TAYLOR v. CHILDREN AND YOUTH

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA __________________________________________

KATHY L. TAYLOR, : Plaintiff, : : v. : No. 5:24-cv-1411 : NORTHAMPTON COUNTY; : BETHLEHEM POLICE DEPT.; and : AFFIANT PETER LABIAK; : Defendants. : __________________________________________

O P I N I O N Bethlehem Police Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 48 - Granted Northampton County Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 49 - Granted

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. June 4, 2025 United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Kathy Taylor, a grandmother, alleges, inter alia, that her complaints of neglect and endangerment against her grandsons’ mother were not investigated by the Bethlehem Police Department or by the Northampton County Office of Children & Youth Services. She alleges that the failure to investigate was due to racial discrimination. Taylor claims a due process violation and discrimination in violation of Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause. For the reasons set forth below, the allegations are insufficient to state a claim for relief. II. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History On April 2, 2024, Taylor initiated the above-captioned action against the Northampton County Office of Children & Youth Services (“CYS”), the Northampton County District Attorney’s Office (collectively “County defendants”), and against the Bethlehem Police 1 Department and Bethlehem Police Detective Affiant Peter Labiak (collectively “Police defendants”). County defendants filed a motion to dismiss, after which Taylor filed an amended complaint. See ECF No. 27. The Amended Complaint contained the following counts: (1) Fourteenth Amendment- due process violation, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (II) Civil Rights Act of 1964- discrimination; and (III) Eighth Amendment- inhumane treatment, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. See id. County defendants and Police defendants each filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. See ECF Nos. 28, 32. Taylor timely responded to the motions, see ECF Nos. 30, 34, and several months later filed an Addendum to the Amended Complaint, see ECF Nos. 38-39. In an Opinion and Order dated March 11, 2025, this Court granted Defendants’ motions in part. See ECF Nos. 45-46. Counts I and II were dismissed without prejudice as to Police defendants and with prejudice as to County defendants but with leave to substitute Northampton County as the defendant in an amended complaint. See id. Count III was dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants. See id. Taylor has filed a Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Bethlehem Police and Detective Peter Labiak (collectively “Police defendants”) and against Northampton County. See Sec. Am. Compl., ECF No. 47. The Second Amended Complaint asserts two claims: (1) substantive due process violation and (II) discrimination under Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause. Police defendants and Northampton County have each moved to dismiss. See Police Mot., ECF No. 48; County Mot., ECF No. 49. Taylor filed responses to the same. See Police Resp., ECF No. 54;1 County Resp., ECF No. 54.2

1 Taylor improperly filed her response to Police defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as a motion, but it is treated as an opposition brief. 2 Taylor attaches numerous exhibits to her responses, but most of them are not relevant to her claims in the Second Amended Complaint. To the extent any are relevant and “undisputedly authentic” they have been reviewed but do not alter the analysis herein. 2 B. Factual Allegations Taylor is the paternal grandmother of two boys. See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. The boys’ father is Timothy Barr, Taylor’s son, and their mother is Maria I. Garcia Roldan. See id. at ¶ 17. Since 2020, Taylor “observed and reported [alleged] acts of perjury, harassment, and endangerment committed by Maria I Garcia Roldan.” Id. at ¶ 16. In June 2022, Taylor

attempted to file a private criminal complaint against Roldan with the Bethlehem Police Department and provided them with a video showing a man pointing a gun on her grandchildren, presumably while in the custody of Roldan. See id. at ¶ 19. Northampton County, through its agency CYS, failed to investigate or intervene, which allegedly contributed to the harm to Taylor and the disruption of her relationship with her grandchildren. See id. The Bethlehem Police Department also failed to investigate Taylor’s complaint or to protect the boys. See id. at ¶¶ 18, 20, 23. Detective Labiak failed to investigate when Taylor provided the Bethlehem Police a video in January 2024 showing her grandson holding a firearm. See id. at ¶ 21. In August 2025, a judge ruled that a CYS caseworker, Roldan, and one of the boys were not credible, but

Defendants failed to reinvestigate. See id. at ¶ 27. In August 2021, Roldan filed a temporary Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) Order against Barr. See id. at ¶ 17. Taylor alleges that in the PFA, Roldan “falsely claimed that [Taylor] sent [Barr] to harm her and her minor children.” Id. She alleges the PFA remains “unresolved” because the “PFA Office has been unable to locate Maria for service or resolution.” Id. Taylor alleges Roldan uses the unresolved PFA to maintain custody of the boys in violation of the standing custody order granting Taylor primary physical and legal custody of the boys. See id. at ¶ 18.

