Tchewam Lily Mukwange v. Oaks of Brittany Apartments

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 22, 2004
• Docket: 14-04-00345-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 22, 2004

Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 22, 2004.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-04-00345-CV

TCHEWAM LILY MUKWANGE, Appellant

V.

OAKS OF BRITTANY APARTMENTS, Appellee

On Appeal from County Court at Law 3

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 804,933

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

This is a dispute between a former tenant and her landlord regarding a security deposit, allegedly unpaid rent, and unpaid subutility fees.  Appellant filed suit in small claims court and received an adverse verdict, which she appealed de novo to the county court at law.   The county court entered final judgment in favor of appellee, and appellant appealed to this Court.  Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, which we grant, and a motion for sanctions, which we deny.

An appeal from a small claims court=s judgment is to a county court or county court at law in a de novo proceeding.  Tex. Gov=t Code Ann. ' 28.053(b) (Vernon 2004).  AJudgment of the county court or county court at law on appeal is final.@  Id. ' 28.053(d).  The word Afinal@ means that there is no further appeal to any other court.  Woodlands Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Rodgers, 47 S.W.3d 146, 148 (Tex. App.CTexarkana 2001, pet. denied);  Howell Aviation Servs. v. Aerial Ads, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 321, 323 (Tex. App.CDallas 2000, no pet.); Williamson v. A‑1 Elec. Auto Serv., 28 S.W.3d 731, 731 (Tex. App.CCorpus Christi 2000, pet. dism=d w.o.j.);  Lederman v. Rowe, 3 S.W.3d 254, 256 (Tex. App.CWaco 1999, no pet.); Gaskill v. Sneaky Enters., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 1999, pet. denied); Davis v. Covert, 983 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism=d w.o.j.).  We agree that appellant=s court of last resort was the county court at law.  We do not have jurisdiction to consider appellant=s appeal.

Appellee has also sought sanctions, contending that appellant=s pro se appeal is frivolous.  AGenerally, a court should only impose sanctions in the most egregious circumstances.@  Brown v. Brown, No.  14-03-00978-CV, 2004 WL 1263949, at *1 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] June 10, 2004, no pet.).  We look at the record from the viewpoint of the advocate and decide whether she had reasonable grounds to believe the case could be reversed.  Smith v. Brown, 51 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).  We have reviewed the record and carefully considered appellee=s request and appellant=s response; nevertheless, we decline to impose sanctions.

Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed for want of jurisdiction

PER CURIAM

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed July 22, 2004.

Panel consists of Justices Yates, Anderson, and Hudson.