2025 IL App (1st) 231135 No. 1-23-1135 Opinion filed June 20, 2025 Sixth Division
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ JAMAL TAYLOR, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) No. 22CH7602 THE COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY’S ) OFFICE, ) Honorable ) Thaddeus L. Wilson, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Tailor and Justice Gamrath concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In 2019, Plaintiff-Appellant Jamal Taylor filed a postconviction petition claiming actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence. On May 29, 2022, Taylor submitted two records
requests under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. West 2022))
to Defendant-Appellee the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (CCSAO). The CCSAO
claimed the records Taylor requested were exempt from disclosure under FOIA because his No. 1-23-1135
postconviction proceedings were pending. Taylor initiated an action in the circuit court and both
parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted CCSAO’s motion for summary judgment
and denied Taylor’s, finding disclosure would interfere with pending law enforcement proceedings
under FOIA section 7(1)(d)(i) (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i) (West 2022)). On appeal, Taylor argues
CCSAO failed to prove the requested records were exempt. For the following reasons, we reverse
the circuit court’s order. On remand, we order CCSAO to comply with their burden under FOIA
to produce the requested documents or justify application of section 7(1)(d)(i) by preparing an
index and detailed affidavit explaining why disclosure of each document would interfere with
pending or reasonably contemplated law enforcement proceedings.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2006, following a jury trial, the circuit court convicted Taylor of, inter alia, one count of
first degree murder and sentenced him to 55 years imprisonment under case No. 04-CR-01554-01.
On February 21, 2019, Taylor filed, with the circuit court, a motion to file a successive
postconviction petition. The circuit court granted the motion and proceeded with Taylor’s petition.
On May 22, 2022, Taylor submitted two FOIA requests to CCSAO, seeking (1) “any and all
subpoenas and warrants” and (2) “the entire case file” for case No. 04-CR-01554-01. On June 9,
2022, CCSAO denied both requests, stating the records requested were exempt under FOIA section
7(1)(d)(ii) as they “interfere with active administrative enforcement proceedings.”
¶4 On August 4, 2022, Taylor filed a complaint against CCSAO, alleging that the office
willfully and intentionally violated FOIA by failing to adequately search for records responsive to
his requests. While his complaint was pending, Taylor filed a motion in his postconviction
proceeding to compel the production of records and subpoenas related to his case. The
postconviction court denied that motion on November 17, 2022. Taylor then moved for partial
2 No. 1-23-1135
summary judgment in the FOIA matter on February 2, 2023, arguing CCSAO did not prove the
requested records were exempt from disclosure. CCSAO filed a cross motion for summary
judgment on March 1, 2023. In their motion, CCSAO argued that the requested records would
“interfere with a pending law enforcement proceeding” under FOIA section 7(1)(d)(i). CCSAO
alleged that even if a postconviction proceeding is by itself not a “law enforcement proceeding,”
Taylor’s requests are essentially a discovery request for his pending postconviction matter and
cannot subvert the limited discovery rules under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS
5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)).
¶5 The record does not indicate that CCSAO submitted any documents to the circuit court for
inspection. In their motion, CCSAO produced an affidavit from FOIA officer Jeanene Booker. In
her affidavit, Ms. Booker states she received both of Taylor’s FOIA requests in May 2022. Based
on her knowledge and experience as a FOIA officer, Ms. Booker states she knew the responsive
records would likely be within the special litigation unit, and she consulted with them accordingly.
Ms. Booker then contacted Assistant States Attorney Carol Rogala regarding the requested
records. Attorney Rogala informed Ms. Booker that the records were under review as part of
ongoing postconviction proceedings. CCSAO then denied Taylor’s requests pursuant to FOIA
section 7(1)(d)(i).