3 Taylor complains that since the PFA was issued in August 2021, Roldan has not taken her children to the dentist. See id. at ¶ 24. However, she also alleges that in October 2023, Roldan attempted to schedule a dental appointment for one of the boys and accused Taylor of neglect to dental staff. See id. Taylor alleges that in September 2020, a doctor testified Roldan was responsible for dental neglect and in February 2024, submitted a letter about such dental

neglect. See id. at ¶¶ 25-26. Taylor alleges that in October 2024 Northampton County was notified that Roldan gave a false address under oath during custody proceedings. See id. at ¶ 22. Finally, Taylor alleges that she, an African-American woman, was “treated differently than similarly situated individuals” as her complaints were ignored “while those of non-minority individuals were investigated.” See id. at ¶¶ 34-35. She alleges “Northampton County has a policy/custom of screening out or ignoring credible reports by African-American individuals, especially in private complaint filings and child welfare investigations. See id. at ¶ 33. III. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Motion to Dismiss, Rule 12(b)(6) - Review of Applicable Law

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court construes pro se pleadings liberally. See Higgs v. AG of the United States, 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011). Only if “the ‘[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level’” has the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 555 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft

4 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. (explaining that determining “whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense”). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits

attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). See also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (holding that “courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice”); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that “a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered” (internal quotations omitted)). Courts may also consider “an undisputedly authentic

document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)). B. Section 1983 Claims – Review of Applicable Law “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

5 committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The first step for the court analyzing a claim under § 1983 “is to identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated.” Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). The court must determine “whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir.

2000) (quoting Id.). Section “1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). The court must also determine whether a defendant is acting under color of state law, i.e., whether the defendant is a state actor, which depends on whether there is “such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, a “defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” See Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.” Id. “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. C. Substantive Due Process Claims - Review of Applicable Law “The touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). To state a claim for a

6 violation of substantive due process rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) the interest at issue is protected by the substantive due process clause; and (2) “the government’s deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience.” Kane v. Barger, 902 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2018). As to the first element, the Supreme Court has long recognized “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child . . . .” Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). But see A.J. v. Lancaster Cty., No. 5:19-cv-01768, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221035, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2019) (qualifying that a parent’s liberty interest “is not implicated by conduct short of actual separation of parent and child”). As to the second element, the defendant’s conduct “must exceed both negligence and deliberate indifference, and reach a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed ‘shocks the conscience.’” Miller v. City of Phila., 174 F.3d 368, 375-76 (3d Cir. 1999). “‘[O]nly the most egregious official conduct’ violates substantive due process.” J.R. v. Lehigh Cty., 534 F. App’x 104, 108 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller, 174 F.3d at 375). D. Equal Protection Claims - Review of Applicable Law

To state a claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of purposeful discrimination; and (2) the defendant’s personal involvement in this discrimination. See Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990)). The plaintiff must show that any disparate treatment was based upon his or her membership in a protected class (race, gender, etc.). See id. “Personal involvement exists where the defendant engaged in the purposeful discriminatory conduct himself or knowingly acquiesced to it.” Dowling v. Commonwealth Liquor Control Bd., No. 88-7568, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17438, at *20-21 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 1992).

7 E. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act – Review of Applicable Law Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. To state a claim under Title VI, a plaintiff

must show: (1) there is racial or national origin discrimination; and (2) the entity engaging in discrimination is receiving federal financial assistance. See Lei Ke v. Drexel Univ., No. 11-6708, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118211, at *36 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 4, 2015). Private individuals may sue to enforce Title VI and obtain both injunctive relief and damages. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001). Title VI “prohibits only intentional discrimination.” See id. at 280. “[F]unding recipients are properly held liable in damages only where they are deliberately indifferent to [] harassment, of which they have actual knowledge.” Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999). “Constructive knowledge is not sufficient.” Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 273 (3d Cir. 2014).

