Taylor Keith Reed v. General Motors LLC, et al.

Opinion

1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TAYLOR KEITH REED, Case No. 2:25-cv-06995-FLA (SSCx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO REMAND AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 14 AND COSTS [DKT. 15] GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 RULING 2 Before the court is Plaintiff Taylor Keith Reed’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to 3 Remand (“Motion”) this action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Dkt. 15 4 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff also requests attorney’s fees and costs of $2,812.50, incurred 5 because of Defendant General Motors LLC’s (“Defendant”) allegedly untimely 6 removal. Id. at 11–12.1 On October 2, 2025, the court found this matter appropriate 7 for resolution without oral argument and vacated the October 3, 2025 hearing on the 8 Motion. Dkt. 19; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15. 9 For the reasons set forth herein, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and 10 REMANDS this action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The court also 11 GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, and AWARDS Plaintiff 12 $2,137.50. 13 BACKGROUND 14 Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action on March 18, 2025, in the Los 15 Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 25STCV07768, alleging violations of the 16 Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act,” Cal. Civ. Code § 17 1793.2) and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312), as well as 18 breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1, 1794), 19 relating to his purchase of a 2019 Chevrolet Camaro (the “Vehicle”) from Defendant. 20 Dkt. 1-1 (“Compl.”)2 ¶¶ 6–44. Plaintiff served the Complaint on Defendant on March 21 24, 2025. Dkt. 15-1 at 6. 22 Defendant answered Plaintiff’s Complaint on May 6, 2025. Dkt. 1-2 at 2–9; 23 Dkt. 1 at 2. Defendant removed the action to this court on July 30, 2025, more than 24 four months after service of the Complaint, alleging it had “conducted a preliminary 25