¶6 On May 31, 2023, the circuit court granted CCSAO’s motion for summary judgment and
denied Taylor’s motion. In its order, the court likened the matter to National Labor Relations
Board v. Robbins & Tire Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978), where the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the National Labor Relations Board properly refused to disclose prior
statements of witnesses from whom they intended to call during a hearing. The board claimed
disclosure of the statements would “interfere with enforcement proceedings” as stated in
3 No. 1-23-1135
Exemption 7(A) of the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A)
(1976)). Robbins, 437 U.S. at 216-17. The United States Supreme Court explained that disclosure
of the statements ahead of the hearing would change the governing discovery rules as posited by
the National Labor Relations Act (28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976)) and force the board to alter its
trial strategy through mechanisms likely to cause substantial delays. Robbins, 437 U.S. at 236-37.
¶7 Here, the circuit court noted that requiring disclosure of records in the same case Taylor
filed a postconviction petition in would undermine the discretion of the court in that case to rule
on discovery matters. This appeal followed.
¶8 II. JURISDICTION
¶9 Taylor appeals the circuit court’s order of May 31, 2023, and filed his timely appeal on June
22, 2023. This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
303(a) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 10 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 When parties file cross motions for summary judgment, they concede that no material
questions of fact exist and invite the court to decide the remaining questions of law based on the
record. Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28. However, the mere filing of cross motions for
summary judgment neither establishes that there is no issue of material fact nor obligates a court
to render summary judgment. Id. Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS
5/2-1005(c) (West 2022). We review the circuit court’s decision as to cross-motions for summary
judgment de novo. Schroeder v. Sullivan, 2018 IL App (1st) 163210, ¶ 25.
4 No. 1-23-1135
¶ 12 On appeal, Taylor argues that (1) section 7(1)(d)(i) does not allow for a categorical
withholding of his case file; (2) CCSAO cannot prove, at the time of denial, that his requests would
have interfered with the postconviction matter; and (3) his postconviction matter is not a “law
enforcement” proceeding as contemplated by section 7(1)(d)(i). All records in the custody or
possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying. 5 ILCS 140/1.2
(West 2022). Any public body asserting an exemption must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the withheld records are exempt. Id. Section 7(1) states that when a request is made
to inspect or copy a public record that contains information exempt from disclosure, but also
contains information not exempt, the public body may elect to redact the exempt information. Id.
§ 7(1). Subject to this requirement, section 7(1)(d)(i) states that records in the possession of any
law enforcement or correctional agency are exempt from disclosure but only to the extent that
disclosure would interfere with pending law enforcement proceedings conducted by any law
enforcement agency that is the recipient of the request. Id. § 7(1)(d)(i).
¶ 13 The office of state’s attorney is considered a “public body” for purposes of the Illinois FOIA
and, as such, they must make their public records available for inspection and copying. Nelson v.
Kendall County, 2014 IL 116303, ¶ 27. If a party seeking disclosure challenges the denial at the
circuit court, the public body must provide a detailed justification for its claim of exemption and
address the requested documents specifically and in a manner that allows for adequate adversary
testing. Illinois Education Ass’n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 464 (2003).
If the public body contesting disclosure can prove that a requested document falls within a category
specifically exempted in section 7, the document is exempt from disclosure. Ballew v. Chicago
Police Department, 2022 IL App (1st) 210715, ¶ 17. As previously stated, the public body
asserting an exemption must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the withheld documents
5 No. 1-23-1135
are exempt. Id. A public body may meet its burden through affidavits in which case the court need
not conduct an in camera inspection of the withheld documents. Kelly v. Village of Kenilworth,
2019 IL App (1st) 170780, ¶ 23. An affidavit is insufficient if the public body presents claims that
are conclusory, overly vague, or sweeping or that merely recite statutory standards. Id. ¶ 24.
¶ 14 Taylor argues that the circuit court erred in likening this matter to Robbins. In Robbins, the
United States Supreme Court reviewed Exemption 7(A) of the federal FOIA, which allowed the
nondisclosure of “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would 1 *** interfere with enforcement proceedings.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Robbins, 437 U.S. at 223. Taylor points to Kelly, 2019 IL App
(1st) 170780, ¶ 46, where this court noted that the federal FOIA may allow for generic
determinations with respect to the interference exemption, but the Illinois FOIA did not.
