UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DARNELL TAYLOR,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23 - 1117 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Darnell Taylor is a former employee of the District of Columbia Department of Public
Works (DPW). Before he resigned, he worked as a sanitation crew chief who drove trash and
recycling collection trucks and supervised other sanitation workers. Mr. Taylor has congestive
heart failure and gastroparesis, a stomach condition that periodically causes him severe abdominal
pain and nausea. In 2022, DPW reassigned Mr. Taylor to a temporary light-duty position at the
DPW Training Academy as an accommodation for his congestive heart failure. While serving in
that position, he experienced a severe gastroparesis “flare-up” that incapacitated him while at
work. After the flare-up, DPW refused to let Mr. Taylor return to work until he provided updated
medical documentation showing that he could safely do his job. Mr. Taylor did not do so and
instead remained on leave until he eventually resigned. Mr. Taylor brought this lawsuit against the
District of Columbia alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with the Disabilities
Act (ADA), the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA), and the Civil Rights Act, as well as
interference and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Both Parties have
moved for summary judgment. The Court concludes that Mr. Taylor has not produced sufficient
evidence to support any of his claims. It thus grants summary judgment in favor of the District. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Court draws the facts from the Parties’ Statements of Material Facts and the underlying
materials referenced in those statements. See Def.’s Statement of Material Facts (DSOF), ECF
No. 40-2; Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts (PSOF), ECF No. 41-2; Def.’s Resp. to PSOF, ECF
No. 42-1. The Court assumes the facts in those statements to be true unless they have been
specifically disputed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also LCvR 7(h)(1). 1
Mr. Taylor began working at DPW in October 2002. PSOF ¶ 1. Over the years, he worked
his way up from a temporary position as a “leaf season Motor Vehicle Operator” to a “career
appointment as a Road Sweeper Operator.” PSOF ¶¶ 1–2. In September 2019, Mr. Taylor was
promoted to the position of Sanitation Crew Chief (SCC). PSOF ¶ 2. As an SCC, he was
responsible for “driving trash and recycling collection trucks, directing the sanitation crew, and
ensuring the collection vehicles [were] properly maintained and in good working order.” PSOF
¶ 3. His SCC duties also included “picking up trash cans and other bulky refuse to load into trash
collection trucks, . . . sweeping alleys and streets . . . assist[ing] sanitation workers at the back of
the trash collection truck or work[ing] as a sanitation worker if DPW [was] short staffed,” as well
as “perform[ing] special services such as walking to dwellings and carrying trash for old, ill, or
disabled citizens.” DSOF ¶¶ 3–4; Def.’s Mot., Ex. G, SCC Job Description, ECF No. 40-3. 2
1 Local Rule 7(h) provides that “the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” LCvR 7(h)(1). The Court notes that Mr. Taylor did not oppose the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment or respond to the District’s Statement of Material Facts. He did, however, file his own Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has thus looked to Mr. Taylor’s motion and his supporting Statement of Material Facts to determine which of the District’s factual assertions he disputes. 2 Mr. Taylor argues that any duties requiring him to get off the truck and lift heavy items were “secondary and minimal duties,” but he does not dispute that they were SCC duties. Pl.’s Mot.
2 In 2019, the same year he was promoted to the SCC position, Mr. Taylor began receiving
medical treatment for gastroparesis, a stomach condition that periodically causes Mr. Taylor
“abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting.” PSOF ¶¶ 4–5. Mr. Taylor’s gastroparesis “flare-ups” can
happen “suddenly and without warning.” PSOF ¶ 5. When they occur, Mr. Taylor “is unable to
function or perform his job duties.” PSOF ¶ 5. In October 2020, Mr. Taylor applied for FMLA
leave that would allow him to be absent from work 1–2 times per month when he had gastroparesis
flare-ups. PSOF ¶¶ 6–7. DPW approved the request and granted Mr. Taylor 320 hours of leave to
be used between October 2020 and October 2022. PSOF ¶ 8. By March 2021, however, Mr. Taylor
had used up the 320 hours and so he submitted a second FMLA request for more hours. PSOF ¶ 9.
Mr. Taylor’s medical documentation in support of that request noted that the abdominal pain he
experienced during flare-ups made him unable to perform “[a]ll duties during dates of incapacity.”
