No. 94-229 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1995
MICHAEL A. TEFFT, EDWARD C. PETERS, JOSEPH E. GASPAR, NANCI ELLEN GREEN, RANDY J. ARCHERY, JOSEPH M. McKAMEY, GEORGE L. DOMME, MICHAEL D. CROSS, MICHAEL E. HEISLER, and JACK C. STIMAC,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. THE STATE OF MONTANA, Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable Thomas McKittrick, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: W. D. Hutchinson, Assistant Attorney General, Agency Legal Services Bureau, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Lawrence A. Anderson, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 19, 1995 Decided: May 4, 1995 Filed: Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiffs, who are firefighters employed by the Montana
Air National Guard in Great Falls, filed this action in the
District Court for the Eighth Judicial District in Cascade County
to recover wages due from the defendant, State of Montana, and
liquidated damages for violation of the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA). The District Court granted plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment and held that the State
violated the FLSA when it reduced plaintiffs' wages and that its
actions were not taken in good faith. After a nonjury trial, the
District Court found the amount of wages and damages due, and
entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs for that amount. The State
appeals from the District Court's order granting summary judgment
and the amount of damages awarded. We affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Did the District Court err when it granted plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment?
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it awarded liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988) of the Fair Labor Standards Act? 3. Were the District Court's findings regarding the amount
of plaintiffs' damages clearly erroneous?
2 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are firefighters who provide protection for
civilian aircraft and a unit of the Montana Air National Guard at
the Great Falls International Airport. Prior to 1975, they were
employed by the federal government. In 1975, when the federal
firefighting jobs were discontinued, plaintiffs were employed by
the Montana Department of Military Affairs. However, through a
cooperative arrangement, the federal government still paid for most
of the costs associated with their jobs.
After the State established the fire crew jobs in 1975,
plaintiffs' salaries were based on the State's statutory pay
matrix. Section 2-18-312, MCA. The State initially paid
plaintiffs biweekly for 80 hours of work during each two week
period. However, plaintiffs' actual schedules had them working 24
hour shifts, followed by 48 hours off duty. Therefore, they worked
substantially more hours during each two week period than the 80
hours for which they were paid. They actually worked between 96
and 120 hours during a two week period, and 2912 hours per year,
but were paid on the basis of a 2080 hour year. The State failed to pay them for the actual time worked, or to keep accurate records of their time at work. In 1982, the State began to reflect actual hours worked on
plaintiffs' time cards, but plaintiffs were still paid for only
80 hours of work biweekly. During a brief period from 1985 to
1986, the State began to pay plaintiffs for the actual hours they
3 , ,
worked. However, to avoid overtime requirements, the State added
an additional day off, or "Kelly day," for each pay period. One
count of plaintiffs' complaint, the "straight time" claim, was a
claim for wages for those hours worked, but for which they were not
paid, between 1979 and 1985. In separate litigation, plaintiffs
settled claims for overtime compensation during this period.
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court reversed previous
case law which excluded state jobs from coverage under the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act. See Garcia v. Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985),
469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016. As a result,
FLSA provisions became binding on state and local governments.
The FLSA provides that a firefighter must be paid at the
overtime rate if the firefighter's tour of duty exceeds 212 hours
in 28 days. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 553.201 (1993).
Plaintiffs' hours consistently exceeded this number, with the
exception of the period from September 1985 to July 1986.
Following Garcia, Congress passed two amendments to the FLSA.
The first amendment eased the financial burden on state and local
governments by exempting them from liability for FLSA violations
that occurred before April 15, 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat.
787, § 2(c) (29 U.S.C. § 216 note (1988) (Effect of Amendments by
Public Law 99-150 on Public Agency Liability Respecting any
Employee Covered Under Special Enforcement Policy)); see Hill v. City of
Greenville (N.D. Tex. 1988), 696 F. Supp. 1123, 1126. A second
amendment enacted an anti-discrimination provision to deter state
4 · ,
and local governments from decreasing employees' wages to offset
the increased overtime compensation requirement. Pub. L. No.