¶ 15 Taylor’s argument has merit. In Kelly, this court noted while Illinois courts frequently
consult federal FOIA jurisprudence to resolve questions on the Illinois FOIA, key differences lie
between the two statutes. Id. ¶ 43. The Kelly court acknowledges that while the interference
exception in the federal FOIA may allow the government to justify its withholdings by reference
to generic categories of documents, the Illinois legislature clearly chose to handle records in a
different manner. Id. ¶ 46. While a public body may prefer to claim exemptions over their entire
files, rather than sift through thousands of documents to redact exempt matters, section 7(1)(d)
does not authorize this approach. Id. ¶ 39. In a situation such as this, CCSAO could raise an “undue
1 Congress amended 5 USC § 552(b)(7) in 1986, replacing the word “would” with “could.” See Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, § 1802(a), 100 Stat. 3207 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)). Section 7(1)(d)(i) of the Illinois FOIA retains the word “would,” similar to the section of the federal FOIA cited in Robbins. See 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i) (West 2022). 6 No. 1-23-1135
burden” exemption under FOIA section 3(g) (5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2018)) or “be prepared to
make the extensive redactions required by section 7(1)(d).” Kelly, 2019 IL App (1st) 170780, ¶ 49.
¶ 16 Here, the CCSAO claimed the entirety of Taylor’s requests were exempt under section
7(1)(d)(i). Yet, as stated above, section 7(1)(d)(i) does not allow for generic exemptions over an
entire file. The CCSAO did not produce any documents to the circuit court for in camera inspection
and chose to rely on Ms. Booker’s affidavit to meet their burden. Ms. Booker’s affidavit does not
detail which records in Taylor’s case file were exempt from disclosure. Furthermore, the affidavit
does not establish why the records were exempt, beyond noting they were under review due to a
pending postconviction proceeding. While affidavits are accorded a presumption of good faith,
they are insufficient if the public body presents claims that are conclusory. Ballew, 2022 IL App
(1st) 210715, ¶ 19.
¶ 17 We find this court’s ruling in Makiel v. Foxx, 2023 IL App (1st) 221815-U 2 persuasive. In
Makiel, an incarcerated plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a postconviction petition before
submitting a FOIA request to CCSAO seeking various records related to the codefendant in his
criminal case. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. CCSAO denied the request, claiming the records were exempt from
disclosure pursuant to section 7(1)(d)(i), as disclosure would interfere with the plaintiff’s active
postconviction proceeding. Id. ¶ 6. The plaintiff filed suit and CCSAO filed a motion for summary
judgment. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. CCSAO did not attach any affidavits to its motion, nor did it present any
documents to the circuit court for in-camera inspection. Id. ¶¶ 8, 25. The circuit court granted the
motion for summary judgment. Id. ¶ 8. On appeal, another panel of this court found that CCSAO
neither provided sufficiently detailed affidavits, nor produced the documents for in camera
2 Nonprecedential orders entered under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) on or after January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes. Ill. Sup. Ct. R 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023). 7 No. 1-23-1135
inspection. Id. ¶ 25. Instead, CCSAO asserted the entire file would interfere with the
postconviction proceedings. Id. Following the approach in Kelly, the court found section 7(1)(d)(i)
did not permit blanket exemptions, and CCSAO did not meet their burden that the records were
exempt. Id. ¶ 29.
¶ 18 Compare the facts in Makiel to those in Ballew. In Ballew, the plaintiff submitted a FOIA
request to the Chicago Police Department (CPD) regarding a homicide. Ballew, 2021 IL App (1st)
210715, ¶ 3. CPD partially responded to the request and disclosed redacted records, claiming the
remaining records were exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(d)(i), as the homicide was an
ongoing investigation. Id. CPD attached an affidavit of the officer overseeing the investigation to
its cross motion for summary judgment. Id. ¶ 9. The affidavit explained that the investigation was
ongoing and the suspect was still at large and possibly connected to another unsolved homicide.
Id. ¶ 21. Thus, releasing any requested documents before the investigation was complete would
materially impact the investigation as CPD were still trying to identify witnesses. Id. This court
found the affidavit provided clear and convincing evidence that the withheld records were exempt
under section 7(1)(d)(i), as the affidavit explained the nature of the open investigation and how
disclosure would interfere. Id. ¶ 22-23. The court further found that because CPD provided the
original case incident report and explained which records were exempt, CPD did not attempt to
assert a blanket exemption. Id. ¶ 24. The record did not indicate that CPD refused to review all
responsive records before asserting their exemption. Id.
¶ 19 Here, the CCSAO’s actions are akin to Makiel rather than Ballew. While the CCSAO
provided an affidavit in its cross motion for summary judgment, it did not explain why the records
Taylor requested were exempt. Instead, the affidavit merely concludes that all the records were
covered by section 7(1)(d)(i) because Taylor had a pending postconviction proceeding. This
8 No. 1-23-1135
response indicates CCSAO refused to review all responsive records before asserting an exemption
and amounts to the generic approach rejected by both Ballew and Kelly.
¶ 20 While a public body may meet its burden to show an exemption exists via affidavit, our
supreme court reminds us that affidavits will not suffice to excuse the need for in camera
inspection if the claims are conclusory, merely recite statutory standards, or are too vague or
sweeping. Illinois Education Ass’n, 204 Ill. 2d at 471. We find the CCSAO failed to meet their
burden to show the documents Taylor requested were exempt under FOIA section 7(1)(d)(i). Based
on this finding, we do not address Taylor’s alternative argument that the CCSAO cannot prove at
the time of denial that his requests would have interfered with the postconviction matter.
¶ 21 Taylor next argues the circuit court erred when it found his postconviction proceeding was
a law enforcement proceeding as contemplated by section 7(1)(d)(i). He claims the court
incorrectly treated his postconviction petition as a law enforcement proceeding, even though a
postconviction petition is civil in nature. Taylor points to Griffith Laboratories U.S.A. v.
Metropolitan Sanitary District of Chicago, 168 Ill. App. 3d 341, 347-48 (1988), where this court
found under a prior version of the Illinois FOIA that enforcement proceedings referred to activities
“directed toward an active and concrete effort to enforce the law.” Taylor asserts that the
legislature’s subsequent amendments to the Illinois FOIA makes Griffith Laboratories irrelevant,
as the legislature eliminated enforcement proceedings generally. He also argues CCSAO does not
“conduct” the postconviction proceeding as contemplated by section 7(1)(d)(i). Taylor’s argument
raises a question of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law we review de novo. In re
Appointment of Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949, ¶ 22.
¶ 22 Taylor’s arguments are defeated by the legislative amendment and this court’s analysis in
Makiel. First, where the legislature amends a statute soon after a controversy arose as to the
9 No. 1-23-1135
interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation
of the original statute. Mattis v. State Universities Retirement System, 212 Ill. 2d 58, 83 (2004). In
Griffith Labs, the court examined the federal FOIA for guidance on interpreting what was an
“enforcement proceeding” under then Illinois FOIA section 7(c)(1). The court discussed
Moorefield v. United States Secret Service¸ 611 F.2d 1021 (5th. Cir. 1980), where the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the congressional record to define the term
“enforcement proceeding” within the context of the federal FOIA. The Moorefield court found that
“ ‘enforcement proceedings’ correspond with ‘law enforcement purposes,’ ” which include the
“prevention as well as the detection and punishment of violations of the law.” Id. at 1025. The
court in Griffith Labs adopted the Moorefield court’s analysis in interpreting section 7(c)(1) of the
Illinois FOIA, stating that enforcement proceedings are activities directed toward an active and
concrete effort to enforce the law. Griffith Labs, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 347.