PSOF ¶ 9. DPW granted Mr. Taylor’s request and gave him 192 additional hours to use between
April 2021 and April 2023. PSOF ¶ 9. But these additional hours also proved insufficient. In
November 2021, Mr. Taylor submitted a third FMLA leave request “to manage his gastroparesis.”
PSOF ¶ 10. And again, DPW granted it, giving Mr. Taylor 448 more FMLA leave hours for a total
of 640 hours to use between April 2021 and April 2023. PSOF ¶ 12.
Since 2019, Mr. Taylor has also been receiving treatment for “congestive heart failure.”
PSOF ¶ 13. In November 2021, Mr. Taylor applied for an ADA accommodation related to that
condition. DSOF ¶ 18; Def.’s Mot. Ex. Q, Nov. 2021 ADA Request, ECF No. 40-3. Mr. Taylor’s
request indicated that it was “difficult[] for [him] to run behind the vehicle for 4-6 hrs collecting
the trash.” Nov. 2021 ADA Request. And in support of the request, Mr. Taylor’s doctor stated that
Summ. J. 3–5, ECF No. 41; see also Taylor Dep. Tr. 20:14–22:10, 23:2–9, 149:8–13; ECF No. 40-3.
3 he required “accommodations that restrict heavy lifting and hauling as well as intense running,”
but that he could “bend[,] walk[,] and lift objects up to 30lbs intermittently.” DSOF ¶¶ 19–20. Kim
McDaniel, DPW’s Labor and Employee Relations Advisor, reviewed Mr. Taylor’s request and
consulted another administrator about what “positions met [Mr. Taylor’s] restrictions.” DSOF
¶ 21; PSOF ¶ 20. Ultimately, Ms. McDaniel offered Mr. Taylor a “temporary accommodation” of
a 90-day detail to the Training Academy where he would not be required to do any heavy lifting.
PSOF ¶¶ 21–23. At the end of the detail, Mr. Taylor would “either return to his full duty position
or submit updated medical documentation to DPW.” PSOF ¶ 23. Mr. Taylor accepted the
accommodation. PSOF ¶ 24.
Mr. Taylor began his detail at the Training Academy on February 14, 2022. PSOF ¶ 23.
His role at the Academy was “to assist students preparing to test for their commercial driver’s
license,” and his duties included “fueling and driving training trucks around the yard, setting up
cones for the driving course, distributing paper materials, and ensuring the students used industry-
specific jargon.” PSOF ¶ 26. Shortly after beginning his detail, Mr. Taylor contacted
Ms. McDaniel to ask what would happen when his detail ended. PSOF ¶ 28. She explained that
there were no permanent positions available at the Training Academy and that he would not be
able to return to his SCC position unless he received clearance from his treating physician. PSOF
¶ 28. Accordingly, she advised him to look for other positions in the D.C. government that would
be a better fit “based on [his] medical restrictions” or to consider seeking “disability benefits.”
PSOF ¶ 28. On April 14, 2022, Ms. McDaniel offered to extend Mr. Taylor’s detail by one month
until June 13, 2022, but again reminded him that “the detail was temporary” and that he should
“explore other employment options.” PSOF ¶¶ 29–30. Mr. Taylor accepted the offer. PSOF ¶ 32.
4 During his time at the Training Academy, Mr. Taylor’s ability to work was regularly
affected by his gastroparesis. DSOF ¶¶ 28–32. According to Mr. Taylor’s supervisor, Training
Specialist Corey LaBoard, and one of Mr. Taylor’s colleagues, Ralph Deville, Mr. Taylor was
often so sick that he would vomit. DSOF ¶ 30, 26. While both Mr. LaBoard and Mr. Deville
believed that Mr. Taylor was trying to do his job, they routinely observed that his sickness
interfered with his ability to do so. Laboard Aff., Ex. W ¶ 16, ECF No. 40-4; Deville Aff., Ex. BB
¶ 5, ECF No. 40-4. Mr. LaBoard noted that Mr. Taylor “always complained about his stomach”
and that his stomach pain would “break[] him down to the point where he [could not] do anything.”
LaBoard Aff. ¶ 8. Mr. Deville estimated that Mr. Taylor “was sick and complained about being
sick . . . approximately 8 ½ days out of 10.” Deville Aff. ¶ 8. On several occasions, Mr. Taylor had
to leave the Training Academy early to go to the hospital. DSOF ¶ 31; see also LaBoard Dep.
