Tarris Woods v. Sandra T. Kenner and Charles E. Twymon, Jr.

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Tarris Woods v. Sandra T. Kenner and Charles E. Twymon, Jr.. Read the opinion of the Court — 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 8411
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided August 13, 2015·No. 01-14-01030-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 01-14-01030-CV FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 8/13/2015 7:39:19 AM CHRISTOPHER PRINE CLERK

NO. 01-14-01030-CV

IN THE FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS AT HOUSTON, TEXAS 8/13/2015 7:39:19 AM ______________________________________ CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk TARRIS WOODS -Appellant-

VERSUS

SANDRA T. KENNER AND CHARLES E. TWYMON, JR. -Appellee- ______________________________________ On Appeal from the Probate Court of Galveston County Trial Court Case No. PR-0075144 Hon. Kimberly Sullivan, Presiding _____________________________________________

APPELLANT'S RESPONSE TO APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR DAMAGES

Douglas T. Godinich Attorney at Law SBN: 24007244 2727 Broadway Galveston, Texas 77550 (409) 763-2454 (telephone) (409) 736-4309 (facsimile) Attorney for Appellant Tarris Woods

1 TO THE HONORABE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT:

Appellant Tarris Woods asks the Court to deny

appellee’s motion for damages.

A.INTRODUCTION

1. Appellant is Tarris Woods; Appellee is Sandra

Kenner.

B. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES

2. Although the Court has the authority under Texas

Rule of Appellate Procedure 45 to impose damages

against a party for filing a frivolous appeal, this is

not a case in which the Court should do so.

3. An appealing party cannot be sanctioned for filing

a frivolous appeal unless the party had no reasonable

belief that the judgment could be reversed. Damages are

appropriate only in “truly egregious” circumstances.

City of Houston v. Precast Structures Inc., 60 S.W.3d

331, 340 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.

denied).

4. The motion for damages should be denied because

appellant:

2 4(a). Appellant filed his objections to the findings

of facts and conclusion of law with the trial court on

December 18, 2014. (CR: 64-67)The challenged issues

under this case number is outlined in number six (6)

which states:

“Charles E. Twymon Jr., was appointed as a co- independent administrator… [C]harles E. Twymon, Jr., received consideration from the movant for the sale of the property as a court appointed administrator and the sale was approved by this court.”

4(b). Appellant filed his objections to the findings

of facts with the trial court on December 18, 2014 under

case number 01-14-01029-CV (CR: 97-100). The challenged

issues in that case is outlined in number four (4) which

states:

“The proposed findings of fact submitted by Mr. McQuage fails in part based on the fact that the findings makes little or no mention about the heirship proceedings or basis for vacating the Appointment of Administrators”

Appellee cites the case of Heard v. City of Dallas,

456 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), writ refused

N.R.E. (Oct. 7, 1970) which states: ‘Rule 298

contemplates that the request for further additional or

amended findings shall specify the further additional 3 or amended findings that the party making the request

desires the trial court to make and file.’

Appellant therefore complied by specifying the

additional or amended findings as outlined above.

4(c). Appellee next makes the argument that

Appellant moved this court to enjoin the continuation

of Appellee’s Sandra Kenner’s lawsuit to recover

damages arising from the Appellant for withholding

possession of their jointly owned property and “offered

nothing to invoke this Court’s power to preserve its

appellate jurisdiction…”

4 (d). The Order Probating Last Will and Testament as

a Muniment of Title (CR:38-39) states that

“On this day came on to be heard the Application filed herein by Charles E. Twymon, Jr., and Sandra T. Kenner…” 4 (e). In Appellee’s brief Mr. McQuage makes the

following statement:

“Mr. Twymon, Jr., prosecuted his rights in this

4 proceeding through an attorney of record1” The above statement can be shown either to mislead this

Court by Appellees counsel or an attorney of record in

this case is not being candor to this tribunal as

further outlined below.

4(f). In the hearing held on July 27, 2015 in the

County Court at Law Number Three (3) under cause number

CV-74132 of Galveston County Texas, appellee’s counsel,

Mr. McQuage makes the following statement to yet

another tribunal:

“We have two homestead claimants to this property”. (See: Appendix “1” pg. 15; 5-6)

If we look at the Order Probating Last Will and

Testament as a Muniment of Title (CR: 38-39) we have

two applicants Charles E. Twymon, Jr., and Sandra T.

Kenner so what happened to Charles E. Twymon, Jr., as

a party to the above case?

Maybe the statement made by appellee’s counsel as

outlined below would explain Charles E. Twymon, Jr.,

1 Appellant request that this Court take judicial notice of Appellee’s Original Brief filed on July 15, 2015, which is hereby incorporated herein as Exhibit “2” as if fully stated herein. 5 rights and how they will be effected.

“That’s a totally different deal. That’s not a conveyance through the administration or anything like that. That’s just the two Twymon brothers giving deed to their interest to Mr. Woods.” (See: Appendix “1” pg. 22; line 9-13) 4(g). On June 15, 2015, Appellant filed his Motion

for Temporary Order Staying Enforcement of the Judgment

which cited Tex.R.App.P 24 which functions to preserve

the status quo of the matters in litigation as they

existed prior to the issuance of the order or judgment

from which an appeal is taken. Citing: Alpert v. Riley,

274 S.W.3d 277, 297 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008,

pet. denied).

4(h). Appellant attached seven (7) exhibits to the

above motion. Exhibit one (1) is a certified copy of

the warranty deed that was filed with the Galveston

County Clerk’s office on September 25, 2012 which

granted, sold and conveyed all of the property to the

Appellant.

4 (i). Appellee’s counsel, Mr. McQuage makes a

judicial admission “[T]hat’s just the two Twymon

6 brothers giving deed to their interest to Mr. Woods.”

(See: Appendix “1” pg. 22; line 11-13)

4(j). The next issue that is raised by the Appellee

is based on the allegation that Appellant refused to

submit the complete record of the proceeding on the

supersedeas bond.

4(k). Appellee filed her response to the Motion for

Review of Excessive Supersedeas Bond on June 16, 2015,

raising the objection that a full copy of the transcript

was not attached.

4(l). Appellant filed his Counter-Response on June

17, 2015 and attached the full version of the transcript

to comply with appellee’s objection and which the

Honorable Justice Jennings, acting individually, ruled

on July 9, 2015.

4 (m). Appellee’s counsel has failed to make any

determination of representation of Charles Twymon, Jr.,

because in the Application for Probate of Copy of Will

as Muniment of Title, Charles Twymon, Jr., was a named

executor (CR: 3) Charles Twymon, Jr., is the only person 7 best situated to resolve the ambiguity regarding the

current representation of Charles Twymon, Jr., as an

individual and Charles Twymon, Jr., as co/independent

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Related

Alpert v. Riley
274 S.W.3d 277 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2009)
Smith v. Brown
51 S.W.3d 376 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2001)
City of Houston v. Precast Structures, Inc.
60 S.W.3d 331 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2001)
Heard v. City of Dallas
456 S.W.2d 440 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1970)