¶ 23 The Griffith Labs court issued its ruling on March 24, 1988. Id. at 341. Less than six months
later, on September 1, 1988, the Governor approved Public Bill 85-1357, where the Illinois
General Assembly further clarified section 7(1)(c) of the Illinois FOIA, adding the word “law” in
front of the phrase “enforcement proceedings.” Pub. Act 85-1357 (eff. Jan. 1, 1989) (amending Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 116, ¶ 207, now codified as 5 ILCS 140/7)). Hence, we find that the legislature
intended for the term enforcement proceedings to align with our decision in Griffith Labs.
¶ 24 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act allows prisoners to assert that they suffered a substantial
denial of their constitutional rights in the proceedings that resulted in their conviction. 725 ILCS
5/122-1(a) (West 2022). The Unified Code of Corrections defines a conviction as a sentence
entered upon a verdict of guilty of an offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-1-5 (West 2022). Here, Taylor’s
petition challenges his murder conviction by a jury. If the legislature intended to limit “law
10 No. 1-23-1135
enforcement proceedings” in section 7(1)(d)(i) only to judicial hearings of a criminal nature, it
would have done so. They did not, and we will not depart from the plain language of the statute to
read any exceptions or limitations not consistent with the express legislative intent. People v.
Jones, 2024 IL App (3d) 210414, ¶ 15.
¶ 25 Second, Taylor’s assertion that the state’s attorney does not conduct postconviction
proceedings—as it typically defends them—is a roundabout argument that this court rejected in
Makiel. In Makiel, the plaintiff argued his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition was not a law enforcement proceeding because he initiated the proceedings, and not the
state’s attorney. Makiel, 2023 IL App (1st) 221815-U, ¶ 20. As we found then, this argument would
result in the State never being able to assert the exemption in section 7(1)(d)(i) when a convicted
individual files a postconviction petition or other collateral attack. Id. We are not so bound to plain
language statutory interpretations that we must rigidly follow a provision’s language to such an
absurd result. People v. Pearson, 2020 IL App (2d) 180182, ¶ 14.
¶ 26 Illinois courts have not previously addressed whether postconviction proceedings are law
enforcement proceedings within the context of section 7(1)(d)(i). However, the General Assembly
patterned the Illinois FOIA after the federal FOIA, and thus Illinois courts often look to federal
caselaw construing the federal FOIA for guidance in construing the Illinois FOIA. Chicago Sun-
Times v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2021 IL App (1st) 192028, ¶ 37 (citing Special Prosecutor,
2019 IL 122949, ¶¶ 54-55). Federal courts have found that postconviction motions qualify as law
enforcement proceedings within the context of the federal FOIA. See King v. United States
Department of Justice, Civil Action No. 09-1555 (HHK), 2009 WL 2951124, *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 9,
2009) (“[appellant]’s post-conviction motion is still pending and is therefore prospective, as is
required for [an] application of [federal FOIA Exemption 7(A)]”); see also Johnson v. Federal
11 No. 1-23-1135
Bureau of Investigation, 118 F. Supp. 3d 784, 792-93 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“[W]here there is a pending
[postconviction] motion and the movant is seeking a new trial, the new trial constitutes a
prospective enforcement proceeding that may implicate Exemption 7(A)”).