167:14–20, ECF No. 40-4. And in one instance, Mr. Taylor left the Academy to get to the doctor
and took the keys to the trash trucks with him, causing a “major disruption because without those
keys DPW was unable to move its vehicles from the training lots.” DSOF ¶ 32. Mr. LaBoard also
received complaints from other staff that Mr. Taylor spent time in the “trucks with the seat reclined
rather than assisting students.” DSOF ¶ 28. 3
Matters came to a head on May 17, 2022, when Mr. Taylor experienced a gastroparesis
flare-up while accompanying a training team and students to a testing site. PSOF ¶¶ 33–34. On the
way to the site, Mr. Taylor became ill and threw up out the window of the vehicle he was riding
in. PSOF ¶ 36; Def.’s Mot., Ex. C, Taylor Dep. Tr. 152:9–12, ECF No. 40-3. Once he reached the
site, he lay on the ground and said that he was in so much pain that he wanted to die. DSOF ¶ 41.
3 Mr. Taylor’s Statement of Facts adopts many of the facts in the District’s Statement word for word. While Mr. Taylor does not affirmatively adopt all the facts summarized in this paragraph, he also does not dispute them or point to evidence that calls them into question.
5 Mr. LaBoard contacted Ms. McDaniel to inform her that Mr. Taylor “was at work laying on the
ground and provided her with a photograph of the same.” PSOF ¶ 38. Mr. LaBoard then instructed
Mr. Deville to take Mr. Taylor back to the Academy. PSOF ¶ 39.
Later that day, Ms. McDaniel informed Mr. Taylor by email that he “could not report back
to work until DPW received a release from [his] treating physician and [Ms.] McDaniel had an
opportunity to speak to that physician.” PSOF ¶ 40. She directed Mr. Taylor to submit his
documentation and his physician’s contact to Annie Johnson, DPW’s HR Specialist and FMLA
Coordinator. PSOF ¶ 40. Mr. Taylor replied that, “Ms. Johnson has all the paperwork for me
already pertaining to my health issues that I went through yesterday. This is what I have FMLA
for.” PSOF ¶ 42. Later that day, Ms. Johnson emailed Mr. Taylor requesting “updated medical
documentation for [his] ADA reasonable accommodation request, as the medical note [he]
provided was insufficient.” PSOF ¶ 43.
About two weeks later, Mr. Taylor submitted another ADA request dated May 30, 2022,
“seeking an accommodation based on his [congestive heart failure].” PSOF ¶ 44. The request did
not mention his gastroparesis, and neither did the supporting documentation from his medical
provider, which only discussed Mr. Taylor’s congestive heart failure and the accommodations he
required for that condition, PSOF ¶¶ 44–46; DSOF ¶ 48. At no point did Mr. Taylor ever request
an ADA accommodation related to his gastroparesis. PSOF ¶ 49.
On June 14, 2022, Ms. McDaniel informed Mr. Taylor that she had spoken with his
physician. PSOF ¶ 47. She explained that he could not return to his SCC position because of his
“medical restrictions as outlined by [his] treating physician,” and that there were no available
positions with “light duty work” that he could do. PSOF ¶ 47. She noted that the Training Academy
was “at capacity” and that, even if it were not, he had demonstrated while on detail that he was
6 “physically unable to do the work.” PSOF ¶ 47. Ms. McDaniel told Mr. Taylor that he could
continue to use his leave, “including annual, sick, and/or leave without pay,” but encouraged him
to “look into short term and long term disability benefits” that might be available through the D.C.
government. PSOF ¶ 47.
Mr. Taylor remained on leave until he eventually resigned and submitted paperwork to
obtain his retirement benefits. DSOF ¶ 52; PSOF ¶ 48. He no longer works at DPW. Id.
B. Procedural Background
Mr. Taylor filed this lawsuit against the District of Columbia and DPW on April 21, 2023,
alleging disability discrimination under the ADA (Count I), the Civil Rights Act (Count II), and
the D.C. Human Rights Act (Count III), as well as interference and retaliation under the FMLA
(Count IV). Compl., ECF No. 1. DPW was dismissed as a “non sui juris entity that cannot be sued
separate from the District of Columbia itself.” See Min. Order, July 18, 2023. On October 23,
2025, the District moved for summary judgment on all of Mr. Taylor’s claims. Def.’s Mot. Summ.