F. Monell Claims - Review of Applicable Law “Local governing bodies . . . may be sued where ‘the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.’” Lebie v. Borough, No. 13-cv-6819, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68207, 2014 WL 2085518, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 2014) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). “Liability is imposed when the policy or custom itself violates the Constitution, or where the policy or custom is the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional violation by an employee of the local body.” Id. (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991)). “A policy is made ‘when a

8 decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’” Id. (quoting Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480). “A custom may exist when, ‘though not authorized by law, such practices of state officials are so permanent and well settled that they operate as law.’” Id. (quoting Regan v. Upper Darby Township, 363 F. App'x 917, 923 (3d Cir. 2010)). “Custom requires proof of knowledge and

acquiescence by the decisionmaker.” Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 15-1574, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139539, 2015 WL 5965003, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2015) (quoting McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 657 (3d Cir. 2009)). “It is incumbent upon a plaintiff to show that a policymaker is responsible either for the policy or, through acquiescence, for the custom.” Id. (quoting Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1481). IV. ANALYSIS A. The substantive due process claim (Count I) is dismissed. Taylor’s due process claim is based on Defendants alleged “inaction, disregard of credible evidence, and failure to provide protection.” See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 31. This basis can be broken into two theories: (1) failure to investigate and (2) failure to protect.3 This Court

considers each in turn.

3 Taylor alleges in her opposition brief, but not in the Second Amended Complaint, that in 2021 she did not receive a full hearing on the PFA. See Resp. Police Mot. 3. However, the Police defendants had no involvement with, or authority over, the state court’s scheduling of proceedings or its decision to issue an order without a hearing. Similarly, the County was substituted here for CYS and the District Attorney’s Office, neither of which had any involvement or authority to control court scheduling and orders. Moreover, the alleged violation became known in 2021 when a PFA was issued without a hearing, starting the two-year statute of limitations to raise such a claim, which has long passed. See Sameric Corp. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that the two-year statute of limitations for a procedural due process claim is based on Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions and “accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based”). Taylor’s allegations against the County court, see Resp. Police Mot. 7, are therefore also untimely and are subject to dismissal for other reasons not discussed herein. 9 First, failure to investigate, as was explained in the Opinion dated March 11, 2025, dismissing the first Amended Complaint: “an allegation of a failure to investigate, without another recognizable constitutional right, is not sufficient to sustain a section 1983 claim.” Graw v. Fantasky, 68 F. App’x 378, 383 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-97 (1989)). Taylor’s claim fails as to the Police defendants because “private citizens do not have a constitutionally protected right to investigation of criminal charges.” Little v. Outlaw, No. 22-1043, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128438, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2022). “Even a negligent police investigation . . . cannot serve as the basis for a constitutional claim.” Whitehead v. City of Phila., No. 13-2167, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21000, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2014) (“There is no constitutional right to a police investigation.”).4 Further, “the benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause.” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005). Even if it did, a due process claim would fail here because Taylor has not alleged any behavior by the Police defendants that rises to the level of conscious-shocking. See Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. 3d 409, 416-21 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that where the police responded to a neighbor’s 911 call reporting a woman screaming in an apartment, the officers’ failure to kick down the door to the apartment where the victim was inside being raped and murdered did not amount to “shocks the conscious” in the absence of other evidence).

Opn. 11. The Second Amended Complaint does not offer any additional allegations, or any allegations of conscious-shocking behavior, to support the due process claim against Police

Finally, Taylor’s brief , but not the Second Amended Complaint, alleges that a “pattern of deliberate misrepresentation and procedural manipulation culminated in the fraudulent filing of a second criminal case against Plaintiff’s son.” See Resp. Police Mot. 4-5. Because Taylor was advised in the Opinion dated March 11, 2025, that she “may not bring any claims on behalf of her son,” see Opn. 19, this Court will not address such contentions any further. Taylor’s suggestion of selective prosecution about other persons, see Resp. Police Mot. 5-6, is also irrelevant to the instant decision. 4 A reckless investigation “claim, if cognizable, could only arise under the Fourth Amendment.” See Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 354 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 919 (2017)). But a Fourth Amendment claim against the Police defendants, if any, would belong to Barr, not Taylor. See Doe v. Plum Borough Sch. Dist., No. 2:17-cv-00032, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129464, at *26-27 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2017) (dismissing with prejudice the plaintiff’s attempt to bring a claim based on a police officer’s failure to arrest a third party due to a reckless investigation). 10 defendants.5 As to the County, although the Second Amended Complaint substitutes the County for CYS, which cured one problem with the dismissed pleading,6 Taylor again fails to allege conscious-shocking behavior that rises to a constitutional violation, see Taylor v. Lawrence Cty. Children, No. 2:23-CV-00676-CCW, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114140, at *8 (W.D. Pa. June 28, 2024) (determining that a plaintiff’s allegation that a social worker did not properly perform his

or her duties “is akin to an allegation of negligence,” which is insufficient to state a due process claim). This Court previously explained: In order for due process liability to attach in the case of a C&Y caseworker, the “social worker need not have acted with the ‘purpose to cause harm,’ but the standard of culpability for substantive due process purposes must exceed both negligence and deliberate indifference, and reach a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed ‘shocks the conscience.’” See Taylor v. Lawrence Cty. Children, No. 2:23-CV-00676-CCW, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114140, at *7-8 (W.D. Pa. June 28, 2024) (quoting Miller, 174 F.3d at 375-76). Assuming Taylor has a protected liberty interest,7 she has not alleged any conduct by C&Y that is conscious-shocking. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (“[O]nly the most egregious official conduct” violates substantive due process). Rather, Taylor makes conclusory allegations of dental neglect. . . .

5 Taylor argues in her opposition brief that her claim is not simply a right to a police investigation, but is grounded on her fundamental right to familial association. See Resp. Police Mot. 1-2. Regardless, her allegations must still amount to conscious-shocking behavior, but do not. See Taylor v. Lawrence Cty. Children, No. 2:23-CV-00676, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114140, at *7-8 (W.D. Pa. June 28, 2024) (concluding the plaintiff’s allegation that CYS failed to investigate allegations of child abuse perpetrated by the child’s father did not shock the conscious). 6 See Opn. 12 (concluding that Taylor’s due process claim in the first Amended Complaint failed as a matter of law because “an office of children and youth services is typically no more than a department or agency of its respective county or other municipal body and, as such, not an entity separately amenable to suit” (quoting Miles v. Childs. Hosp., No. 2:23-CV-01238-CB- RAL, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98807, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 3, 2024)) 7 But see A.J., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221035, at *7 (dismissing substantive due process claim because the child was not removed from the plaintiff-parent’s home) 11 Opn. 12-13. The Second Amended Complaint does not offer any allegations showing a purpose to cause harm or of any conscious-shocking behavior that would support the due process claim against the County. Second, failure to protect,8 this basis for the due process claim again fails for the reasons discussed in the Opinion dated March 11, 2025, which explained:

“nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 195; Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 431 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Generally, the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative obligation on the state to protect its citizens.”). See also Estes v. Hous. Auth., No. 3:23-cv-120-KRG-KAP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103817, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 13, 2023) (“Failure to take additional safety measures simply cannot be recharacterized as the sort of affirmative conduct necessary for a federal claim.”). There is no applicable exception here because Taylor has not alleged that she was in a special relationship with either the Police defendants or County defendants. See Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining the limited exceptions to the rule that the State does not have an affirmative duty of care and protection, known as the special relationship and state-created-danger exceptions); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the State’s “failure to take affirmative action to protect a victim from the actions of a third person will not, in the absence of a custodial relationship between the state and the victim, support a civil rights claim”).

Opn. 15-16. The Second Amended Complaint does not offer any new allegations that alter this analysis. None of the Defendants had a duty to protect Taylor from allegedly false complaints or to protect the boys from harm/neglect by their mother. See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 203 (holding that the failure of the state’s child protection team to protect a child from violence by his father while in his father’s custody did not violate the child’s due process rights); McMillan’s v. Dep’t of Human Serv., No. 18-2080, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139295, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2018) (concluding that the plaintiff-grandmother failed to state a due process claim against the City and

8 The failure-to-protect claim includes allegations that Defendants failed to protect the grandchildren from neglect and/or to protect Taylor from false allegations by Roldan. The latter allegations somewhat overlap with the failure-to-investigate allegations. 12 CYS for allegedly failing to intervene in the father’s alleged abuse of his children or in the abduction of the plaintiff’s grandchildren); Williams v. Jersey Shore Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp. 3d 688, 704-05 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (explaining that “a school district generally cannot be held liable for failing to protect students from student-on-student harassment”). See also Whitehead, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21000, at *4 (“There is no constitutional right to a police

investigation.”). Moreover, the sole allegation of a policy or custom in the Second Amended Complaint, see Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 33, is too conclusory to sufficiently allege that a custom or policy was responsible for any alleged due process violation by the County. See Garcia v. Phila. DA Office, No. 23-1224, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 13505, at *5 (3d Cir. June 1, 2023) (concluding that the district court correctly dismissed the Monell claim because the allegations related to the claimed custom or policy were “too vague and conclusory to show evidence of an actionable custom or policy on the part of the [defendant]”). “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan,

