Taylor v. New City Police Department

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided January 8, 2024·No. 1:23-cv-10324·Unknown

Opinion

USDC SDNY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT casaexivevnne SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOC #: DATE FILED:_1/8/2024 PHILLIP TAYLOR SR., Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-10324 (JHR) NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT; POLICE OFFICER YESENIA RENGEL OF 44 ORDER OF SERVICE PRECINCT; JOHN DOE POLICE OFFICER; NYC HEALTH+HOSPITALS/JACOBI KIRK ROBINSON, Defendants. JENNIFER H. REARDEN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights in connection with a traffic stop and subsequent trip to New York City Healtht+Hospitals/Jacobi Hospital in the Bronx on November 20, 2020. By Order dated November 29, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. The Court directs service on the Individual Defendants Police Officer Yesenia Rengel and Jacobi Hospital employee Kirk Robinson. For the reasons discussed below, the Court also dismisses all claims except Plaintiff’s claims against Rengel and Robinson in their individual capacities. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits: To state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79

(2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. at 678. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. DISCUSSION A. New York Police Department Plaintiff’s claims against the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“All actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he NYPD is a non-suable agency of the City.”); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). Here, Plaintiff has attempted to assert a claim against the NYPD. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against NYPD.

B. Unidentified “John Doe” Police Officer “Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying a defendant.” Williams v. City of New York, No. 23-CV-2700 (JPO), 2023 WL 3511431, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2023) (citing Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997)). In the complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit the New York City Law Department and the NYPD to identify the John Doe police officer assigned to the NYPD’s 44th Precinct who was involved in the events in the complaint that Plaintiff states occurred in Bronx County, beginning at approximately 10:30 p.m. on November 21, 2020 and served as Officer Rengel’s partner on that day. ECF No. 1 at 4. It is therefore ordered that the New York City Law Department, which is the attorney for and agent of the NYPD, ascertain the identity

and badge number of the unidentified “John Doe” police officer whom Plaintiff seeks to sue, as well as the addresses where he or she may be served. The New York City Law Department must provide this information to Plaintiff and the Court within sixty days of the date of this Order. Within thirty days of receiving this information, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint naming the newly identified defendants. The amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the original complaint. An amended complaint form that Plaintiff should complete is attached to this Order. Once Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint, the Court will screen the amended complaint and, if necessary, issue an order directing the Clerk of Court to complete the USM-285 forms with the addresses for the newly named defendants and deliver all documents necessary to effect service on those defendants to the U.S. Marshals Service. C. Order of Service Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service.1 Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6

(2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants Police Officer Yesenia Rengel and New York City Health+Hospitals/Jacobi Hospital employee Kirk Robinson through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to complete a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for Defendants.

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