312 Ga. 1 FINAL COPY
S21A0297. TAYLOR v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Appellant Micayla Christina Taylor, also known as “Cay Cay,”
was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with
the shooting death of Divante Rodriekus Simmons and the
aggravated assault of William Lawton. On appeal, Appellant raises
seven enumerations of error: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient
to support her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying her
motion to suppress; (3) the trial court erred in denying her plea in
bar; (4) the trial court erred in giving the State’s requested charge
on conspiracy over Appellant’s objection; (5) trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to object to prospective Juror No. 44
being struck from the jury panel; (6) trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to object to alleged hearsay
statements given by Jeston Yates; and (7) trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by allowing admission of testimony regarding Appellant’s request to take a polygraph test.1 For the reasons that
follow, we affirm Appellant’s convictions.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed the following. Appellant was
arrested on February 5, 2016, after being implicated in the February
1, 2016 shootings of Lawton and Simmons. The shootings occurred
in Newton County in an area known as “Gum Tree.” According to
Jeston Yates, who lived in the Gum Tree area at the Salem Terrace
Apartments, he encountered Appellant at the apartment complex
around 10:15 a.m. on the morning of February 1. Appellant asked
1 The crimes occurred on February 1, 2016. In April 2016, a Newton County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault (as to Simmons and Lawton), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. In November 2018, a jury found her guilty of felony murder and the two counts of aggravated assault. The jury acquitted Appellant of malice murder and the firearm possession count. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison for the felony murder count and 20 consecutive years for the aggravated assault count as to Lawton. The remaining count of aggravated assault as to Simmons merged with the felony murder count for sentencing purposes. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on December 18, 2018, which she amended through new counsel on July 5, 2019. On July 16, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for new trial. On October 2, 2019, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for new trial. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 31, 2019, and the case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2020 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 Yates where she could sell some marijuana, and he noticed
Appellant had “about five blunts with her,” as well as “a 9” handgun.
After smoking marijuana with Appellant, Yates told Appellant to go
down to Gum Tree Court or Plum Orchard Road, two nearby streets,
to sell the marijuana. Yates testified that around 11:00 a.m.,
Appellant left the apartment complex driving a silver Malibu or
Impala. About five to ten minutes later, Appellant returned, telling
Yates that she went to Gum Tree Court to make a sale but two men
ran off with the marijuana after asking if they could smell it. Yates
testified that he left the apartment complex after this conversation
because he did not want to get involved.
Reginald West and his son, Demarkcus Jones, who was also
known as “Head Head,” testified that the same morning, between
10:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., they were walking to West’s duplex in the
Gum Tree area from another part of the neighborhood. As West
and Jones approached West’s duplex, West noticed a silver Impala
parked in front of the neighbor’s unit. When the two men neared
the driveway, the Impala started to leave but stopped beside West.
3 A man in the driver’s seat said to West, “[S]omebody going to pay.”
West observed that a woman was seated in the front passenger seat
of the vehicle.
Yates testified that about an hour or so later, he was walking
through the Gum Tree area when Appellant’s silver car pulled up
next to him. A man was driving the car, and Appellant was seated
in the passenger seat. They told Yates to get in the car, and when
Yates hesitated, the man drew a gun — the same gun Yates saw
Appellant with earlier that morning. Appellant started giving Yates
a description of the man who stole her marijuana, saying he was
“cross-eyed.” Yates testified that he immediately knew Appellant
was describing Jones because Jones has a damaged eye and is the
only person in the area with an eye like that.2 Appellant then asked
Yates where “Head Head” lived, and Yates said he did not know.
According to Yates, the three started driving around the Gum Tree
area near West’s duplex. Yates heard Appellant call the driver
2 Jones is blind in his left eye and has visible damage to that eye caused
by a childhood accident. 4 “Plug,” which Yates knew to mean her drug dealer or supplier. The
man driving the car told Yates that he and Appellant were “going to
handle some business” and “make an example out of them boys down
there that night,” and “they were going to go riding tonight until
they find who did it.” At around 1:00 p.m., they dropped off Yates
on Plum Orchard Road.
According to West, later that afternoon between 2:30 p.m. and
4:30 p.m., he was standing outside his duplex with his other son,
Reggie, and he saw a silver Impala driving up and down the street
multiple times. At some point during this timeframe, the car pulled
into West’s driveway. The same man and woman from the earlier
encounter were inside the vehicle, and the man said to West and
Reggie, “I know y’all ain’t got nothing to do with this, but when I
come back, they going to have to pay, give me my money.”
