Taylor v. Churchill Valley Country Club

228 A.2d 768, 425 Pa. 266, 1967 Pa. LEXIS 678

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 24, 1967
• Docket: Appeal, 43
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion by

Mb. Chief Justice Bell,

Plaintiffs instituted an action of trespass, seeking to recover damages sustained when Richard L. Taylor, the minor plaintiff herein, was struck and injured by a golf ball.

On July 5, 1959, Richard L. Taylor was engaged as a caddy at Churchill Valley Country Club (hereinafter called “defendant”). In order to observe golf balls driven (or hit on a second shot) on the 17th hole, it was the customary practice for one caddy in each golf group to go ahead of the golfers and to take a position on a narrow footbridge separating the 15th and 17th holes. While sitting on this footbridge the minor plaintiff was struck by a golf ball hit by Jack Damico,

* who was one of a foursome, for two of whom plaintiff was caddying. Plaintiff sustained severe personal injuries. At the time of this incident, Taylor was twenty years old.

The case was tried before a Judge and jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the Judge granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment which was entered on that verdict.

In support of their reasons for the grant of a new trial, plaintiffs contend that several errors were committed by the trial Court. However, we need not consider these alleged trial errors because the lower Court correctly directed a verdict in favor of defendant, regardless of the ground or grounds upon which it placed its decision. If a lower Court makes a correct ruling, order, decision, or judgment or decree, but assigns an erroneous reason for its action, an appellate Court will affirm the lower Court’s action, order or ruling or decision or judgment or decree, and assign the proper reason therefor. Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 117 A. 2d 899. In that case the Court said (page 115) : “. . . The rule here applicable is that a correct decision will be sustained if it can be sustained for any reason whatsoever; in other words we will not reverse in such a case even though the reason given by the Court below to sustain its decision was erroneous: Derry Council, No. 40 v. State Council, 197 Pa. 413, 420; Com. to use v. Wing, 253 Pa. 226, 230; Corgan v. Geo. F. Lee Coal Co., 218 Pa. 386, 392; Brew v. Hastings, 206 Pa. 155, 162; 2 R.C.L. 189; State H. for C.I. v. Consolidated W.S. Co., 267 Pa. 29, 39.”

Negligence

The principles set forth in Wood v. Conneaut Lake Park, Inc., 417 Pa. 58, 209 A. 2d 268, are controlling. In the Conneaut Lake Park case, the Court pertinently said (pages 61-62) : “It is well settled (1) that defendant is not an insurer: Cooper v. Pittsburgh, 390 Pa. 534, 136 A. 2d 463, and cases cited therein; Haugh v. Harris Bros. Amusement Co., 315 Pa. 90, 172 A. 145; Schentzel v. Philadelphia National League Club, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 179, 96 A. 2d 181, and (2) that plaintiff must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence (a) that defendant was negligent, and (b) that its negligence was the proximate cause of the accident: Markle v. Robert Hall Clothes, 411 Pa. 282, 191 A. 2d 374; Zilka v. Sanctis Const. Co., 409 Pa. 396, 186 A. 2d ; Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. [463, 175 A. 2d 864]. Moreover a verdict will not be sustained which is based on conjecture or surmise or guess: Steiner v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 415 Pa. 549, 204 A. 2d 2542; Robbins v. Kaufman, 415 Pa. 192, 202 A. 2d 826.

“As the Court relevantly and correctly said in Schentzel v. Philadelphia National League Club, 173 Pa. Superior Ct., supra (page 183) :

“ ‘. . . “One who maintains a ‘place of amusement for which admission is charged, is not an insurer, but must use reasonable care in the construction, maintenance and management of it, having regard to the character of the exhibitions given and the customary conduct of patrons invited:* Haugh v. Harris Bros. Am. Co., 315 Pa. 90, 172 A. 145.” ’

“When we apply this test to the facts in the instant case, it means that plaintiff must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence that defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in the erection or maintenance of its [golf course] . . . commensurate with the risk involved.”

Plaintiffs contend that the defendant negligently failed to provide screening or other protective devices at the point at which the minor plaintiff sustained his injury. Although plaintiffs’ brief states that there was expert testimony to prove that defendant was negligent in not providing screening at this particular spot, the testimony of the one witness on whom they rely to prove this—the Club’s golf pro—was insufficient. He testified merely that the Club has one screen on the course (on the 18th tee), and several other golf clubs have a screen on a couple of holes. This testimony failed to prove that defendant was negligent in failing to provide screening or other appropriate safeguards at this spot, and for this reason the lower Court correctly directed a verdict in favor of the defendant.*

Judgment affirmed.

Jack Damico was joined as an additional defendant. The lower Court entered a nonsuit with respect to him. That action is not challenged on this appeal.

Italics throughout, ours.

The writer of this Opinion is convinced that plaintiffs are precluded from recovering for an additional and even more important reason—the minor plaintiff assumed the risk of the game. In Schentsel v. Philadelphia National League Club, 173 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, the Court reviewed at great length the authorities governing recovery in trespass suits for injuries sustained by spectators in many sports, including particularly baseball, and denied recovery to a woman who had been struck by a foul ball and who had never previously seen a baseball game. In the SGhent eel case, the Court pertinently and accurately said (pages 186-187) :

“. . . We quote at length from Prosser on Torts at pages 383-384: ‘By entering freely and voluntarily into any relation or situation which presents obvious danger, the plaintiff may be taken to accept it, and to agree that he will look out for himself, and relieve the defendant of responsibility. Those who participate or sit as spectators at sports and amusements assume all the obvious risks of being hurt by roller coasters, flying balls, [Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass’n, 105 Wash. 215, 177 P. 776; Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (baseball); Schlenger v. Weinberg, 107 N.J.L. 130, 150 A. 434, 69 A.L.R. 738 (golf); Douglas v. Converse, 248 Pa. 232, 93 A. 955 (polo); Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, 245 App. Div. 137, 281 N.Y.S. 505 (hockey)], fireworks explosions, or the struggles of the contestants. “The timorous may stay at home.” [Cardozo, C. J., in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173.]

In Getz v. Freed, 377 Pa. 480, 105 A. 2d 102, we said (pages 482-483) : “A person who plays golf [or caddies'] assumes some risks of the game. Cf. Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Superior Ct. 471, 157 A. 10; Douglas v. Converse, 248 Pa., supra. For example, he knows that every star sometimes, and every ‘dub’ ofttimes, hooks or slices, and that when he is playing [or caddying] on a parallel hole or on a parallel area of ground he may be struck by a wild shot . . . [and] risks being hit and injured.”

In the instant case, the minor plaintiff testified that he knew the risk and accepted it and for this additional reason should not be allowed to recover.