Taylor v. People of the Venue of the Foreign United States of America

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: March 9, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-3967
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ERIC EMMANUEL TAYLOR, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03967 (UNA) ) PEOPLE OF THE VENUE OF THE ) FOREIGN UNITED STATES ) OF AMERICA, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and

Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Court grants the IFP Application,

and for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses this matter without prejudice.

Plaintiff, who holds himself out as an “independent regulatory agent” sues “all the people

of the venue of the domestic United States.” See Compl. at 1. The allegations are rambling and

largely incomprehensible, comprised of esoteric ruminations on assorted legal authority and

regarding another case that he filed in this District, Taylor v. Trump, et al., 20-mc-00001 (UNA)

(“Taylor I”), which was dismissed as frivolous on June 12, 2020, see id. at Memorandum, ECF

No. 4; Dismissal Order, ECF No. 5. See id. at 1–9; Compl. Exhibit 1 (Taylor I Dkt. Sheet), ECF

No. 1-1. The relief sought is not entirely clear, but it appears that Plaintiff, somehow, demands

“default and summary judgment.” See Compl. at 8.

Pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch,

656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction

[and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d

661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of

the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and

determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498

(D.D.C. 1977).

When a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor

concisely stated,” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. Dist. of Columbia, 319

F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 17-7021, 2017

WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). Put differently, “[a] confused and rambling narrative of

charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort

Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s Complaint

falls squarely into this category. It is vague and haphazard, comprised of a hodgepodge of

anecdotes, failing to establish the duty, if any, of the Defendant, to afford him relief; indeed, it is

unclear who Plaintiff is even suing. The Complaint also fails to establish this Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction. Insofar as Plaintiff challenges the outcome of Taylor I, he may not do so by

filing a separate civil complaint, and the Court notes that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.

Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Taylor I on November 9, 2020. See Taylor I Dkt. at Mandate,

ECF No. 10.

For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order accompanies

this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: March 9, 2026

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge