRANSIT CORP D/B/A BIKE RENTAL CENTRAL PARK, MOTION
Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
57TH & 6TH GROUND LLC., CARNAGIE HOUSE TENNANTS Third-Party CORPORATION, GEORGETOWN 57, LLC Index No. 596011/2019
Plaintiffs,
-against-
ASEN KOSTADINOV, GO NEW YORK TOURS, INC.
Defendants. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 003) 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY .
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 004) 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY .
This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by a
customer service worker on July 14, 2018, when, while painting an interior wall and ceiling of a
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storefront located at located at 1391 6th Ave, New York, NY 10019 (the premises), he fell from a
mobile baker’s scaffold.
In motion sequence number 3, plaintiff Juan Miguel Presinal Tejeda moves, pursuant to
CPLR § 3212, for summary judgment in his favor as to liability on his Labor Law §§ 240(1) and
241(6) claims against defendants 57th & 6th Ground LLC (Ground), Carnegie House Tennants
Corporation (Carnegie), Georgetown 57 LLC (Georgetown 57), and ASK Standard Transit
Corporation d/b/a Bike Rental Central Park (BRCP).
In motion sequence number 4, defendants/third-party plaintiffs1 move, pursuant to CPLR
§ 3212, for summary judgment (i) dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common law
negligence causes of action; (ii) on their cross-claims for contractual and common law
indemnification and breach of contract against BRCP; (iii) on their third-party causes of action
for contractual indemnification and breach of contract against third-party defendants Asen
Kostadinov and Go New York Tours (Go Tours); and (iv) dismissing the crossclaims and
counterclaims asserted against them for contractual and common law indemnification and
contribution by BRCP and third-party defendants (MS #4).
The motions are consolidated for disposition.
BACKGROUND
Georgetown 57 and Carnegie held leasehold interests in the premises, a commercial
building owned by Ground (NYSCEF Doc No 125). On July 1, 2018, the ground floor of the
premises was leased to BRCP for use as bike rental shop and tour sales office, where plaintiff’s
accident occurred (NYSCEF Doc No 126). The lease provided that BRCP (i) “shall indemnify,
defend, and save harmless Owner, and The Georgetown Company, LLC against and from all
1 For the purposes of this decision and order defendants/third-party plaintiffs” refers to Ground, Carnegie, and Georgetown 57. 157783/2018 PRESINAL TEJEDA, JUAN MIGUEL vs. 57TH & 6TH GROUND LLC. Page 2 of 14 Motion No. 003 004
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liabilities, obligations, damages, penalties, claims, costs and expenses . . . incurred as a result of .
. . the carelessness, negligence, or improper conduct of the Tenant, Tenant’s agent, contractors,
employees, invitees, or licensees” (id. § 8); and (ii) “agrees to secure and keep in force
throughout the term of this Lease . . . General Liability Insurance with a minimum limit of
liability not less than the amount $3,000,000.00 combined single limit” (id. § 47). The lease was
guaranteed by Kostadinov and Go Tours (NYSCEF Doc No 144).
Plaintiff began working as a “customer service [] distributor” for BRCP in 2017
(NYSCEF Doc No 120, 28:9-16, 70:16-25 [plaintiff set customers up with bicycles to ride]). On
July 14, 2018, however, plaintiff’s bosses Didi and Pedro instructed him to paint the ceiling and
walls of the premises (id., 134:23-13, 145:18-146:9).2 Pedro told plaintiff to climb up onto a
baker’s scaffold—which did not have guardrails—in order to reach the higher areas that needed
painting; plaintiff refused multiple times because he was uncomfortable being high up, but Pedro
insisted (id., 145:7-17, 150:2-151:7; NYSCEF Doc No 124 [plaintiff testified that the platform
was raised to the highest setting, marked by the “X”]3).
Plaintiff saw that the scaffold’s wheels were locked, although the brakes appeared to be
“loose,” and then climbed onto the platform (id., 166:10-167:20). Plaintiff faced the wall as he
painted it and kept extra paint behind him on the platform (id., 170:23-25). After painting for
some time, plaintiff stepped backwards to dip his brush in paint again, but accidentally stepped
too far and fell off the platform and onto the floor (id., 171:1-6). Among other injuries, plaintiff’s
head struck the floor, causing him to lose consciousness; his coworker Hector, who had been
painting another wall in the store, helped him back up (id., 169:6-15, 174:19-178:14).