J., ECF No. 40. On October 27, 2025, Mr. Taylor cross-moved for the same. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J.,
ECF No. 41. Both motions are ripe for review. Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 42. 4
LEGAL STANDARD
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The burden is on the movant to make the initial showing of the absence of
any genuine issues of material fact.” Ehrman v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66
(D.D.C. 2006) (citations omitted). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
4 As previously noted, Mr. Taylor did not file an opposition to the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The cross-motion he filed four days later, however, indicates that he was aware of the District’s arguments and crafted his own motion in part to respond to those arguments.
7 justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Est. of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d
118, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion” by
“citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). When “both parties file cross-
motions for summary judgment, each must carry its own burden under the applicable legal
standard.” Ehrman, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 67 (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Taylor brings disability discrimination claims under the ADA, the DCHRA, and the
Civil Rights Act, as well as interference and retaliation claims under the FMLA. None of
Mr. Taylor’s claims survive summary judgment.
A. Disability Discrimination
Title I of the ADA “requires employers to make ‘reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,’ and makes it
unlawful to ‘discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.’” Waggel v.
George Wash. Univ., 957 F.3d 1364, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (first quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A); and then quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). The DCHRA imposes functionally
identical requirements on employers in the District of Columbia. D.C. Code § 2–1402.11(a)(1).
And disability discrimination claims under both statutes are subject to the same standards. Pressley
v. Mgmt. Support Tech., Inc., No. 22-cv-2262, 2023 WL 5206107, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2023);
see also Hunt v. District of Columbia, 66 A.3d 987, 990 (D.C. 2013). 5
5 Mr. Taylor bases his Civil Rights Act claim on 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2). While that provision permits an individual to recover compensatory and punitive damages for intentional disability
8 Mr. Taylor asserts that DPW discriminated against him based on disability by: (1) denying
him a reasonable accommodation, and (2) refusing to let him return to work following his May 17,
2022, gastroparesis flare-up. Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 7–8, ECF No. 41-1. The District
argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on both claims. The Court agrees.
1. Failure to Accommodate
“To prevail on a reasonable accommodation claim, a plaintiff must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) [he] was a qualified individual with a disability, (2) the
employer had notice of h[is] disability and (3) the employer denied h[is] request for a reasonable
accommodation.” Waggel, 957 F.3d at 1371 (cleaned up). A plaintiff is a “qualified individual”
under the ADA if he has a disability and, “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of [his] employment position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also Swanks v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
The District does not contest that Mr. Taylor’s congestive heart failure and gastroparesis
are disabilities. Nor does it argue that it was unaware of Mr. Taylor’s disabilities. The viability of
Mr. Taylor’s claim thus turns on the third inquiry: did he request a reasonable accommodation that
the District denied? See Flemmings v. Howard Univ., 198 F.3d 857, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“An
underlying assumption of any reasonable accommodation claim is that the plaintiff-employee has
requested an accommodation which the defendant-employer has denied.”). No reasonable jury
presented with the current record could answer that question in the affirmative.
The Parties agree that Mr. Taylor submitted at least two requests for accommodation. Both
requests related to his congestive heart failure. Mr. Taylor submitted his first request in November
discrimination claims brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, it does not provide a standalone cause of action. Mr. Taylor’s Civil Rights Act claim thus stands or falls with his ADA claim.
9 2021, stating that his congestive heart failure made it difficult for him “to run behind the vehicle
for 4-6 hrs collecting the trash” and providing documentation from his doctor indicating that it was
“not advisable” for him to engage in any strenuous activity, such as “heavy lifting and hauling.”
Nov. 2021 ADA Request. After considering Mr. Taylor’s request and stated limitations, DPW
offered him a 90-day detail to the Training Academy where he could avoid strenuous activity.
PSOF ¶¶ 20–21. Mr. Taylor accepted that accommodation and began the detail in February 2022.
PSOF ¶¶ 23–24. Based on this uncontested sequence of events, no reasonable jury could find that
DPW denied Mr. Taylor’s November 2021 accommodation request. Indeed, Mr. Taylor’s own
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts states unequivocally regarding his November 2021 request
that he “was granted an ADA accommodation for his [congestive heart failure].” PSOF ¶ 22.