99-150, § 8, 99 Stat. 791 (29 U.S.C. § 215 note (1988) (Liability
of Public Agency for Discrimination Against Employee for Assertion
of Coverage)).
In response to Garcia, the Department of Military Affairs
proposed changes in the manner in which firefighters were paid.
However, the proposal was rejected by the State's Personnel
Division on the basis that it deviated from the State pay matrix.
The Department, therefore, requested an exclusion from the State's
pay plan under § 2-18-103 (6), MCA, which excludes officers or
members of the militia. The State granted the exclusion by
July 1986. Plaintiffs were required to be members of the National
Guard and became part of a new class known as the Militia
Protective Services, an exempt classification. We recently held
that the requirement of National Guard membership was
unconstitutional because the State could not establish a rational
basis for it. McKameyv.State (Mont. 1994), 885 P.2d 515,51 St. Rep.
1218. Following this reclassification, the State reduced plaintiffs' hourly wages. The Kelly day was eliminated and plaintiffs were paid biweekly based on a reduced hourly wage multiplied by the
number of hours actually \iOrked. The new hourly wages were
effectively determined by dividing each plaintiff's set annual
salary by 2912 hours instead of 2080 hours.
5 · .
Plaintiffs filed a complaint, and later an amended complaint,
that demanded lost compensation for (1) unpaid "straight time," and
(2) discrimination in violation of the FLSA based on the State·s
reclassification. Plaintiffs contended they were entitled to
unpaid wages and were entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to
the FLSA, based on the State·s reduction of their wages in response
to the Garcia decision. The plaintiffs moved for and received
summary judgment on the FLSA claim. In its order, the District
Court held that the State had failed to raise a factual issue
regarding its violation of the Act, or whether it acted in good
faith when it reduced plaintiffs· wages. Accordingly, the court
held that plaintiffs were entitled to liquidated damages.
The District Court ordered a hearing on the remaining issues,
including the amount of damages, and the State was allowed to
submit additional proof of good faith and reasonable grounds for
its actions. Both parties offered expert testimony regarding
damage calculations. The State failed to offer evidence
satisfactory to the District Court that it had acted in good faith when it reduced plaintiffs· wages. The District Court found plaintiffs· damage calculations more reliable than the State·s, and adopted plaintiffs· damage figures. On January 31, 1994, the District Court entered judgment against the State for $485,434.60.
ISSUE 1
Did the District Court err when it granted plaintiffs· motion
for summary judgment?
6 , .
The nature of our inquiry when we review a district court's
summary judgment decision is identical to the trial court's. Cooper
v. Sisters of Charity (1994), 265 Mont. 205, 207, 875 P.2d 352, 353 (citing
Minniev. City of Roundup (1993), 257 Mont. 429, 431, 849 P.2d 212, 214).
Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material
fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Rule 56 (c), M.R.Civ.P. i Spain-Morrow Ranch, Inc. v. West
(1994), 264 Mont. 441, 444, 872 P.2d 330, 331-32.
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided Garcia, which
applied the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA to
state employees. In order to minimize financial impact on state
and local governments, Congress enacted amendments to the FLSA.
Hil( 696 F. Supp. at 1125. Congress also enacted what is referred
to as § 8 to prohibit governmental discrimination against employees
who are entitled to financial benefits as a result of Garcia.
29 U.S.C. § 215 note (1988), Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 8, 99 Stat. 791.
Section 8 provided:
A public agency which is a State, political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency and which discriminates or has discriminated against an employee with respect to the employee's wages or other terms or conditions of employment because on or after February 19, 1985, the employee asserted coverage under section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. § 207] shall be held to have violated section 15 (a) (3) of such Act [29 U.S.C. § 215 (a) (3)] . The protection against discrimination afforded by the preceding sentence shall be available after August I, 1986, only for an employee who takes an action described in section 15(a) (3) of such Act.
7 · ,
Section 7 sets forth the number of hours after which firefighters
must be paid overtime. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988). Section 215 (a) (3)
makes it unlawful for any person to discriminate against an
employee because the employee has filed a complaint or instituted
a proceeding under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (3) (1988).
