IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION TIMOTHY WAYNE TARVER, ) ) APPELLANT, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-0119-JB-B ) SUSAN DAVIS, ) ) APPELLEE. )
ORDER This ac)on is before the Court on appeal from the decision of United States Bankruptcy Judge Jerry C. Oldshue entered April 2, 2024, Appellant, Timothy Wayne Tarver’s (“Tarver”) Brief (Doc. 5)1, Appellee, Susan Davis’ (“Davis”) Brief (Doc. 6), and Tarver’s Reply Brief (Doc. 11). APer considera)on of the record and the relevant filings, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision is AFFIRMED. I. Background2 The Debtor, Timothy Wayne Tarver (“Tarver”) filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy on September 21, 2020. (Doc. 3). His Pe))on listed four creditors: one secured by a mortgage, two secured by vehicles, and his ex-wife, Susan Davis (“Davis”), formerly known as Susan Tarver. Tarver is an above median income debtor. (Id.) Tarver’s regular monthly income from several sources includes: $12,796.25 in gross wages from employment, $1,300.00 in rental income, $3,389.00 in VA disability, and $1,700.00 in other re)rement. (Id.)
1 Tarver filed a “Corrected” brief on August 22, 2024 (Doc. 11). Although the Court has considered the corrected brief, it will refer to Tarver’s brief as Doc. 5, so as not to disrupt the sequenGal order of the filings. 2 The factual background recites the Procedural Background and Findings of Fact from the Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum Opinions of February 13, 2023 (Doc. 3 at PageID.292-308) and April 2, 2024 (Doc. 3 at PageID.399- 440), with only non-substanGve alteraGons and without internal citaGons. Tarver was married to Davis for more than ten years. (Id.). The two were divorced on June 11, 2012, by Final Decree of Divorce (“Divorce Decree”) entered by the Circuit Court of Elmore County, Alabama (“Domes)c Court”). (Id.) The Divorce Decree incorporated a Marital Sealement
Agreement (“Agreement”) executed by both Tarver and Davis on May 11, 2012. (Id.) The Agreement reflects that Tarver and Davis each had independent counsel and affixed their signatures voluntarily in the presence of a notary public. (Id.). The Agreement provides in part for Davis to receive “ . . . 50% of [Tarver’s] Air Force re)rement and 50% of the disability monies. . .” (Id.). When Tarver failed to assign the VA benefits, the Domes)c Court ordered Tarver to pay half of “any amounts [he] received in lieu of disposable re)red pay . . .” (“Court Ordered
Payments”). (Id.). Tarver’s subsequent refusal to remit the Court Ordered Payments to Davis prompted an avalanche of li)ga)on, beginning with the first contempt proceeding filed by Davis in the Domes)c Court. (Id.). Although Tarver argued that the state court lacked jurisdic)on to divide his VA disability benefits under federal law, the Domes)c Court remained resolute in its holding that
Davis was en)tled to the Court Ordered Payments and entered a contempt order for his failure to comply. (Id.). Upon Tarver’s appeal, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the Domes)c Court’s Order and the Supreme Court of Alabama denied cer)orari.3 Tarver’s con)nued refusal to pay Davis the Court Ordered Payments led her to file a second pe))on for contempt. (Id.) In addi)on to making the same argument that he could not be required to remit his VA disability; Tarver also removed the contempt proceeding to federal court.
(Id.). APer the federal court remanded for lack of jurisdic)on, Tarver ins)tuted another federal
3 See Tarver v. Tarver, 194 So. 3d 1000 (Ala Ct. App. 2014) and Ex parte Tarver, 210 S. 3d 1101 (Ala. 2015). ac)on against Davis which was also dismissed for the same reason. (Id.). The Domes)c Court then held Tarver in contempt, entered a $27,853.00 judgment against him, and ordered him to make all future payments to Davis. (Id.). Tarver appealed the contempt judgment to the Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals. While that appeal was pending, Tarver’s bank account was garnished by the Circuit Court of Geneva County at Davis’ request. (Id.). Upon Tarver’s mo)on to stay the garnishment, the Domes)c Court entered an order allowing release of the garnished funds to Tarver once he posted a supersedeas bond. (Id.). APer the Alabama Court of Civil Appeal’s affirmance of the Domes)c Court and the Supreme Court of Alabama’s denial of cer)orari, the Domes)c Court ordered that Davis was en)tled to receive the supersedeas bond funds. (Id.).
