NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 3, 2026
S25A1302. TAYLOR v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Shauntae Laquana Taylor appeals following her convictions for
malice murder and other charges in connection with the shooting
death of Miguel Munoz. 1 As her sole enumeration of error on appeal,
1 Munoz was killed in the early morning hours of September 4, 2019. A
DeKalb County grand jury indicted Taylor, along with Jessica Smith, in connection with Munoz’s death on December 12, 2019, charging them with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 3 and 4), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 5). Taylor and Smith’s cases were severed for trial, and Smith, with no formal agreement with the State, testified for the State at Taylor’s trial. Following a trial, a jury found Taylor guilty on all counts on March 28, 2022, and the trial court sentenced her to life with the possibility of parole on Count 1; 20 years to serve in prison on Count 4, to run consecutively to Count 1; and five years to serve on Count 5, to run consecutively to Count 4. Count 2 was vacated, and Count 3 was merged into Count 1. Taylor filed a timely motion for new trial on April 19, 2022, which was amended by new counsel on July 1, 2024. The trial court denied Taylor’s motion for new trial on September 4, 2024. Taylor then filed, and later amended, a timely notice of appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to this Court on May 15, 2025. The case then was docketed in this Court to the August 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. Taylor contends she received ineffective assistance of counsel “when
trial counsel failed to effectively delve into the potential theory that
codefendant Jessica Smith may have been at least the decision
maker for the shooting, and possibly even the shooter.” However,
for the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Taylor failed to
carry her burden to establish this claim under the standard set out
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Smith testified at Taylor’s trial that, sometime in August or
September 2019, she began “prostituting” for Taylor. She said that
Taylor set up a web page for Smith on an internet prostitution site,
which she used to arrange for clients to come to the hotel where
Smith and Taylor were staying. Smith would have sex with the
clients and then turn all the money she received over to Taylor. In
turn, Taylor provided Smith with food and lodging but did not give
Smith any money.
In the early morning hours of September 4, 2019, Taylor
arranged for Smith to meet a client at another hotel. Taylor drove
Smith to a hotel in Brookhaven where Munoz was staying, with the
2 intention that Smith would have sex with Munoz for money. After
Smith and Taylor were admitted to the hotel by the front desk clerk,
they took the elevator to the third floor where Munoz was staying.
Only Smith entered Munoz’s hotel room at that time, and the plan
was for Taylor to remain outside in the hallway. Smith testified that,
after she entered the room, Munoz sat on the edge of the bed and
used drugs. But Smith said that the two never engaged in any sexual
acts because, at some point, she became uncomfortable and told
Munoz that she was not “going to do anything with him.”
When Smith texted Taylor to tell her “[what was] going on,”
Taylor replied that Munoz still needed to pay Smith for her time.
However, Munoz refused to pay because no sexual acts had occurred.
Smith relayed Munoz’s response to Taylor by text, and Taylor
instructed Smith to open the hotel room door, which Smith did.
Taylor then entered the room and told Munoz that he needed to pay.
When Munoz refused, Taylor drew a gun from behind her back and
began striking Munoz on the head with it. Smith testified that she
fled the room after Taylor hit Munoz three times. Smith said she ran
3 downstairs and went outside the hotel “to the bushes,” where she
waited for about ten minutes until Taylor called and instructed
Smith to meet at the car. Smith described Taylor as “frantic” when
they arrived at the car, and the two then left and returned to their
own hotel.
Hotel employees discovered Munoz’s dead body in his room
later that morning , and a subsequent autopsy revealed that Munoz
had four blunt-force head injuries and a penetrating gunshot wound
to the chest, which resulted in his death. Fragments of a 9mm
hollow-point “rapidly invasive projectile” (RIP) were removed from
Munoz’s body, and a 9mm shell casing was found in his hotel room.
After Taylor was later arrested in connection with Munoz’s death,
investigators discovered an unfired 9mm hollow-point RIP round in
the hotel room where she was staying. Although police never located
the gun used in the shooting, subsequent testing revealed that the
shell casing retrieved from Munoz’s hotel room and the unfired
round located in Taylor’s hotel room had both been inside “the same
exact firearm,” a High Point 9mm pistol, at some point in time.
4 Following her convictions, Taylor moved for a new trial on
several grounds. After Taylor chose to waive any evidentiary
hearing on the motion, instead submitting the motion for decision
on the parties’ briefs, the trial court denied Taylor’s motion, finding
that she failed to carry her burden to establish her claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel.
Taylor now raises the same claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel on appeal. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, a defendant must show both that her counsel performed
deficiently and that she was prejudiced by the deficient
performance. See Coston v. State, 321 Ga. 760, 766 (2025) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Proof of deficiency under the first prong
of this test requires a defendant to demonstrate that her trial
attorney “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way
considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing
professional norms.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (2023)
(quotation marks omitted). Demonstrating prejudice under the
second prong requires the defendant to show a “reasonable
5 probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Palmer v. State, 310
Ga. 668, 678 (2021) (quotation marks omitted). Showing that
counsel’s deficient performance had “some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding” is not enough; the defendant must
instead establish “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Bentley v. State, 307 Ga. 1, 4 (2019) (quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94).
Demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel presents a “high
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 3, 2026
S25A1302. TAYLOR v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Shauntae Laquana Taylor appeals following her convictions for
malice murder and other charges in connection with the shooting
death of Miguel Munoz. 1 As her sole enumeration of error on appeal,
1 Munoz was killed in the early morning hours of September 4, 2019. A
DeKalb County grand jury indicted Taylor, along with Jessica Smith, in connection with Munoz’s death on December 12, 2019, charging them with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 3 and 4), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 5). Taylor and Smith’s cases were severed for trial, and Smith, with no formal agreement with the State, testified for the State at Taylor’s trial. Following a trial, a jury found Taylor guilty on all counts on March 28, 2022, and the trial court sentenced her to life with the possibility of parole on Count 1; 20 years to serve in prison on Count 4, to run consecutively to Count 1; and five years to serve on Count 5, to run consecutively to Count 4. Count 2 was vacated, and Count 3 was merged into Count 1. Taylor filed a timely motion for new trial on April 19, 2022, which was amended by new counsel on July 1, 2024. The trial court denied Taylor’s motion for new trial on September 4, 2024. Taylor then filed, and later amended, a timely notice of appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to this Court on May 15, 2025. The case then was docketed in this Court to the August 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. Taylor contends she received ineffective assistance of counsel “when
trial counsel failed to effectively delve into the potential theory that
codefendant Jessica Smith may have been at least the decision
maker for the shooting, and possibly even the shooter.” However,
for the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Taylor failed to
carry her burden to establish this claim under the standard set out
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Smith testified at Taylor’s trial that, sometime in August or
September 2019, she began “prostituting” for Taylor. She said that
Taylor set up a web page for Smith on an internet prostitution site,
which she used to arrange for clients to come to the hotel where
Smith and Taylor were staying. Smith would have sex with the
clients and then turn all the money she received over to Taylor. In
turn, Taylor provided Smith with food and lodging but did not give
Smith any money.
In the early morning hours of September 4, 2019, Taylor
arranged for Smith to meet a client at another hotel. Taylor drove
Smith to a hotel in Brookhaven where Munoz was staying, with the
2 intention that Smith would have sex with Munoz for money. After
Smith and Taylor were admitted to the hotel by the front desk clerk,
they took the elevator to the third floor where Munoz was staying.
Only Smith entered Munoz’s hotel room at that time, and the plan
was for Taylor to remain outside in the hallway. Smith testified that,
after she entered the room, Munoz sat on the edge of the bed and
used drugs. But Smith said that the two never engaged in any sexual
acts because, at some point, she became uncomfortable and told
Munoz that she was not “going to do anything with him.”
When Smith texted Taylor to tell her “[what was] going on,”
Taylor replied that Munoz still needed to pay Smith for her time.
However, Munoz refused to pay because no sexual acts had occurred.
Smith relayed Munoz’s response to Taylor by text, and Taylor
instructed Smith to open the hotel room door, which Smith did.
Taylor then entered the room and told Munoz that he needed to pay.
When Munoz refused, Taylor drew a gun from behind her back and
began striking Munoz on the head with it. Smith testified that she
fled the room after Taylor hit Munoz three times. Smith said she ran
3 downstairs and went outside the hotel “to the bushes,” where she
waited for about ten minutes until Taylor called and instructed
Smith to meet at the car. Smith described Taylor as “frantic” when
they arrived at the car, and the two then left and returned to their
own hotel.
Hotel employees discovered Munoz’s dead body in his room
later that morning , and a subsequent autopsy revealed that Munoz
had four blunt-force head injuries and a penetrating gunshot wound
to the chest, which resulted in his death. Fragments of a 9mm
hollow-point “rapidly invasive projectile” (RIP) were removed from
Munoz’s body, and a 9mm shell casing was found in his hotel room.