26 1 The court cites documents by the page numbers added by the court’s CM/ECF 27 System, rather than any page numbers included natively. 28 2 Citations to the Complaint refer to pages 11 through 18 of Dkt. 1-1. 1 investigation and determined that Plaintiff’s citizenship and the reasonable, non- 2 speculative estimation of the amount in controversy placed at issue through Plaintiff’s 3 allegations plausibly give rise to subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. 4 Plaintiff filed the subject Motion on August 29, 2025, arguing, inter alia, that 5 Defendant failed to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(1)(b)(3)’s (“Section 1446”) thirty- 6 day window to remove an action to federal court. Mot. at 7–11. Plaintiff also seeks 7 attorney’s fees and costs associated with remanding this action. Id. at 11–12. 8 Defendant filed an opposition (“Opposition”) on September 12, 2025. Dkt. 16 9 (“Opp’n”). 10 DISCUSSION 11 I. Legal Standard 12 Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction,” possessing only “power 13 authorized by the Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 14 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Federal courts are 15 presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the 16 record. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3 (2006). “Article III 17 generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject 18 matter before it considers the merits of a case.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 19 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 20 Most commonly, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction where: (1) an 21 action arises under federal law (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or 22 (2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the 23 citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from that of each defendant (diversity 24 jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Except as otherwise provided by an act of 25 Congress expressly, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district 26 courts of the United States have original jurisdiction[] may be removed by the 27 defendant or the defendants” to the district court for the district and division where the 28 action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 1 However, pursuant to Section 1446(b)(1), a notice of removal must be filed 2 within thirty days after a defendant receives the initial pleading or summons. Section 3 1446 is strictly construed against removal. If removability is not apparent from the 4 initial pleading, the thirty-day removal period accrues “thirty days after receipt by the 5 defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, 6 order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which 7 is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). “If a notice of removal is filed 8 after this thirty-day window, it is untimely and remand to state court is therefore 9 appropriate.” Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 A defendant’s notice of removal must include “a plausible allegation that the 11 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin 12 Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “[W]hen the plaintiff contests, or 13 the court questions, the defendant’s allegation,” “both sides [must] submit proof,” at 14 which point “the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the 15 amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88–89. Courts “strictly 16 construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction 17 must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” 18 Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “The ‘strong presumption’ 19 against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of 20 establishing that removal is proper.” Id. 21 II. Analysis 22 Plaintiff argues remand is appropriate because Defendant failed to remove the 23 action timely. Mot. at 7–11. The court agrees. Plaintiff served the Complaint on 24 March 24, 2025, Dkt. 1 at 2, Dkt. 15-1 at 6, and Defendant did not file its Notice of 25 Removal until July 30, 2025—more than four months later and well outside Section 26 1446’s thirty-day window for removal. Compare Dkt. 15-1 at 6, with Dkts. 1-1, 1-2. 27 Defendant argues removal was timely because the Complaint did not establish the 28 $75,000 amount in controversy unequivocally. Opp’n at 16–19. 1 Although the Complaint does not contain a clearly stated amount in 2 controversy, see generally, Compl., Defendant provides no explanation for why it 3 took 128 days (from March 24, 2025—when Plaintiff served the Complaint, Dkt. 15-1 4 at 6—to July 30, 2025—when this action was removed, Dkt. 1) to determine the value 5 of the vehicle (for which a VIN number is included in the Complaint, Compl. ¶ 6) or 6 any potential penalties or attorney’s fees and costs Defendant seeks to include in 7 calculating the amount in controversy, see generally, Dkt. 1, Opp’n.3 Plaintiff makes 8 precisely this argument in his Motion, and Defendant’s Opposition is noticeably silent 9 on any explanation for the delay in determining federal jurisdiction. Mot. at 7–11; see 10 generally, Opp’n. 11 Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s citizenship could not be determined from the 12 Complaint, thereby extending the period of removability. Opp’n at 20. The 13 Complaint states Plaintiff “is, and at all times relevant herein was, a resident of 14 Woodland Hills, California.” Compl. ¶ 2. Defendant’s reliance on Plaintiff’s use of 15 the term “resident,” rather than “citizen,” to claim indeterminate citizenship is 16 unavailing. Opp’n at 21. Defendant’s Notice of Removal further states Defendant’s 17 “preliminary investigation also concluded that Plaintiff resided in California when he 18 purchased the subject vehicle, and on other occasions, establishing a plausible basis 19 for intent to remain in California thus providing a plausible basis for citizenship.” 20 Dkt. 1 at 3. Defendant does not explain the nature of its “investigation” or why it 21 could not have determined any earlier that Plaintiff was a citizen of California given 22 that “Plaintiff resided in California when he purchased the subject vehicle[.]” Id. 23 / / / 24 25 3 Defendant argues the January 1, 2025 Song-Beverly Act amendments “expanded the formula for actual damages” to include “negative equity …, manufacturer’s rebate[s] 26 …, any third party sold optional equipment …, and unpaid financing.” Opp’n at 21. 27 Defendant, however, fails to identify how this new formula prevented its determination of removability within thirty days of service of the Complaint. See 28 generally, Opp’n. 1 The evidence before the court creates clear “doubt as to the right of removal in 2 the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. Defendant had sufficient information to 3 determine removability within thirty days after it received service of the Complaint on 4 March 24, 2025. Dkt. 15-1 at 6. Defendant missed the April 23, 2025 removal 5 deadline by 98 days. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and 6 REMANDS the action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. 7 III. Attorney’s Fees 8 When remanding a case, a court may, in its discretion, “require payment of just 9 costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the 10 removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 11 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015). Typically, a court may only award fees and costs when 12 “the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” 13 Jordan, 781 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 14 141 (2005)). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply “an objectively reasonable standard by 15 looking to the clarity of the law at the time of removal.” Lussier v. Dollar Tree 16 Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Martin, 546 U.S. at 141). 17 Attorney’s fees are warranted here. Defendant provides no evidence to support 18 its contention that the amount in controversy requirement is met, or that Defendant 19 had any evidentiary support to support removal. See generally, Dkt. 1; Opp’n. While 20 not all remands should result in attorney’s fees, Opp’n at 25, Defendant provides no 21 support that there was an “objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal,” Jordan, 22 781 F.3d at 1184. 23 Plaintiff’s Motion includes a declaration from his counsel, Michelle Yang 24 (“Yang”), attesting to her hourly rate and hours preparing and drafting the Motion. 25 Dkt. 15-1 ¶¶ 11–12. Yang spent 6.25 hours on the Motion, and requests a billing rate 26 of $450 an hour. Id. Defendant does not contest the merits of Yang’s lodestar 27 submission. Opp’n at 25–26. However, Yang billed 1.5 hours as “[a]nticipated time 28 to review, prepare for, and attend the hearing regarding Plaintiff’s Motion.” Dkt. 15-1 1 | § 11. The court vacated the hearing on this matter and will not award attorney’s fees 2 || for a hearing which did not take place. Dkt. 19. Accordingly, the court GRANTS 3 | Plaintiff's request for attorney’s fees and costs, and AWARDS Plaintiff $2,137.50 4 | (4.75 hours x $450) against Defendant and its counsel, jointly and severally. 5 CONCLUSION 6 The court, having considered Plaintiff's Motion and finding good cause 7 | therefor, hereby GRANTS the Motion and ORDERS as follows: 8 1. The action is REMANDED to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, 9 Case No. 25STCV07768. 10 2. All dates and deadlines in the action are VACATED. 1] 3. The clerk of the court shall close the action administratively. 12 4. Plaintiff's request for attorney’s fees and costs is GRANTED, and the 13 court AWARDS Plaintiff $2,137.50 in attorney’s fees and costs against 14 Defendant and its counsel, jointly and severally. Defendant and its 15 counsel are ORDERED to pay Plaintiff within fifteen (15) days of this 16 Order. 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 | Dated: February 13, 2026 ae) _ a1 FERNANDO L. AEN | LE-ROCHA 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28