Davis later filed a third contempt ac)on alleging that Tarver refused to abide by the Domes)c Court’s Orders and that by methods of trickery and deceit Tarver had taken the supersedeas bond funds from the courthouse. (Id.). The day before the ini)al selng on the third contempt pe))on, Tarver filed suit against the Domes)c Court Judge, the Honorable Sibley Reynolds. The Eleventh Circuit Opinion dismissing Tarver’s claims against Judge Reynolds stated
in part that “. . . to the extent, [Tarver] seeks to reli)gate the state court orders requiring him to pay half of his VA disability benefits to [Davis] he cannot do so in federal court. He has already appealed those orders in state court — twice. He cannot try again here.” Tarver v. Reynolds, 2019 WL 3889721, at 9 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 16, 2019), aff'd, 808 F. App'x 752 (11th Cir. 2020). APer 8½ years of li)ga)on, Tarver’s aaempts to renege on the Agreement and avoid the orders of the Domes)c Court had proven fu)le. Yet on September 1, 2020, Tarver ini)ated a new
ac)on by filing a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama seeking a declaratory judgment and injunc)ve relief (“Declaratory Judgment Ac)on”) to prevent Davis from making any claim to his disability benefits under the Divorce Decree. (Id.). Despite the filing of the Declaratory Judgment Ac)on, Tarver’s con)nued failure to comply with the orders of the Domes)c Court led to the issuance of a “Third Contempt Order” which states in part,
Mr. Tarver having received all the bond funds from the Clerk when requested to return the funds and he did not return the money sent to him in error. Mr. Tarver last paid funds to Mrs. Tarver in September 2018.
ORDERED 1. That Mr. Tarver has the ability to pay his agreed sealement, monthly and has failed. 2. That he is found to be in contempt and placed into custody, pending payment of the purger amount of $92,569.66. 3. Aaorneys fees of $7500.00 taxed to Mr. Tarver for the aaorney bringing this Contempt Ac)on.
(Id.). The Third Contempt Order was the impetus for Tarver’s filing of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy in which he listed Davis’ claim as his only unsecured debt. (Id.). Davis’ proof of claim is based on the Third Contempt Order aaached thereto. (Id.). The administra)on of the bankruptcy was delayed for a ruling on Tarver’s then pending Declaratory Judgment Ac)on. APer the District Court’s dismissal of Tarver’s Declaratory Judgment ac)on,4 the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on April 28, 2022, at which Tarver advised that the maaer was on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. (Id.). Tarver further represented to the Bankruptcy Court at that hearing that if his appeal was unsuccessful, he would not be seeking return of the funds paid into the court for payment of Davis’ Claim. Ul)mately, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and dismissed the Declaratory Judgment Ac)on. (Id.).5
4 See Tarver v. Tarver, 2021 WL 4443699 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2021). 5 See Tarver v. Tarver, 2022 WL 4372439 (11th Cir. 2022). Following the dismissal of Tarver’s Declaratory Judgement Ac)on, the Bankruptcy Court considered Tarver’s objec)on to Davis’ proof of claim (based on the third contempt Order) wherein Tarver argued that the Domes)c Court Orders are void and the award was a property
sealement. The Bankruptcy Court held that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine (“Rooker-Feldman”) prevents re-li)ga)ng, altering, or otherwise amending the orders of the Domes)c Court. (Id.). The February 13, 2023 Memorandum Order and Opinion explained that: (1) Rooker-Feldman prevents lower federal courts from re-adjudica)ng maaers that were previously li)gated by the same par)es in state court as such review may be had only by the state appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court; (2) the crux of the pending disputes between the par)es had
already been extensively li)gated in both state and federal courts; (3) the United States District Court and the Eleventh Circuit had already held that Tarver’s argument (that the state court’s ruling violates federal law) falls within the narrow purview of Rooker-Feldman and prohibits his collateral aaack of the Divorce Decree; and (4) Rooker-Feldman applies in bankruptcy proceedings. (Id.) (ci)ng Tarver v. Tarver, 2022 WL 4372439 (11th Cir. 2022); Tarver v. Reynolds,