Mr. Taylor submitted his second request for accommodation on May 30, 2022. PSOF ¶ 44;
see also Def.’s Mot., Ex. FF, May 2022 ADA Request, ECF No. 40-4. Again, Mr. Taylor stated
that he was seeking an accommodation because his congestive heart failure made it difficult for
him “to run, jump, or engage in the fast paced activity” required for being “behind a truck.” May
2022 ADA Request. Neither Mr. Taylor’s request nor the supporting medical documentation
mentioned his gastroparesis or requested any accommodation related to that condition. Id.
Mr. Taylor argues that this second request was effectively denied because the District did
not adequately consider whether it could further accommodate him by making his assignment to
the Academy permanent or by modifying his role as an SCC to ensure that he never had to run
behind the truck or lift trash heavier than 30 pounds. Pl.’s Mot. at 2–3. But this argument ignores
the significant change in circumstances that occurred between Mr. Taylor’s two requests.
Following Mr. Taylor’s gastroparesis flare-up on May 17, 2022, DPW prevented him from
returning to work not because of limitations related to his congestive heart failure, but because it
10 was concerned that his gastroparesis made him unable to do his job. As Ms. McDaniel explained
in her email to Mr. Taylor following the May 17 incident, she understood that during his flare-up
he “could not physically function” and that otherwise his “ability to physically function at the
facility [was] very minimal.” Def.’s Mot., Ex. DD, ECF No. 40-4. Based on those “observations,”
Ms. McDaniel explained that DPW was “concern[ed] that [Mr. Taylor] could get injured or [his]
condition worsened” if he came to work and thus he could not do so “until [DPW] received a
release from [his] treating physician.” Id.
In other words, DPW’s refusal to let Mr. Taylor return to work was not a refusal to
accommodate his congestive heart failure. Indeed, DPW was still providing Mr. Taylor with an
accommodation that was effective for the limitations imposed by his heart condition. He was still
on his temporary detail to the Academy—where he could avoid strenuous activity and heavy
lifting—and that detail extended until June 13, 2022. PSOF ¶¶ 22, 26, 29–32. Under those
circumstances, no reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Taylor’s second request for an ADA
accommodation was denied. And more importantly, the relevance of that request was superseded
by DPW’s concerns about Mr. Taylor’s gastroparesis. It was no longer clear to DPW that
accommodating Mr. Taylor’s congestive heart failure was enough to ensure that he could
physically do his job at the Academy or any other DPW job. See Swanks, 179 F.3d at 934 (“[A]
‘qualified individual’ is a person ‘with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires.’” (emphasis added) (quoting 42. U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
Given that Mr. Taylor cannot show that he was denied a reasonable accommodation for his
congestive heart failure, the only remaining question is whether he could convince a jury that he
11 requested and was denied a reasonable accommodation for his gastroparesis. He cannot carry this
burden.
To begin, Mr. Taylor acknowledges that he never requested a reasonable accommodation
for his gastroparesis. He affirmed this in his deposition, adding that his ADA requests were only
ever related to his heart condition, and that he never even considered making such a request related
to his gastroparesis. Taylor Dep. Tr. 63:7–14; 171:17–20; 165:15–21. Mr. Taylor suggests that a
formal ADA accommodation request was unnecessary because the District was already aware of
his gastroparesis from his prior requests for FMLA leave. Pl.’s Mem. 7, ECF No. 41-1. But the
FMLA and the ADA are “fundamentally different” statutes, and the D.C. Circuit has declined to
construe “requests for FMLA leave” as “requests for an ADA accommodation.” Waggel, 957 F.3d
at 1373.
It is true that under certain circumstances, a “plaintiff’s need for an accommodation” may
be “so apparent that the defendant must offer one regardless of whether the plaintiff requested it.”
Chenari v. George Wash. Univ., 847 F.3d 740, 748 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Under such circumstances,
however, an employer may still need “information about the nature of the individual’s disability
and the desired accommodation.” Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “Because
an appropriate accommodation will often turn on specific facts concerning the employee’s
disability and the employer’s workplace, the employee and employer frequently need to share
information” as part of an “interactive process” aimed at finding “a workable solution.” Ali v.
