Teal v. Powell Lumber Co.

262 S.W.2d 223, 1953 Tex. App. LEXIS 2047
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 15, 1953
Docket4860
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 262 S.W.2d 223 (Teal v. Powell Lumber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Teal v. Powell Lumber Co., 262 S.W.2d 223, 1953 Tex. App. LEXIS 2047 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953).

Opinion

ANDERSON, Justice.

This is a boundary case, the question for determination being whether a particular 62.3 acres of land lies within or without the bounds of the David S. Suddeth Survey in Orange County.

Application to purchase the land as un-surveyed school land having been made by F. M. Teal under the provisions of art. 5421c, Rev.Civ.Stat, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St, the Commissioner of the General Land Office found it to be vacant and unsurveyed school land, bounded on the east by the Suddeth survey, on the west by the Harvey Vanway survey, on the north by the Charles Morgan survey, and on the south by the John Allen survey, and approved the Teal application to purchase.

This suit was instituted in the district court of Orange County by appellee, Powell Lumber Company, pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid Act, to try the issues of boundary, of title to and ownership of the land, and of whether appellee was a good faith claimant of the land, with preferred rights regarding it, if it should be found to be vacant and unsurveyed school land. The Commissioner of the General Land Office of Texas, the Attorney General of Texas, and F. M. Teal, and Progress Petroleum Company were named as defendants. Progress Petroleum Company, the holder under Powell Lumber Company of a mineral lease on the Vanway survey and a part of the Suddeth survey, made common cause with the plaintiff upon the trial of the case.

The trial, which was before the court without a jury, resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. The land in controversy was decreed to be a part of the David S. Sud-deth survey, and Powell Lumber Company was adjudged its owner, subject to the mineral lease of Progress Petroleum Company. The Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Attorney General have appealed.

The appellants predicate their appeal on only two points of error. The effect of these points is to challenge the correctness of the trial court’s judgment on the evidence which that court had before it.

No1 findings of fact or conclusions of law were either requested or filed. We must therefore proceed upon the theory that the trial court resolved every disputed fact issue in favor of appellee, and must sustain the trial court’s judgment if the evidence, when construed most favorably to it, supports it under any reasonable theory authorized by law and the pleadings. North East Texas Motor Lines v. Dickson, 148 Tex. 35, 219 S.W.2d 795, 11 A.L.R.2d 1065; Construction & General Labor Union v. Stephenson, 148 Tex. 434, 225 S. W.2d 958; Williams v. Ritcheson, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W.2d 813, error refused.

The following plat, which is not drawn to scale, will serve to illustrate the evidence. The shaded area represents the land in controversy.

*226 Appellee, Powell Lumber Company, owns the Vanway survey and all of the Suddeth survey except 60 acres in its northeast corner, subject to the mineral lease that is held by Progress Petroleum Company. The Vanway survey is junior to the Suddeth survey, and its field notes call for it to begin at the northwest corner of the Suddeth survey, and for it then to run west, south east to the Suddeth southwest corner, and north with the Suddeth we,st boundary to the place of beginning. In other words, the field notes of the Vanway survey call for that survey to adjoin the Suddeth survey, and for the east boundary of the Vanway survey and the west boundary of the Sud-deth survey to be the same or a common boundary.

The Vanway survey’s east boundary, the parties agree., is marked on the ground and can be identified by its original monuments; but the Suddeth survey’s west boundary cannot be located on the ground with certainty by any of its original monuments, and its true location on the ground is the matter in issue.

The appellee contends, of course, that the west line of the Suddeth survey is the same as the established east line of the Vanway survey, and that the land in controversy is therefore a part of the Suddeth survey. The appellants contend, on &e other hand, that the true location on the ground of the west line of the Suddeth survey is almost 400 varas east of the established east line of the, Vanway survey, and that the vacancy contended for exists between the two surveys.

Appellants first contend that, when considered in connection with the survey’s course and distance calls, certain objects which are to be found identify the boundaries of the Suddeth survey on the ground, and fix the survey’s west boundary where appellants would have it located. By this means, appellants would place the survey’s northwest corner 399.2 varas east of the 'established northeast comer of the Van-way survey, and its southwest corner 373 varas east of the established southeast corner of the Vanway survey, leaving a vacancy of 62.3 acres between the two surveys. Appellants next contend that if the objects which exist on the ground and on which they in part rely to identify the Sud-deth survey are not deserving of consideration or are not sufficient for that purpose, then the survey must be constructed by its course and distance calls from call-points lying to the east of it.

If either contention is correct, and if the survey on which appellants rely (presumably the same one on which the Commissioner of the General Land Office relied when he declared the vacancy) was conducted from or tied to the correct call-points, the vacancy, or a larger one, no doubt exists as appellants contend it does.

To refute the existence of the vacancy and to sustain the judgment of the trial court, appellee relies primarily upon the calls for adjoinder contained in the field notes of the Vanway survey, and upon the premise that the burden of proving the existence of the vacancy, and that the call for adjoinder contained in the Vanway field notes resulted from mistake rested upon appellants, and that appellants failed to meet or discharge that burden of proof.

The case was tried by all parties upon the theory that originally both the Suddeth survey and the Van way survey were actually surveyed on the ground. The evidence leaves no doubt as to the correctness of this theory, but in any event, in the absence of evidence to' show the contrary, we should have to presume that the surveys were actually made on the ground. Boon v. Hunter, 62 Tex. 582; Maddox v. Fenner, 79 Tex. 279, 291, 15 S.W. 237; Anderson v. Schaefer, Tex.Civ.App., 275 S.W. 300. Certain well established principles of law that serve to define and circumscribe the questions before us for determination are therefore applicable.

One of these is the rule that if the footsteps of the original surveyor can be identified and followed, they will control the location of the line or boundary in question even though they may not be in harmony with the field note calls. This rule is *227 stated in the case of Miller v. Meyer, Tex. Civ.App., 190 S.W. 247, 250, as follows: “The real object in applying the various calls is to find the footsteps of the surveyor. When these are found and identified, all classes of calls must yield to them. Fulton v. Frandolig, 63 Tex. 330; Converse v. Langshaw, 81 Tex. 275, 16 S.W. 1031; Ruling Case Law, vol. 4, § 56, p.

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Bluebook (online)
262 S.W.2d 223, 1953 Tex. App. LEXIS 2047, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/teal-v-powell-lumber-co-texapp-1953.