2019 WL 3889721 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 16, 2019), aff'd, 808 F. App'x 752 (11th Cir. 2020)); see also, In re Wilson, 116 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1997)(“[T]he Bankruptcy Code was not intended to give li)gants a second chance to challenge a state court judgment nor did it intend for the Bankruptcy Court to serve as an appellate court [for state court proceedings]”); In re Cass, 2019 WL 7667445 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2019)(no)ng that only the U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdic)on over judgments of state courts in civil cases); In re Al-Sedah, 347 B.R. 901, 904 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2005)(“The Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine is applicable in bankruptcy proceedings.”). As Rooker-Feldman precluded Tarver’s aaempt to aaack the validity of the underlying Domes)c Court Order, the Bankruptcy Court found that Davis’ claim cons)tuted prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the debt because it was )mely filed, properly executed, and substan)ated by the Domes)c Court Order. However, Davis’ Claim was not afforded priority
treatment because the Domes)c Court Order did not indicate whether the award was “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.” (Doc. 3.) Accordingly, Tarver’s Objec)on was sustained in part, allowing Davis’ claim to be treated as a general unsecured. (Id.). However, considering the extensive pre-pe))on li)ga)on between the par)es and the state court exper)se and familiarity with the Domes)c Court proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court determined that if Davis sought to pursue priority treatment, clarifica)on of the Third Contempt Order would be
more appropriate and more efficiently handled in the Domes)c Court. (Id.). On February 27, 2023, Tarver sought reconsidera)on of the Bankruptcy Court’s allowance of Davis’ claim as a general unsecured claim, again contending that the underlying award from the Domes)c Court was unenforceable. (Id.). The Bankruptcy Court denied Tarver’s request no)ng that sufficient cause did not exist to amend its ruling because the same arguments were
previously raised and Rooker-Feldman prohibits re-li)ga)on of the state court judgment. (Id.). ThereaPer, Tarver’s Chapter 13 plan was confirmed which required payments of $2,248.00 per month with a 100% dividend to unsecured creditors. (Id.). Davis then filed a Mo)on to Reclassify her claim under §507(a)(1)(A) based on an Order she obtained from the Circuit Court of Elmore County on or about November 15, 2023. (Id.). Said Order states that the amount awarded to Davis under the Sealement Agreement, “shall be considered as a domes)c support obliga)on in
the nature of post-marital support.” (Id.). Tarver objected to priority treatment of Davis’ claim again arguing that an award of veteran’s disability is exempt. (Id.). On April 2, 2024, the Bankruptcy Court issued a Memorandum and Order which stated, in relevant part:
This Court already held that Rooker-Feldman precludes re-li)ga)on of Tarver’s contest to the validity of the Domes)c Court Order underpinning Davis’s Claim. (Doc. 138). Tarver’s Response to Davis’s Mo)on as well as his numerous prior contests of the state court orders rely on the same essen)al claim, that the state court violated controlling federal law and acted without jurisdic)on by enforcing the nego)ated division of his VA disability benefits at divorce. This Court understands that is Tarver’s argument. However, there is no excep)on to Rooker-Feldman for situa)ons where a state court misapplies controlling federal law. See Wood v. Orange Cnty., 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983)(“the federal district court's jurisdic)on does not trench on the exclusive authority of the Supreme Court to review state court decisions for errors of federal law.”)
It is not appropriate for Tarver to aaempt to again raise the same arguments that he has already lost mul)ple )mes in this and other courts. This Court has already determined that Rooker-Feldman precludes re-li)ga)on of the pre-pe))on Domes)c Court Award here. The February 13, 2023 Memorandum Order did not invite Tarver to again contest the validity of the state court orders; it simply allowed Davis to seek clarifica)on of whether the monetary award in the Third Contempt Order was, “. . . in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.” (Doc. 138). As Davis has now obtained an order from the Domes)c Court indica)ng the obliga)on “shall be considered as a domes)c support obliga)on in the nature of post-marital support” this Court finds consistent therewith that such claim is en)tled to priority treatment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(1)(A).
