Technology v. Moore, et al.

2003 DNH 018
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedJanuary 24, 2003
DocketCV-02-146-M
StatusPublished

This text of 2003 DNH 018 (Technology v. Moore, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Technology v. Moore, et al., 2003 DNH 018 (D.N.H. 2003).

Opinion

Technology v . Moore, et a l . CV-02-146-M 01/24/03 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Technology Planning Int’l., LLC RBP Holdings, Ltd., and Dover Technologies, Ltd., Plaintiffs

v. Civil N o . 02-146-M Opinion N o . 2003 DNH 018 Moore North America, Inc. and Raymond Hartman, Defendants

O R D E R

This litigation arises out of the parties’ inability to

successfully come to terms on TPI’s proposed purchase of Moore’s

Document Automation Systems business in Dover, New Hampshire. In

the wake of that impasse, TPI sued Moore seeking, among other

things, specific performance of the parties’ non-binding letter

of understanding, choosing incorrectly to view it as a binding

purchase and sale agreement. By order dated July 1 9 , 2002, the

court granted in part and denied in part Moore’s motion to

dismiss. Some of TPI’s claims (e.g., specific performance) were

plainly without legal merit and were, therefore, dismissed.

Those claims that survived did so by the thinnest of margins.

Subsequently, Moore filed counterclaims against TPI and a third party complaint against TPI’s President, Richard Piller, seeking

damages for abuse of process and violations of New Hampshire’s

Uniform Trade Secrets Act (stemming from TPI’s decision to attach

to its complaint various allegedly confidential documents that

were prepared by Moore and provided to TPI as part of its due

diligence investigation). The viability of those claims remains

to be tested. Not to be outdone, Piller responded with cross-

claims of his own against defendant Raymond Hartman.

The parties are now embroiled in discovery disputes which,

at least according to T P I , cannot be resolved without judicial

intervention. And, says T P I , until those discovery disputes are

unraveled, it is not in a position to submit a meaningful

opposition to Moore’s pending motion for summary judgment.

I. TPI’s Motion to Stay Moore’s Motion for Summary Judgment and to Compel Discovery.

Initially, it probably bears mentioning that a fair reading

of the court’s Local Rules precludes parties from submitting a

single motion that seeks disparate forms of relief and/or invokes

unrelated Federal Rules (e.g., a Rule 56(f) motion combined with

a motion to compel discovery). See generally Local Rule 7.1.

2 Turning first to that part of TPI’s motion seeking relief

under Rule 56(f), it is denied. Among other things, neither

TPI’s motion nor the supporting affidavit of counsel satisfies

Rule 56(f)’s “utility and materiality” requirements. See

Resolution Trust Corp. v . North Bridge Assoc., Inc., 22 F.3d

1198, 1203 (1st Cir. 1994) (“the criterion for Rule 56(f) relief

can be thought of as embodying five requirements:

authoritativeness, timeliness, good cause, utility and

materiality.”). While TPI complains that it has not been

provided with all discovery that it has requested, it has failed

to articulate what it expects that discovery to reveal, or how

the requested discovery would support one or more of its claims,

or how it would assist TPI in defeating Moore’s pending motion

for summary judgment. See, e.g., Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover,

Inc. v . American Bar Ass’n., 142 F.3d 2 6 , 44 (1st Cir. 1998)

(“the moving papers must contain a proffer which, at a bare

minimum, articulates a plausible basis for the movant’s belief

that previously undisclosed or undocumented facts exist, that

those facts can be secured by further discovery, and that, if

obtained, there is some credible prospect that the new evidence

will create a trialworthy issue.”) (emphasis supplied).

3 As for that part of TPI’s motion seeking to compel

defendants to produce discovery, it is referred to the Magistrate

Judge.

II. Hartman’s Motion to Dismiss Piller’s Cross-Claim.

Defendant and cross-claim defendant Raymond Hartman moves to

dismiss the cross-claim filed against him by third-party

defendant and cross-claim plaintiff Richard Piller. In short,

Hartman says because he and Piller do not share a “like status”

in the case, such as co-defendants, they cannot be considered

“co-parties” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g). And, because that rule

only authorizes cross-claims by one party against a “co-party,”

Piller is precluded from bringing claims against him (at least

under Rule 13(g)).

As Hartman himself candidly concedes, there is a decided

lack of agreement among courts and legal commentators on this

issue. Many have strictly interpreted the language of Rule 13

and concluded that “co-parties” are those that have a similar

status in the case, such as co-defendants. See, e.g.,

International Paving Systems, Inc. v . Van-Tulco, Inc., 866 F.

4 Supp. 6 8 2 , 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (collecting cases). Others have,

however, employed a broader reading of that term, concluding that

it applies to any parties who are not adverse or opposing.1 See,

e.g., Earle M . Jorgenson C o . v . T.I. United States, Ltd., 133

F.R.D. 472 (E.D. P a . 1991); Mauney v . Imperial Delivery Services,

Inc., 865 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Finally, the Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has adopted an even more lenient

interpretation of the Federal Rules, concluding that “a third

party defendant may file a cross-claim against an original

defendant even if it would be inappropriate to characterize the

third party defendant as a co-defendant of the original

defendant.” Thomas v . Barton Lodge I I , Ltd., 174 F.3d 636, 652

(5th Cir. 1999).

1 Of course, even under this more liberal interpretation of the term “co-party,” it is questionable whether it can properly be said that Piller and Hartman are not adverse or opposing, since Piller is the President of TPI (the company that sued Hartman), and Piller’s affidavit provides the factual basis for TPI’s complaint against Hartman, and the facts giving rise to TPI’s claim against Hartman are the same as those giving rise to Piller’s claims against Hartman, and Piller and TPI are represented by the same counsel. In short, it taxes the imagination far less to view Piller and Hartman as “adverse parties,” than as “co-parties.”

5 While Hartman’s argument in support of his motion to dismiss

Piller’s cross-claims certainly has some logical appeal, viewing

the situation from a slightly broader perspective, it makes

little sense to grant the relief he seeks. Even if the court

were to conclude that Piller’s efforts to pursue a cross-claim

against Hartman are not strictly authorized by the Federal Rules,

Piller could (and, in light of this case’s procedural history,

likely would) simply file a separate action against Hartman.

Then, he would likely move to consolidate the two proceedings - a

motion that would, almost certainly, be granted. Requiring

Piller to pursue that avenue is neither warranted nor prudent.

Doing so would represent an inefficient use of resources and

would add unnecessary confusion to a case that could certainly

benefit from a bit more order and clarity. See generally Fed. R.

Civ. P. 1 (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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