Tobias Dickerson, a resident of the Salem Terrace Apartments,
also testified at trial. According to Dickerson, at approximately 5:30
p.m. on the same day, he was walking up a path from Plum Orchard
Road to the Salem Terrace Apartments with his young daughter. As
5 they entered the apartment complex parking lot, Dickerson saw a
gray or silver Impala parked nearby — a car he had seen at the
complex most of the day. A man was standing outside the driver’s
side of the car, and a woman was standing on the passenger side.
As Dickerson and his daughter approached, the woman pointed a
handgun — a “.40-caliber” or a “baby 9” — at them, asking “[W]here
he go, where he go?” Dickerson responded that he did not know what
she was talking about, and the woman ran to the other side of the
apartment complex. Dickerson rushed his daughter into his
apartment and came back outside to confront the woman “because
she drawed down on [him] and [his] daughter.” When he came back
outside, the car sped out of the complex. Dickerson then walked to
his mother’s house on Plum Orchard Road, and while he was
standing in the yard, he saw the silver Impala driving up and down
the street eight or nine times.
Yates testified that about two hours later, between 7:00 p.m.
and 7:30 p.m., he was outside a house on Plum Orchard Road and
saw a silver car driving slowly up and down the road. Yates noticed
6 that the car looked like the one he had ridden in earlier in the day
with Appellant, and he observed that the same man was driving the
car, holding a gun.
West and Jones testified that about 8:30 that evening, they
were with their friends Lawton and Simmons at Lawton’s home on
Gum Tree Court. According to West and Lawton, at around 10:00
p.m., a silver or gray Impala turned down Gum Tree Court, drove
past Lawton’s house, turned around in the cul-de-sac at the end of
the street, and drove back up the street. The men testified that as
the Impala neared Lawton’s house again, multiple gunshots were
fired from the vehicle. Lawton said that Simmons pulled him to the
ground behind a car parked in front of the house. West stated he
also got down and slammed Jones to the ground. Jones testified that
he could see “fire” coming up off the ground where the bullets were
hitting the parking area. One of the bullets struck Lawton in his
left bicep. Lawton testified that after the shooting stopped, he got
up to go inside his house but noticed that Simmons was still on the
ground. The men then realized Simmons had been shot.
7 Officers responded to the shootings at approximately 10:30
p.m. They observed Simmons lying on the ground, apparently
deceased. They spoke briefly with Lawton and assisted in applying
a tourniquet to his arm. The officers recovered multiple shell
casings from a .40-caliber weapon located in the immediate vicinity
and along the road.3 When the ambulance arrived, emergency
personnel confirmed Simmons was deceased. The ambulance
transported Lawton to the hospital where he was treated and
released.
A few days after the shootings, Dickerson, West, and Yates
were interviewed by officers. During these interviews, officers
presented the men with photographic lineups and asked if they
recognized anyone matching the appearance of the woman they
encountered on February 1. Dickerson selected a photograph of
Appellant and also identified her at trial. West circled a photograph
of Appellant, but indicated that he was not sure she was the woman
he encountered on February 1. However, West positively identified
3 Officers never recovered the handgun used in the shootings.
8 Appellant at trial. Yates could not identify anyone in the
photographs presented to him, but at trial, he identified Appellant
as the woman who asked him where she could sell marijuana, had a
gun in her possession, and was riding in the silver car.
Appellant was arrested on February 5 and interviewed by
Investigator Jocelyn Detweiler and Corporal Charles Cook. The
interview lasted approximately four hours. At the beginning of the
interview, Appellant agreed to waive her Miranda4 rights and give
a statement to the officers.
During the first few minutes of the interview, Appellant told
the officers that on the day of the shootings, she “did try to go
purchase some weed” in the Gum Tree neighborhood and “somebody
did steal from” her. She also told the officers that she was “driving
around the neighborhood in the day time” in a silver Impala looking
for “Head Head.” The officers then asked her to describe Head Head,
and Appellant responded, “He got messed up eyes.” When the
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)
(1966).
9 officers asked for more details about the events surrounding the
robbery, Appellant stated:
I went to go purchase some weed, I’m gonna be honest, earlier that day. And, he ended up taking it from me. Like, he stole from me. So I just let it go, like, I just roll — at first, I did ride around the neighborhood. I’m not gonna lie. I rolled around the neighborhood. I’m, like, have you all seen — you all seen a dude?
One of the officers then inquired as to what Appellant was
planning to do once she found Head Head, and Appellant responded
that she was “gonna try to get [the marijuana] back,” “was going to
chase after him,” and “[b]eat him up or something.” Appellant also
told the officers that “J” was in the car with her the whole time,
indicating “J” was her “plug” or supplier. Appellant then stated that
around 2:00 or 3:00 p.m., she and “J” drove over to the Salem Terrace
Apartments to find Yates to get the name of the man who had stolen
the marijuana from her. Appellant said she described the man to
Yates and said he had “cock eyes,” and Yates told her the man’s
name was “Head Head.” Appellant said she, “J,” and Yates then
rode around Gum Tree to see if Yates could show them where Head
10 Head lived, but Yates “act like he ain’t know where he live. He was
just pointing.” She said they dropped off Yates after that. Appellant
told the officers that she returned to the Gum Tree area throughout
the day looking for Head Head because she wanted to “get [her] sack
back,” and if she saw Head Head “with [her] stuff,” she was “going
to beat him up.”
2. Appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support her convictions because the State “simply
cobbled together circumstantial evidence and the testimony of
insufficient and unreliable witnesses” to show that “Appellant was
somehow involved in the shooting in the Gum Tree neighborhood
that evening.” See OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant a conviction on
circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent
with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). Appellant claims
that while the evidence may have established that on February 1,
she was robbed of marijuana and was riding around in a silver or
gray Impala in the Gum Tree area, no evidence was presented by
11 the State to place her at the actual scene of the homicide or in
possession of the murder weapon or to show that the silver or gray
Impala in which she was riding was the same one at the scene of the
shootings that night.
However, the evidence presented at trial established that the
vehicle in which Appellant was riding on February 1 was the same
make, model, and color as the one driven by the assailant during the
shootings. Furthermore, several witnesses saw Appellant with a
handgun before the shootings, and Yates saw the same handgun in
possession of the man driving Appellant’s car. Testimony at trial
also showed that for most of the day on February 1, Appellant was
looking for “Head Head” — the man who allegedly stole marijuana
from her — and Appellant’s own statements to officers
demonstrated that when she found Head Head, she intended to
retaliate for the theft.
It is the jury’s role to resolve conflicts in the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. Questions as to the reasonableness of hypotheses are generally to be decided by the jury which heard the evidence and where the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though
12 circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, that finding will not be disturbed unless the verdict of guilty is insupportable as a matter of law.
Smith v. State, 280 Ga. 161, 162 (1) (625 SE2d 766) (2006) (citations
and punctuation omitted).
Here, the State presented evidence that Appellant had a
motive for the shootings, that Jones was with the victims at the time
of the shootings, that a car matching the description of Appellant’s
was involved in the shootings, and that Appellant had a handgun
with her and in her vicinity during the day of the shootings, which
authorized the jury to find that she was at least a party to the
crimes. See id. See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (defining “parties to a
crime”). Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to exclude every
other reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt and to enable a
rational trier of fact to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crimes of which she was convicted. See Smith, 280 Ga.
at 162.
Appellant also contends that no rational trier of fact could have
13 found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the commission of the
alleged crimes under the constitutional standard set forth in
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979). Properly viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdicts, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a jury
to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of
which she was convicted under the Jackson standard. See id. See
also Boyd v. State, 306 Ga. 204, 207 (1) (830 SE2d 160) (2019).
3. Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying
her motion to suppress a portion of the statements she made during
her February 5 custodial interview with Investigator Detweiler and
Corporal Cook. An audio recording of the interview was introduced
at a pretrial Jackson-Denno5 hearing and played for the court.6
As noted above, early in the interview, after knowingly and
voluntarily waiving her rights under Miranda, Appellant told the
5 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
6 A written transcript of the interview was also introduced at the hearing
and admitted during trial.
14 officers that she was in the Gum Tree area to sell marijuana on
February 1; that a man named Head Head stole her marijuana; and
that she was driving around Gum Tree in a silver Impala looking for
Head Head to beat him up and get the marijuana back. After
making these admissions, about two hours into the interview,
Appellant asked the officers:
APPELLANT: I have a right to a — do I have a right to a lawyer or not? Do I need a — I need an attorney? DETWEILER: Do you need an attorney? APPELLANT: I mean, no, because I’m telling you all what happened. . . . COOK: So you still want to keep talking to us? APPELLANT: Huh? COOK: You confusing me. You still want to keep talking with us? APPELLANT: I mean, is it a waste of time? DETWEILER: At — no. COOK: Cay Cay, only you know that. DETWEILER: Yeah. COOK: And I just need to hear it from you, that you want to just keep talking with us and keep moving forward. Because, listen, I wasn’t – you know where I was? I was at home in bed. Cause I was sick that day. I ain’t going to tell you no story about it. I can tell you exactly what I was doing. APPELLANT: Okay. COOK: I was at home in the bed, sweetheart. APPELLANT: All right. Well, I’m just going to be 100 then.