2 Plaintiff had never painted professionally but he told his employer he had experience because he had painted his own house once (id., 307:5-16). 3 Plaintiff estimated that the scaffold was “9 or 10 feet” high (NYSCEF Doc No 120, 315:15), however, BRCP submits the scaffold’s specifications showing that the platform reaches to just over six feet (NYSCEF Doc No 163). 157783/2018 PRESINAL TEJEDA, JUAN MIGUEL vs. 57TH & 6TH GROUND LLC. Page 3 of 14 Motion No. 003 004
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Plaintiff’s causes of action against defendants are for common law negligence and
violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1) and 241(6) (NYSCEF Doc No 1). Across a third-party
complaint and several answers, the parties (except for plaintiff) asserted claims against each
other for contractual and common law indemnification, breach of contract, and contribution
(NYSCEF Doc Nos 11, 12, 15, 61, 73). On July 25, 2019, all parties discontinued their claims
against defendant CA 114 Prince LLC f/k/a Carnegie Retail LLC (NYSCEF Doc No 58).
DISCUSSION
“It is well settled that ‘the proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima
facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to
demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact.’” (Pullman v Silverman, 28 NY3d 1060,
1062 [2016], quoting Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). “Failure to make
such showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing
papers.” (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985] [internal citations
omitted]). “Once such a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party
opposing the motion to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to raise material
issues of fact which require a trial of the action.” (Cabrera v Rodriguez, 72 AD3d 553, 553-554
[1st Dept 2010], citing Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 342).
“The court’s function on a motion for summary judgment is merely to determine if any
triable issues exist, not to determine the merits of any such issues or to assess credibility.”
(Meridian Mgmt. Corp. v Cristi Cleaning Serv. Corp., 70 AD3d 508, 510-511 [1st Dept 2010]
[internal citations omitted]). The evidence presented in a summary judgment motion must be
examined “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” (Schmidt v One New York Plaza
Co., 153 AD3d 427, 428 [2017], quoting Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335, 339
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[2011]) and bare allegations or conclusory assertions are insufficient to create genuine issues of
fact (Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]). If there is any doubt as to the
existence of a triable fact, the motion for summary judgment must be denied (id.).
i. Labor Law § 240(1) (MS #3)
Labor Law § 240(1), also known as New York’s “Scaffold Law,” provides that all
general contractors and owners “shall furnish [scaffolding] and other devices which shall be so
constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed.” Labor
Law § 240(1) “imposes absolute liability on building owners and contractors whose failure to
provide proper protection to workers employed on a construction site proximately causes injury
to a worker” (Wilinski v 334 E. 92nd Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 18 NY3d 1, 7 [2011] [internal
quotation marks and citation omitted]). To prevail on a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, the
plaintiff must establish that the statute was violated, and that the violation was a proximate cause
of his or her injuries (Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280, 287-289
[2003]). “[T]he single decisive question is whether plaintiff’s injuries were the direct
consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically
significant elevation differential” (Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 603
[2009]). The legislative intent behind the statute is to place “ultimate responsibility for safety
practices . . . where such responsibility actually belongs, on the owner and general contractor,
instead of on workers, who are scarcely in a position to protect themselves from accident”
(Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 520 [1985], rearg denied 65 NY2d
1054 [1985] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Therefore, the statute should be
liberally construed to achieve the purpose for which it was framed (Rocovich v Consolidated
Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509, 513 [1991]).
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Plaintiff relies on Vergara v SS W. 21 LLC, 21 AD3d 279 [1st Dept 2005] to argue that he
is entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) because he fell from a mobile
scaffold without railings and the lack of railings proximately caused his fall (NYSCEF Doc Nos
118, 185). BRCP notes that while plaintiff claims the scaffold was “unstable,” there is no
evidence that it collapsed, slipped, fell, or otherwise malfunctioned—rather, it was plaintiff that
fell when he misjudged the edge of the platform—and asserts that whether the scaffold provided
proper protection for the task at hand is an issue of fact (NYSCEF Doc No 155). Defendants/
third-party plaintiffs similarly argue that plaintiff has not demonstrated that the scaffold was an
inadequate safety device (NYSCEF Doc No 179). They submit the affidavit of Joseph J.
McHugh, P.E., which suggests that “the subject scaffold was safe and adequate for the plaintiff
to perform his work” and that it was plaintiff’s own conduct, rather than the lack of safety rails,
which caused his fall (NYSCEF Doc No 181).