The District Court's order correctly noted that the State
conceded, in its brief in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, that it reduced plaintiffs' hourly wages in
response to Garcia and to avoid increasing annual pay. Other courts
have concluded that discrimination in violation of the FLSA occurs
under these circumstances. See Drollingerv. Stateo/Arizona (9th Cir. 1992),
962 F.2d 956; Blantonv. Cityo/Murfreesboro (6th Cir. 1988), 856 F.2d 731;
Hill, 696 F. Supp. 1123. In Drollinger, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that Arizona violated § 8 as a matter of law when
it lowered hourly wage rates for firefighters as a response to
Garcia. Drollinger, 962 F. 2 d at 957 - 5 9 .
The State argues that the District Court erroneously decided
that the State's "reclassification" plan violated § 8 of the FLSA
amendments, and 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (3). First, the State claims
that it did not discriminate against plaintiffs because they asserted coverage under the FLSA. Instead, the State contends that
it lawfully responded to budgetary constraints. The District Court
rejected the State's "economic necessity" defense.
Other courts have rejected an "economic necessity" defense in
similar circumstances. See Blanton, 856 F.2d at 735; Hill, 696 F. Supp.
8 at 1126. The court in Hill recognized that congressional amendments
were designed to delay the impact of the FLSA overtime provisions
to give state and local governments sufficient time to rearrange
their budgets in order to comply with the FLSA. Hill, 696 F. Supp.
at 1126. In Blanton, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
an economic necessity defense where a city decreased its
firefighters' wages.
Actions by public employers to reduce employee pay and benefits, taken as the sole and direct result of fiscal pressures created by the mandated extension of Fair Labor Standard Act benefits, run afoul of the strictures of section 8.
Blanton, 856 F.2d at 735. In order to justify a reduction based on
economic necessity, an employer must prove that wages were reduced
from fiscal concern which was not attributable to the extra cost of
complying with the FLSA. Blanton, 856 F.2d at 735.
We too reject the State's assertion of an economic necessity
defense. The State argues that the federal government provided
funding for plaintiffs' salaries, and after Garcia the State did not
receive additional funding. However, the District Court stated,
and we agree, that the State failed to establish that it could not
augment federal funds with state funds, or implement a different
plan, without violating the FLSA.
The State also argues that plaintiffs did not assert FLSA
violations until 1988, and therefore, that the State could not have
reclassified plaintiffs in response to their assertion of coverage
9 under the Act in violation of §§ 8 and 215 (a) (3) .1 Section
215(a) (3) makes it unlawful for the State to discriminate against
an employee because the employee has filed a complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under the
FLSA. 29 U. S . C . § 215 (a) (3) ( 1988) .
In Drollinger, the Ninth Circuit rej ected an argument similar to
the State's when it held that:
[T] he FLSA prohibits not only FLSA violations in response to employee assertions of coverage, but also FLSA violations in anticipation of assertions of coverage: any other interpretation would nullify the Act's protections. Section 8 would be meaningless if an employer were permitted to reduce hourly wages in response to Garcia and thereby avoid the FLSA's pay-and-a-half provisions as long as he did so before his employees learned of their statutory entitlements and had a chance to request that they be afforded the benefits due them.
Drollinger, 962 F. 2 d at 958, n . 2 .
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit in Blanton resolved this issue
against a city which asserted a similar argument. That court cited
legislative history for the proposition that employers' actions to
decrease wages that are intended to avoid the FLSA constitute
discrimination under § 8, whether or not they are in response to
1 While this contention may be technically correct, it is not correct as a practical matter. It is true that on March 21, 1988, the District Court first granted plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint in Stimac v. State of Montana, Cascade County Cause No. BDV-84-1570, regarding overtime and allege a claim based on the FLSA. However, the motion to allow that amendment was filed on June 6, 1986. The reduction in wages was authorized on June 19, 1986, and was actually implemented during July 1986.
