Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp.

264 P.2d 279, 1 Utah 2d 175, 1953 Utah LEXIS 242

• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Decided: December 2, 1953
• Docket: 8028
• Status: Published

Opinions

HENRIOD, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff who claimed damages for breach of an express contract of employment. That portion of the judgment based on a contract implied in law is- reversed. No costs are awarded.

Plaintiff managed defendant’s radio and television store under a written agreement calling for a salary and bonus, which contract, by its terms, ended March 1, 1951. Plaintiff stayed on as manager and accepted the same compensation until July, when he quit. During the interim the parties had talked of a new contract, but none was signed.

Plaintiff’s complaint; a short form permitted under the rules, together with an attached exhibit, alleged that defendant owed him some $730 under the terms of a new contract consummated between March arid July. No effort was made to amend the complaint to conform to any different proof, nor was any proof affirmatively offered to establish a quantum meruit theory. The trial court took the case under advisement. Several days later in a memorandum decision the court adjudged that there had been no express contract, but that plaintiff was entitled to recover on quantum meruit.

Quaere; Under our new rules can one recover on a contract implied in law where he pleads and attempts to prove an express contract,. seeking no amendment of his pleadings, demanding no relief under and urging no claim under a quantum meruit or other theory ?

Plaintiff says Rule 54(c) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure¹ resolves the question affirmatively. We disagree. The rule reads in part that “ * * * every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. * * * ”

Recently we had this rule before us in Morris v. Russell, Utah, 236 P.2d 451, 455, where plaintiff pleaded an (1) express contract and (2) quantum meruit. During the trial the latter count was stricken on defendant’s motion, but was reinstated next day on plaintiff’s motion. We held that a judgment based on the quantum meruit count did not violate the rule. Difference between that case and this is obvious. There, the defendant had notice of his opponent’s claims, was not surprised, misled or prejudiced in his defense, having had an opportunity to meet the issues presented.

It is true that our new rules should be “liberally construed” to secure .a “just * * * determination of every action”,² but they do not represent a one-way street down which but one litigant may travel. The rules allow locomotion in both directions by all interested travelers. They allow plaintiffs considerable latitude in pleading and proof, to the point where some people have expressed the opinion that careless legal craftsmanship has been invited rather than discouraged. Be that as it may, a defendant must be extended every reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and to meet an adversary’s claims. Also he must be protected against surprise and be assured equal opportunity and facility to present and prove counter contentions, — else unilateral justice and injustice would result sufficient to raise serious doubts as to constitutional due process guarantees.

Mr. Justice Crockett, in the cited case, recognized the true implications of the rule and the fairness which it was designed to engender when he said: “The adding of the quantum meruit count, was the equivalent of permitting an amendment to conform to the proof. * * * There is no showing that the defendants were misled or prevented from presenting all their evidence or in any way prejudiced by reinstating the count.”

Here the record indicates that the plaintiff had an express contract in mind, not one implied in law. Plaintiff sought no change in theory by way of pleading or proof. .We believe an injustice would result if the rule were interpreted to charge the defendant with liability under quantum meruit, an issue he was never called upon to meet.

1 . Lifted from Federal Rule 54(c) (1), 28 U.S.C.A. Division of construction is reflected in Fed.Rules. Digest, Vol. 2, pp. 257-260; Federal Rules Service, Vol. 8, pp. 822-834.

2 . Rule 1(a), U.R.C.P.