Plaintiff is correct that Vergara is controlling. In Vergara, the plaintiff met his prima
facie burden because “[t]here [was] no dispute that the six-foot-high, manually propelled
scaffold, which plaintiff was directed to use in order to plaster a fifteen-foot-high ceiling, had no
side rails, and no other protective device was provided to protect him from falling off the sides”
(Vergara, 21 AD3d at 280; Ordonez v One City Block, LLC, 191 AD3d 412, 414 [1st Dept 2021]
[“Plaintiffs established prima facie that defendants violated Labor Law § 240(1) and that the
violation proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries, as the uncontroverted evidence shows that the
scaffold supplied to plaintiff . . . lacked guardrails and that no other protective devices were
provided to protect him from falling”]; Deschaine v Tricon Constr., LLC, 187 AD3d 599 [1st
Dept 2020]). Plaintiff has made the same showing here.4 Notably, the Court of Appeals decision
4 The record is inconsistent as to the exact height of the scaffold at issue, but it appears to be comparable to those described in Vergara, Ordonez, and Deschaine. 157783/2018 PRESINAL TEJEDA, JUAN MIGUEL vs. 57TH & 6TH GROUND LLC. Page 6 of 14 Motion No. 003 004
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BRCP relies on, Holly v County of Chautauqua, 13 NY3d 931 [2010], is distinguishable in that it
involved a stationary scaffold, whereas here, the scaffold was mobile like those in Vergara and
Ordonez.
BRCP also notes that plaintiff fell because he stepped over the side of the scaffold and
not due to some defect of the scaffold. However, “[i]t does not matter whether plaintiff’s fall was
the result of the scaffold falling over, or its tipping, or was due to plaintiff mis-stepping off its
side[; in] any of those circumstances, either defective or inadequate protective devices
constituted a proximate cause of the accident” (Vergara, 21 AD3d at 280; Isaac v 135 W. 52nd St.
Owner LLC, 221 AD3d 529, 530 [1st Dept 2023] [same]). Finally, “Defendant’s expert’s opinion
that the lack of safety railings accorded with industry customs and regulations is irrelevant under
Labor Law § 240 (1)” (Celaj v Cornell, 144 AD3d 590, 591 [1st Dept 2016]). Therefore,
defendants have failed to raise an issue of fact to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie showing that he is
entitled to protection under the statute. Accordingly, the part of plaintiff’s motion seeking
summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action will be granted.
ii. Labor Law § 241(6) (MS #3)
Labor Law § 241(6) provides that “[a]ll areas . . . shall be so constructed, shored,
equipped, guarded, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate
protection and safety to the persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places.” The
obligations imposed under Labor Law § 241 are non-delegable, meaning that once a plaintiff has
established a violation, he need not demonstrate that the owner or general contractor exercised
supervision or control over the worksite (Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494,
502 [1993]). In order to state a viable Labor Law § 241 claim, a plaintiff must allege that the
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defendant violated a specific standard of conduct under the Industrial Code (Toussaint v Port
Auth. of N.Y., 38 NY3d 89, 94 [2022]).
Plaintiff bases his Labor Law § 241(6) claim on defendants’ violation of 12 NYCRR §
23-5.18(b), which provides that “[t]he platform of every manually-propelled mobile scaffold
shall be provided with a safety railing constructed and installed in compliance with this Part
(rule)” (NYSCEF Doc No 118). Defendants/third-party plaintiffs and BCRP assert that this
provision of the Industrial Code does not apply to the scaffold at issue, which “stood at 6’3” at
its top height,” because 12 NYCRR § 23-5.1(j) exempts scaffolds under seven feet tall from the
requirement of having railings (NYSCEF Doc Nos 179, 155). However, as plaintiff notes, it is
well-settled that “code provisions specifically applicable to manually propelled scaffolds
[including § 23-5.18(b)] require safety railings without reference to the height of the scaffold”
(Vergara, 21 AD3d at 281 [emphasis added]; Chong v 457 W. 22nd St. Tenants Corp., 144
AD3d 591, 592 [1st Dept 2016]; Celaj, 144 AD3d at 591). Plaintiff has thus established that
defendants violated the relevant Industrial Code violation, and that violation was a proximate
cause of his accident. BRCP’s remaining arguments—that (i) summary judgment on the issue of
its liability under the statute cannot be granted because there are questions of fact as to plaintiff’s
comparative negligence; (ii) NYCRR § 23-5.18(b) is preempted by federal law (i.e., OSHA
standards); and (iii) plaintiff’s interpretation of NYCRR § 23-5.18(b) amounts to an
unconstitutional taking because it would ban baker’s scaffolds (NYSCEF Doc No 155)—are
without merit. Accordingly, the part of plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment on his
Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action will be granted.