After Taylor was later arrested in connection with Munoz’s death,
investigators discovered an unfired 9mm hollow-point RIP round in
the hotel room where she was staying. Although police never located
the gun used in the shooting, subsequent testing revealed that the
shell casing retrieved from Munoz’s hotel room and the unfired
round located in Taylor’s hotel room had both been inside “the same
exact firearm,” a High Point 9mm pistol, at some point in time.
4 Following her convictions, Taylor moved for a new trial on
several grounds. After Taylor chose to waive any evidentiary
hearing on the motion, instead submitting the motion for decision
on the parties’ briefs, the trial court denied Taylor’s motion, finding
that she failed to carry her burden to establish her claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel.
Taylor now raises the same claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel on appeal. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, a defendant must show both that her counsel performed
deficiently and that she was prejudiced by the deficient
performance. See Coston v. State, 321 Ga. 760, 766 (2025) (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Proof of deficiency under the first prong
of this test requires a defendant to demonstrate that her trial
attorney “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way
considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing
professional norms.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (2023)
(quotation marks omitted). Demonstrating prejudice under the
second prong requires the defendant to show a “reasonable
5 probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Palmer v. State, 310
Ga. 668, 678 (2021) (quotation marks omitted). Showing that
counsel’s deficient performance had “some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding” is not enough; the defendant must
instead establish “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Bentley v. State, 307 Ga. 1, 4 (2019) (quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94).
Demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel presents a “high
bar,” and if a defendant fails to establish either the deficiency or the
prejudice prong, we are not required to consider the other. Mohamed
v. State, 307 Ga. 89, 93 (2019).
As noted above, Taylor argues that she is entitled to a new trial
because her trial counsel failed to “effectively delve” into the
possibility that Smith was the “decision maker” or the shooter in this
case. In support of this argument, Taylor asserts that the State’s
objection to her trial counsel’s “appropriate question on cross-
examination allowed the prosecution to structure state witness
6 Jessica Smith’s answers in a way favorable to the state’s prosecution
of Taylor.” But Taylor fails to provide any record citation to either
the State’s objection or to her counsel’s allegedly “appropriate”
question.2 She also notes “[s]pecifically,” but without record
citation, that Smith “was permitted to confess to drug use in her
testimony, yet no attempt was made to impeach her credibility when
she testified against … Taylor, as per [OCGA §] 24-6-609.” Taylor
further contends that Georgia Department of Corrections records
show that Smith had two prior felony drug convictions in 2012,
2 Taylor’s Appellant’s brief provides two legal citations, to the Strickland
case, setting out the requirements for establishing her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and to OCGA § 24-6-609, addressing impeachment of a witness through evidence of a prior criminal conviction. And although Taylor purports to provide five record citations, with one exception, those citations are illusory in that they either (1) do not correspond to accurate volume or page numbers in the record or (2) fail to provide record support for the facts asserted in the brief. Instead, such citations point to portions of the trial transcript that do not relate to or support Taylor’s factual assertions or argument, including, in one instance, to a page containing the court reporter’s certification of the transcript. The one accurate and locatable record citation is to a quoted portion of the trial court’s final charge to the jury, which does not reflect any action or inaction alleged to constitute deficient performance on the part of her trial counsel. The inaccurate and irrelevant nature of her record citations means that they provide no support for her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This level of briefing and representation by counsel on appeal thus results in a disservice to her client and falls well below the standard that this Court expects from the counsel who practice before it. 7 which her counsel failed to introduce, but Taylor failed to attach any
proof of those prior convictions to her motion for new trial below, and
because there was no evidentiary hearing on the motion, no other
evidence of the alleged convictions exists in the record.
Accordingly, we conclude that Taylor has failed to demonstrate
that her trial counsel’s performance was deficient because she has
neither pointed us to any specific action taken by her counsel at trial
that she claims was deficient nor identified any instance where her
counsel failed to act when action reasonably was required under
prevailing professional norms. See Sauder v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 816
n. 21 (2024) (“To the extent [appellant] has not identified specific
instances of [his counsel’s] alleged deficiencies, he has not carried
his burden of showing that his lawyer performed deficiently.”); Ward
v. State, 313 Ga. 265, 275 (2022) (holding that appellant failed to
demonstrate ineffectiveness of trial counsel because he did “not
identify any specific instances to support [his] broad allegations”).
See also Taylor, 315 Ga. at 650 (“It is not the function of this Court
to cull the record for a party to find alleged errors or to form
8 arguments on the appellant’s behalf.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Because Taylor failed to carry her burden to show deficient
performance by her trial counsel, we need not address the prejudice
prong of the Strickland test. See Mohamed, 307 Ga. at 93.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.