10 employee assertions of coverage. Blanton, 8 5 6 F. 2 d at 73 6 . The
Eighth Circuit added that:
[I]t is not necessary to prove the employer intended to retaliate to prove a violation of section 8 if an employer, such as the City of Murfreesboro, reduced its employees' rates of pay so as to nullify the effect of extending the Act's coverage.
Blanton, 856 F. 2d at 736. Finally, in Hill, the court recognized that
an assertion of coverage need only be some act that would give the
employer notice that employees are covered by the FLSA. That court
added that where the employer already had notice that employees
were covered by the FLSA, it would be superfluous to require the
employees to affirmatively notify their employer that they are
covered by the FLSA. Hill, 696 F. Supp. at 1125.
The State has conceded that it had actual notice that the FLSA
covered plaintiffs as early as July 1985. Therefore, as the court
stated in Hill, further notice in the form of a claim by its
employees was unnecessary.
Finally, the State asserts that the plaintiffs "ratified" the
wage cuts when they signed agreements that reduced their hourly
wage. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that
employees' rights under the FLSA cannot be abridged by contract or
otherwise because it would defeat the purpose of the FLSA. Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight System (1981), 450 u.S. 728, 739-40, 101 S. Ct.
1437, 1444-45, 67 L. Ed. 2d 641, 652-53.
For these reasons, we conclude that the uncontroverted
evidence established a violation of the federal Fair Labor
11 Standards Act by the State of Montana, and that the District Court
did not err when it granted plaintiffs I motion for summary judgment
on that issue.
ISSUE 2
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it awarded
liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b) (1988) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act?
What constitutes good faith and reasonable grounds, as those
notions relate to the issue of liquidated damages, involves mixed
questions of law and fact. To the extent that legal principles are
involved, the standard of review is de novo, but to the extent that
factual issues are involved, we will reverse the district court
only for clear error. Brattv. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1990), 912
F.2d 1066, 1071, cert~nkd (1991), 498 U.S. 1086. The State argues
that the District Court erred when it awarded liquidated damages
and decided that the State did not prove it acted in good faith or
on reasonable grounds. We note that despite its summary judgment
decision, which awarded liquidated damages, the District Court
allowed the State to submit evidence of good faith and reasonable
grounds at the hearing, but found that it either had not done so,
or that its evidence was insufficient.
As set forth above, § 8 violations are deemed violations of
29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (3). The damage provision for these violations
provides in relevant part:
12 Any employer who violates the provisions of section 15(a) (3) of this Act shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 15 (a) (3) , including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.
29 U.S.C. § 216 (b) (1988) However, 29 U.S.C. § 260 states that in
claims to recover damages under the FLSA:
[I]f the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages .
See also Bratt, 912 F. 2 d at 1 0 71 . The State acknowledges that an
employer has the burden of proving that its violation of the FLSA
was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds to
believe it did not violate the FLSA. See E.E.o.c. v. First Citizens Bank of
Billings (9th Cir. 1985), 758 F.2d 397, 403, cert. denied (1985), 474 U.S.
902.
Courts have utilized different standards to determine what
constitutes good faith and reasonable grounds. Compare Kinney v. District
of Columbia (D.C. Cir. 1993), 994 F.2d 6, 12, and Bratt, 912 F.2d at
1072, with Walton, 786 F.2d at 312. As discussed below, we conclude
that the Fifth Circuit's test to determine good faith and
reasonable grounds based on an objective standard is more reliable.
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court in Walton, stated that
the correct standard is the one provided by the statute:
13 [W]hether the employer's conduct--objectively viewed through the lens of the "reasonable man" famous in tort law--acted "in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation" of the FLSA.
Walton, 78 6 P . 2d at 3 12 . The Walton court concluded that the
objective standard was especially appropriate in claims against
corporate or governmental employers which do not have an actual
mental state. Walton, 78 6 F. 2 d at 3 12 . That court added that a
decision made aboveboard and justified in public is more likely to
satisfy the test. Walton, 78 6 F. 2 d at 3 12 . Double damages are
meant to be the norm and not the exception. Walton, 786 F. 2d at
310. In addition, double damages are partly designed to compensate
for concealed violations. Utilizing these damages when concealed
violations are detected presents employers with the full costs of
their actions, a goal stressed in the legislative history of the
double damage provision. Walton, 786 F. 2d at 312.
