Taylor Profita v. Stephen Andersen
This text of Taylor Profita v. Stephen Andersen (Taylor Profita v. Stephen Andersen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 30 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TAYLOR PROFITA, No. 18-56192
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00286-PA-DFM
v. MEMORANDUM* STEPHEN ANDERSEN; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 21, 2019**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Taylor Profita appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1195
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (9th Cir. 2010). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Thompson v.
Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
To the extent that Profita’s claims sought to have the district court probate a
will, administer an estate, or dispose of property in the custody of the state probate
court, the district court properly dismissed those claims for lack of jurisdiction
under the probate exception because federal courts lack jurisdiction over probate
matters. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12 (2006).
To the extent that Profita alleged legal error in any prior state court
proceeding, dismissal of Profita’s claims was proper because the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars a de facto appeal of prior state court decisions and claims inextricably
intertwined with the state court decisions. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-
65 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rooker-Feldman bars de facto appeals of a state court decision
and constitutional claims “inextricably intertwined” with the state court decision);
see also Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (a de
facto appeal is one in which “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut
the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws
or procedural rules” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
To the extent that any state court proceedings were ongoing, dismissal of
Profita’s claims was proper because the Younger abstention doctrine bars a federal
court from interfering with pending state court proceedings. See ReadyLink
2 18-56192 Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758-59 (9th Cir. 2014)
(federal courts are required to abstain from interfering with pending state court
proceedings where “the federal action would have the practical effect of enjoining
the state proceedings”).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 18-56192
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