15 COOK: Please. APPELLANT: All right. So from the — DETWEILER: Just — APPELLANT: Just hold on. Just let me talk.
(Emphasis added.)
The interview resumed, and Appellant told the officers again
that on the day of the shootings, she was driving around Gum Tree
looking for Head Head because she was going to “chase after him”
until she got her marijuana back. Then, about 30 minutes after the
exchange quoted above, the following exchange occurred:
COOK: Describe [your plug] good to us. APPELLANT: Naw. I need my attorney. DETWEILER: Okay. You wish to not speak with us at this time? APPELLANT: I mean, you all going to try and put a murder on me, and I didn’t commit. DETWEILER: Do you wish to not speak with us at this time? APPELLANT: I mean, I’ll — I keep talking. Man, I didn’t – DETWEILER: Are you sure? COOK: Go over it again to make sure. DETWEILER: All right now. APPELLANT: What? DETWEILER: It’s all right. APPELLANT: So what? DETWEILER: So I’ll let them go into the thing (inaudible).
16 APPELLANT: So what? . . . COOK: What we got to do now, Cay Cay, is you — you requested an attorney but then you said you wanted to keep talking. We got to review these again. APPELLANT: For real? DETWEILER: Yeah. You ready?
At this point, the investigators reviewed Appellant’s Miranda
rights, and Appellant signed the corresponding waiver form and
agreed to continue speaking with the investigators. During the
remainder of the interview, Appellant reiterated that on the day of
the shootings, she was looking for Head Head in the Gum Tree area
to get her marijuana back, but she did not have a weapon and was
not involved in or present when the shootings occurred. She told the
officers that she “let it go,” and she “didn’t go shoot nobody.”
Appellant contends that the two statements emphasized above
unequivocally invoked her right to counsel, and thus, the
interrogation should have stopped until an attorney was made
available to her or until she reinitiated the conversation with the
officers. See State v. Estrada, 300 Ga. 199, 201 (794 SE2d 103)
17 (2016) (“When a defendant invokes his right to counsel, all
interrogation is to cease until such time as an attorney is made
available or until such time as the defendant reinitiates
conversation with law enforcement and waives his right to having
counsel present.” (emphasis omitted)). Appellant argues that
because the interrogation did not cease after she invoked her right
to counsel, her subsequent statements should have been suppressed
at trial, and the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this
Court must affirm the trial court’s findings on disputed facts unless
clearly erroneous.” Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 241 (765 SE2d 896)
(2014). Here, however, there are no disputed facts, given that
Appellant’s custodial interview was captured in an audio recording
that is part of the appellate record. See id. “Accordingly, our review
of the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts is
de novo.” Id. at 242.
A suspect who asks for a lawyer at any time during a custodial interrogation may not be subjected to further questioning by law enforcement until an attorney has
18 been made available or until the suspect reinitiates the conversation. If the police persist in questioning a suspect who has requested that counsel be present, any resulting statements made by the suspect are inadmissible in the State’s case-in-chief. In order for a suspect to properly invoke his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation, he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.
Dubose v. State, 294 Ga. 579, 582 (2) (755 SE2d 174) (2014) (citations
and punctuation omitted). See also Willis v. State, 287 Ga. 703, 704
(1) (699 SE2d 1) (2010). However,
[a]n invocation must be clear and unambiguous; the mere mention of the word “attorney” or “lawyer” without more, does not automatically invoke the right to counsel. If the defendant makes reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, cessation of the questioning is not required.
Dubose, 294 Ga. at 582 (citations and punctuation omitted;
emphasis in original).
In this case, Appellant’s first reference to a lawyer — “I have a
right to a — do I have a right to a lawyer or not? Do I need a — I
need an attorney?” — was not an “unequivocal and unambiguous
19 request[ ] to have counsel present during interrogation.” Lee v.
State, 306 Ga. 663, 668 (3) (832 SE2d 851) (2019). See also United
States v. Wysinger, 683 F3d 784, 795 (II) (A) (7th Cir. 2012) (holding
that defendant’s initial question — “Do I need a lawyer before we
start talking?” — “was not an unequivocal request for a lawyer and
[law enforcement] was not required to cease the interrogation at
that point.”); Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F3d 557, 573-574 (III) (4th
Cir. 1999) (concluding that the defendant’s question, “Do you think
I need an attorney here?,” which was posed to the police officer
during interrogation, was an ambiguous “query whether his
interrogator thought that counsel might be helpful” and not “a clear
assertion of his right to counsel” (emphasis omitted). “When a
defendant makes an equivocal reference to counsel, as [Appellant]
did here, interviewing officers are not always required to clarify the
request, but they can.” Lee, 306 Ga. at 668. After Appellant made
the equivocal and ambiguous statement inquiring whether she
needed an attorney, the officers “reasonably sought clarification” of
Appellant’s statement, asking several times if Appellant wanted to
20 keep talking to them. See id. Appellant clearly indicated that she
did want to keep talking to the officers. Accordingly, at this point,
Appellant did not unambiguously invoke her right to counsel.
