Taylor D Hunt v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 9, 2026
• Docket: 25A-CR-01260
• Status: Published
• Author: Judge Felix

Opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Jan 09 2026, 8:52 am Taylor D. Hunt, CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Appellant-Defendant Court of Appeals and Tax Court

v.

State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

January 9, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1260 Appeal from the Allen Superior Court The Honorable Steven O. Godfrey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 02D04-2308-F3-000058

Opinion by Judge Felix Judges Brown and Scheele concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1260 | January 9, 2026 Page 1 of 11 Felix, Judge.

Statement of the Case [1] While driving to pick up his kids, Taylor Hunt passed out behind the wheel of

his vehicle at a stop light. Law enforcement officers removed Hunt from the

vehicle and found a firearm as well as two plastic bags of suspected

methamphetamine on Hunt’s person. The State charged Hunt with possession

of methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm and unlawful possession

of a firearm by a serious violent felon. The trial court found Hunt guilty as

charged, entered a conviction on the possession of methamphetamine count,

and sentenced Hunt to 12 years of incarceration. Hunt now appeals, raising

two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hunt’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine; and 2. Whether Hunt’s sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] On August 22, 2023, Sergeant David Klein of the Fort Wayne Police

Department observed Hunt’s vehicle stopped at the intersection of Coldwater

Road and Cook Road. Id. Hunt had failed to proceed through the intersection

for several light cycles. Sergeant Klein observed that Hunt’s vehicle’s brake

lights were on, indicating that Hunt’s foot was on the brake and the vehicle

“could go in motion” or was “still in gear, not in park.” Id. at 27. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1260 | January 9, 2026 Page 2 of 11 [4] Sergeant Klein approached Hunt’s vehicle and found Hunt “unconscious in the

[driver’s] seat with his head tilted back,” Tr. Vol. II at 16, and observed a “hand

rolled joint” on Hunt’s waistband, id. at 17. Wanting to avoid startling Hunt

awake and causing an accident, Sergeant Klein attempted to unlock Hunt’s

vehicle through an open rear window so that he could put the vehicle in park

and secure Hunt’s keys before “address[ing] the situation.” Id. at 26. While

Sergeant Klein was “reaching in to unlock the door[,] the vehicle started rolling

forward.” Id. at 18. Sergeant Klein yelled, “[P]olice, stop,” a “couple times,”

and Hunt “suddenly became conscious” and “stopped the vehicle.” Id.

Sergeant Klein “reached in” to “ma[k]e sure the vehicle was in park” and “took

the keys out.” Id.

[5] Once Hunt was conscious, he stated upon inquiry that he had a handgun in his

possession. Sergeant Klein removed a 9-millimeter handgun from Hunt’s

waistband. During a subsequent search of Hunt’s person, Detective William

Turriff removed a “couple of baggies” of multicolored tablets from Hunt’s front

left pocket. Tr. Vol. II at 38. Hunt told officers that the tablets were ecstasy but

“would test positive for methamphetamine.” Id. at 69. A records check

revealed that Hunt was out on parole following a robbery conviction.

[6] The State charged Hunt with possession of methamphetamine as a Level 3

felony 1 and unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a

1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(d)(2).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1260 | January 9, 2026 Page 3 of 11 Level 4 felony 2. At Hunt’s bench trial, the two bags of tablets found on his

person were individually marked as State’s Exhibits 4 and 5. Andrew England,

a forensic scientist in the Drug Unit at the Indiana State Police Forensic

Services Division, testified that he received one of the “baggies,” marked State’s

Exhibit 5, for testing. Tr. Vol. II at 38. England testified that State’s Exhibit 5

contained “multicolored tablets” with an “F symbol marked on them.” Id. at

57. England “randomly selected” and analyzed one of the tablets from State’s

Exhibit 5, id. at 65, and concluded that it “contained methamphetamine,” id. at

58. The single tablet that he tested weighed 0.28 grams. The remaining tablets

in State’s Exhibit 5 weighed 17.84 grams. The tablets in State’s Exhibit 4 were

not weighed or tested. The trial court found Hunt guilty as charged but only

entered a conviction on the possession of methamphetamine count, and it

sentenced Hunt to 12 years of incarceration. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision 1. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Hunt’s Conviction

[7] Hunt argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his

conviction for possession of methamphetamine as a Level 3 felony. Our

standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element

2 I.C. § 35-47-4-5(c).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1260 | January 9, 2026 Page 4 of 11 of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Hancz- Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the

evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226

N.E.3d at 783).

[8] In order to convict Hunt of possession of methamphetamine as a Level 3

felony, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hunt knowingly

or intentionally possessed methamphetamine in an amount of “at least ten (10)

but less than twenty-eight (28) grams and an enhancing circumstance applies.”

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(d)(2). Hunt argues only that the State failed to prove

that “he possessed at least ten (10) grams of methamphetamine” because only

one tablet from Exhibit 5 was analyzed, and that tablet only weighed 0.28

grams. 3 Appellant’s Br. at 13. At trial, Detective Turriff testified that he

removed Exhibits 4 and 5 from Hunt’s left pocket, and Officer Dalton

Waidelich testified that Hunt told him the tablets “would test positive for

methamphetamine,” Tr. Vol. II at 69. England testified that he received the

3 Hunt does not dispute that an enhancing circumstance applies.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1260 | January 9, 2026 Page 5 of 11 bag of tablets marked Exhibit 5 for testing, randomly selected and tested one

tablet from Exhibit 5, and the results revealed the tablet to be

methamphetamine. England described Exhibit 5 as a bag containing

“multicolored tablets,” all with an “F symbol marked on them.” Id. at 57.

[9] Hunt claims that there was insufficient evidence to show the untested tablets

were also methamphetamine. This argument is merely a request for us to

reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090.

The trial court was permitted to infer that the untested tablets—contained in the

same bag and all stamped with an “F”—were methamphetamine based on the

positive methamphetamine test result from the single tablet that was tested. See

Woodford v. State, 752 N.E.2d 1278, 1283 (Ind. 2001) (determining that a

positive cocaine result from a representative sample consisting of two out of

nine rocks was sufficient evidence that the untested rocks were also cocaine).

On these facts, we conclude that the single pill taken from the bag filled with

other pills bearing the same marking is a sufficient representative sample from

which a factfinder could infer that the untested pills were made up of the same

substance as the representative sample. This is especially true when, as here,

the person from whom the pills were seized told officers that the tablets would

test positive for methamphetamine. Thus, we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence to convict Hunt of possession of at least ten grams of

methamphetamine.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1260 | January 9, 2026 Page 6 of 11 2. Hunt’s Sentence Is Not Inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[10] Hunt argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should

be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review

and revise a trial court’s sentencing decision. Russell v, State, 234 N.E.3d 829,

855–56 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d

783, 784 (Ind. 2020)). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule

7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the

trial court’s decision, [we] find[] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the

nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at

1092 (quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)).

[11] Our Supreme Court has explained our role under Appellate Rule 7(B) as

follows:

“[O]ur constitutional authority to review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate,” Cramer [v. State], 240 N.E.3d [693,] 698 [(Ind. 2024)] (quoting Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017)), an act that, importantly, is reserved for “exceptional” cases, id. (citing Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015)). Determining a sentence’s appropriateness thus “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” McCain, 148 N.E.3d at 985.

Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092.

[12] Additionally, the defendant bears the burden of proving that “his or her

sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review.” Konkle, 253

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1260 | January 9, 2026 Page 7 of 11 N.E.3d at 1092 (quoting Cramer, 240 N.E.3d at 698). And because sentencing

“‘is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment

should receive considerable deference,’” a trial court’s sentencing decision will

generally prevail “unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a

positive light the nature of the offense . . . and the defendant’s character.” Id.

(alteration omitted) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind.

2015)).

[13] In reviewing the defendant’s sentence, “we are not limited to the mitigators and

aggravators found by the trial court,” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014),

and we “focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—

consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any

individual count,” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting

Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Similarly, a defendant

“need not ‘necessarily prove’” that the sentence is inappropriate on both prongs

so long as “one of the prongs weighs heavily in favor” of revising the

defendant’s sentence. Id. at 126–27 (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016)) (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, “to the extent the

evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong

must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127 (citing Connor, 58 N.E.3d at

220).

[14] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without

regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State,

868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1260 | January 9, 2026 Page 8 of 11 reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). When considering the nature of the offense,

we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer,

868 N.E.2d at 494). Here, Hunt was convicted of and sentenced on one count

of possession of methamphetamine as a Level 3 felony. “A person who

commits a Level 3 felony . . . shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between

three (3) and sixteen (16) years, with the advisory sentence being nine (9) years.”

I.C. § 35-50-2-5(b) (emphasis added). The trial court sentenced Hunt to 12

years of incarceration. Hunt’s request is that we revise his sentence to “nine (9)

years executed or twelve (12) years with three (3) years suspended and on

probation.” Appellant’s Br. at 19.

[15] After determining the advisory sentence, we consider “whether there is

anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant

that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature

when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also consider whether the

offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Konkle,

253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[16] As set forth in more detail above, Hunt was under the influence while driving

and passed out at a stoplight with his car still in gear. While Sergeant Klein

was reaching in to unlock the rear door, the car started moving forward toward

the intersection while Hunt was still unconscious. Despite Hunt’s cooperation

with arresting officers, nothing about his actions leading up to his arrest

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1260 | January 9, 2026 Page 9 of 11 illustrate restraint or regard for his fellow motorists. Further, Hunt admitted

that both bags removed from his person would test positive for

methamphetamine; yet, Hunt was only charged based on the contents of one of

those bags; he also was not charged with driving under the influence.

[17] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad

consideration of a defendant’s qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing

Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on

reh’g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or

persistent examples of good character,” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting

Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122). “When considering a defendant's character,

their criminal history is relevant.” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1249 (citing

Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)).

[18] Hunt’s presentence investigation report reveals two prior misdemeanor and two

prior felony convictions. The report shows multiple instances of revoked

probation, and the instant offense was committed while Hunt was on parole.

Further, of significant concern is Hunt’s affiliation with the “‘Gangster

Disciples’ gang from age 11 until the present.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 74.

Hunt has rejected multiple opportunities to reform and has not taken advantage

of prior alternatives to incarceration. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say

that Hunt has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of

his offense or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232

N.E.3d 119; Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 855–56. Hunt’s sentence is not

inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1260 | January 9, 2026 Page 10 of 11 Conclusion [19] In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hunt’s conviction for

possession of methamphetamine, and Hunt’s sentence is not inappropriate

under Appellate Rule 7(B). We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues

raised.

[20] Affirmed.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Gregory L. Fumarolo Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1260 | January 9, 2026 Page 11 of 11