Tasty One, LLC v. Earth Smarte Water, LLC

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided March 9, 2023·No. 2:20-cv-01625·Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5

6 TASTY ONE, LLC, Case No. 2:20-cv-01625-APG-NJK 7 Plaintiff, Order 8 v. [Docket Nos. 112, 115, 120] 9 EARTH SMARTE WATER, LLC, 10 Defendant. 11 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s renewed motion to de-designate documents. 12 Docket No. 112. Plaintiff filed a response, Docket No. 116, and Defendant filed a reply, Docket 13 No. 119. The motion is properly resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons 14 more fully discussed below, Defendant’s renewed motion to de-designate documents is 15 GRANTED. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 On September 14, 2021, the Court entered a protective order. Docket No. 66. Under the 18 protective order either party can designate documents disclosed during discovery as “Highly 19 Confidential – Attorney’s Eyes Only” or “Confidential.” Id. at 2. Either designation imposes 20 limitations on how the disclosed documents may be used and who may access them. Id. The 21 protective order allows any party to challenge a document’s confidentiality designation. Id. at 7. 22 On September 28, 2021, two months after discovery closed in this case, Plaintiff disclosed 23 approximately 395 pages of documents to Defendant designated as “Highly Confidential – 24 Attorney’s Eyes Only” (“disputed documents”). Docket No. 112 at 2. On November 18, 2022, 25 Defendant moved to reopen discovery and to remove the “Highly Confidential – Attorney’s Eyes 26 Only” designation from the disputed documents disclosed by Plaintiff. Docket Nos. 99, 100. The 27 Court granted Defendant’s motion to reopen discovery but denied the motion to remove the 28 “Highly Confidential” designation without prejudice because neither party provided the disputed 1 documents to the Court for its review. Docket No. 111. On February 3, 2023, Defendant filed the 2 current renewed motion to de-designate documents. Docket No. 112. 3 Prior to filing the renewed motion, the parties met and conferred about possible ways to 4 resolve their dispute without further Court intervention. Docket No. 116 at 5-6. As a result of that 5 meet and confer process, Plaintiff decided to redesignate the documents as “Confidential” and 6 disclosed them with any relevant customer information redacted on February 3, 2023.1 Id. 7 II. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DE-DESIGNATE DOCUMENTS 8 Defendant’s motion asks the Court to remove the “Highly Confidential – Attorney’s Eyes 9 Only” designation from approximately 395-pages of documents Plaintiff disclosed to Defendant. 10 Docket No. 112 at 2-3. The documents are primarily invoices and summaries of invoices for sales 11 of water filtration systems by Plaintiff. Id.; see also Docket Nos. 114-1, 114-2, 114-3. Defendant 12 submits that the “Highly Confidential” designation should be removed because the documents 13 primarily pertain to individuals who are joint customers of Plaintiff and Defendant and the 14 designation is frustrating Defendant’s counsel’s ability to communicate with Defendant and 15 investigate the case. Docket No. 112 at 9-10. Plaintiff submits that the “Highly Confidential” 16 designation is appropriate to protect its confidential trade information and to prevent Defendant 17 from interfering in Plaintiff’s relationship with its customers. Docket No. 116 at 12-15. 18 Although “courts generally make a finding of good cause before issuing a protective order, 19 a court need not do so” when the parties stipulate to the order. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop 20 of Portland in Or., 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). Blanket protective orders, such as the 21 protective order in this case, “are inherently subject to challenge and modification, as the party 22 resisting disclosure has not made a particularized showing of good cause with respect to any 23 individual document.” San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. – N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 24 1 Plaintiff submits that redesignating the documents and disclosing them with any relevant 25 customer information redacted moots the instant motion. Docket No. 116 at 7-8. Defendant submits that the motion is not moot because the disputed documents should have never been 26 designated under either confidentiality designation. Docket No. 119 5-6. Defendant further submits that the motion is not moot because the redacted documents are “‘Swiss Cheese’ (that is, 27 documents with no pertinent information).” Id. at 6 (quoting Docket No. 107 at 8 (Plaintiff’s response to initial motion to de-designate documents)). Since Defendant still challenges the 28 confidentiality designation of the documents, the Court finds that the motion is not moot. 1 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 2 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Docket No. 66 (protective order). “Ninth Circuit precedent strongly 3 favors disclosure to meet the needs of parties in pending litigation.” Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Ronald 4 A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P., 214 F.R.D. 583, 586 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting Beckman, 966 F.2d 5 at 475). Consequently, a designating party can only prove good cause exists to retain a document’s 6 confidentiality designation by “showing specific prejudice or harm will result” if the designation 7 is removed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th 8 Cir. 2002) (citing Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476; San Jose Mercury News, 187 F.3d at 1102). 9 When a party challenges a confidentiality designation, the court conducts a two-step 10 analysis. Todd v. Tempur-Sealy Intn’l, Inc., 2015 WL 1006534, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2015). “First, it 11 must determine whether a particularized harm will result from disclosure of the information from 12 the public.” Id. (quoting Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 424). As mentioned above, any 13 allegations of harm resulting from a potential disclosure must be specific and particularized. 14 “Second, if the court concludes that such harm will result from the disclosure of the discovery 15 documents, then it must proceed to balance the public and private interest to decide whether 16 maintaining” the confidentiality designation is appropriate. Id. “The Ninth Circuit has directed 17 courts doing this balancing to consider the factors identified in Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 18 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).” Universal Ent. Corp. v. Aruze Gaming Am., Inc., 2020 WL 19 8771655, *2 (D. Nev. 2020) (internal quotation omitted). The Glenmede Trust factors to be 20 considered when evaluating whether good cause exists to keep a document protected are:

21 “1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; 2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose; 3) whether 22 disclosure of the information will cause a party embarrassment; 4) whether 23 confidentiality is being sought over information important to public health and safety; 5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote fairness 24 and efficiency; 6) whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality is a public entity or official; and 7) whether the case involves issues important to the 25 public.” 26 27 56 F.3d at 483. The Court will apply these factors in determining whether the challenged 28 documents are properly designated. 1 Plaintiff submits that it will be harmed if the “Highly Confidential” designation is removed 2 from the unredacted documents because Defendant will be able to use the information within them 3 to gain a competitive advantage over Plaintiff.

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Tasty One, LLC v. Earth Smarte Water, LLC, (D. Nev. 2023).

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