To the extent that Tarver argues that he should not be required to pay the domes)c award from his VA disability, the record reflects that he has gross income of $12,796.25, receives VA disability of $3389.00, has net income of $7224.40, and his current Chapter 13 plan payment is $2248.00. Thus, Tarver’s Chapter 13 plan payment may be made from the source of his choosing. He has more than sufficient income to pay his Chapter 13 plan payment even if his VA disability was carved out as exempt; therefore, that is a non-issue.
(Id.). This appeal followed. II. Appellate jurisdicPon, venue, and standard of review This Court has appellate jurisdic)on to hear final orders of the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (“The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdic)on to hear
appeals [ ] from final judgments, orders, and decrees[.]”). Venue is proper because the appeal “shall be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving.” Id. A bankruptcy court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. In re Colortex Industries, Inc., 19 F.3d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The district court makes no independent factual findings; accordingly, we review solely the bankruptcy court's factual determina)ons under the
“clearly erroneous” standard.”); In re Daughtrey, 896 F.3d 1255, 1273 (11th Cir. 2018)(“A factual finding is not clearly erroneous unless, aPer reviewing all of the evidence, we are leP with ‘a definite and firm convic)on that a mistake has been commiaed.’”)(cita)ons omiaed). A bankruptcy court's legal conclusions and any mixed ques)ons of law and fact are reviewed de novo. In re Am.-CV StaDon Grp., Inc., 56 F.4th 1302, 1309 (11th Cir. 2023). “The district court must
independently examine the law and draw its own conclusions aPer applying the law to the facts, and then may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge's judgment, order, or decree or remand with instruc)ons for further proceedings.” McKinney v. Russell, 567 B.R. 384, 386 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (cita)on omiaed). III. Analysis On appeal, Tarver raises four grounds on which the Bankruptcy Court erred. The Court
will consider each argument in turn. A. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in overriding 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).
Tarver’s first assignment of error is that the Bankruptcy Court failed to make an independent determina)on of Davis’ claim under 11 U.S.G. § 502(b)(1) pursuant to the provisions of 38 U.S.C. §5301(a)(1). (Doc. 5). According to Tarver, “[w]hen the state court confirmed that VA disability was to be paid to Davis, this maaer became an en)rely federal issue […]”. (Doc. 5). In short, Tarver argues the Bankruptcy Court should have considered the legality of the underlying domes)c payments pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5308 and disallowed Davis’ claim. (Id.). Instead,
Tarver posits that the Bankruptcy Court misapplied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 9). In contrast, Davis contends that the Bankruptcy Court properly applied the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, before considering the merits of Davis’ claim, and properly permiaed clarifica)on from the Domes)c Court in order to establish whether Davis’ claim should be given priority status. (Doc. 6). Under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) a claim asserted in a proof of claim is allowed except to the
extent that “such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law […]”. As quoted above, the Bankruptcy Court determined that Tarver’s objec)on to the reclassifica)on of Davis’ claim was yet another aaempt by Tarver contest to the validity of the Domes)c Court Order underpinning Davis’ Claim. Because the Bankruptcy Court had already determined that Tarver’s arguments were barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, it declined to entertain Tarver’s argument again for the purpose of reaching an
alterna)ve conclusion. In so doing, it noted “there is no excep)on to Rooker-Feldman for situa)ons where a state court misapplies controlling federal law.” (Doc. 3) (ci)ng Wood v. Orange Cnty., 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983)(“the federal district court's jurisdic)on does not trench on the exclusive authority of the Supreme Court to review state court decisions for errors of federal law.”)). The Bankruptcy Court’s ac)ons were not erroneous. First, the record reflects that Davis’
claim was based on the third contempt order, which cons)tuted prima facia evidence of the validity and amount of the debt and the claim was )mely filed, properly executed, and substan)ated. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court issued a lawful order allowing Davis’ claim and properly exercised its authority to grant leave for clarifica)on from the Domes)c Court. Importantly, the Bankruptcy’s Court permilng Davis to seek clarifica)on or Davis’ submission of the Domes)c Court’s clarifica)on order to the Bankruptcy Court did not open the door for Tarver
to again contest the enforceability of the underlying Domes)c Court Order. Rather, Tarver had already made his unenforceability arguments, the Court had previously determined those arguments were foreclosed by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, and the clarifica)on order did not erase the slate on the Bankruptcy proceeding. Further, even if the clarifica)on order somehow opened the door to consider Tarver’s arguments anew, the same would s)ll be barred by the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. In sum, Rooker-Feldman prevents the Bankruptcy Court from considering Tarver’s arguments that the Domes)c Court Order is invalid and unenforceable. Based on the relevant facts here, Rooker-Feldman applies.6 As a result, the Bankruptcy Court’s determina)on that Davis’ claim be paid, was not legal error. Second, even if the determina)on
6 To be clear, Tarver’s appeal focuses on whether the Bankruptcy Court impermissibly allowed Davis’ claim after the clarification order was filed because the order, in contrast to the Third Contempt Order, specifically detailed that Davis was to received Tarver’s VA disability funds. Nevertheless, this Court has considered the facts in total and finds that the initial determination that Rooker-Feldman applied (at the time Tarver objected to Davis’ claim) and the subsequent determination that Rooker-Feldman applied (after the clarification order was submitted and Tarver again opposed priority status) is correct. Although Tarver continues to frame his position otherwise, it is clear that the only reason he filed bankruptcy was to potentially circumvent the enforceability of the Domestic Court Order which has already been upheld upon review. was in error, which it was not, such an error would not be clear given the lengthy record leading up to the Order now being appealed. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court’s determina)on that Rooker-Feldman applied is supported by the fact that the same conclusion was previously reached
in other District Courts and affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit. As a result, even if an error was made, the significant history of li)ga)on addressing the very issue ul)mately considered by the Bankruptcy Court supports the determina)on made. B. Whether the Bankruptcy Court exceeded its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
According to Tarver, the Bankruptcy Court “exceeded the limits of its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and commiaed clear legal error when it sua sponte ruled that Davis’ claim is to be equitably paid”. (Doc. 5). Tarver’s posi)on relies on his posi)on that the underlying Domes)c Court Order was unenforceable under 38 U.S.C. §5301(a)(1) and, therefore, the Bankruptcy Court lacked the power to permit Davis’ claim. In response, Davis again argues the Bankruptcy Court correctly applied Rooker-Feldman and properly granted leave to seek clarifica)on rela)ng to the priority status of Davis’ claim. (Doc. 6). Federal statute 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) gives the Bankruptcy Court the power to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this )tle. [. . . including the power to] sua sponte, tak[e] any ac)on or mak[e] any determina)on
necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.” 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Tarver’s second assignment of error fails for the same reasons as hist first. More specifically, Tarver’s posi)on relies on his belief that the Bankruptcy Court should have considered the enforceability of Davis’ claim based on the clarifica)on order. But, again, there is no support for Tarver’s posi)on that the clarifica)on order opened the door for Tarver to reassert his previous objec)ons to Davis’ claim. Second, the Bankruptcy Court’s applica)on of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine was not in error, for the reasons discussed above. As a result, Tarver’s second ground
for appeal lacks merit. C. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred by ruling against Appellant’s judicial estoppel arguments.
Tarver’s third ground of appeal is that the Bankruptcy Court erred in not finding that Davis was judicially estopped from asser)ng that the Domes)c Court obliga)on was a domes)c support obliga)on (“DSO”) in order to receive priority treatment. (Doc. 5). To that end, Tarver contends that the divorce decree clearly treated the payment of benefits as a property sealement, a posi)on that Davis agreed with up un)l the moment she sought priority status for her claim. As such, Tarver argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in permilng Davis to take the posi)on that the payment of benefits was a DSO. Conversely, Davis contends that the Bankruptcy Court’s deferral of the classifica)on issue to the Domes)c Court was not clear error. (Doc. 6) “State courts have concurrent jurisdic)on with the bankruptcy courts to determine whether an obliga)on is in the nature of support for the purposes of § 523(a)(5).” Cummings v. Cummings, 244 F.3d 1263, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) (cita)ons omiaed). “We previously have noted that ‘[i]t is appropriate for bankruptcy courts to avoid incursions into family law maaers out of
considera)on of court economy, judicial restraint, and deference to our state court brethren and their established exper)se in such maaers.’” Id. (11th Cir. 1992)(quo)ng Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573, 1579). As a result, a Bankruptcy Court may chose to await clarifica)on from a Domes)c Court as to the nature of the support. See Id. Here, Tarver contends that the Bankruptcy Court “had all the facts and documentary evidence [. . .] “to conclude that the VA disability was not a DSO.” (Doc. 5). He also acknowledges that the Bankruptcy Court had the discre)on to consider judicial estoppel on its own. (Id.).
Tarver’s posi)on is misplaced because while he may disagree with the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to defer, he makes no compelling argument that the court’s ac)on was legal error. Here, the record reflects a disagreement between Tarver and Davis as to the nature of the payment obliga)on and a lack of indica)on as to the nature of the obliga)on per the third contempt order. Given that the totality of the record created a ques)on as to the nature of the obliga)on, it was not improper for the Bankruptcy Court to conclude that Davis was not judicially estopped from
asser)ng the obliga)on was in the nature of a domes)c support obliga)on. Moreover, no error occurred when the Bankruptcy Court decided to await clarifica)on from the Domes)c Court as to the nature of the claim. As a result, Tarver’s third ground for appeal is not persuasive. D. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine and collateral estoppel.
Tarver’s final argument is that the Bankruptcy Court erred in applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 5). More specifically, Tarver argues that it is the role of the Bankruptcy Court to “determine the allowance and enforceability of Davis’ claim” and therefore, it should have determined the claim was for VA disability which is exempt. (Doc. 5 at 65). Tarver argues he “did not call upon the Bankruptcy Court to review or vacate any state court order. His objec)on was that Davis’ claim is disallowed in the Bankruptcy Court under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) because, at its core, her claim is specifically for VA disability which is exempt from ‘claim of creditors’ and her claim is unenforceable under 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1).” (Doc. 5). Despite Tarver’s classifica)on otherwise, the state court determined that the Domes)c Court order was enforceable and Tarver’s objec)on to Davis’ claim sought a determina)on by the Bankruptcy Court that the claim should be disallowed because the Domes)c Court order was not enforceable. The Bankruptcy Court did not err in finding Rooker-Feldman applied.7 As a result, regardless of how oPen Tarver
describes his ac)ons as not seeking review or vaca)on of the Domes)c Court Order, a second (or sixth) round of review is exactly what he sought. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court correctly determined Rooker-Feldman barred his effort to reli)gate the enforceability of the underlying Domes)c Court Order. Tarver similarly argues that collateral estoppel does not apply because “the issue before the state court was not ‘iden)cal’ to the issue before the Bankruptcy Court because the state
court did not adjudicate whether Davis’ claims was allowable or unenforceable under 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a).” (Doc. 9). As with Tarver’s previous arguments, he asserts that the clarifica)on order was a significant change which triggered the Bankruptcy Court’s authority to consider the enforceability of the underlying Domes)c Court Order. This Court disagrees. Again, the clarifica)on order did not reopen Pandora’s box. The Bankruptcy Court properly considered
Davis’ claim, did not err in its determina)ons, and the clarifica)on order was limited to one issue. Although Tarver has spent over a decade aaemp)ng to have the Domes)c Court Order deemed unenforceable by mul)ple courts, the state court adjudicated the enforceability and the
7 The Court understands Tarver’s posi)on that the Eleventh Circuit in Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 2021), rejected the use of the “inextricably intertwined” standard and his argument that the allowance or disallowance of claims was never decided in state court. However, contrary to Tarver’s posi)on, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine prohibited Tarver’s collateral aaack of the divorce decree, and the post-Behr analysis does not change the outcome for Tarver on the instant facts. See Tarver v. Tarver, 2022 WL 4372439 (11th Cir. 2022) and Tarver v. Reynolds, 2019 WL 3889721 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 16, 2019), aff’d, 808 F. App’x 752 (11th Cir. 2020). Bankruptcy Court’s determina)on that Tarver was estopped from raising the same argument in Bankruptcy Court was not in error. IV. Conclusion
APer considera)on of the record and the relevant filings, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision is AFFIRMED. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of March 2025. /s/ JEFFREY U. BEAVERSTOCK CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE