Taylor v. Killen

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: November 13, 2023
• Docket: N22C-03-068 CLS
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SHYNEIKA D. TAYLOR, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) C.A. No. N22C-03-068 CLS RONALD KILLEN, TALLEY ) BROTHERS, INC., MAZDA MOTOR ) CORPORATION and MAZDA ) MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC., ) ) Defendant. )

Date Submitted: August 17, 2023 Date Decided: November 13, 2023

Upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. GRANTED.

OPINION

Joel H. Fredricks, Esquire, Nitsche & Fredricks, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware 19899, Attorney for Plaintiff, Shyneika D. Taylor.

Stephen F. Dryden, Esquire, Weber Gallagher Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby LLP, New Castle, Delaware 19720, Attorney for Defendants, Donald Killen and Talley Brothers, Inc.

Joseph J. Bellew, Esquire, and Joseph E. Brenner, Esquire, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Wilmington, Delaware 19801, Attorneys for Defendants, Mazda Motor Corporation and Mazda Motor of America, Inc.

SCOTT, J. 1 INTRODUCTION Before the Court is Defendant Mazda Motor Corporation (“Mazda Japan”)

Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) Plaintiff Shyneika Taylor’s (“Ms. Taylor”) Amended

Complaint pursuant to Del. Super. Civ. R. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5). The Court has

reviewed the Motion, Ms. Taylor’s and Defendants Ronald Killen and Talley

Brothers, Inc.’s opposition. For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

is GRANTED.

ALLEGED FACTS Ms. Taylor filed this action against Defendants for personal injuries resulting

from a motor vehicle collision that occurred in Delaware on December 29, 2021.

Specifically, Ms. Taylor alleges she was lawfully stopped attempting to make a left

turn when her vehicle was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Defendant

Ronald Killen (“Mr. Killen”). At the time of the collision, Mr. Killen alleged to be

in the course and scope of his employment with Defendant Talley Brothers, Inc.

(“Talley Brothers”). The collision pushed Ms. Taylor into the oncoming lane of

travel causing her to subsequently strike another vehicle, which was operated by

Jacquette N. Murray (“Ms. Murray”). Ms. Taylor was injured in the collision. During

discovery in the case against Mr. Killen and Talley Brothers, it was determined that

Ms. Taylor’s seatback, restraint system, and headrest in her 2013 Mazda CX5 failed

during the collision. As a result, on March 8, 2023, Taylor filed an Amended

2 Complaint adding Defendants Mazda Japan and Mazda Motor of America (“Mazda

USA”) with allegations associated with product liability. Mazda–Japan is

incorporated and headquartered in Japan. Mazda USA maintains their principal

place of business in California. Plaintiff’s counsel purports he served Mazda Japan

in Hiroshima, Japan with copies of the following papers via regular and registered

mail: Praecipe, Summons, Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s Civil Case Information

Statement, Plaintiff’s Civil Rule 3(h) Statement, and Amended Answers to Form 30

Interrogatories. The envelopes were not addressed to any registered agent or officer

or other authorized recipient of legal service of process for Mazda Japan. The papers

were mailed to “Mazda Motor Corporation, 3-1 Shinchi, Fuchu-cho, Aki-gun,

Hiroshima 730-8670, Japan.” The envelopes were delivered to Mazda Japan’s

mailroom and were received by an unidentified clerk employed by Mazda Ace Co.,

Ltd., a subsidiary company that provides a variety of services to Mazda Japan,

including copying, printing, and mailroom functions. The documents that were

mailed to Mazda Japan were in English and had not been translated to Japanese.

Mazda Japan seeks dismissal on the basis that (1) service was improper

pursuant the requirements of the Hague Convention and (2) this Court lacks personal

jurisdiction.

3 Parties’ Positions Mazda Japan’s Motion It is Mazda Japan’s position that service was insufficient because Ms. Taylor

failed to comply with the Hague Service Convention and Delaware law. Mazda

Japan argues the Hague Service Convention method of service, which provides that

requests for the international service of judicial documents must be made through a

central authority designated by each signatory country, should have been employed

by Ms. Taylor. Because Ms. Taylor failed to request service through Japan’s central

authority and did not translate her documents into Japanese, Mazda Japan asserts she

failed to effectuate service. Further, Mazda Japan goes on explain how services was

still not effectuated under Delaware law. Mazda Japan elaborates that process

delivered to a clerical employee of Mazda Japan’s subsidiary Mazda Ace was

insufficient because the employee lacked actual or apparent authority to accept

service and the package was not directed to any specific employee or agent of Mazda

Japan.

Mazda Japan also argues Ms. Taylor fails to establish personal jurisdiction by

way of general or specific jurisdiction. Mazda Japan supports its argument by

explaining it is incorporated under the laws of Japan with a principal place of

business in Hiroshima, Japan and Mazda Japan is neither incorporated in Delaware,

nor does Mazda Japan maintain an office in Delaware. Further Mazda Japan explains

4 is not registered, licensed, or otherwise authorized to do business in Delaware, does

not have a registered agent in Delaware, nor is it required to do so, does not own

property in, does not maintain an office or telephone number in Delaware, does not

maintain employees in Delaware, does not maintain bank accounts in Delaware,

does not purchase, market, or sell products in Delaware, does not regularly transact

business within Delaware, does not directly sell products to consumers in the United

States, but rather sells products to a North American distributor in California that

determines the dealerships to which products are delivered for retail sale. As such,

Mazda Japan asserts a violation of due process will occur if it is required to defend

itself in this proceeding.

Ms. Taylor’s Opposition It is Ms. Taylor’s contention that service has been completed upon Mazda

Japan. Ms. Taylor explains pursuant to Delaware law and rules, service may be

completed pursuant to the law governing the place in which service is made. Further,

Ms. Taylor points to case law indicating under California law, service on Mazda

Japan may be completed on Mazda USA, as Mazda USA is a general manager for

Mazda Japan. Therefore, according to Ms. Taylor, completion of service in this

manner is consistent with the goals and purpose of service, namely notice of the

litigation. Additionally, Ms. Taylor contends the Hague Convention is not

5 implicated in this matter because service on a domestic agent for the company abroad

was valid.

On the issue of jurisdiction, Ms. Taylor argues Delaware Superior Court has

personal jurisdiction for the allegations against Mazda Japan. Ms. Taylor contends

Mazda Japan has taken acts to avail itself of Delaware. Ms. Taylor compares the

facts of this case to Triche, a case decided on March 15, 2023, where Mazda Japan

through numerous actions, including designing the vehicles for use in the U.S.

Markets to comply with U.S regulations, has availed itself of the benefits of the

markets and laws of the forum State. Further, Ms. Taylor alleges the claims at issue

are directly related to this State, as the vehicle was purchase in Delaware by a

Delaware resident, used in Delaware, and the injuries from the defective product

occurred in Delaware. It is Ms. Taylor’s position that through Triche and Ford Motor

Co., Delaware has personal jurisdiction over Mazda–Japan.

Mr. Killen and Tally Brothers’ Opposition

Mr. Killen and Tally Brothers oppose the motion on ground that the issues

surrounding questions of jurisdiction need to be determined and should be

determined by the discovery process.

6 Mazda Japan’s Reply Brief

Mazda Japan argues Ms. Taylor failed in her opposition to contradict its

argument related to personal jurisdiction. It is Mazda Japan’s position that Ms.

Taylor effectively concedes to its argument regarding general jurisdiction. As for

specific jurisdiction, Mazda Japan observed Ms. Taylor attempted to use Ford Motor

Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., in Mazda Motor Corp. v. Triche. Mazda Japan

contends that Ms. Taylor’s reliance on Triche is unavailing because there is no

indication Mazda Japan took steps to subject itself to Delaware’s jurisdiction. Mazda

Japan explains that the plaintiff in Triche produced evidence showing Mazda Japan

specifically targeted its marketing strategies to Florida and Ms. Taylor only makes

a “bald assertion” that the Court should conclude the Florida specific facts apply

here. Mazda Japan further explains the Ford decision emphasizes the question of

who is making the contacts because in Ford, the contacts originated with Ford and

at every step it was Ford not an intermediary, who made the contacts. Apply such

concept to these facts, Mazda Japan argues it did not make any allege contacts so it

should not be subject to personal jurisdiction.

Further, Mazda Japan argues that while Ms. Taylor explains why she could

effectuate service upon Mazda Japan via Mazda America, the argument fails because

Mazda America is not Mazda Japan’s agent. Mazda Japan produces an agreement

7 between Mazda Japan and Mazda America in which the entities agree Mazda

America is in no way a legal agent or representative of Mazda Japan. Additionally,

Mazda Japan explains that while Ms. Taylor attempted to argue Mazda America is

Mazda Japan’s “general manager” she misunderstands that Mazda Japan explicitly

disclaimed Mazda America as its agent. Mazda Japan further argues that even if

Mazda America was an agent, Ms. Taylor still fails to effectuate serve because the

Mazda Japan process was not served on Mazda America, it was mailed to Mazda

Japan in Japan.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Superior

Court Civil Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a basis for the

trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.1 Absent an

evidentiary hearing or jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff need only make a prima

facie showing that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate.2 In making its

determination, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true,

unless contradicted by affidavit, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

1 Greenly v. Davis, 486 A.2d 669, 670 (Del.1984); Herman v. BRP, Inc., 2015 WL 1733805, at *3 (Del.Super.Apr. 13, 2015); see Werner v. Miller Tech. Mgmt., L.P., 831 A.2d 318, 326 (Del. Ch.2003) (construing Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(2) in the same way). 2 Greenly, 486 A.2d at 670; Sprint Nextel Corp. v. iPCS, Inc., 2008 WL 2737409, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2008). 8 plaintiff.3 However, Delaware courts have warned that “[a]lthough plaintiffs have ‘a

relatively light burden’ to establish a prima facie basis for personal jurisdiction, the

Court of Chancery has stated ‘[c]ourt[s] should exercise caution in extending

jurisdiction over nonresident defendants whose direct ties to Delaware are, at best,

tenuous.’ ”4

Defendant is a nonresident of Delaware and considered a foreign entity.

Ordinarily service of process must comply with Super. Ct. Civ. R. 4 and 10 Del. C.

§ 3104. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 4(h) which states:

In an action in which the plaintiff serves process pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 3104 ... the defendant's return receipt and the affidavit of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney of the defendant's nonresidence and the sending of a copy of the complaint with the notice required by the statute shall be filed as an amendment to the complaint within 10 days of the receiving by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney of the defendant's return receipt; provided, however, that the amendment shall not be served upon the parties in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5(a). When a plaintiff has alleged a nonresident committed acts sufficient to permit

this Court to have jurisdiction over the nonresident, service may be made “[b]y any

form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requiring a signed receipt.”5

3 See Herman, 2015 WL 1733805, at *3 (citing AeroGlobal Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Cirrus Indus., 871 A.2d 428, 437 (Del.2005)); Hartsel v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., et al., 2011 WL 2421003, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 15, 2011). 4 Wakely Ltd. v. Ensotran, LLC, 2014 WL 1116968, at *3 (D.Del. Mar. 18, 2014) (citing Ross Holding & Mgmt. Co. v. Adv. Realty Grp., 2010 WL 1838608, at *15 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2010)). 5 10 Del. C. § 3104(d)(3). 9 Additionally, proof of service may be made by an affidavit of the person effecting

service or, if served by mail, “proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the

addressee or other evidence of personal delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the

court.”6 If process is insufficient, then there is no personal jurisdiction over the

Defendants.7 Because Defendant is a foreign entity, this Court must determine

whether the Hague Service Convention applies.

ANALYSIS

Service is improper

The foregoing discussion results in two issues. First, whether the Hague

Service Convention applies in this case. Second, assuming it applies, whether Ms.

Taylor’s mailing was a valid method under the Convention. The first issue is

answered in the affirmative. As noted, Article 1 applies whenever there is occasion

to transmit service documents outside this country. This leads to the question of how

does one know when there is occasion to transmit service documents abroad. In

Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, the United States Supreme Court,

applying Illinois' general long-arm statute, held that whether there is occasion to

transmit documents abroad must be determined by reference to the forum state's

6 Id. § 3104(e). 7 Cannon v. Target Stores, 2009 WL 2382946, *1 (D.Del.2009). 10 law.8 “If the internal law of the forum state defines the applicable method of serving

process as requiring the transmittal of documents abroad, then the Hague Service

Convention applies.”9

In the Volkswagenwerk case, Schlunk filed a wrongful death action in Illinois

state court after his parents were killed in an automobile accident. He alleged that

defects in their Volkswagen automobile contributed to their deaths. Schlunk initially

filed suit against Volkswagen of America, Inc., as a wholly-owned domestic

subsidiary of the defendant, but later amended his complaint to add the defendant.

He attempted to serve the amended complaint on the defendant by serving the

domestic subsidiary as the defendant's involuntary agent, but the defendant moved

to quash the service on the grounds that it could be served only pursuant to the Hague

Service Convention.

Ruling against the defendant, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “[w]here

service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under both state law and the Due

Process Clause, our inquiry ends and the Convention has no further implications.”10

The service satisfied Illinois' long-arm statute, then codified at Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110,

para. 2–209,10 because the statute stated that personal service upon an agent is

8 486 U.S. 694 (1988). 9 Id. at 700. 10 Id. at 707. 11 equivalent to personal service upon the principal.11 The service satisfied the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

because the Court was satisfied that notice was virtually guaranteed to reach the

parent corporation.12 The statute itself did not require the transmittal of documents

to Germany as a condition of proper service.13

Unlike Volkswagenwek, service on a domestic agent here is not valid and

complete under both state law and the U.S. Constitution. First and foremost, this

Court notes there is no statute, referenced by either party nor has the Court found,

that prescribed that service on an agent is equivalent to service on the principal.

Instead, Ms. Taylor argues Mazda Japan has been served in accordance with Rule 4

of the Delaware Civil Rules because service was effectuated on Mazda America in

California and because Mazda America is a “general-manager” under California

Law it can accept service for Mazda Japan. The basis behind Ms. Taylor’s argument

is correct. Under Delaware Civil Rules, service may be effectuated under the laws

of the state in which service is completed. However, under these facts, Mazda Japan

was not served because the service Ms. Taylor refers to is solely service to Mazda

11 Id. at 706. 12 Id. at 706–07. 13 Id. at 706. 12 America. Therefore, Ms. Taylor has failed to properly serve Mazda Japan in terms

of domestic service.

Because Ms. Taylor has failed to properly serve Mazda Japan domestically,

the Hague Convention would apply to Ms. Taylor’s attempted mailing to Japan.14

According to the Hague Convention, when attempting to serve process in Japan,

direct mail is not an option.15 To properly effect service in Japan, a plaintiff may

make a request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (“MOFA”) for service

that will require mandatory receipt by the Japanese defendant. All documents to be

served must be translated into Japanese by the plaintiff.16 The Consular Affairs

Bureau of MOFA and the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Supreme Court of Japan will

each then check the documents, page by page, to confirm they have been translated

in their entirety.17 After review, service requiring mandatory receipt is completed by

a postal employee of Japan by handing over the documents to the defendant. In this

14 Both the United States and Japan have ratified or acceded to the Convention. Under the Supremacy Clause contained in the United States Constitution, Article VI, the Convention “pre-empts inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state law in all cases to which it applies.” Volkswagenwek, 486 U.S. at 699. 15 Ian Papendick, Tomonori Mawzawa, and Stephen LaBrecque, Methods of Service to a Corporate Defendant in Japan, LAW.COM (June 23, 2021, 8:08 P.M.), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2021/06/23/methods-of-service-to-a- corporate-defendant-in-japan/?slreturn=20230930104000. 16 Id. 17 Id. 13 case, no such procedures were followed.18 Ms. Taylor simply mailed non-translated

process to Mazda Japan, in direct violation of Hague Convention. Therefore, service

was not effectuated under the Hague Convention. As such, the Motion must be

granted on lack of service grounds.

Because this Court has decided this Motion on improper service grounds,

there is no need to consider arguments regarding personal jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Mazda Japan’s Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED.

/s/ Calvin L. Scott Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.

18 Id. 14