Taylor v. . Lee

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Taylor v. . Lee

121 S.E. 659, 187 N.C. 393, 1924 N.C. LEXIS 295

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedMarch 12, 1924

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 121 S.E. 659 (Taylor v. . Lee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Taylor v. . Lee, 121 S.E. 659, 187 N.C. 393, 1924 N.C. LEXIS 295 (N.C. 1924).

Pincite

Opinion

Stacy, J.

Appellant’s chief exception, as stressed on tbe argument and in bis brief, is tbe one addressed to tbe refusal of tbe court to' grant bis motion for judgment as of nonsuit, made first at tbe close of plaintiffs’ evidence and renewed at tbe close of all tbe evidence, and based upon tbe ground that appellant’s special promise to plaintiff, which was not in writing, was to answer for tbe debt, default or miscarriage of bis codefendant Parker, and was therefore void under tbe statute of frauds. O. S., 987.

It was in evidence that tbe defendants, Lee and Parker, landlord and tenant respectively, went to tbe plaintiffs’ store and made arrangements with them whereby tbe plaintiffs were to furnish tbe defendant Parker with certain supplies during tbe year .1920. Plaintiffs understood that Lee was to be responsible for whatever Parker bought. He said to *394 the plaintiffs: “Mr. Parker will be on our land this year and you sell him anything he wants and I will see it paid.” Almost this identical language was held in Whitehurst v. Padgett, 157 N. C., 424, to be sufficient to warrant a finding that the promise was an original one and not within the statute of frauds, if made at the time or. before the debt was created, upon sufficient consideration, and credit was given thereon solely to the promissor or to both promissors as principals, or if the promise were based upon a new consideration of benefit or harm passing between the promissor and the creditor, or if the promise were for the benefit of the promissor and he had a personal, immediate and pecuniary interest in the transaction in which a third party was the original obligor. See Peele v. Powell, 156 N. C., 553, and cases there cited.

In the instant case there was no exception to the charge, and we think the case was properly submitted to the jury. The verdict as rendered was warranted by the evidence.

No error.

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Stacy, J.

Appellant’s chief exception, as stressed on tbe argument and in bis brief, is tbe one addressed to tbe refusal of tbe court to' grant bis motion for judgment as of nonsuit, made first at tbe close of plaintiffs’ evidence and renewed at tbe close of all tbe evidence, and based upon tbe ground that appellant’s special promise to plaintiff, which was not in writing, was to answer for tbe debt, default or miscarriage of bis codefendant Parker, and was therefore void under tbe statute of frauds. O. S., 987.

It was in evidence that tbe defendants, Lee and Parker, landlord and tenant respectively, went to tbe plaintiffs’ store and made arrangements with them whereby tbe plaintiffs were to furnish tbe defendant Parker with certain supplies during tbe year .1920. Plaintiffs understood that Lee was to be responsible for whatever Parker bought. He said to *394 the plaintiffs: “Mr. Parker will be on our land this year and you sell him anything he wants and I will see it paid.” Almost this identical language was held in Whitehurst v. Padgett, 157 N. C., 424, to be sufficient to warrant a finding that the promise was an original one and not within the statute of frauds, if made at the time or. before the debt was created, upon sufficient consideration, and credit was given thereon solely to the promissor or to both promissors as principals, or if the promise were based upon a new consideration of benefit or harm passing between the promissor and the creditor, or if the promise were for the benefit of the promissor and he had a personal, immediate and pecuniary interest in the transaction in which a third party was the original obligor. See Peele v. Powell, 156 N. C., 553, and cases there cited.

In the instant case there was no exception to the charge, and we think the case was properly submitted to the jury. The verdict as rendered was warranted by the evidence.

No error.

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Bluebook (online)

121 S.E. 659, 187 N.C. 393, 1924 N.C. LEXIS 295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/taylor-v-lee-nc-1924.

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