564 F.3d at 658. Taylor’s allegation that the “County has a policy/custom of screening out or ignoring credible reports by African-American individuals, especially in private complaint filings and child welfare investigations,” see Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 33, is conclusory and insufficient to plausibly state a claim against the County. See Bayer v. Monroe Cty. Children & Youth Servs., 414 F. App’x 431, 437 (3d Cir. 2011) (“agree[ing] with the District Court that plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations are insufficient to support their contention that Monroe County/MCCYS has a policy, custom, or practice of ‘seiz[ing] minor children from their parents without prior judicial authorization, and without any reasonable basis to believe such a seizure is necessary to protect children from imminent harm’”); Khan v. City of Paterson, No. 17-5006,

13 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61247, at *9 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2019) (finding that the plaintiff’s allegations that, inter alia, it “was also a custom and practice of the City to fail to investigate discrimination in accordance with their own by-laws when the complainant was Muslim” was conclusory and did not allege sufficient facts to plausibly plead a municipal policy or custom). Count One asserting a due process violation is dismissed with prejudice9 as to all

Defendants. B. The discrimination claim (Count II) is dismissed. Taylor claims discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and under the Equal Protection Clause. Her sole allegations of discrimination are that she, an African-American woman, “has been treated differently than similarly situated individuals” and “[h]er complaints have been ignored or dismissed, while those of non-minority individuals were investigated.” See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35. She also alleges that “Northampton County has a policy/custom of screening out or ignoring credible reports by African-American individuals, especially in private complaint filings and child welfare investigations. See id. at ¶ 33.

These conclusory allegations fail to state a claim under either Title VI or the Equal Protection Clause. See Z.H. v. Penn Hills Sch. Dist., No. 12cv1696, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10338, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2013) (dismissing the Title VI claim, which alleged that the plaintiff “was treated differently from similarly situated students who are not members of his protected class, as these students are not excluded from school and placed in alternative

9 This Court finds that further leave to amend would be futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a court may deny leave to amend if a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, if an “amendment would be inequitable or futile”); Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that leave to amend may be denied “based on . . . repeated failures to cure the deficiency by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment”) 14 education in the aftermath of making a complaint without due process,” because such conclusory allegations were insufficient to state a claim); Bolus v. Gaughan, No. 3:21-CV-01315, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222340, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2023) (dismissing the equal protection claim because the plaintiff’s “statement that he was treated differently than others is entirely conclusory absent corresponding facts to provide proper context for this statement” (internal

quotations omitted)). Additionally, these conclusory allegations are made against Defendants collectively and fail to show any intentional or purposeful discrimination. See Price v. Commonwealth Charter Acad. Cyber Sch., No. 17-1922, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59394, at *10 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2018) (dismissing the Title VI claim where the complaint offered “conclusory allegations that Defendants collectively violated Title VI, but Plaintiff fail[ed] to allege any set of facts that indicate there was intentional discrimination by Moving Defendants on the ‘ground of race, color, or national origin’ which would violate § 601”); B.D. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Greater Egg Harbor Reg’l High Sch. Dist., No. 14-7232 (NLH/KMW), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96511, at *17 (D.N.J. July 23, 2015) (dismissing conclusory discrimination claim

“against all ‘defendants’ collectively” pursuant to Twombly and Iqbal); Herring v. Chichester Sch. Dist., No. 06-5525, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82571, at *30 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2007) (dismissing equal protection claim because the plaintiff “has only made conclusory allegations and has not provided a ‘clear showing’ of invidiously, purposeful, and intentional discrimination”). The discrimination claims in Count Two are dismissed with prejudice10 as to all Defendants.

10 This Court finds that further leave to amend would be futile. See Alston, 363 F.3d at 235; Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1414. 15 V. CONCLUSION The Second Amended Complaint again fails to contain sufficient allegations of a due process violation by the Police defendants or by the County. Taylor does not allege that the failure to investigate amounted to conscious-shocking behavior or that there was any special relationship that afforded her a due process right to protection. The allegations of discrimination

in violation of Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause are wholly conclusory and do not show any intentional or purposeful discrimination. The Second Amended Complaint is therefore dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. A separate order will be issued.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.______ JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR. United States District Judge