Regan, 111 F.4th 1264, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). When an employee “withholds
requested information that is relevant to determining the existence of a disability or the appropriate
accommodation for it, that employee may bear responsibility for the breakdown of the interactive
process, which would foreclose a failure-to-accommodate claim.” Id. at 1270 (citation omitted).
12 That is exactly what happened here. The District does not dispute that it was aware of
Mr. Taylor’s gastroparesis and that he might require accommodation for that condition to continue
working. Indeed, DPW asked Mr. Taylor for updated medical documentation about his
gastroparesis in an apparent attempt to initiate the interactive process. Mr. Taylor, however, failed
to provide the requested information, instead submitting an accommodation request and supporting
documentation that only addressed his congestive heart failure. Under these circumstances, no
reasonable jury could conclude that DPW was responsible for the breakdown in the interactive
process or for any failure to accommodate Mr. Taylor’s gastroparesis. See Ward, 762 F.3d at 32–
35 (affirming grant of summary judgment for employer on failure to accommodate claim where
employee did not respond to repeated requests for medical information); see also Ali v. Pruitt, 727
F. App’x 692, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (affirming summary judgment ruling that plaintiff “abandoned
the interactive process when he failed to provide supportive medical information” requested by his
employer). For all the above reasons, DPW is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Taylor’s
failure to accommodate claims under the ADA and the DCHRA.
2. Denial of Permission to Return to Work
Outside of a reasonable accommodation claim, a plaintiff may prevail on a claim of
disability discrimination under the ADA or DCHRA by showing that he (1) suffered an adverse
employment action (2) because of his disability. Adeyemi v. District of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222,
1226 (D.C. Cir. 2008). When a plaintiff lacks direct evidence of disability discrimination, claims
brought under the ADA and DCHRA are evaluated under the burden-shifting framework
established in McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Giles v. Transit Emps.
Fed. Credit Union, 794 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Under that framework, “the plaintiff bears the
initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. at 6. “The burden then
13 shifts to the employer to set forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged
action.” Id. If at summary judgment the employer has asserted such a reason, the question of
whether the plaintiff has stated a prima facie case fades away, and “the only remaining question is
whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s
asserted nondiscriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff on a prohibited basis.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, Mr. Taylor alleges that he suffered an adverse employment action when the District
refused to permit him to return to work after his May 17, 2022, gastroparesis flare-up. Pl.’s
Mem. 7. In response, the District has identified a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for why it
would not let Mr. Taylor keep working. Namely, DPW was concerned after the May 17, 2022,
incident that Mr. Taylor’s disabilities “rendered him unable to perform the essential functions of a
SCC, or even light duty functions at the Training Academy.” Def.’s Opp’n 7–8. To address those
concerns, the District requested updated medical documentation from Mr. Taylor and, at least with
regard to his gastroparesis, he never provided it. Id. at 8. In the face of this legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason, Mr. Taylor has not “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
find that [the District’s] asserted nondiscriminatory reason” was in fact a pretext for
discrimination. See Giles, 794 F.3d at 6. As explained above, Mr. Taylor did not provide the
medical documentation that DPW requested, nor did he meaningfully engage in an interactive
process about how his gastroparesis could be reasonably accommodated. The District was
therefore justified in refusing to allow him to return to work. And there is no basis on which a jury
could reasonably conclude otherwise.
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to the District on Mr. Taylor’s disability
discrimination claims.
14 B. FMLA Claims
Next up are Mr. Taylor’s FMLA claims. The FMLA entitles eligible employees up to “12
workweeks of leave during any 12-month period” for specified family or medical reasons,
including “a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform” their work. 29
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). “Employers may not ‘interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of
FMLA rights[.]’” Waggel, 957 F.3d at 1375 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)). Mr. Taylor brings
two claims under the FMLA. He argues that the District (1) interfered with the exercise of his
FMLA rights and (2) retaliated against him for taking FMLA leave. Neither claim has merit.
As an initial matter, Mr. Taylor’s claims under the FMLA are ill-defined. Mr. Taylor’s
brief devotes only one page of legal argument to his FMLA claims. Half of that page is a paragraph
of FMLA case law that appears to have been copied and pasted directly from the District’s
summary judgment brief. Compare Pl.’s Mem. 8–9, with Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 18,
ECF No. 40-1. The next three sentences, which also appear to be copied and pasted from the
District’s brief, acknowledge that the District granted Mr. Taylor’s FMLA leave requests three
times, “never interfered with [Mr.] Taylor’s right to take intermittent FMLA leave,” and
“facilitated [Mr.] Taylor’s use of FMLA leave for three years.” Pl.’s Mem. 9. Needless to say, it
is not a strong start to Mr. Taylor’s argument.