Turning now to Appellant’s second reference to counsel during
the interview, the recording reflects that when officers asked
Appellant for a more detailed description of her plug, “J,” she
responded, “Naw. I need my attorney.” Assuming without deciding
that this statement was an unequivocal invocation of Appellant’s
right to counsel and that the officers’ subsequent questions violated
her Fifth Amendment right to counsel, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (101 SCt 1880, 68 LE2d 378) (1981), the trial court’s error
in admitting the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because in the remainder of the interview, the information elicited
from Appellant was cumulative of other statements she made earlier
in the interview when she had been advised of her Miranda rights
and had not yet made any reference to counsel. See Frazier v. State,
278 Ga. 297, 298 (4) (602 SE2d 588) (2004) (“Because [the
defendant’s] custodial statement merely repeated what he had
21 earlier told his aunt and admitted in his non-custodial statement to
the first officer on the scene, admission of the custodial statement
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt even assuming, arguendo,
that officers during that interrogation failed to scrupulously honor
[the defendant’s] right to remain silent.”). See also Ensslin v. State,
308 Ga. 462, 472 (2) (d) (841 SE2d 676) (2020) (in conducting
harmless error analysis after concluding that the appellant invoked
his right to remain silent, this Court held “it is clear that the
challenged statements were cumulative of [a]ppellant’s testimony
admitting that he killed [the victim] but claiming self-defense,
rendering their admission harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
Additionally, throughout the entire interview, Appellant
consistently denied any involvement in the shootings or knowledge
of whom the perpetrator was. For these reasons, even assuming the
trial court erred in admitting the challenged statements at trial, this
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ensslin, 308 Ga.
at 474.
4. Appellant’s next contention alleges error by the trial court
22 in denying her plea in bar. On August 18, 2018, Appellant filed a
plea in bar, asserting that her constitutional right to a speedy trial
had been violated because, following her indictment, the trial of her
case was continued from multiple trial calendars, primarily at the
State’s request. The trial court denied Appellant’s plea in bar,
determining that the delay in trial was not excessive; that both
parties contributed to the delay and each party had specific reasons
for the requested continuances; that the Appellant’s right to a
speedy trial was not asserted until the plea in bar was filed; and that
no prejudice to Appellant had been shown. On appeal, Appellant
contends that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous because at the
time she filed her plea in bar, the delay in her trial had been over 30
months, which “clearly harmed her.” We see no clear error in the
trial court’s factual findings or any abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s weighing of the factors and decision to reject Appellant’s
speedy trial claim. See Cash v. State, 307 Ga. 510, 513 (2) (837 SE2d
280) (2019).
(a) Threshold inquiry.
23 Courts examining an alleged denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial first must consider whether the interval between the defendant’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation and the trial is sufficiently long so as to be characterized as presumptively prejudicial. If the delay is long enough to invoke the presumption of prejudice, the trial court must balance four factors: (1) whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long, (2) whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay, (3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether [s]he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.
Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-533 (92 SCt 2182, 33
LE2d 101) (1972); Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (112
SCt 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992)). “The trial court’s weighing of each
factor and its balancing of all four factors — its ultimate judgment
— are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion.” State v.
Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 526 (2) (a) (705 SE2d 636) (2011).
The trial court determined that the pretrial delay in
Appellant’s case was 30 months — Appellant was arrested in
February 2016, filed her plea in bar in August 2018, and was tried
in November 2018. Appellant does not contest that the trial court
accurately calculated this delay. The trial court properly held that
24 the pretrial delay was presumptively prejudicial, and the court
proceeded to consider and weigh the Barker factors. See Barker, 407
U.S. at 530-533. On appeal, Appellant argues that she was deprived
of her right to a speedy trial due to the continuances that delayed
her trial, which were predominantly the fault of the government.
