Taylor v. Swift & Co.

219 P. 516, 114 Kan. 431, 1923 Kan. LEXIS 102
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedOctober 6, 1923
DocketNo. 24,848
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 219 P. 516 (Taylor v. Swift & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Taylor v. Swift & Co., 219 P. 516, 114 Kan. 431, 1923 Kan. LEXIS 102 (kan 1923).

Opinion

The opinion of the court is delivered by

Dawson, J.:

This was an action to enforce a claim for compensation for alleged injuries sustained by plaintiff through exposure while working in and out of defendant’s meat-cooling plant. The alleged exposure occurred on September 26, 1917. The action was originally begun on September 24, 1920. It was removed to the federal court and there dismissed without prejudice on April 12,1921, [432]*432and this action was begun July 5, 1921. In the petition filed by plaintiff on July 5, 1921, he attempted to state a cause of action as follows:

“Plaintiff says that on the 26th of September, 1917, he received an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment while working for the defendant. That he was required in the course of his employment to work in cold refrigerator cars and to be on the outside of the cars at times and in the cold department of the cars at other times. That said refrigerator cars were kept at a freeing point, to wit: about 30 to 32' degrees. That on account of working out and in said cars the said plaintiff accidentally contracted a severe case of cold and LaGrippe and as a result of contracting said case of cold and LaGrippe the plaintiff became paralyzed in both of his legs and from his hips down. That the injuries which he received by reason of said LaGrippe and cold were accidental and was a result of his working in said refrigerator cars as aforesaid.”

Defendant filed a motion to make this petition more definite and certain by requiring plaintiff to state the nature and extent of the alleged accident, and by setting forth the facts constituting it. This motion was sustained. Thereupon plaintiff amended his petition by inserting the words “as follows” after the word “defendant” at the end of the first sentence in the paragraph of his petition quoted above, so that as amended, it read:

“Plaintiff says that on the 26th of September, 1917, he received an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment while working for the defendant, as follows: That he was required in the course of his employment to work in cold refrigerator cars,” etc.

Defendant’s demurrer to this petition was sustained on October 15, 1921, and on October 20, 1921, plaintiff filed an amended petition, the material part of which reads:

“Plaintiff says that on the 26th day of September, 1917, he received an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment while working for the defendant, as follows:
“That he was required in the course of his employment to work in cold refrigerator cars and in and about said cooler and to be on the outside of cars at times and in the cold department of cars at other times and also said cooler in which he was working as aforesaid, that said refrigerator cars and cooler were kept at a freezing point, to wit: about 30 to 32 degrees. That in the due course of his employment he was required at times and particularly on the 26th day of September, 1917, was required to lift heavy calves, placing them on scales and taking them off scales for the purpose of weighing them. That on the aforesaid date and while so lifting said heavy calves he strained himself and became overheated and as a result of said working in the cold as aforesaid he contracted a severe case of cold and LaGrippe. That said [433]*433cold, and LaGrippe so contracted as aforesaid became so severe that it settled in both of his legs and he became paralyzed in his legs from his hips down. That said injuries which he received by reason of said LaGrippe and cold contracted as aforesaid Were accidental and were a result of his working in said cold places as aforesaid.”

Defendant’s answer traversed all the allegations of plaintiff’s petition, pleaded various defenses, and invoked the statute of limitations.

Plaintiff’s reply, in part, alleged:

“Plaintiff further denies that the statute of limitations has run in this action. Plaintiff says that on or about the month of September, 1920, plaintiff filed a petition in the above entitled case claiming compensation for an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of plaintiff’s employment for the defendant. That the defendant filed a petition in removal and took same to the United States district court. That the plaintiff dismissed said action in said court without prejudice, on April 12, 1921, and that on July 12, 1921, less than one year thereafter, again filed the petition in the present action.”

The cause was tried before a jury. The testimony of plaintiff concerning his alleged accident and injuries, in its main features, reads:

“Q. . . . What did you do or help do on the morning of the day that you were injured? A. I helped to lift the lambs and also the veal and get them on the main rail.
“Q. Can you tell the jury about how much those lambs and veal weigh? A. The veal weighed from fifty pounds to five hundred, and the lambs usually weigh about fifty pounds. The veal averaged from — well, they run from fifty to five hundred pounds.
“Q. Any time during that day did you — you may state whether or not you. noticed anything in connection with the handling of those veal or lambs? ...
“A. I began feeling bad about noon, pains through my spine and through my limbs. . . .
“Q. Just prior to your feeling bad in your spine and limbs, or wherever it was, what had you done? A. I had lifted the lambs and the veal and getting out the orders in general. And also scaling them.
“Q. What was the first thing you noticed? A. Pains through my spine and down the backs of my legs.
“Q. I wish you would describe, if you can, a little more definitely the nature of those feelings you had in your'back. A. Well, it felt as if a severe cold — if a person knows how a severe cold feels.
“Q. Did you lift any of these veals yourself? A. I helped to lift them. I helped to lift the veals, myself and another man.
“Q. I see. Now, how did that feel with respect to being heavy, to you, at that time? A. They felt rather heavy.
[434]*434“Q. If you can. remember of any particular time of lifting any particular lamb or veal there, that affected you, I wish you would tell the jury. A. I remember feeling so badly about ten-thirty that I went into the office, and I never lifted any more after that. . . .
' “Q. Now where were these calves, these veals that you were lifting, taken from? A. From the sheep cooler, the mutton department. . . .
“Q. How far did you take them? A. From the cooler over the scales.
“Q. And how far is that? A. From the back end of the cooler over the scales — about seventy feet, I think.
“Q. What was the condition of the weather outside at that time? A. It was warm at that time.
“Q. What was your condition with respect to perspiring or being hot? A. When I would go on the beds, I would perspire quite a bit, going on to the beds, and it is animal heat out there, you know — the temperature is very high.
“Q.

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Bluebook (online)
219 P. 516, 114 Kan. 431, 1923 Kan. LEXIS 102, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-swift-co-kan-1923.