Taylor v. Taylor

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Taylor v. Taylor

831 So. 2d 240, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 16076, 2002 WL 31465403

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedNovember 6, 2002

DocketNo. 2D02-101

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 831 So. 2d 240 (Taylor v. Taylor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Taylor v. Taylor, 831 So. 2d 240, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 16076, 2002 WL 31465403 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002).

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Opinion

WHATLEY, Judge.

The Father requests that this court dissolve any and all trial court orders keeping him out of his home and away from the Mother. However, the only order before this court for review is that entered on January 15, 2002. The other orders mentioned by the Father in his argument were entered after the notice of appeal was filed, and therefore, they are not properly before this court for review.

In the January 15, 2002, order, the trial court dismissed the temporary domestic violence injunction because the Mother had not “presented credible evidence that she has been the victim of domestic violence and that she has reasonable cause to believe that she is in imminent danger from domestic violence.” In other words, the trial court found that neither of the statutory prerequisites for the issuance of a domestic violence injunction was established by the Mother. § 741.30(1), Fla. Stat. (2001).

Notwithstanding this finding, the court directed the Father to continue to have no contact with the Mother and the children and awarded the Mother exclusive use and occupancy of the residence. Although these directives are allowed if an injunction is entered, § 741.30(6)(a), the trial court dismissed the injunction in this case. The trial court’s sua sponte consolidation of the Mother’s petition for an injunction with the Mother’s subsequently filed paternity action did not confer authority on the court to enter these directives against the Father.

Accordingly, we quash that part of the January 15, 2002, order enjoining the Father from contact with the Mother and the children and awarding the Mother exclusive use and occupancy of the residence.

FULMER, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.

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WHATLEY, Judge.

The Father requests that this court dissolve any and all trial court orders keeping him out of his home and away from the Mother. However, the only order before this court for review is that entered on January 15, 2002. The other orders mentioned by the Father in his argument were entered after the notice of appeal was filed, and therefore, they are not properly before this court for review.

In the January 15, 2002, order, the trial court dismissed the temporary domestic violence injunction because the Mother had not “presented credible evidence that she has been the victim of domestic violence and that she has reasonable cause to believe that she is in imminent danger from domestic violence.” In other words, the trial court found that neither of the statutory prerequisites for the issuance of a domestic violence injunction was established by the Mother. § 741.30(1), Fla. Stat. (2001).

Notwithstanding this finding, the court directed the Father to continue to have no contact with the Mother and the children and awarded the Mother exclusive use and occupancy of the residence. Although these directives are allowed if an injunction is entered, § 741.30(6)(a), the trial court dismissed the injunction in this case. The trial court’s sua sponte consolidation of the Mother’s petition for an injunction with the Mother’s subsequently filed paternity action did not confer authority on the court to enter these directives against the Father.

Accordingly, we quash that part of the January 15, 2002, order enjoining the Father from contact with the Mother and the children and awarding the Mother exclusive use and occupancy of the residence.

FULMER, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.

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Bluebook (online)

831 So. 2d 240, 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 16076, 2002 WL 31465403, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-taylor-fladistctapp-2002.

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