The following continuances are reflected in the record: (1) at
Appellant’s request, the trial court granted a continuance of the
June 2016 pretrial motions and status hearing; (2) at the joint
request of both parties, the trial court granted a continuance of the
pretrial motions hearings scheduled for August 2016 and September
2016; (3) the trial court rescheduled the pretrial motions hearing on
March 2017 due to its own conflict; (4) the case appeared on the trial
court’s October 2017 trial calendar, but was continued at the State’s
request because Yates, one of the State’s witnesses, had absconded;
(5) Appellant’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw in January 2018,
which was granted by the trial court on January 30, 2018;7 (6)
7 Appellant’s private attorney withdrew because Appellant was no longer
able to pay for her representation, and new counsel was then appointed by the trial court. 25 Appellant’s new counsel requested a continuance from the February
2018 and April 2018 trial calendars to allow counsel to review the
file and prepare for trial, and the trial court granted the requests;
(7) the case appeared on the trial court’s September 2018 trial
calendar, but was continued to November 2018 at the State’s request
for the State to locate Yates; and (8) the trial court ordered that the
trial would proceed in November 2018 with or without the State’s
witnesses. The trial went forward in November 2018.
(b) The Barker Factors.
(i) Length of the Delay.
As noted above, Appellant does not contest that the length of
the delay was properly calculated by the trial court as 30 months.
In considering this time period, the trial court held that the delay
was not uncommonly long given the nature of the charges and the
time period required for investigation. However, the trial court held
that the length of delay should be weighed against the State, as the
delay amounted to a “little less than three years” from the time of
Appellant’s arrest to her trial. On appeal, neither party contests the
26 trial court’s conclusion, and we conclude that the trial court properly
weighed the length of the delay against the State. See Porter, 288
Ga. at 527.
(ii) Reasons for the Delay.
The trial court considered the reasons for the delay in
Appellant’s trial and noted that they included requests for
continuances by both parties. The trial court thus attributed the
delays to the State and Appellant, and we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in weighing this factor neutrally.
See Robinson v. State, 287 Ga. 265, 268 (1) (b) (695 SE2d 201) (2010)
(concluding that, “in balancing all of the reasons for the delay that
[we]re attributable to the State against those that [we]re
attributable to the defendant[ ], this Barker factor ultimately
remains neutral”).
(iii) Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial.
The trial court weighed the third factor against Appellant
because she waited 30 months to file a plea in bar asserting her right
27 to a speedy trial. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
conclusion that this factor should be weighed against Appellant. See
Cash, 307 Ga. at 518 (“We do not see an abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s conclusion that [the defendant’s] failure to assert the
right sooner weighed against him.”).
(iv) Prejudice.
The trial court found that Appellant failed to satisfy her burden
of showing she was prejudiced by the pretrial delay and failed to
demonstrate actual prejudice, and thus, this factor did not weigh in
Appellant’s favor. See id. at 518-519. On appeal, while Appellant
generally asserts that her defense was prejudiced, she does not
explain how or provide any concrete basis for this assertion, such as
an inability to prepare her defense, the loss of any witnesses, and/or
any impairment to her defense. See Porter, 288 Ga. at 529 (“The
types of prejudice associated with an unreasonable delay before trial
include oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the
accused, and the possibility that the accused’s defense will be
28 impaired by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.”
(citation and punctuation omitted)). The trial court did not clearly
err in finding that Appellant did not demonstrate actual prejudice
from the delay of her case or abuse its discretion by failing to weigh
the prejudice prong in Appellant’s favor. See Cash, 307 Ga. at 520.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that Appellant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated
and denying her plea in bar.
5. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury on conspiracy. During the charge conference, the State
requested that the trial court charge the jury on conspiracy, and the
trial court advised that it would give the Suggested Pattern Jury
Instructions on conspiracy and party to a crime. Appellant objected
to the conspiracy instruction — both at the conclusion of the charge
conference and again after the trial court finished reading the
instructions to the jury. On appeal, Appellant contends that because
conspiracy was not the theory under which she was charged and
because the evidence did not support a conspiracy charge in this
29 case, it was error for the trial court to charge the jury on conspiracy
over Appellant’s objection. We disagree.
It is not error to charge on the subject of conspiracy when the evidence tends to show a conspiracy, even if a conspiracy is not alleged in the indictment. The State may prove a conspiracy by showing that two or more persons tacitly came to a mutual understanding to pursue a criminal objective. And the conspiracy may be inferred from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interest of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances.
Smith v. State, 306 Ga. 753, 758 (2) (833 SE2d 117) (2019) (citations
and punctuation omitted). “And, only slight evidence is necessary
to warrant a charge on the subject of conspiracy.” Id.
Here, more than slight evidence supported giving a conspiracy
instruction to the jury. This evidence included testimony from
several witnesses who observed Appellant and a man, whom
Appellant referred to as her “plug” or drug supplier, in the Gum Tree
area at various points during the day on February 1, 2016, riding in
a silver or gray Impala and searching for the man who allegedly
stole Appellant’s marijuana. Appellant and her associate were also
seen with a handgun, with which they threatened both Yates and
30 Dickerson. The gunshots that caused Simmons’s death and
Lawton’s injuries were fired from a silver or gray Impala matching
the description of the car in which Appellant and her associate were
traveling. Appellant admitted to police officers that she and her
“plug” were looking for the man who stole her marijuana and
intended to harm the suspected offender — “Head Head” — when
they found him, and Jones was with Simmons and Lawton at the
time of the shootings. This evidence constituted the “slight
evidence” needed for the trial court to charge the jury on conspiracy,
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. See id.
6. In Appellant’s next three enumerations of error, she
contends that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in
regard to the following: (a) failing to object to a prospective juror
being struck prior to voir dire; (b) failing to object to alleged hearsay
statements given by Yates; and (c) allowing the admission of
testimony regarding Appellant’s request to take a polygraph test.
We will address each contention in turn, applying the constitutional
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104
31 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Appellant must show “both that counsel’s performance was
deficient, and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to h[er]
defense.” Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2) (782 SE2d 245)
(2016). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (III). To show deficient
performance, Appellant must “overcome the strong presumption
that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable
professional conduct, and that counsel’s decisions were made in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Lockhart, 298 Ga. at
385 (citation and punctuation omitted).
The reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is examined from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial and under the particular circumstances of the case, and decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 31, 37 (2)
(d) (597 SE2d 386) (2004) (“As a general rule, matters of reasonable
trial tactics and strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to
32 ineffective assistance of counsel,” and “[a] reviewing court evaluates
trial counsel’s performance from counsel’s perspective at the time of
trial.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). To show prejudice under
the Strickland test, Appellant must show that “there is a reasonable
probability that, absent any unprofessional errors on counsel’s part,
the result of h[er] trial would have been different.” Lockhart, 298
Ga. at 385 (citation omitted).
“An appellant must prove both prongs of the Strickland test,
and if [s]he fails to prove one prong, it is not incumbent upon this
Court to examine the other prong.” Winters v. State, 305 Ga. 226,
230 (4) (824 SE2d 306) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).
“In reviewing either component of the inquiry, all factual findings
by the trial court will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.” Id. See
also Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586 SE2d 313) (2003) (“We
accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently
apply the legal principles to the facts.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
33 (a) Appellant first contends that her trial counsel failed to
provide effective assistance in regard to the striking of a potential
juror prior to voir dire. As shown by the record, prior to jury
selection, the trial court excused prospective Juror No. 44 because
there was a warrant outstanding for her arrest, and she was taken
into custody. The trial court advised the parties on the record of this
juror’s excusal and asked if there was any objection. The prosecutor
responded, “None,” and defense counsel responded, “I guess not. I
would have taken her.” The trial court inquired further, “But no
objection as far as the record?” Defense counsel responded, “There
is not, Judge.”
On appeal, Appellant contends that Juror No. 44 was
improperly excused by the trial court, and Appellant’s trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to inquire into or object to this juror’s
removal. During the hearing on Appellant’s motion for new trial,
trial counsel was asked about her decision not to object to the
removal of this juror, as well as her comment that she would have
taken the juror. She testified that her comment, “I would have taken
34 her,” was “probably meant somewhat facetiously” because she did
not have “any information on that juror,” and her understanding
was that the juror was taken into custody and was unavailable for
jury selection. In denying Appellant’s motion for new trial, the trial
court determined that trial counsel’s decision not to make a
meritless objection to the removal of Juror No. 44 was strategic and
not constitutionally deficient.
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct fell
within the wide range of what is reasonable, and Appellant bears
the burden to show that her counsel’s actions were “patently
unreasonable.” Lockhart, 298 Ga. at 386. The evidence brought
forth during the motion for new trial hearing shows that Appellant’s
trial counsel pursued a reasonable strategy in deciding not to object
to the dismissal of Juror No. 44 because the juror was in custody and
unavailable for jury service. See id. (“Decisions regarding which
jurors to strike and which to accept are questions of trial strategy.”).
We conclude that Appellant failed to show deficient performance
under Strickland, and thus, this ineffective assistance of counsel
35 claim fails.
(b) Appellant next contends that her trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to object to alleged hearsay statements from
Yates, one of the State’s key witnesses at trial. During the State’s
direct examination of Yates, he testified about statements made to
him by Shanteria Hicks, a friend of Appellant’s, who was supposedly
with Appellant on the morning of the shootings. Yates repeated
statements Hicks supposedly made regarding the events
surrounding the theft of Appellant’s marijuana, such as where the
theft happened and who committed it. Appellant contends that: (1)
this testimony was inadmissible hearsay because Hicks did not
testify at trial; (2) no exception to the hearsay rule applied to permit
these statements to be introduced through Yates; and (3) trial
counsel therefore should have objected to the admission of this
testimony.
