24-1543-cv Tatas v. Ali Baba’s Terrace Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of November, two thousand twenty-five.
PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, MICHAEL H. PARK, STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
Mehmet Emin Tatas, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 24-1543-cv
Ali Baba’s Terrace Inc., Ali Riza Dogan, Senol Bakir, Tolgahan Subakan, Defendants-Appellees,
Admiral Insurance Company, Defendant. _____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Mehmet Emin Tatas, pro se, Lynbrook, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Diane Krebs, Jackson Lewis P.C., Melville, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Edgardo Ramos, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Mehmet Emin Tatas, pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment
following a jury verdict in his favor on his assault and battery claim and
otherwise in favor of his former employer, Ali Baba’s Terrace Inc. (“ABT”); ABT’s
owner, Ali Riza Dogan; and former coworkers Senol Bakir and Tolgahan
Subakan. Tatas alleged that Defendants discriminated and retaliated against
him and subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his race and
national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and state and local law. He also
alleged that Dogan assaulted and battered him. We assume the parties’
2 familiarity with the remaining facts, the procedural history, and the issues on
appeal.
I. Evidentiary Rulings
“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,
and will reverse only if an erroneous ruling affected a party’s substantial rights.”
Marcic v. Reinauer Transp. Cos., 397 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2005).
Tatas first argues that the district court improperly (1) denied him the
ability to introduce two documents (a response to interrogatories and a
document request) and (2) precluded him from testifying that a New York State
Department of Labor (“DOL”) employee told him to record his conversations
with Dogan. Neither argument suggests an abuse of discretion.
First, Tatas does not cite any portion of the record showing that the district
court prevented him from introducing the referenced documents, and
Defendants assert that Tatas’s counsel never sought their admission. Second,
the district court precluded testimony about the DOL employee because Tatas’s
testimony was complete without adding this information and because it would
have created confusion about why a DOL employee was advising Tatas. Given
3 these concerns that the testimony would be more prejudicial than probative, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Tatas next argues that the district court improperly permitted defense
counsel to ask about his immigration to the United States when it precluded such
questions with respect to Subakan. This argument fails as well. The district
court’s reasoning for excluding the testimony was sound: Subakan’s
immigration status was not relevant to the issue of why he had moved out of
Tatas’s apartment. By contrast, the questions about Tatas’s immigration history
went to his overall credibility and therefore had substantially more probative
value.
Tatas also asserts that the district court erred by failing to permit witness
Eyyup Dogan from testifying about the discrimination he experienced. The
district court explained that Eyyup’s alleged sexual orientation discrimination
was not sufficiently related to Tatas’s alleged race and national origin
discrimination and would not have any probative value for any element of
Tatas’s case. The district court’s conclusion that evidence concerning Eyyup’s
allegations of discrimination would be more prejudicial than probative was thus
not an abuse of discretion.
4 Tatas further contends that the district court (1) failed to act when Eyyup
was allegedly intimidated by Ali Riza Dogan through phone calls and (2) did not
move Dogan’s seat during Eyyup’s testimony when asked. However, Tatas has
not demonstrated that either decision affected his substantial rights. Although
Tatas’s counsel represented that the phone call from Dogan during the trial
scared Eyyup, Eyyup still returned to testify for a second day. Further, there is
no indication in the record that Dogan’s seating position in the courtroom
prevented Eyyup from giving testimony or that Dogan engaged in any
intimidation in the courtroom.
II. Jury Instructions
“We review a claim of error in jury instructions de novo, reversing only
where appellant can show that, viewing the charge as a whole, there was a
prejudicial error.” Warren v. Pataki, 823 F.3d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 2016) (quotation
marks omitted). “[A]n error is harmless only if the court is convinced that the
error did not influence the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). A
party waives arguments, however, by failing to object to a jury instruction at trial.
Id. at 138. This Court “will disregard the failure to object where there is plain
error affecting substantial rights that goes to the very essence of the case, or
5 where the party’s position has previously been made clear to the trial court and
it was apparent that further efforts to object would be unavailing.” Id. at 138–
39 (quotation marks omitted).
With respect to the jury instructions, Tatas first argues that the district
court erred by permitting the jury to find only Dogan liable for assault, rather
than letting the jury consider if ABT was also liable. But Tatas did not raise this
issue at trial, and it is thus forfeited on appeal. Nor does the record reveal plain
error.
Next, Tatas contends that the jury instructions were erroneous because the
district court should have instructed the jury that (1) it could find the individual
defendants liable on the hostile work environment and retaliation claims, (2)
Defendants’ proffered explanation for their actions was pretext for
discrimination, and (3) Tatas could be awarded front pay damages. All three
arguments lack merit.
First, although Tatas’s counsel raised the issue of amending the jury
instructions to include instructions on individual liability for the hostile work
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24-1543-cv Tatas v. Ali Baba’s Terrace Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of November, two thousand twenty-five.
PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, MICHAEL H. PARK, STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________
Mehmet Emin Tatas, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 24-1543-cv
Ali Baba’s Terrace Inc., Ali Riza Dogan, Senol Bakir, Tolgahan Subakan, Defendants-Appellees,
Admiral Insurance Company, Defendant. _____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Mehmet Emin Tatas, pro se, Lynbrook, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Diane Krebs, Jackson Lewis P.C., Melville, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Edgardo Ramos, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Mehmet Emin Tatas, pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment
following a jury verdict in his favor on his assault and battery claim and
otherwise in favor of his former employer, Ali Baba’s Terrace Inc. (“ABT”); ABT’s
owner, Ali Riza Dogan; and former coworkers Senol Bakir and Tolgahan
Subakan. Tatas alleged that Defendants discriminated and retaliated against
him and subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his race and
national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and state and local law. He also
alleged that Dogan assaulted and battered him. We assume the parties’
2 familiarity with the remaining facts, the procedural history, and the issues on
appeal.
I. Evidentiary Rulings
“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,
and will reverse only if an erroneous ruling affected a party’s substantial rights.”
Marcic v. Reinauer Transp. Cos., 397 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2005).
Tatas first argues that the district court improperly (1) denied him the
ability to introduce two documents (a response to interrogatories and a
document request) and (2) precluded him from testifying that a New York State
Department of Labor (“DOL”) employee told him to record his conversations
with Dogan. Neither argument suggests an abuse of discretion.
First, Tatas does not cite any portion of the record showing that the district
court prevented him from introducing the referenced documents, and
Defendants assert that Tatas’s counsel never sought their admission. Second,
the district court precluded testimony about the DOL employee because Tatas’s
testimony was complete without adding this information and because it would
have created confusion about why a DOL employee was advising Tatas. Given
3 these concerns that the testimony would be more prejudicial than probative, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Tatas next argues that the district court improperly permitted defense
counsel to ask about his immigration to the United States when it precluded such
questions with respect to Subakan. This argument fails as well. The district
court’s reasoning for excluding the testimony was sound: Subakan’s
immigration status was not relevant to the issue of why he had moved out of
Tatas’s apartment. By contrast, the questions about Tatas’s immigration history
went to his overall credibility and therefore had substantially more probative
value.
Tatas also asserts that the district court erred by failing to permit witness
Eyyup Dogan from testifying about the discrimination he experienced. The
district court explained that Eyyup’s alleged sexual orientation discrimination
was not sufficiently related to Tatas’s alleged race and national origin
discrimination and would not have any probative value for any element of
Tatas’s case. The district court’s conclusion that evidence concerning Eyyup’s
allegations of discrimination would be more prejudicial than probative was thus
not an abuse of discretion.
4 Tatas further contends that the district court (1) failed to act when Eyyup
was allegedly intimidated by Ali Riza Dogan through phone calls and (2) did not
move Dogan’s seat during Eyyup’s testimony when asked. However, Tatas has
not demonstrated that either decision affected his substantial rights. Although
Tatas’s counsel represented that the phone call from Dogan during the trial
scared Eyyup, Eyyup still returned to testify for a second day. Further, there is
no indication in the record that Dogan’s seating position in the courtroom
prevented Eyyup from giving testimony or that Dogan engaged in any
intimidation in the courtroom.
II. Jury Instructions
“We review a claim of error in jury instructions de novo, reversing only
where appellant can show that, viewing the charge as a whole, there was a
prejudicial error.” Warren v. Pataki, 823 F.3d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 2016) (quotation
marks omitted). “[A]n error is harmless only if the court is convinced that the
error did not influence the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). A
party waives arguments, however, by failing to object to a jury instruction at trial.
Id. at 138. This Court “will disregard the failure to object where there is plain
error affecting substantial rights that goes to the very essence of the case, or
5 where the party’s position has previously been made clear to the trial court and
it was apparent that further efforts to object would be unavailing.” Id. at 138–
39 (quotation marks omitted).
With respect to the jury instructions, Tatas first argues that the district
court erred by permitting the jury to find only Dogan liable for assault, rather
than letting the jury consider if ABT was also liable. But Tatas did not raise this
issue at trial, and it is thus forfeited on appeal. Nor does the record reveal plain
error.
Next, Tatas contends that the jury instructions were erroneous because the
district court should have instructed the jury that (1) it could find the individual
defendants liable on the hostile work environment and retaliation claims, (2)
Defendants’ proffered explanation for their actions was pretext for
discrimination, and (3) Tatas could be awarded front pay damages. All three
arguments lack merit.
First, although Tatas’s counsel raised the issue of amending the jury
instructions to include instructions on individual liability for the hostile work
environment and retaliation claims, specific instruction was not necessary. The
jury verdict form explicitly permitted the jury to find liability against the
6 individual defendants for all of the discrimination, hostile work environment,
and retaliation claims. Second, Tatas’s counsel had no other amendments to the
jury instructions and confirmed she was “good” with the instructions. Dkt. No.
59.2, at 515. Tatas therefore forfeited any argument concerning the substantive
text of the instructions, including with respect to pretext, and he has not shown
that the instructions were plain error. Third, the parties agreed that front pay
damages would not be presented to the jury.
III. Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence
Tatas principally argues that the jury verdict was against the weight of the
evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
“The weight of the evidence,” however, “is a matter for argument to the jury, not
a ground for reversal on appeal.” Schwartz v. Cap. Liquidators, Inc., 984 F.2d 53,
54 (2d Cir. 1993).
To the extent Tatas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, his
argument is meritless. “It is well established that a party is not entitled to
challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict
on a given issue unless it has timely moved in the district court for judgment as
a matter of law on that issue.” Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir.
7 1998). Tatas failed to move for judgment as a matter of law. We thus may not
disturb the jury’s findings except to “prevent a manifest injustice in cases where
a jury’s verdict is wholly without legal support.” Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up); see Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 164.
Our review of the record does not reveal manifest injustice. Tatas
testified about the February 2016 incident with Bakir, in which Bakir tried to
attack him with a knife after calling him a terrorist, and Tatas’s account was
supported by Emin Tatas’s and Eyyup’s testimony. He also testified that Dogan
blamed him for the altercation with Bakir, made comments about his and his
son’s supposed affiliation with a Kurdish terrorist group, and physically
attacked him on three occasions. However, Bakir, Subakan, and ABT cook
Yunus Hoscan testified that Tatas was the instigator of the February 2016
altercation with Bakir and that Bakir did not threaten or approach Tatas with a
knife. And Dogan and ABT manager Mursel Yalbuzdag testified that Tatas was
verbally and physically aggressive and that Dogan did not physically attack
Tatas. Given the contradicting testimony about the various incidents, the jury’s
verdict does not constitute manifest injustice. See Sorlucco v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t,
971 F.2d 864, 875 (2d Cir. 1991) (Credibility assessments are generally a matter
8 “for the jury to resolve.”); United States v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93, 104–05 (2d Cir.
1998) (“A jury’s credibility assessments are entitled to deference.”).
We have considered Tatas’s remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 1
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
1 We deny Tatas’s motions to reverse the jury verdict and to supplement his appendix.