Tarrant v. Clear Creek Independent School District

238 S.W.3d 445, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5494, 2007 WL 2005106
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 12, 2007
Docket01-06-00653-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 238 S.W.3d 445 (Tarrant v. Clear Creek Independent School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tarrant v. Clear Creek Independent School District, 238 S.W.3d 445, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5494, 2007 WL 2005106 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

OPINION

SAM NUCHIA, Justice.

Appellant, Judith Tarrant, a retired school teacher, appeals the summary judgment rendered in the trial court in favor of appellees Clear Creek Independent School District (CCISD) and Shirley J. Neeley, Ed.D., in her official capacity as Commissioner of Education (the Commissioner). Appellant brings one issue in which she complains that the Commissioner’s decision to deny appellant’s appeal of CCISD’s nonrenewal 1 of her one-year contract was arbitrary and capricious and contains erroneous conclusions of law and must, therefore, be reversed. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2003, appellant, resigned from CCISD. She then retired that same year from Sweeney Independent School District after one day’s work. She was rehired by CCISD for the 2004-2005 school year under a special provision permitting retirees who are certified in an “acute shortage area” to return to work without forfeiting their pensions or retirement benefits. Appellant’s contract with CCISD was for a one-year term. In March 2005, appellant was notified by letter that the superintendent of CCISD would recommend to the Board of Trustees (the Board) that her contract not be renewed. Approximately three weeks later, appellant received notice informing her that the Board had adopted the superintendent’s recommendation and that the reasons the contract was not renewed included the following: 2

32. Failure of a retired/rehired employee to meet the criteria for continued employment as set forth at DC(LOCAL).
Specifically, Board Policy DC(LOCAL) requires that the contracts of persons hired under the retire/rehire policy *447 “shall be limited to one year.” You were hired in an “acute teacher shortage area” under this policy in August 2004. At the end of each year, these positions are vacated, and under the terms of your contract, the contract expires each year. Of course, you may reapply subject to the requirements stated in Board Policy DC(LOCAL).

The letter also informed appellant that she could request a hearing before the Board. Appellant requested a hearing, and, at the close of the hearing, the Board voted not to renew appellant’s contract. Appellant appealed the Board’s decision to the Commissioner, who made findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied the appeal. Appellant filed suit in the district court for judicial review of the Commissioner’s ruling. See Tex. Edug.Code Ann. § 21.307 (Vernon 2006). The district court rendered summary judgment in favor of CCISD and the Commissioner, and appellant then filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION

In support of her contention that the Commissioner’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and contained erroneous conclusions of law, appellant advances three arguments. She first contends that the school district was not authorized to issue a teaching contract that expired after one year and could not be renewed. Second, she argues that the Government Code does not require that positions held by teachers under the “acute shortage area exception” be vacated in order to hire non-retirees. Third, she asserts that the Education Code permits a school district to nonrenew a teacher’s contract only for a pre-established reason and that participation in the “acute shortage area exception” was not a pre-established reason.

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s judgment 'affirming or denying the Commissioner of Education’s decision by a substantial-evidence standard, as follows:

We must determine whether the evidence as a whole is such that reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the agency in the disputed action. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency and may only consider the record on which the agency based its decision. The true test is not whether the agency reached the correct conclusion, but whether some reasonable basis exists in the record for the action taken by the agency. The findings, inferences, conclusions, and decisions of an administrative agency are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence, and the burden is on the contestant to prove otherwise.

Tijerina v. Alanis, 80 S.W.3d 292, 295 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied) (citations omitted). We must uphold an agency finding-even if the evidence actually preponderates against that finding — as long as the evidence suggests that the agency’s determination was within the bounds of reasonableness. Sw. Pub. Serv. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 962 S.W.2d 207, 215 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied). An agency decision that is not supported by substantial evidence is deemed arbitrary and capricious. Weslaco Fed’n of Teachers v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 27 S.W.3d 258, 266 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (citing Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 809 S.W.2d 201, 211 (Tex.1991)). We give great weight to the construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged to enforce the statute as long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute. Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 153 S.W.3d 174, 187 (Tex.App. *448 Austin 2004, pet. denied). We may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision unless it is not supported by substantial evidence or unless the Commissioner’s conclusions of law are erroneous. Tex. Edug.Code Ann. § 21.307(f) (Vernon 2006).

B. The Commissioner’s Decision

Appellant contends that there are no factual disputes in this case and does not challenge the Commissioner’s findings of fact. Rather, appellant challenges the Commissioner’s interpretation of relevant statutes and her conclusions of law. In the discussion of the case, the Commissioner’s decision contains the following statement:

As required by section 824.603 3 of the Government Code, Respondent adopted Policy DC(LOCAL) which sets forth the procedures for hiring retirees, including the requirement of certification in an acute shortage area for the school year in which the retiree will be teaching. While allowing retirees to work for the school district without losing retirement payments, the policy requires that preference be given to certified applicants who are not retirees. A retiree who is hired under this policy is limited to a one-year term contract.

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238 S.W.3d 445, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 5494, 2007 WL 2005106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tarrant-v-clear-creek-independent-school-district-texapp-2007.