We have already concluded that overwhelming evidence supported
"the conclusion that the [State's military service] requirement's
sole purpose [was] to circumvent the wage and overtime standards
set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act " McKamey, 885
P.2d at 522.
In its summary judgment order, the court mentioned that the
State's decision to reduce plaintiffs' wages and eliminate them
from the State's pay plan was not made aboveboard nor justified to
the pUblic. The court added that the militia exception was
frivolous and a subterfuge designed to avoid legal obligations
14 ·.
imposed by the FLSA. Other factors the court found persuasive are:
the State was aware of Garcia's ramifications, other available
alternatives were not pursued, the State unilaterally declared
plaintiffs exempt from the State pay plan, and the State did not
inform plaintiffs of its decision to do so. The record supports
the District Court's findings.
Based on our decision in AfcKamey, and evidence cited by the
District Court, we conclude that the District Court was not clearly
erroneous, did not abuse its discretion, and did not err as a
matter of law when it found and concluded that plaintiffs were
entitled to liquidated damages under § 216, and that the State did
not objectively demonstrate good faith or reasonable grounds under
§ 260.
ISSUE 3
Were the District Court's findings regarding the amount of
plaintiffs' damages clearly erroneous?
"A district court's damage determination is a factual finding
which must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence; we will not overturn a district court unless its determination was
clearly erroneous." Semenzav.Bowman (Mont. 1994), 885 P.2d 451, 455,
51 St. Rep. 1209, 1212 (citing Columbia Grain Int'I v. Cereck (1993), 258
Mont. 414, 417, 852 P.2d 676, 678). We rely on a three-part test
to determine if a finding is clearly erroneous. First, we review
the record to ensure the findings are supported by substantial
evidence. Second, if there is an evidentiary basis for the
15 finding, we consider whether the district court misapprehended the
effect of the evidence. Third, if the other two criteria are
satisfied, we may still determine that a finding is clearly
erroneous when a review of the record leaves the Court with a firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Interstate Prod Credit Ass'n v.
DeSaye (1991), 250 Mont. 320, 323, 820 P.2d 1285, 1287.
The District Court's findings were based on conflicting expert
testimony. The trial judge has the duty to resolve conflicts in
evidence and this Court gives due regard to the trial judge's
superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. Williams
v. DeVinney (1993), 259 Mont. 354, 359, 856 P.2d 546, 549. A district
court is "not bound by the opinion of a particular party or expert
but remains free to adopt any reasonable valuation that is
supported by the record." Goodoverv.Lindey's (1992), 255 Mont. 430,
440, 843 P.2d 765, 771 (citing In reMarriage oJ Dzivi (1991), 247 Mont.
165, 167, 805 P.2d 567, 568).
In its brief, the State concedes that substantial evidence
supports the District Court's "straight time" wage award, but argues that a review of the record leads to a conclusion that the District Court misapprehended the evidence and made a mistake. Specifically, the State attacks the adequacy of the foundation for
the testimony of the plaintiffs' damage expert. However, the
foundation was made difficult by the State's failure to maintain
accurate records of the hours worked by the plaintiffs.
16 The District Court recognized that the State breached its duty
to properly account for the hours plaintiffs actually worked, and
therefore, that plaintiffs were entitled to substantiate their
claim without precise time records. See Wage Claim of Holbeck v. Stevi-West,
Inc. (1989), 240 Mont. 121, 125-26, 783 P.2d 391, 394 (citing Garsjo
v. Department of Labor and Industry ( 1977), 172 Mont. 182 , 188 - 89, 562 P. 2 d
473, 476).
Gar~o relied on language from a United States Supreme Court
case discussing the difficulty an employee confronts when an
employer keeps insufficient records. Garsjo, 562 P.2d at 476 (citing
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. , (1946), 328 U. S . 680, 687, 66 S. Ct.
1187, 1192, 90 L. Ed. 1515, 1523. In Ande~on, 328 U.S. at 687-88,
the United States Supreme Court reasoned:
[W]here the employer's records are inaccurate or inadequate and the employee cannot offer convincing substitutes, a more difficult problem arises. The solution, however, is not to penalize the employee by denying him any recovery on the ground that he is unable to prove the precise extent of uncompensated work. Such a result would place a premium on an employer's failure to keep proper records in conformity with his statutory duty; it would allow the employer to keep the benefits of an employee's labors without paying due compensation as contemplated by the Fair Labor Standards Act. In such a situation we hold that an employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. The burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence. If the employer fails to produce such
17 evidence, the court may then award damages to the employee, even though the result be only approximate.
In Garsjo, we also quoted similar reasoning from the Michigan Supreme
Court, which held that:
"When the employee shows, as he did here, 'that he did in fact perform overtime work for which he was not properly compensated and produces sufficient evidence to show the extent and amount of such work as a matter of just and reasonable inference, the burden shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of the work performed or with evidence to negate the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the evidence of the employee. And if the employer fails to produce such evidence, it is the duty of the court to enter judgment for the employee, even though the amount be only a reasonable approximation. '"
Garsjo, 562 P.2d at 476-77 (quoting Purcellv.Keegan (Mich. 1960), 103
N.W.2d 494, 497).
Each party used a different approach to determine the unpaid
"straight time" claim based on the available data. Plaintiffs'
expert assumed that each plaintiff worked a standard schedule of
2912 hours per year and used this figure as a ceiling to compute
unpaid "straight time" for each year. He used the total hours
worked, minus total overtime paid from settlement of the previous
suit, minus "straight time" hours paid, to determine unpaid
"straight time" hours. Plaintiffs' expert then multiplied the
unpaid "straight time" with the hourly pay rate for the year in
question to determine the amount of damages.
The State's expert challenged the use of a 2912 hour average
ceiling and noted that in later years when more accurate time cards
were used, records indicated some plaintiffs took leave without
18 pay. As a result, the total for each plaintiff may not have been
exactly 2912 hours.
The trial court criticized this approach, stating that if the
State was going to use this approach it should have used the most
reliable records, which were after 1986. However, the State did
not explain its failure to use these records. The records used by
the State showed that plaintiffs averaged approximately 2700 hours
per year. However, after 1986, records reflected that plaintiffs
averaged approximately 2900 hours per year. The court found
plaintiffs' formula "reasonable in light of the lack of other
records to come to more accurate figures."
The other damage issue involves the FLSA claim. As noted
above, in 1986 the State recomputed each plaintiff's hourly wage by
dividing his or her annual salary by 2912, instead of 2080 as
required by statute. Sections 2-18-306, -312, MCA. The District
Court's Conclusion of Law No.7 noted that the State's method was
illegal.
Plaintiffs' expert compared 2080 hours to 2912 hours to arrive
at a factor of .714, which he then used to arrive at the total amount by which plaintiffs were underpaid. The State argues that
plaintiffs' expert should have audited actual records, instead of
using the formula. Plaintiffs respond that this could not be done
because of inaccurate record keeping by the State.
The State's expert testified that he based his calculations on
an audit of payroll records. However, the District Court noted
19 numerous errors in his method, several of which the State's expert
admitted during cross-examination.
Plaintiffs introduced evidence that they worked hours for
which they were not properly compensated. Plaintiffs produced
sufficient evidence of the amount of uncompensated work, based on
reasonable inferences, to entitle them to damages based on a
reasonable approximation. The District Court found that the State
failed to produce sufficient evidence of the precise amount of work
performed, or to negate the inference produced by the plaintiffs.
The District Court is in a better position than this Court to
reconcile contradictory expert testimony. Based on our review of
the record, we are not convinced the District Court misapprehended
the evidence, nor are we convinced the District Court made a
mistake. Therefore, we conclude that the District Court's damage
calculations were not clearly erroneous.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
We concur: