Tasciotti v. Trew

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedJune 16, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-00209
StatusUnknown

This text of Tasciotti v. Trew (Tasciotti v. Trew) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tasciotti v. Trew, (S.D. Miss. 2021).

Opinion

USDC SDNY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: DATE FILED: _ 6/16/2021 PETER TASCIOTTI, Plaintiff, 20 CV 6661 (NSR) Vv. ORDER JESSE TREW & GLEN TREW, Defendants.

NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge: The instant case was initiated when Plaintiff Peter Tasciotti (‘Plaintiff’), proceeding pro se, filed his Complaint and therein asserted claims sounding in fraud, harassment, theft of property, and destruction of property against defendants Jesse Trew and Glen Trew (collectively, “Defendants”). (Complaint (“Compl.”) (ECF No. 2).) As described in the Complaint, the actions giving rise to this litigation consist primarily of the following: (1) In or around April 2019, Plaintiff along with his common-law wife and their children travelled to the Gulf Coast International Society for Krishna Consciousness (MS ISKON) located in Carriere, Mississippi (Complaint at 91); (2) Subsequently, also sometime in or around April 2019, Plaintiff left the MS ISKON in order to visit two older children located in Los Angeles while his common-law wife and younger children remained at the MS ISKON (id.); and (3) While Plaintiff was in Los Angeles, Defendant Jesse Trew is alleged to have “interfere[d with Plaintiff's] relationship with family and children”; harassed Plaintiff's children and potentially plotted “a homosexual interaction with the minors”; stole property and intellectual property, including an irreplaceable film project called “The Matrix Documentary movie” that was stored on compact discs, digital video tapes, micro SD cards, and other electronic media (id. at 5). In light of the Complaint’s lack of detailed allegations about where Jesse Trew allegedly engaged in the aforementioned conduct giving rise to this litigation, the Court did not see fit to

1 References to portions of the Complaint indicate page numbers rather than paragraph numbers.

question whether venue was proper, and issued an Order to Show Cause directing the Clerk of the Court to issue summonses as to the Defendants. (See ECF No. 5.) However, upon closer examination, and based on Plaintiff’s recent filings, it is clear that: (1) Plaintiff’s claims arise from conduct that occurred in the Southern District of Mississippi and (2) Defendants are not residents

of New York. Accordingly, as explained below, venue is improper in the Southern District of New York, and this Court orders that this action be transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), the federal venue statute, a civil action may be commenced in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). When a case is filed in a district in which venue is improper, the court shall dismiss the case or, “if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district . . . in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). “After finding that venue is wrong, ‘[w]hether dismissal or transfer is appropriate lies within the sound discretion of the district court.’” Padilla v. City, Town, or Municipality of Dallas Co., Texas, No. 3:19CV1115(VAB), 2019 WL 3766375, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2019) (quoting Minnette v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir. 1993)). Transfer should be the usual remedy for improper venue. See 17 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 111.34 (3d ed. 2020) (“[o]rdinarily, transfer will be in the interest of justice because normally dismissal of an action that could be brought elsewhere is time consuming and justice-defeating.”). “When a plaintiff’s choice of venue is improper, a district court may sua sponte transfer the case....” Ventricelli v. Nicklin, No. 119CV0230, 2020 WL 132334, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2020). See MRP, LLC v. Barr & Barr, Inc., No. 11 CIV. 0896 (DAB), 2011 WL 13266913, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011) (where venue is improper, “courts may sua sponte transfer cases.”) (citing cases). Even if venue is proper, a district court may sua sponte transfer an action in the interest of

justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses to any other district where it might have been brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 530 (1990); Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing cases); Kelly v. Kelly, 911 F. Supp. 70, 71 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). “The purpose of section 1404(a) is to prevent the waste of time, energy and money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Flaherty v. All Hampton Limousine, Inc., No. 01-CV-9939, 2002 WL 1891212, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although “a district court should not dismiss for improper venue on its own except in extraordinary circumstances,” Stich v. Rehnquist, et al., 982 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir. 1992), courts may sua sponte transfer cases for forum non conveniens under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

where “the interests of justice would be best served by doing so.” Kelly v. Kelly, 911 F.Supp. 70, 71 & n.3 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Lead Indus. Ass’n v. Occup. S. & H. Admin., 610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that the “broad language of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) would seem to permit a court to order transfer sua sponte”); 5B Federal Prac. & Proc.3d § 1352 (“The broad language of the transfer statute seems to suggest that the district court may order transfer on its own motion.”).) As an initial matter, neither of the Defendants are residents of New York, and accordingly the Southern District of New York is not the proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that Defendants are residents of Tennessee – i.e., Jesse Trew resides in Franklin, Tennessee whereas Glen Trew lives in Nashville, Tennessee. (Compl. at 2.) Subsequent filings indicate that Plaintiff is uncertain as to the residency of Defendant Jesse Trew as he avers that “Defendant [Jesse Trew] has made at least three and possibly four moves of residence. He started in the STATE OF MISSISSIPPI and moved to STATE OF TENNESSEE (wherein he has previous residence) and moved to STATE OF COLORADO” and that he also

“may be in the country of India.” (ECF No.

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Related

Ferens v. John Deere Co.
494 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Rita J. Minnette v. Time Warner
997 F.2d 1023 (Second Circuit, 1993)
Kelly v. Kelly
911 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. New York, 1996)

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