¶ 27 In Watford v. Rowe, 2021 IL App (5th) 190434-U, during postconviction proceedings, the
plaintiff filed a motion for discovery that the court denied because plaintiff had not shown “good
cause” for discovery. Plaintiff then filed a FOIA request. Based on the Illinois Supreme Court’s
ruling in In re Special Prosecutor, the Watford court held it need not decide whether section
7(1)(d)(i) applied because it found that FOIA may not be used to obtain documents that a
postconviction court has already denied the postconviction petitioner during discovery. The
Watford court also reasoned that an order denying discovery in a postconviction case may not be
circumvented in a collateral FOIA proceeding and found that one would have to appeal the
postconviction court’s ruling that denied the discovery. Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 28 We find that there is a distinction between Special Prosecutor and Watford. An order
denying discovery for lack of good cause under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, as was the case
in Watford and here, is not the same as an order prohibiting the disclosure of documents, as was
the case in Special Prosecutor. The FOIA request in Special Prosecutor was clearly a collateral
attack on the injunction, whereas, here, the FOIA petitioner has not lodged a collateral attack on
any injunction prohibiting the disclosure of the subject records. We note that FOIA has long been
recognized as an alternative means to obtain documents from public bodies.
¶ 29 Federal courts note, however, for purposes of Exemption 7(A), the fact that a defendant in
an ongoing criminal proceeding may obtain documents via FOIA that he could not procure through
discovery does not in and of itself constitute interference. North v. Walsh, 881 F.2d 1088, 1097
12 No. 1-23-1135
(D.C. Cir. 1989). Rather, the government must show that disclosure of those documents would—
in some discernable way—disrupt, impede, or otherwise harm the enforcement proceeding. Id.
¶ 30 While we find that a postconviction petition falls within the scope of section 7(1)(d)(i),
CCSAO still bears the burden of proving the withheld documents were exempt from disclosure.
Ballew, 2022 IL App (1st) 210715, ¶ 17. That did not happen here; therefore, summary judgment
was improper. We hold that the pendency of a postconviction petition, in and of itself, is not
sufficient to trigger the law enforcement exemption.
¶ 31 We note that during oral arguments, CCSAO acknowledged that if a third party had
submitted a FOIA request for case file records rather than Taylor, then “it would not be denied;
the State’s Attorney would produce the file.” CCSAO also acknowledged that if Taylor had sought
the records under FOIA before he filed his postconviction petition, then his request would be
granted so long as there was no postconviction petition pending, or at least the section 7(1)(d)
exemption would not be asserted. CCSAO’s interpretation would lead to the absurd result that a
defendant who subsequently files a postconviction petition may not use FOIA to obtain his case
file, but a third party could. Even if documents are limited in a postconviction proceeding, a FOIA
request is not precluded unless the state explains why disclosure of each document or category of
documents would interfere with pending or reasonably contemplated law enforcement
proceedings. We remind CCSAO that all records in the custody or possession of a public body are
presumed to be open to inspection or copying. 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2022). Any public body
asserting an exemption must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the withheld records are
exempt. Id. Section 7(1) states that when a request is made to inspect or copy a public record that
contains information exempt from disclosure, but also contains information not exempt, the public
body may elect to redact the exempt information. Id. § 7(1).
13 No. 1-23-1135
¶ 32 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 The circuit court erred in granting summary judgment where the CCSAO’s affidavits in
support of their motion merely recited the statutory standard, instead of explaining why Taylor’s
requested records were exempt. We reverse the circuit court judgment granting the CCSAO’s
motion for summary judgment. We remand the matter, ordering the CCSAO to comply with its
burden under FOIA to produce the requested documents or justify application of section 7(1)(d)(i)
by preparing an index and detailed affidavit explaining why disclosure would interfere with or in
some way harm pending or prospective law enforcement proceedings.
¶ 34 Reversed and remanded with directions.
14 No. 1-23-1135
Taylor v. Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, 2025 IL App (1st) 231135
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 22-CH- 7602; the Hon. Thaddeus L. Wilson, Judge, presiding.
Matthew Topic, Josh Loevy, Merrick Wayne, and Shelley Attorneys Geiszler, of Loevy & Loevy, of Chicago, for appellant. for
Appellant:
Eileen O’Neill Burke, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Cathy Attorneys McNeil Stein, Jonathon D. Byrer, Paul Fangman, and Brett D. for Schweinberg, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for Appellee: appellee.