Tefft v. . Munson

New York Court of Appeals

Tefft v. . Munson

57 N.Y. 97

CourtNew York Court of Appeals

DecidedJanuary 5, 1874

StatusPublished

Cited by28 cases

This text of 57 N.Y. 97 (Tefft v. . Munson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tefft v. . Munson, 57 N.Y. 97 (N.Y. 1874).

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Opinions

Earl, C.

The plaintiff claims that the mortgage to the loan commissioners has no validity as against him, and that his deed has priority over it under the laws in reference to the registry of deeds and mortgages. It is a principle of law, not now open to doubt, that, ordinarily, if one who has no title to lands, nevertheless makes a deed of conveyance, with warranty, and afterward himsSlf purchases and receives the title, the same will vest immediately in his grantee who holds his deed with warranty as against such grantor by estoppel. In such case the estoppel is held to bind the land; and to create an estate and interest in it. The grantor in such case, being at the same time the warrantor of the title which he has assumed the right to convey, will not, in a court of justice, be heard to set up a title in himself against his own prior grant; he will not be heard to say that he had not the title at the date of the conveyance, or that it did not pass to his grantee in virtue of his deed. ( Work v. Welland, 13 N. H., 389; Kimball v. Blaisdell, 5 id., 533; Somes v. Skinner, 3 Pick., 52; The Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch., 528, 567; Jackson v. Bull, 1 John. Cas., 81, 90; White v. Patten, 24 Pick., 324; Pike v. Galvin, 29 Maine, 183.) And the doctrine, as will be seen by these authorities, is equally well settled that the estoppel binds not only the parties, but all privies in estate, privies in blood and privies in law; and, in such case, the title is treated as having been previously vested in the grantor, and as having passed immediately upon the execution of his deed, by way of estoppel. In this case, Martin B. Perkins conveyed the lands to the loan commis *100 sioners, by mortgage with warranty of title, and thereby became estopped from disputing that, at the date of the mortgage, he had the title and conveyed it; and this estoppel applied equally to the plaintiff to whom he made a subsequent conveyance, by deed, after he obtained the title from his father, and who thus claimed to be his privy in estate. The plaintiff was estopped from denying that his grantor, Martin B. Perkins, had the title to the land at the date of the mortgage, and he must, therefore, for every purpose as against the plaintiff, be treated as having the title to the land at that date.

I, therefore, can see no difficulty in this case, growing out of the law as to the registry of conveyances. Martin B. Perkins, having title, made the mortgage which was duly recorded. He then conveyed to his father and the deed was recorded. His father then conveyed to him and the deed was recorded. He then conveyed to the plaintiff and his deed was recorded. Thus the title and record of the mortgage were prior to the title and record of the deed to plaintiff, and the priority claimed by plaintiff cannot be allowed, Assuming it to be the role that the record of a conveyance made by one having no title, is, ordinarily, a nullity, and constructive notice to no one; the plaintiff cannot avail himself of this rule, as he is estopped from denying that the mortgagor had the title at the date of the mortgage. The case of White v. Patten (supra), is entirely analogous to this. In that case, the plaintiff derived his title from a mortgage, made to him by one Thayer, containing covenants of seizin, warranty, etc., and recorded February 19, 1834. At the time of the execution of this mortgage the title was not in Thayer, but in one Perry, his father in law. Perry afterward, by deed, recorded. August 2, 1834, conveyed the land in fee simple to Thayer, who conveyed the land by mortgage to the defendant, recorded the same day. The counsel for the defendant used the same arguments in a great measure, which have been urged upon ouf attention by the counsel for the plaintiff in this case, both as to the title and the registry of the mortgages; and, yet the *101 court held in a very able opinion, that the plaintiff had the prior and better title.

' I am, therefore, of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

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Earl, C.

The plaintiff claims that the mortgage to the loan commissioners has no validity as against him, and that his deed has priority over it under the laws in reference to the registry of deeds and mortgages. It is a principle of law, not now open to doubt, that, ordinarily, if one who has no title to lands, nevertheless makes a deed of conveyance, with warranty, and afterward himsSlf purchases and receives the title, the same will vest immediately in his grantee who holds his deed with warranty as against such grantor by estoppel. In such case the estoppel is held to bind the land; and to create an estate and interest in it. The grantor in such case, being at the same time the warrantor of the title which he has assumed the right to convey, will not, in a court of justice, be heard to set up a title in himself against his own prior grant; he will not be heard to say that he had not the title at the date of the conveyance, or that it did not pass to his grantee in virtue of his deed. ( Work v. Welland, 13 N. H., 389; Kimball v. Blaisdell, 5 id., 533; Somes v. Skinner, 3 Pick., 52; The Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch., 528, 567; Jackson v. Bull, 1 John. Cas., 81, 90; White v. Patten, 24 Pick., 324; Pike v. Galvin, 29 Maine, 183.) And the doctrine, as will be seen by these authorities, is equally well settled that the estoppel binds not only the parties, but all privies in estate, privies in blood and privies in law; and, in such case, the title is treated as having been previously vested in the grantor, and as having passed immediately upon the execution of his deed, by way of estoppel. In this case, Martin B. Perkins conveyed the lands to the loan commis *100 sioners, by mortgage with warranty of title, and thereby became estopped from disputing that, at the date of the mortgage, he had the title and conveyed it; and this estoppel applied equally to the plaintiff to whom he made a subsequent conveyance, by deed, after he obtained the title from his father, and who thus claimed to be his privy in estate. The plaintiff was estopped from denying that his grantor, Martin B. Perkins, had the title to the land at the date of the mortgage, and he must, therefore, for every purpose as against the plaintiff, be treated as having the title to the land at that date.

I, therefore, can see no difficulty in this case, growing out of the law as to the registry of conveyances. Martin B. Perkins, having title, made the mortgage which was duly recorded. He then conveyed to his father and the deed was recorded. His father then conveyed to him and the deed was recorded. He then conveyed to the plaintiff and his deed was recorded. Thus the title and record of the mortgage were prior to the title and record of the deed to plaintiff, and the priority claimed by plaintiff cannot be allowed, Assuming it to be the role that the record of a conveyance made by one having no title, is, ordinarily, a nullity, and constructive notice to no one; the plaintiff cannot avail himself of this rule, as he is estopped from denying that the mortgagor had the title at the date of the mortgage. The case of White v. Patten (supra), is entirely analogous to this. In that case, the plaintiff derived his title from a mortgage, made to him by one Thayer, containing covenants of seizin, warranty, etc., and recorded February 19, 1834. At the time of the execution of this mortgage the title was not in Thayer, but in one Perry, his father in law. Perry afterward, by deed, recorded. August 2, 1834, conveyed the land in fee simple to Thayer, who conveyed the land by mortgage to the defendant, recorded the same day. The counsel for the defendant used the same arguments in a great measure, which have been urged upon ouf attention by the counsel for the plaintiff in this case, both as to the title and the registry of the mortgages; and, yet the *101 court held in a very able opinion, that the plaintiff had the prior and better title.

' I am, therefore, of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

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57 N.Y. 97, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tefft-v-munson-ny-1874.

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