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iii. Labor Law § 200 and Common Law Negligence (MS #4)
Labor Law § 200 “is a codification of the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or
general contractor to provide construction site workers with a safe place to work” (Singh v Black
Diamonds LLC, 24 AD3d 138, 139 [1st Dept 2005], citing Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas
Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877 [1993]). It provides that worksites “shall be so constructed, equipped,
arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives,
health and safety of all persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places” (Labor
Law § 200[1]). “In order to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove that the party so
charged had authority or control over the activity causing the injury, thus enabling it to avoid or
correct an unsafe condition” (O’Sullivan v IDI Constr. Co., Inc., 28 AD3d 225, 226 [1st Dept
2006]; Jackson v Hunter Roberts Constr., L.L.C., 205 AD3d 542, 543 [1st Dept 2022] [a
contractor will not be held liable unless it had “authority to supervise or control the means and
methods of plaintiff’s work”]).
Defendants/third-party plaintiffs argue that plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common law
negligence causes of action must be dismissed as against them because each of these three
entities lacked the authority to supervise or control plaintiff’s work (NYSCEF Doc No 131). This
argument is supported by plaintiff’s testimony that his work was only directed by other
employees of BRCP (NYSCEF Doc No 145, 68:10-69:21, 134:23-136:23) and that he had never
heard of defendants/third-party plaintiffs (id., 389:5-14). Plaintiff has not opposed this argument.
Accordingly, the part of defendants/third-party plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment seeking
dismissal of plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence causes of action will be
granted.
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iv. Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs’ Claims Against BRCP, Kostadinov and Go Tours (MS #4)
Contractual Indemnification
“The right to contractual indemnification depends upon the specific language of the
contract” (Alfaro v 65 W. 13th Acquisition, LLC, 74 AD3d 1255, 1255 [2nd Dept 2010]). “A party
is entitled to full contractual indemnification provided that the ‘intention to indemnify can be
clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts
and circumstances’” (Drzewinski v Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co., 70 NY2d 774, 777 [1987],
citing Margolin v New York Life Ins. Co., 32 NY2d 149, 153 [1973]). “A contract assuming the
duty to indemnify will be strictly construed” (GFE Jerome Ave. LLC v Steph-Leigh Assoc., LLC,
193 AD3d 435, 436 [1st Dept 2021]) “in light of the apparent objective of the parties” (Williams
v 100 Church Fee Owner, LLC, 198 AD3d 590, 591 [1st Dept 2021]).
Defendants/third-party plaintiffs seek summary judgment on their causes of action for
contractual indemnification based on the indemnity provision of the lease entered into by BRCP
(NYSCEF Doc No 143 § 8) and the guaranty entered into by third-party defendants (NYSCEF
Doc No 144). BRCP and third-party defendants do not dispute that they are contractually
obligated to indemnify defendants/third-party plaintiffs against liabilities resulting from this
action but assert that the contractual indemnification claims are premature because there has not
yet been any finding of negligence in this case (NYSCEF Doc No 165 [relying on Pena v
Intergate Manhattan LLC, 194 AD3d 576, 578 [1st Dept 2021] [finding motion for summary
judgment on contractual indemnification claim was premature because “no finding ha[d] yet
been made as to whether [the indemnitor or indemnitee] were negligent”]]). However, by this
decision and order, defendants are deemed liable under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6);
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therefore, the indemnity clause is triggered and the claim seeking coverage under it is not
premature.
Defendants/third-party plaintiffs have therefore established BRCP’s obligation (and third-
party defendants’ obligation as guarantors) to indemnify them in this action. Accordingly, the
part of defendants/third-party plaintiffs’ motion seeking summary judgment on their contractual
indemnification claims will be granted.
Common Law Indemnification
“Common-law indemnification is predicated on vicarious liability without actual fault”
on the part of the indemnitee (Edge Mgt. Consulting, Inc. v Blank, 25 AD3d 364, 367 [1st Dept
2006]). “To be entitled to common-law indemnification, a party must show (1) that it has been
held vicariously liable without proof of any negligence or actual supervision on its part; and (2)
that the proposed indemnitor was either negligent or exercised actual supervision or control over
the injury-producing work” (Naughton v City of New York, 94 AD3d 1, 10 [1st Dept 2012]).
Where there is no “liability, vicarious or otherwise, there is no basis for indemnification”
(Nieves-Hoque v 680 Broadway, LLC, 99 AD3d 536, 537 [1st Dept 2012].