At the hearing on Appellant’s motion for new trial, when trial
counsel was questioned about her failure to object to Yates’s hearsay
testimony, trial counsel explained that she did not expect Yates to
36 testify about Hicks’s statements, and the testimony caught her “off-
guard.” Trial counsel also indicated that she knew she could
impeach Yates with information showing that Hicks was
incarcerated on the day of the shootings and could not have been
present to make these statements to Yates. In the trial court’s order
denying Appellant’s motion for new trial, the trial court found that
Appellant failed to demonstrate that her trial counsel’s performance
fell below the broad range of professional conduct because her
decision not to object was not a “professionally unreasonable choice,
particularly in considering that she was aware that she could
potentially impeach the witness concerning the remarks made.”
The trial court also found that Appellant failed to establish any
prejudice.
At trial, trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined Yates and
impeached him with information showing Hicks was incarcerated on
the day of the shootings. Officers also testified to Hicks’s
incarceration on that day. Trial counsel used this evidence in her
closing argument to argue to the jury that Yates should not be
37 believed. In addition, the State elicited testimony from Yates about
the statements Appellant made to him following the robbery and
about Yates’s own interactions with Appellant that day. Appellant
also admitted in her custodial interview that she had been robbed of
marijuana, and she described the man who robbed her and where it
occurred.
Thus, even if we assume without deciding that Yates’s
testimony at issue was inadmissible hearsay, the admission of these
statements was not prejudicial because the testimony was
cumulative of other evidence that was properly admitted at trial and
was used to impeach Yates. See Carter v. State, 310 Ga. 559, 565 (2)
(b) (852 SE2d 542) (2020). “In short, this testimony was not
detrimental to Appellant.” Id.
(c) Finally, Appellant contends that her trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to object to testimony about
Appellant’s initial refusal and later offer to take a polygraph test.
Appellant’s claim fails.
As previously noted, the recording of Appellant’s February 5,
38 2016 custodial interview was introduced at trial. During this
interview, officers questioned Appellant about whether she wanted
to take a polygraph test. Appellant initially declined to take a
polygraph test, but later in the interview, she told the officers they
could “polygraph” her. At trial, one of the officers testified about this
exchange and indicated they decided not to give Appellant a
polygraph test. During closing arguments, Appellant’s trial counsel
pointed to the officers’ failure to obtain a polygraph test from
Appellant to support the argument that they failed to conduct a
thorough investigation in this case.
On appeal, Appellant contends that her trial counsel should
have objected to the admission of testimony regarding the polygraph
test and requested that the related portions of Appellant’s custodial
interview be redacted. Appellant argues that because the results of
a polygraph test are not admissible at trial unless stipulated to by
Appellant, her trial counsel’s decision to allow these references to a
potential polygraph test to be admitted was deficient performance.
See State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 76-77 (239 SE2d 324) (1977). We
39 disagree.
At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that
her decision not to object to the polygraph test references was
strategic. Trial counsel explained that it allowed her to argue to the
jury that Appellant explicitly asked law enforcement officers to give
her a polygraph test, and they elected not to do so. In denying
Appellant’s motion for new trial, the trial court found that trial
counsel made a reasonable and strategic decision to allow this
evidence to be admitted to further the defense’s theory of inadequate
investigation by law enforcement officers. The trial court also found
that Appellant failed to present any evidence to show prejudice or
that the outcome of the trial would have been different had this
testimony been omitted.
The trial court’s rulings were supported by the record and trial
counsel’s rationale for allowing the evidence to be admitted. Trial
counsel testified that she made this decision as part of her trial
strategy, and “in order to show deficient performance of trial counsel
in regard to trial strategy, an appellant must demonstrate that
40 counsel’s decision was so patently unreasonable that no competent
attorney would have made it under the circumstances at the time.”
Clark v. State, 300 Ga. 899, 903 (1) (b) (799 SE2d 200) (2017). We
conclude that Appellant failed to meet the burden of showing that
her trial counsel was constitutionally deficient because the record
shows that her trial counsel’s decision not to move to exclude the
statements about the polygraph test was a reasonable strategy. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. See also Clark, 300 Ga. at 903 (“The
fact that [Appellant] and [her] present counsel may now find fault
with the strategy and tactics employed at trial does not support a
finding that trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance to
[Appellant].”). Therefore, this enumeration of error fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
41 Decided June 21, 2021.
Murder. Newton Superior Court. Before Judge Benton.
Jennifer F. Arndt, for appellant.
Randal M. McGinley, Acting District Attorney, W. Cliff
Howard, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General,
Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Alex M.
Bernick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.