As best the Court can tell, Mr. Taylor’s FMLA claims, much like his disability
discrimination claims, primarily take issue with the District’s refusal to let him return to work after
his May 17, 2022, gastroparesis flare-up. He argues that “he was entitled to use his FMLA leave
when he needed 1–2 days off per month during his gastroparesis flare-ups,” Pl.’s Mot. 3; that he
had previously “never had any issues with taking leave under the FMLA,” Pl.’s Mem. 9; and that
the District interfered with his FMLA rights and retaliated against him for exercising those rights
15 when it “treated his taking of leave” after the May 17, 2022, incident as “a demonstration he was
unable to work at all,” Compl. ¶ 79. The Court is not persuaded.
“To prevail on an FMLA interference claim, a plaintiff must show (1) employer conduct
that reasonably tends to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of FMLA rights, and
(2) prejudice arising from the interference.” Waggel, 957 F.3d at 1376. And to prevail on an FMLA
retaliation claim, “a plaintiff must show: (1) the exercise of protected FMLA activity; (2) an
adverse employment decision; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse action.” Id. at 1375. FMLA retaliation claims, like the disability discrimination claims
discussed above, are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Id. This means that an
employer may rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliation by “putting forward evidence of a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action.” Id. The plaintiff must then “identify
evidence of pretext . . . to overcome the employer’s rebuttal and survive summary judgment.” Id.
at 1375–76.
Addressing interference first, Mr. Taylor expressly concedes in his motion that the District
never interfered with his taking of “intermittent FMLA leave” prior to May 17, 2022. Pl.’s Mem.
9. The only remaining question is whether the District’s refusal to let Mr. Taylor return to work
after May 17, 2022, amounted to interference with his FMLA rights. Based on the record evidence,
no reasonable jury could reach that conclusion. On the contrary, the District appears to have
required Mr. Taylor to use his FMLA leave until DPW could assess whether there was a job he
could safely do, and told him he could “continue to use [his] leave, including annual, sick, and/or
leave without pay” while encouraging him “to look into short term and long term disability
benefits.” PSOF ¶¶ 40, 47.
16 Mr. Taylor’s FMLA retaliation claim is similarly deficient. It fails for much the same
reason as his disability discrimination claims under the ADA and the DCHRA. To briefly rehash,
the District has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for why it would not let him
return to work: it was concerned that he could not do so safely. In response, Mr. Taylor has not
produced evidence to support that this reason was pretextual. Rather, the record suggests that the
District always gave Mr. Taylor the FMLA leave that he requested and only kept him from
returning to work when his gastroparesis appeared to prevent him from doing any job safely. And
the record further suggests that Mr. Taylor never provided the District with updated medical
documentation that could address its concerns. 6
Accordingly, Mr. Taylor’s FMLA claims also must fail.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court grants the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF
No. 40, and denies Mr. Taylor’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 41.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge Date: March 31, 2026
6 Mr. Taylor’s Complaint also appears to allege a retaliation claim under the ADA. See Compl. ¶¶ 47, 57–58. Mr. Taylor’s motion, which purports to seek summary judgment on each of his claims, does not discuss that claim, see generally Pl.’s Mot. And Mr. Taylor did not oppose the District’s motion, which explicitly seeks summary judgment on any retaliation claims under the ADA or the DCHRA. Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 16–17, ECF No. 40-1. The Court thus deems Mr. Taylor to have forfeited any retaliation claims that he might have brought under those statutes. See Oceana, Inc. v. Pritzker, 24 F. Supp. 3d 49, 72 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[A] plaintiff’s failure to raise arguments or theories in its motion for summary judgment results in waiver of those arguments.”). But even were those claims not forfeited, they would be evaluated under the same framework as Mr. Taylor’s FMLA retaliation claim, see Harris v. CNN America, Inc., No. 23-cv- 3526, 2026 WL 491447, at *11 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2026), and would fail for the same reasons.