BRCP and third-party defendants argue, as they did with the contractual indemnification
claim, that defendants/third-party plaintiffs’ “motion for summary judgment on their [] claim for
common-law indemnification [is] premature . . . [a]s no finding has yet been made as to whether
[the indemnitor or indemnitee] were negligent” (Pena, 195 AD3d at 578). However, as noted
supra, by this decision and order, defendants are determined to be liable for plaintiff’s causes of
action pursuant to Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) and therefore the claim is not premature.
Additionally, defendants/third-party plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are being held
vicariously liable, rather than directly liable, and that it was BRCP that “exercised actual
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supervision or control over the injury-producing work” (Naughton, 94 AD3d at 10).
Accordingly, the part of defendants/third-party plaintiffs’ motion seeking summary judgment on
their common law indemnification claims will be granted.
Breach of Contract
Defendants/third-party plaintiffs argue that BRCP breached its contract by failing to
procure general liability insurance with a limit of at least $3 million on their behalf as provided
under the lease (NYSCEF Doc No 143 § 47) and third-party defendants breached their contract
by failing to ensure that BRCP’s lease obligations were satisfied as provided under the guaranty
(NYSCEF Doc No 144). BRCP disputes the claim that it did not procure the proper insurance
and submits its policy agreement with Atlantic Casualty, though it reflects an aggregate coverage
limit of $2 million (NYSCEF Doc No 167, p. 14), and its policy agreement with Travelers
Insurance, which only covers workers compensation and employer’s liability (NYSCEF Doc No
168). BRCP has therefore failed to demonstrate that it complied with its contractual obligation to
procure the appropriate insurance. Accordingly, the part of defendants/third-party plaintiffs’
motion seeking summary judgment on its breach of contract cause of action for failure to procure
general liability insurance with coverage up to $3 million against BRCP and third-party
defendants will be granted.
v. Crossclaims Asserted by BRCP, Kostadinov, and Go Tours (MS #4)
BRCP’s answer (NYSCEF Doc No 12) and third-party defendants’ answer (NYSCEF
Doc No 73) assert crossclaims against defendants/third-party plaintiffs for contribution and
indemnification. As defendants/third-party plaintiffs note, these crossclaims are meritless
(NYSCEF Doc No 131) and BRCP and third-party defendants failed to provide support for the
claims, or even address them, in their opposing papers (NYSCEF Doc No 165). Accordingly, the
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part of defendants/third-party plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all
crossclaims asserted against them by BRCP and third-party defendants will be granted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to defendants’ liability on
his causes of action pursuant to Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) (MS #3) is granted in its
entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants/third-party plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (i)
dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence causes of action as against
them, (ii) on their cross-claims for contractual and common law indemnification and breach of
contract against defendant BRCP, (iii) on their third-party causes of action for contractual
indemnification and breach of contract against third-party defendants, and (iv) dismissing the
crossclaims and counterclaims asserted against them for contractual and common law
indemnification and contribution by BRCP, Kostadinov, and Go Tours (MS #4) is granted in its
ORDERED that pursuant to the stipulation of discontinuance as to defendant CA 114
Prince LLC f/k/a Carnegie Retail LLC (NYSCEF Doc No 58), the caption in this matter is
hereby amended as follows:
JUAN MIGUEL PRESINAL TEJEDA,
Plaintiff,
-v– 57TH & 6TH GROUND LLC., CARNAGIE HOUSE TENNANTS CORPORATION, GEORGETOWN 57, LLC, ASK STANDARD TRANSIT CORP D/B/A BIKE RENTAL CENTRAL PARK,
Defendants.
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57TH & 6TH GROUND LLC., CARNAGIE HOUSE Third-Party TENNANTS CORPORATION, GEORGETOWN 57, LLC Index No. 596011/2019
Defendant.
And it is further
ORDERED that all papers, pleadings, and proceedings in the above-entitled action be
amended in accordance with this change, without prejudice to the proceedings heretofore had
herein; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff shall, within 30 days of entry of this order, serve a copy of this
order with notice of entry upon the County Clerk and the Clerk of the General Clerk’s Office, who
are directed to mark the court’s records to reflect the change in the caption herein; and it is further
ORDERED that such service upon the County Clerk and the Clerk of the General Clerk’s
Office shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse
and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the “E-Filing” page on
the court’s website).
9/10/2024 DATE PAUL A. GOETZ, J.S.C. CHECK ONE: CASE DISPOSED X NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
X GRANTED DENIED GRANTED IN PART OTHER
APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER
CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE
157783/2018 PRESINAL TEJEDA, JUAN MIGUEL vs. 57TH & 6TH GROUND LLC. Page 14 of 14 Motion No. 003 004
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